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As the first systematic and in-depth study in any language on the subject, this thesis 
makes original contributions by unravelling the relationship between Chinese 
healthcare state governance, health law and medical practitioners, and casting a 
spotlight on the ethically problematic medical practices raised by cases of SARS and 
others. More specifically, this thesis examines the role of state governance and 
regulation in China’s healthcare system and their impact on professional practices and 
ethics. The thesis addresses the issues from a social-legal perspective. It provides 
evidence from an integration of historical, empirical and theoretical approaches to 
explore the role of Chinese medics in their relations with healthcare state governance 
and law. It explores the character of power relations and the consequences of 
imbalance of power in these relations. Diagrammatic models are used throughout this 
work to illustrate the findings from the above approaches and to represent the 
changing nature of the author’s thinking about the dynamics at work in the 
relationships under scrutiny.  
 
The basic principle advocated in this thesis is that the effective formation and delivery 
of healthcare is facilitated by ethically-based systems of policy, rules and regulation. 
More particularly, it is argued that the roles of medical professionalism and patient 
control are central to good governance of healthcare in China. Set within this context, 
the thesis has three main goals. First, it aims to contribute to the development of 
theories about the relationship between the medical profession and the Communist 
state of China, examining the relatively powerless position of medical professionals in 
China as demonstrated by both historical and original empirical evidence generated by 
the research undertaken for this thesis. Secondly, the thesis examines the nature and 
extent of de-professionalisation among Chinese medical professionals. More 
particularly, it considers the consequences of challenges to Chinese medics’ 
professional autonomy which have occurred as a result of the Chinese healthcare 
power structure. Ultimately, it is argued that a re-structured model which places 
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CHAPTER 1    INTRODUCTION 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
In recent years, health provision has become a central social concern in China. A 
combination of underpaid local healthcare professionals, a government unable to 
uphold its healthcare obligation to the public, 1  profit-chasing motivations among 
healthcare institutions, 2 and increasing numbers of medics taking kickbacks from 
pharmaceutical companies have all seriously damaged public trust in China’s 
healthcare system and its service provision.3 Corruption has eroded public confidence 
in China’s medical community; whenever malpractice happens, patients tend to use 
extreme methods, such as attacks on healthcare practitioners and hospitals, to express 
their anger.4 It is commented by scholars that “the system was almost made to be 
abused.”5 In 2001, the Chinese government declared that its healthcare system was in 
crisis, and the ministries responsible for healthcare have been tasked with making 
major reforms to the entire system.6  
 
Besides a failed health system, the cover-up by Chinese officials of the SARS crisis in 
2003 also put China’s medical community under the spotlight. At that time, hundreds 
of thousands of Chinese medical practitioners knew that government officials were 
                                                 
1 A. Browne, ‘In China, Doctors tell Patients to Pay Upfront’, (Dec 7th, 2005) the Wall Street Journal. 
2 Q. Meng, ‘New Directions in China’s Health Sector Reform’, 9 (2009) China Brief 5; WHO report, 
China, Health, Poverty and Economic Development (Office of WHO representative in China, Beijing, 
2005); M. Wang, WTO, Globalization and China’s Health Care System (Palgrave, New York, 2006). 
3 S. Finder, ‘Insider Analysis: Pharmaceutical Outsourcing to China – Some Legal Issues’, (2007) FDC 
Reports; J. Tao (ed) China: Bioethics, Trust, and the Challenge of the Market (Hong Kong, Springer, 
2008); P. Zheng, et al., ‘Public Hospitals in China: Privatization, the Demise of Universal Health Care 
and the Rise of Patient-Doctor Violence’, 4 (2006) Journal of Law & Medicine 465-70; Y, Yang, 
‘Netizen Accuses Zhejing Doctors in New Kickback Scandal’, (Feb 28th, 2011) China Daily.  
4 See e.g., ‘Worsening Patient-Doctor Relationship: Different Opinions from Media, Patients and 
Medical Professionals’ (in Chinese), (Aug 29th, 2006) Yunnan Information Daily; ‘Doctor/ Patient 
Conflicts Become More Common’ (in Chinese), (Aug 8th, 2001) China Daily; and ‘Patient-Doctor 
Disputes: Wearing Helmets to Work’ (in Chinese), (Jan 10th, 2007) Asian Times.  
5 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Research Report: Healthcare in China into the 21st Century 
(London, EIU, 1998), 123. 
6 The International Trade Administration, Health Industries Report: Medical Device Reimbursement in 
China, US Department of Commerce. 
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risking lives by denying the scope of the SARS epidemics.7 (In this thesis, the term 
“medical/healthcare practitioners”, “medical/healthcare professionals”, or “medics” 
refers generally to a group of healthcare providers, including doctors, nurses, hospital 
pharmacists and allied qualified health personnel.) In effect, medical practitioners in 
China were asked to, and did, participate in the SARS cover-up in order to avoid 
social panic and maintain the stability of Chinese society and its economic 
environment.8 When recalling that history, one of the physicians admitted, that when 
WHO inspectors visited his hospital, they were instructed by local officers to remove 
dozens of SARS patients from their isolation wards and transfer them to locations 
where they could not be observed by the inspectors.9 Physicians even had to change 
SARS patients’ medical records to hide the truth.10  
 
Chinese medical practitioners – who appeared to put state interests above medical 
ethics – could be said to come within the provision of the 1998 PRC Medical 
Practitioners Act which states, “In the event of a natural disaster, the spreading of an 
infectious disease, an unexpected heavy casualty or other emergencies seriously 
threatening the people's lives and health, doctors should accept assignments by order 
of the administrative department of health under the people's government at or above 
the county level.” 11  Clearly, Chinese medical practitioners fulfilled their legal 
obligations by giving in to the demands of the state. However, their conduct broke the 
Hippocratic Oath - the guiding ethical code for Western physicians. The question is 
whether Chinese medical practitioners take or work according to the Hippocratic Oath 
or at least its spirit?  
 
Chinese medical practitioners do take an ethical oath when they become medical 
students. The Oath of a Medical Student, which has been adopted by most Chinese 
medical schools, was enacted by the Ministry of Education in 1991.12 However, the 
                                                 
7 See e.g., T. S. Jost, Readings in Comparative Health Law and Bioethics (Durham, Carolina Academic 
Press, 2007), 358; M. Forney, ‘Heal Thyself?’ (June 9th, 2003) Time Magazine; S. Jakes, ‘Beijing’s 
SARS Attack’, (April 8th, 2003) Time Magazine.  
8 Ibid. 
9 X. Wang, ‘Memory of SARS at Di Tan Hospital’ (in Chinese), (Dec 24th, 2003) People’s Daily; S. 
Jakes, ‘Beijing Hoodwinks WHO Inspectors’, (April 18th, 2003) Time Magazine. 
10Ibid. 
11 The 1998 PRC Medical Practitioners Act, Article 28.  
12 The Higher Education Office of the PRC Ministry of Education, ‘The Oath of A Medical Student’ (in 
Chinese), Document No. 106, File 4.  
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Chinese Oath is different from the Hippocratic Oath (whether the ancient or modern 
version).13 The Oath of a Medical Student emphasises loyalty, dedication and self-
development, without giving any specific reference to bioethics (more detailed 
discussions about the Oath appear in Part III).14  
 
All of the above discussion, including the SARS experience, reflects a need for 
clarification of medical ethics and its role for medical practitioners in China. It also 
suggests a need to review the way in which healthcare is practised and organised in 
China’s social and economic reform era. In this thesis, it is argued that there is a broad 
systemic weakness in and between China’s healthcare institutions, laws and state 
governance, that is – there is a missing role of responsible medical professionalism.  
 
As Lubman points out, “the current scene is marked by a partially marketized 
economy, a dilution of the control over society by the central Party-state, and 
expanded personal freedoms.… Reform has also generated a crisis of values: 
Communist ideology is hollow, while corruption and disorder are increasing.”15 The 
trends of marketisation and political decentralisation in China have affected not only 
the healthcare system and general welfare, but also the manner of medical practice 
and healthcare delivery. This thesis considers how Chinese medical practitioners 
respond to such challenges. It focuses on how Chinese medics talk about, explain, 
circumvent or even resist these threats.  
 
On the basis of the analysis presented in forthcoming chapters, it is argued that 
medical deprofessionalisation in China presents considerable challenges for medical 
ethics and patient care, necessitating careful and sympathetic adjustments. These 
arguments are underpinned by historical and empirical research in areas which have 
received little attention from academics. Indeed, perhaps because of the lack of 
attention given to the study of Chinese medical deprofessionalisation and to issues 
raised by a decline of medical ethics in China, this thesis and its conclusions have 
                                                 
13 E. A. Yolly and R. N. Gamutan, ‘The Hippocratic Oath’, available at: http://www.acim-
asia.com/The_Hippocratic_Oath.htm (Last visited on May 25th, 2010) 
14 Q. Liu and L. Xu, ‘The Oath of a Medical Student’, 29 (1999) Chinese Journal of Medical History 4.  
15 S. Lubman, Bird in the Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Berkley, Stanford University Press, 
1999), abstract; Y. Ji, China’s Enterprise Reform: Changing State/Society Relations after Mao 
(London, Routledge, 1998). 
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resonance across a range of contemporary debates relating to the question of health 
system reform,16 the dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship,17 and the impact of 
law or ethics on improving the quality of care in China.18  
 
2.   The Aims of this Thesis 
 
With regard to China’s healthcare problems, previous commentaries have placed 
emphasis on reforms of the healthcare system or healthcare legislation.19 Such an 
approach provides an important context for the present study, but in this thesis it is 
argued that attention to these factors alone could not solve the inner problem of de-
professionalisation. Focusing on medical practitioners, their views, frustration and 
powerlessness, this thesis offers a deep consideration of an indispensable but hitherto 
neglected feature of China’s healthcare governance: the lack of professionalism 
among China’s medics.  
 
This thesis is written from a socio-legal perspective. Its concern is not with solving 
legal disputes or moral dilemmas about power, or helping others to do so; it is rather 
concerned with identifying the current role of Chinese medics, the character of power 
relations to which they are subject and the consequences of the imbalance of power in 
these relations. The approach of this thesis is primarily exploratory and explanatory. It 
aims to cast a spotlight on the problematic medical practice that were brought to light 
by the case of SARS; more specifically, it is concerned with the role of regulation and 
state governance in China’s healthcare, and the impact of these systems on 
professional practice and bioethics.    
 
                                                 
16 See note 2. 
17 See notes 3 and 4. 
18 See e.g., J. Fang, ‘The Chinese Health Care Regulatory Institutions in an Era of Transition’, 66 (2008) 
Social Science and Medicine 952-962; R. Peng, ‘How Professional Values are Developed and Applied 
in Medical Practice in China’, 30 (2000) The Hastings Center Report 4, 23-26; M. Harris and C. Wu, 
‘Medical malpractice in the People’s Republic of China: The 2002 Regulation on the Handling of 
Medical Accidents’ 33 (2005) Medicine & Ethics Journal of Law 456; J. Nie, ‘The Plurality of Chinese 
and American Medical Moralities: Toward an Interpretive Cross-Cultural Bioethics’, 10 (2000) 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 3, 239-260; R. Qiu, ‘Confucianism, Traditional and Contemporary 
China’, in R. M. Veatch (ed) Cross-Cultural Perspectives in Medical Ethics (London, Jones and 
Bartlett Publishers, 2000). 
19 Ibid, also see D. Jiang, ‘Thoughts on the Practice of Regulation on the handing of Medical 
Accidents’, 11 (2002) National Judges College Law Journal, 53-56; L. Pei, ‘Hospital Management in 
China in a Time of Change’, 11 (2002) Chinese Medical Journal 115, 1716- 1726. 
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The basic principle advocated in this thesis is that the effective formation of the 
healthcare service is facilitated by ethically-based systems of policy, rules and 
regulation. The roles of a well-functioning medical profession and patient control are 
central to good governance of healthcare in China. Set within this context, this thesis 
has three main goals. First, it aims to contribute to the development of theories and 
understanding about the relationship between medical professionals and the 
Communist state of China; it does so by examining the relatively powerless position 
of medical professionals in China from both a historical perspective and by providing 
up-to-date empirical evidence. Secondly, the thesis examines the nature and extent of 
de-professionalisation among Chinese medical professionals. It is especially 
concerned with the consequences of challenges to the Chinese medics’ professional 
autonomy in the healthcare power structure. Thirdly, it is argued that a re-structured 
model which places Chinese medical practitioners in a more professional and 
responsible role is urgently needed.  
 
3.   A Socio-Legal Methodology 
 
Socio-legal research uses “various empirical methods to study what is legal about 
legal processes, legal institutions and legal behaviour”. 20  The sociology of law 
receives its intellectual impetus mainly from mainstream sociology and aims to 
transcend the lawyers’ focus on legal rules and legal doctrine by remaining 
“exogenous to the existing legal system”, in order to “construct a theoretical 
understanding of that legal system in terms of the wider social structure”.21 
 
The ‘socio’ in socio-legal studies does not refer to sociology or social science, but 
represents “an interface with a context within which law exists”.22 In this thesis, the 
socio-legal method offers a way to explain empirical data in the light of theoretical 
materials that draw attention to the relationship between health care state governance, 
medical law and bioethics as linked to medics’ practices.  
 
                                                 
20 R. Banakar and M. Travers, Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2005), Introduction.  
21 Ibid. 
22 S. Wheeler and P. A. Thomas, ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in D. J. Hayton (ed), Law’s Future(s) (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2002), 271; P. A. Thomas (ed), Socio-Legal Studies (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997). 
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It has been claimed that, “medicine is so central to modern society, doctors have 
emerged as perhaps the key profession”.23 Yet it is argued in this work that in an 
authoritarian state like China, healthcare practitioners may have difficulties in 
remaining true to their moral views and ethical responsibilities, particularly when 
facing conflicting guidance from bureaucratic and administrative rules. Therefore, this 
thesis uses the socio-legal method to hear the hidden voices from Chinese medics 
about their opinions concerning their perceptions of and interactions with law, state 
governance, their understandings of bioethics and even ethical dilemmas (if they exist) 
over conflicting interests.  
 
4.   Research Questions  
 
Surveys about legal awareness in the health sector have been found in a few Asian 
studies.24 In 2001, Zhou conducted fieldwork on the nurses’ legal knowledge within a 
hospital in Beijing.25 However, Zhou’s research object was confined only to nurses 
and their legal education. So far, there is still no survey which has been done in China 
to study what impact state governance, law and bioethics have on medical practice, 
professional behaviour, medical costs, and healthcare service outcomes. Although 
several research groups have conducted long-term or short-term studies related to 
healthcare and ethics in mainland China, their research topics concentrate mainly on 
the One-Child Policy,26 women’s rights,27 historical bioethics in China,28 healthcare 
legislation, 29 the healthcare system, 30 Chinese medicine, 31 and there are even two 
                                                 
23 M. Moran and B. Wood, States, Regulations and the Medical Profession (Buckingham, Open 
University Press, 1993), preface. 
24 K. Kim, et al., ‘Perception of Legal Liability by Registered Nurses in Korea’, 27 (2007) Nurse 
Education Today 6, 617; Z. Ueki, ‘Legal Awareness in Dentists’ Medical Practice’, Medical Law 
(Tokyo, Yuhikaku Publishing, 2003, 2nd edn), Chapter Three.  
25 R. Zhou, ‘A Study of Nurses’ Legal Education’, 36 (2001) Chinese Journal of Nursing 761. 
26 See e.g., S. Greenhalgh and E. A. Winckler, Governing China’s Population: from Leninist to 
Neoliberal Biopolitics (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005); P. Lofstedt, et al., ‘Abortion 
Patterns and Reported Sex Ratios at Birth in Rural Yunnan, China’, 12 (2004) Reproductive Health 
Matter 24, 86. 
27 See e.g., C. N. Milwertz, Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-Child 
Family Policy (Surry, Curzon Press, 1997). 
28 See e.g., P. U. Unschuld, Medical Ethics in Imperial China: A Study in Historical Anthropology 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979) and P. U. Unschuld, Medicine in China: A History of 
Ideas (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985).  
29 See e.g., J. Fang, ‘The Chinese Health Care Regulatory Institutions in an Era of Transition’, 66 (2008) 
Social Science and Medicine 952-962. 
30 See e.g., Y. Liu, ‘China’s Public Health-care System: Facing the Challenges’, 82 (2004) Bulletin of 
the World Health Organization 7, 532-538. 
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extensive field studies about the political abuse of psychiatric units32 and the trade in 
organ transplantation in China.33 The role and position of Chinese medics within the 
healthcare system and against the backdrop of medical legislation remains a relatively 
unexplored landscape awaiting discovery and understanding.  
 
As the first systematic and in-depth study on this subject, the thesis traces voices from 
the Chinese medical practitioners who usually hide behind a veil of silence; it 
provides compelling evidence that they have clear and even active views about 
professional power. It also explores the complex political, legal, socio-cultural, and 
historical terrain that shapes their silences, and their diverse understandings of 
professional ethics.  
 
The research questions which this study addresses are:  
(1)  How do Chinese medical practitioners react to state governance and law?  
(2) Whether, how and why do law or political ideology take priority over medical 
ethics and professional knowledge, or vice versa?  
(3) Do Chinese medics feel frustration over their role within the healthcare system and 
think that their current position in the healthcare arena is problematic? 
(4) If so, what are the causes, effects and solutions? 
 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the ways in which the medical practices 
of health personnel are affected by guiding principles, such as law, political guidance 
and ethics, and any dilemmas they may face in choosing guiding principles in practice. 
What is more, this thesis foresees professionalism as a crucial missing element in 
China’s healthcare power structure that must be brought into being.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
31 See e.g., S. Dharmananda, ‘Understanding Chinese Medicine’, available at: 
http://www.itmonline.org/arts/understand.htm (Last visited on April, 11th, 2010). 
32 See e.g., R. Munro, China’s Psychiatric Inquisition: Dissent, Psychiatry and the Law in Post-1949 
China (London, Wildy, Simmonds and Hills, 2006); R. Munro, ‘Political Psychiatry in Post-Mao China 
and Its Origins in Cultural Revolution’,30  (2002) Journal of American Academic Psychiatry Law, 97-
106; J. Birley, ‘Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union and China: A Rough Guide for 
Bystanders’, 30 (2002) Journal of American Academic Psychiatry Law, 145-147, and R. Munro, 
‘Judicial psychiatry in China and Its Political Abuses’, 14 (2000) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1–
125; Human Rights Watch and Geneva Initiative on Psychiatry, Dangerous Minds: Political Psychiatry 
in China Today and its Origin in the Mao Era (New York, Human Rights Watch, 2002).  
33 See e.g., D. Matas and D. Kilgour, Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong 
Practitioners in China (6 July 2006); and hereafter Revised Report into Allegations of Organ 
Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China (31 January 2007).  
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5.   The Structure of this Thesis 
 
In order to answer the research questions, this thesis has 10 chapters which are 
divided into three main parts:  
 
Part One - Literature Review 
 
Following on from the introduction, Part One (consisting of Chapters 2 and 3) seeks 
to examine the overall conceptual framework of the relationship between the Chinese 
state, law and medical practitioners, by firstly in Chapter 2 analysing and dissecting 
the Western model of healthcare governance, followed by a working model of 
healthcare governance in China today. Chapter 3 then traces the framework, from a 
historical perspective, of the development of Chinese medical practitioners, bioethics 
and state governance up to the present day.  
 
Part Two - Empirical Studies 
 
Part Two of this thesis consists of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The fourth chapter describes 
the methods adopted in the empirical study. The fifth and sixth chapters present the 
findings from the questionnaire and interview studies respectively.  
 
In this section, I examine the views of Chinese medical practitioners, as collected 
through my empirical studies. The empirical studies provide up-to-date views of 223 
Chinese medical practitioners who are working on the frontline of China’s healthcare 
services. The data include quantitative and qualitative studies conducted from six 
cities in China, during the period from November 2008 to March 2009. 
 
Part Three - Problem and Suggestions 
 
Having examined the problem from both a historical perspective and an empirical 
basis, Part Three then provides a theoretical analysis of the problem and proposes a 
new long-term and multi-level model for future development.  
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The data presented in Part Two make clear that the vast majority of Chinese medics 
feel that they lack control over their practices. Part Three consists of three chapters. 
Chapter 7 contains an analysis of the problem of deprofessionalisation in China and 
the need to tackle this phenomenon. Chapters 8 and 9 introduce ideas of 
professionalisation and professionalism. By suggesting the establishment of a new 
model which emphasises an increase of professional power to Chinese medical 
professions while ensuring scrutiny mechanisms, I argue for accountable medical 
professionalism in China. 
 
This thesis proposes a process of re-modelling the healthcare power structure from the 
actual situation to a suggested ideal one. At each stage of my research, I offer 
diagrammatic representations of my evolving thinking about the nature of the power 
structure, more specifically, the position of Chinese medics in the power dynamic of 
healthcare state governance, medical law and bioethics. Five models are offered in 
this thesis, including two hypothetical models, one model developed from empirical 
findings, and two new models proposed in Part Three. These models reflect different 
stages in my intellectual journey through the process of writing this thesis. They are 
representations of my assumptions about the nature of the relationship between the 
state and its medical professionals, which I then tested by different research methods 
as the research progressed. Each stage of the model was refined in light of my 
findings. The final version of the model represents what I consider to be the optimal 
balance of considerations and power in the state/professional relationship.   
 
The final Chapter (Chapter 10) reflects on the data, discussion and models presented. 
It concludes that the need for a balance of power in China’s healthcare necessitates in 
turn a call for medical professionalism. This is not only for the benefit of patients or 
the meaning of medicine, but ultimately, for Chinese society’s benefit, in becoming 
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CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A healthcare system is viewed by Frenk as “the vehicle for the organized social 
response to the health conditions of the population.”34 In Frenk’s understanding, the 
concept of a healthcare system involves three components: “vehicle”- method; 
“organization”- system; and an aim to respond to the needs of the population. In 
particular, “a shared aim” is key to developing an integrated health system. In practice, 
a healthcare system consists of a set of building blocks, which are, in Rapoport’s 
words, “a bundle of relations”.35 The method for achieving the shared aim therefore 
varies among different “actors” in a system and between systems.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is not to describe the detail of the political-economic 
contexts and variations of healthcare governance in different countries, but rather to 
review briefly what these experiences tell us about the relationship between medical 
professions, state and law in such healthcare systems. I suggest that it is possible to 
identify a common pattern of relationship-model and that this can provide a 
conceptual framework for this thesis. This provides a starting point from which to 
address the distinctiveness of the governing infrastructure and institutional 
organisation of Chinese medical practitioners.  
 
To this end, this chapter focuses on conceptualising the role of the state, law and 
healthcare profession in healthcare systems and the relationship between them. The 
conceptual model will then be used to help us better interpret the multilateral 
relationships between Chinese medical practitioners and China’s state-led healthcare 
governing mechanisms. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to develop a preliminary 
model or framework to represent how Chinese health practitioners are governed, so 
that it can be tested, modified and developed through further analyses encompassing 
historical, empirical and theoretical approaches.  
                                                 
34 J. Frenk, ‘Dimensions of Health System Reform’, 27 (1994) Health Policy 19-34, 25. 
35 A. Rapoport, ‘System Analysis: General Systems Theory’, 15 (1968) International Encyclopaedia of 
the Social Science 458.  




2.   The Nature of the Medical Profession, State and Law in 
Most Developed Countries 
 
In the area of healthcare, particularly in most developed countries – and many middle 
income countries – governments have become central to social policy and healthcare. 
The state normally participates in healthcare through three major mechanisms: 
regulation, financing, and direct delivery of services. Their involvement is justified on 
the grounds of both equity and efficiency. The medical professionals of these 
countries, on the other hand, may not necessarily be completely under the rule of the 
state, but can probably exert different degrees of influences on state-led control 
mechanisms.   
 
2.1   The State-led Control Mechanisms over the Medical Profession 
 
This section concentrates on relationship in a broad sense between the state and 
medical profession. It first examines briefly the major effects of state healthcare 
financing and delivery policies on the practice of medicine. It then sketches the 
influence of professional regulation on medical practice.   
 
(1)   Healthcare Financing and Delivery Policies: the Healthcare System 
 
Frenk says, “States are central to the working lives of doctors.”36 The challenge of 
professional development cannot be fully understood without reference to the role of 
the state in our society. The state is perceived narrowly by Frenk as the institutions of 
government which provide the administrative, legislative, and judicial vehicles for the 
actual exercise of public authority and power. 37  The way in which healthcare is 
organised and delivered is influenced by a state’s social, organisational, economic, 
political and cultural background. Comparativists, such as Terris, rightly note that 
                                                 
36 See J. Frenk and L. Durán-Arenas, ‘The Medical Profession and the State’, in F. W. Hafferty and J. 
B. McKinlay (ed), The Changing Medical Profession: An International Perspective (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1993); also cited by Moran, see note 23, at 4. 
37 J. Frenk, ‘Dimensions of Health System Reform’, 27 (1994) Health Policy 19-34, 25; J. Frenk, ‘The 
Political Economy of Medical Underemployment in Mexico: Corporatism, Economic Crisis and 
Reform’, 15 (1990) Health Policy 143-62. 
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there is great variety in the degree to which states and their agencies exercise 
centralised control over social and economic institutions.38 With respect to the role of 
the state, different types of healthcare system vary mainly in terms of their prevalent 
founding values or principles, and corresponding ways of financing, service provision 
and regulation.39  
 
Contemporary medicine is, in general, practised within healthcare systems, namely: a 
state-funded health service; a social insurance-type health system funded by a 
comprehensive planning model; and private insurance. The way a country’s 
healthcare system is structured determines the nature of its healthcare institutions and 
scope of service delivery, and simultaneously affects the character of healthcare 
practice. This was well expressed by Shipler when he said that the system of medical 
care expressed the full range of strengths and weaknesses in society: “It is a model of 
the country’s hierarchy, reflecting the instincts of authoritarianism, conservatism and 
elitism that pervade all areas of life.” 40 In the case of China, we have witnessed large 
scale market forces becoming involved in the state-funded healthcare system, which 
in the end transformed the nature of healthcare delivery as well as the “guiding 
values” of professional practice (the transition of the Chinese healthcare system will 
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter). 
 
Having briefly discussed the relationship between the state and medical profession, 
the next section explores the regulatory structure of the medical profession, and the 
broad influences that professional regulation has on medical practice.  
 
(2)   Regulation on Healthcare Practice 
 
It is understandable that the objective of any system of regulation should advocate and 
ensure standards, accountability and efficiency in practice; thus most states play a role 
                                                 
38 M. Terris, ‘The Three World Systems of Medical Care: Trends and Prospects’, 68 (1978) American 
Journal of Public Health 11, 1125-1131. 
39 H. Rothgang, et al., ‘The Changing Role of State in Healthcare Systems’, 13 (2005) European 
Review Supp 1, 187, 191. 
40 D. K. Shipler, Russia: Broken Idols, Silent Dreams (New York, New York Times Books, 1983), 216. 
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in the regulation of medical practitioners.41 The medical arena, on the other hand, has 
its own particular interests, values and power structure. In practice, these features 
have a distinctive influence on the way a country regulates its medical profession. 
 
Before discussing the role of law in regulating medical practice, it must be recognised 
that knowledge, experience and values have been built up and developed within the 
medical community and that the state has its role in steering or controlling 
professional regulation, from its formulation to its implementation. Medical practice 
is governed by technical, generational values and ethical standards. The ethical 
standards, as “collegiate values independent of individual choices made by doctors”,42  
evolve as a normative standard to guide or control professional behaviour. This does 
not mean that governments lose legitimacy in the enforcement of law concerning 
morality or propriety of medical practice. Instead, law, as a system of rules, helps to 
“ensure predictability through their normative or prescriptive force; they impose 
obligations and create corresponding entitlements, which are publicly acknowledged 
and collectively enforced”.43  
 
The extent to which judicial “intervention” in medicine is appropriate emerges as a 
paradox. Lord Woolf’s statement sheds some light on this: “Although it will never be 
a substitute for proper standards of professional ethics, the law can provide a base 
below which standards should not fall and guidance as to what actions are lawful. If 
an action is unlawful, then it will certainly be unethical.”44 In fact, an increasing role 
of law in regulating healthcare professionals, has been pointed out by many scholars, 
such as Montgomery: “the discipline of healthcare law is at risk of being transformed 
– moving from a discipline in which the moral values of medical ethics (and those of 
the non-medical health professions) are a central concern, to one in which they are 
being supplanted by an amoral commitment to choice and consumerism.”45 Jacobs 
                                                 
41 J. Frenk and L. Durán-Arenas, ‘The Medical Profession and the State’, in F. W. Hafferty and J. B. 
McKinlay (ed), The Changing Medical Profession: An International Perspective (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 33. 
42 J. Montgomery, ‘Review: Medical Law in the Shadow of Hippocrates’, 52 (1989) Medical Law 
Review 4, 570; R. S. Downie, ‘Collective Responsibility in Health Care’, 7 (1982) Journal of Medical 
Philosophy 1, 43-56. 
43 D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London, Macmillan, 1991), 65. 
44 The Rt Hon Lord Woolf, ‘The Judiciary, Medicine and Ethics’, in J. Carrier et al. (ed), Law, 
Medicine and Ethics: Essays in Honour of Lord Jakobovits (London, Cancerkin, 2007). 
45 J. Montgomery, ‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’, 26 (2006) Legal Studies 2, 185-210, 186. 
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also argues that: “law has no substantial place in regulating medicine because 
although some rules establish structure, the law’s prime concern is with the 
untoward.”46 Havard expresses similar frustration with legal threats to medicine.47  
 
In short, medical practice identifies strongly with morality through medical ethics. Yet, 
debates over the relationship between law and medical practice are becoming more 
difficult, since moral and ethical debates are increasingly accommodated into the 
discourse of law. In McKinlay’s opinion, law is a system of rules that “enables 
capitalist modes of production in medicine to exist through infusing capital into the 
medical industry and by maintaining the whole structure through legitimatizing the 
activities of powerful players in the medical game.”48 The role that medics play in this 
“medical game”, however, remains ambiguous; even though medics are “often 
presented from the outside as powerful, while it nevertheless remains subject to the 
underlying logic of the game.”49  
 
The involvement of the state in professional regulation implies that politics lies at the 
heart of regulation. A political process involves “the exercise of power and authority 
in struggles between competing interests; and it is a process in which the struggle for 
control of state power”.50 As Dingwall put it, “The fundamental challenge to medicine 
is not from law but from the governmentality that favours law as its operative 
strategy.”51 Professional regulation is, by nature, political, albeit that – traditionally at 
least – ethics has been more the preserve of the medics, while law has been the tool of 
the state; thus the realities are that political power is a strong shaping force with 
respect to the regulation of the medical profession. This, at least, has been true of 
Western states (I will explore the situation in China shortly).  
 
                                                 
46 J. M. Jacobs, Doctors and Rules: A Sociology of Professional Values (London, Routledge, 1988), 
166. 
47 J. D. Harvard, ‘The Legal Threat to Medicine’, 284 (1982) British Medical Journal 612.  
48 D. M. Frankfrord, ‘Professions and the Law’, in F. W. Hafferty and J.B. McKinlay (ed), The 
Changing Medical Profession: An International Perspective (New York, Oxford University Press, 
1993), 44. 
49 Ibid.  
50 See note 23, at 26. 
51 R. Dingwall et al., ‘Litigation and the Threat to Medicine’, in D. Kelleher, et al. (ed), Challenging 
Medicine (London, Routledge, 2006), 57. 
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To sum up, I agree with what Montgomery suggests - law should be facilitative 
(stressing the importance of ethics and values of the healthcare profession) rather than 
proactive (taking over the determination of ethical issues and promoting patient 
rights).52 When professional ethics provides only guiding but not binding principles, 
there is still a necessity for law with respect to accountability. 
 
Having briefly examined the major effects of state healthcare policies and regulation 
on the practice of medicine, the next section will discuss the impact of medical 
profession on state policies and regulation. 
 
2.2   The Medical Profession’s Impacts on State Governance and Law 
 
It is said in Understanding Doctors that, “There is a tendency in our over-centralised 
and largely state-controlled health system to blame government and politicians for all 
the ills facing the profession. Yet it is clear that many of the pressures and challenges 
on the medical profession are not confined to the United Kingdom or to this 
profession and instead reflect wider social and technological change.”53 This section 
aims to examine how the healthcare profession responds to state governance and legal 
controls.  
 
(1)  Medics’ Reducing Influence on Healthcare Governance   
 
The Western medical profession generally tends to represent a “privileged and 
satisfied stratum” in society.54 In the West, various nouns such as, healers, scientists, 
professionals, entrepreneurs and politicians, have been used to describe doctors.55 The 
use of the term ‘politicians’ indicates that Western doctors, both individually and 
collectively, access and possess many political resources. The profession can 
intervene positively in public policy debates about healthcare, by using its positive 
public image, its expertise and reputation to function as an influential lobbyist. The 
American Medical Association (AMA) is an example. “With growing public 
                                                 
52 J. Montgomery, ‘Law and Demoralisation of Medicine’, 26 (2006) Legal Studies 2, 185-210. 
53 R. Levenson, et al., Understanding Doctors: Harassing Professionalism (London, Royal College of 
Physicians and King’s Fund, 2008), foreword.  
54 H. M. Vollmer and D. L. Mills (ed), ‘The Politics of Professionals’, Professionalization (New Jersey, 
Prince-Hall, 1966), 321. 
55 See note 23, at 3. 
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acknowledgment of governmental responsibilities in furnishing medical care, the 
political activities of the AMA have expanded enormously.”56 
 
The political influence of the medical profession is not unique to the AMA. Medics 
are widely recognised by societies as the experts in the field. They are also the 
exemplary expression of professional authority and autonomy, especially for 
controlling the technical content of work and the process of service provision, as 
described in much of the social science literature.57 Western medical professionals are 
collectively organised in order to negotiate their interests with the state for, wages, 
working conditions and other terms of employment.58 Self-evidently, the degree to 
which the medical profession is able to influence politics and, vice versa, depends 
upon local social and political context. In the case of the British National Health 
Service (NHS), in Klein’s words, it is a situation of “mutual dependency”.59  
 
  “On the one hand the state became a monopoly employer: effectively members of the 
medical profession became dependent on it not only for their own incomes but also for the 
resources at their command. On the other hand the state became dependent on the medical 
profession to run the NHS and to cope with the problems of rationing scarce resources in 
patient care.”60  
 
Indeed, in the past, the British medical profession seemed to operate as partners with 
the state, rather than as a pressure group in the policy-making process. 61  The 
establishment of the NHS in 1948 indicated a willingness and capacity of British 
medics to adapt to a political settlement, while still being able to maintain 
accountability in response to their privileged status granted by society. For the 
previous government, the contract with the profession entailed a stewardship of the 
NHS and the development of a regulatory regime that gave confidence to the public 
                                                 
56 D. R. Hyde, et al, ‘The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized 
Medicine – The Political Basis of Power’, 63 (1954) The Yale Law Journal 937-1022, 955. 
57 E. Freidson, Professional Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care (Chicago, Aldine, 1970), 
45; M. S. Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1977); J. Frenk and L. Durán-Arenas, ‘The Medical Profession and the State’, in F. W. 
Hafferty and J.B. McKinlay (ed), The Changing Medical Profession: An International Perspective 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), 27. 
58 American College of Physicians – American Society of Internal Medicine, ‘Physicians and Joint 
Negotiations’, 134 (2001) Annals of Internal Medicine 787-782. 
59 R. Klein, ‘The State and the Profession: the Politics of the Double bed’, 301 (1990) British Medical 
Journal, 700-702. 
60 Ibid.  
61 C. Webster, ‘Conflicts and Consensus: Explaining the British Health Service’, 1 (1990) Twentieth 
Century British History 2, 115-151. 
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and ensured effective professional accountability. 62  However, many things have 
changed since the establishment of the NHS. There have been sweeping reforms to 
further regulate the medical profession as a result, for example, of the Shipman 
scandals.63 Many critics saw the medical profession as having too much power. The 
medics’ self-regulation institutions, such as the General Medical Council (GMC), 
have undergone radical reform as a result.64  
 
The trend of decreasing power of the medical profession, is not confined merely to 
their roles in affecting the direction of healthcare governance, but also reflects 
massive changes in the statutory control of the medical profession. The following 
section will focus on the medical profession’s eroding influence on regulation.  
 
(2)   The Influence of the Medical Profession on Healthcare Regulations 
 
There are vast variations between different countries in how far the medical 
profession is regulated. Each country has to make decisions based upon the following 
factors: how medical students are selected and trained; how much commercial 
competition is allowed; what ethical standards will govern their practices; what 
institutional settings should be provided; and how professionals are going to be paid.65 
The content of healthcare regulation is important, but what matters more is the 
determination(s) of regulation. This raises questions, such as: what is the ultimate 
source of healthcare law and rules; how influential or dominant is the medical 
profession or state in determining the regulations in the first place? Getting to the 
bottom of these questions, is a polemic about the power of the medical profession.  
 
                                                 
62 C. Ham et al., ‘The Medical Profession, the Public, and the Government’, 324 (2002) British Medical 
Journal 838-841.  
63 These healthcare scandals have included the suspension from the medical register of pediatric cardiac 
surgeons from Bristol following an inquiry into poor standards of care, the revelation that children’s 
organs had been removed and retained without their parents’ consent during post mortem examinations 
at Alder Hey Hospital in Liverpool, and the murder by Dr Harold Shipman of more than 200 of his 
patients. See e.g., M. Redfern, The Report of Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry, available at: 
http://www.rlcinquiry.org.uk/; D. J. Smith DBE, The Shipman Inquire: Independent Public Inquire into 
the Issues raised from the Case of Harold Fredrick Shipman, available at: http://www.shipman-
inquiry.org.uk/reports.asp (Last visited on Jan 21st, 2011) 
64 Recent reforms in the UK post-Shipman period have been discussed by, for example, J. K. Mason 
and G. T. Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2010, 8th edn), 14-23. 
65 See note 23, at 19. 
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Although, as discussed earlier, the nature of professional regulation is political, one 
should not ignore that the profession, as an agent, also shapes the political and social 
process. The prestige of science may act as an authoritative source for rules of social 
organisation, providing its own quality control or self-management. But does this 
mean that the medical profession is powerful, and/or that this power is legitimate? 
Legislation in a contemporary democratic society is often expected to represent the 
will of the majority; the degree of professional dominance over healthcare regulation, 
so to speak, is decided through negotiations between the public, government, and 
medics. Therefore, the legitimacy of professional-influenced health legislation 
depends greatly on its local context.  
 
2.3   Summarising the Bilateral Relations and Setting up a Working Model  
 
This section has discussed the bilateral relationships between the medical profession 
and its control mechanisms (state governance and law). Though the role of the state in 
healthcare delivery and financing varies across countries, the state occupies a key 
position in this network of bilateral relationships. The medical profession’s role could 
be lobbyist or partner in state governance; and whether medics could be one 
determinant of law or not depends on the local political and socio-economic contexts. 
This ultimately lies in the legitimacy of professional power. Generally speaking, there 
has been a decrease in the Western medics’ influence over healthcare governance and 
law, but they still to a varying degree exert influence on healthcare policies or even 
voice their resistance towards medical law and reforms. 
 
Based on the above analysis, the hypothetical working model of the Western 
healthcare governance emerged as a triangular shape:  
 
                                                        Healthcare Governance (the State)        
Medical Profession/Medical Ethics Medical Law 
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This triangular shaped model suggests that, in the area of healthcare governance, the 
state is based at the top deciding the nature of the healthcare system and supervising 
the direction of healthcare legislation. Under the state’s healthcare governance, the 
medical profession remains amongst the most trusted of professions and most likely to 
exert an influence over government and legislators, though the nature of these 
relationships has been changing. 
 
The nature of the relationship between state healthcare control mechanisms (financing, 
delivery policies and regulation) and the medical profession as generated above will 
provide a broad and symbolic method/model of shedding some light on the 
examination of healthcare governance in the Chinese context. The following section 
will look into the position of Chinese medics in relation to state governance and law 
under this structure: (1) state healthcare governance and Chinese medics; (2) the 
regulatory control mechanisms (in which the political nature of law will be examined) 
and Chinese medics.  
 
3.  The Chinese Medical Practitioners, State Governance and 
Law 
 
In the previous section, I have proposed a conceptual framework that described the 
multilateral relationships between state, medical profession and law in the West. This 
section focuses on the nature of the relationship of Chinese medics with the state, and 
the ways in which healthcare regulation and practice are influenced by political, social 
and cultural norms. It also explores the role that the Communist Party doctrines play 
in shaping the ethics of Chinese medics and their professional practice by distinctive 
control mechanisms.   
 
3.1   Healthcare State Governance and Chinese Medical Practitioners   
 
One major question to be answered in this section is how the Chinese healthcare 
governmentality is formed. In order to trace the bilateral relationships between the 
state, law and medical practitioners in China, this section starts by discussing that 
relationship by looking briefly into the Chinese healthcare system and three-level 
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healthcare delivery service. It then examines the impact of the healthcare regulatory 
framework on Chinese medics: more specifically, the nature of the law in China; the 
healthcare regulatory framework and legislation trends. Finally, this section explores 
the engagement of political control mechanisms in healthcare. 
 
(1)   The Under-Resourced Healthcare System 
 
The healthcare system during Mao’s period placed emphasis on prevention. It made 
health services affordable by charging below cost for visits and hospital stays.66 With 
easy assess to basic curative care, and affordable services tailored to meet local needs, 
Mao’s government earned solid support from its political base − the rural and urban 
working populations – and was regarded internationally as “a success”.67 
 
The market-orientated economic reform in China that began in the late 1970s 
significantly shaped Chinese health policies toward the development of the country’s 
health sector.68 As part of that transition to a market economy, near-universal access 
to basic healthcare has dismantled. By decentralising healthcare provision and 
management, reforms aimed to improve productivity and efficiency and encouraged 
privatisation. The Chinese central government reduced its role in universal healthcare 
provision and let the private sector take part in healthcare provision and financing.  
 
In 1988, with the introduction of fiscal contracts, the government formally expressed 
the notion that local authorities should minimize dependence on support from higher 
levels.69 With tax autonomy, local governments were expected to generate revenues 
by their own efforts to cover public service costs. Healthcare institutions were allowed 
more financial independence and given decision-making power from local 
                                                 
66 W. C. Yip and W. C. Hsiao, ‘Medical Savings Accounts: Lessons from China’, 16 (1997) Health 
Affairs 6. 
67 See e.g., D. M. Lampton, ‘Changing Health Policy in the Post-Mao Era’, 54 (1981) The Yale Journal 
of Biology and Medicine, 21-26; W. C. Hsiao, ‘Transformation of Health Care in China’, 310 (1984) 
The New England Journal of Medicine 392-396.  
68 Q. Meng, ‘New Directions in China’s Health Sector Reform’, 9 (2009) China Brief 5. 
69 J. Ma and J. Norregaard, China’s Fiscal Decentralization, Internal Monetary Fund Research Report 
(Oct 1998). 
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authorities. 70  As a result of economic reform, the government subsidy was 
significantly reduced to cover only 10-20% of hospital expenditure.71 
 
Healthcare decentralisation without sufficient funding allocation has led to vast 
inequalities in access to healthcare, especially in impoverished areas.72 Healthcare 
facilities and even some government health programs depended on patient revenues to 
meet their operating expenses and needed to charge user fees for services rendered.73 
The devastating result was that the richer one was, the better the healthcare one 
received; while those whose income was low and who could not afford medical 
treatment were deprived of their right to access healthcare.74  
 
In 2000, a report published by World Health Organisation, ranked China 144th 
amongst 191 member states with regard to public health infrastructure.75 In terms of 
equity in healthcare, China was ranked 118th – the fourth from the bottom amongst all 
countries surveyed. Research conducted by the Chinese government found that, due to 
financial difficulties, in 2007, 59.3% of rural population in China tended not to go to 
hospital when sick.76 It was shown in the official report that, in 2009, the health 
inequality problem was still serious; the average rural population’s yearly healthcare 
spend was 455 RMB (equivalent to 44 GBP), which was much less than their urban 
counterparts (21862 RMB, equivalent to 2000 GBP).77 Poverty and inequality are 
major challenges to China’s healthcare system.  
 
                                                 
70 See e.g., J. Tao (ed), China: Bioethics, Trust, and the Challenge of the Market (Hong Kong, Springer, 
2008), 137-142; W. C. L. Hsiao, ‘The Chinese Health Care System: Lessons for Other Nations’, 41 
(1995) Social Science and Medicine 8, 1047.  
71 W. C. Yip and W. C. Hsiao, ‘Medical Savings Accounts: Lessons from China’, 16 (1997) Health 
Affairs 6.  
72 WHO, China, Health, Poverty and Economic Development (Beijing, WHO’s Representative Office 
in China, 2005), 27.  
73 Ibid, 1052; also see, The World Bank, China 2000: Financing Health Care: Issues and Options for 
China (Washington, World Bank, 1997). 
74 L. Lim, ‘The High Price of Illness in China’, (March 2nd, 2006) BBC News Beijing. 
75 A. Tandom, et al., Measuring Overall Healthcare System Performance for 191 Countries, (2000) 
WHO GPE Discussion Paper Series: No 30. 
76 Research Centre of PRC Ministry of Civil Affair, ‘Problems faced Urbanisation and Urban Migrant 
Peasants’ (in Chinese), available at: 
http://zyzx.mca.gov.cn/article/mjzl/lq/200712/20071200009107.shtml (Last visited on Nov 20th, 2010).   
77 Ministry of Health of PRC, The 2009 Public Health Report: Date Interpretation (in Chinese), 
available at: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-04/09/content_1576976.htm (Last visited on April 13th, 
2010). 
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China is currently at the crossroads of transforming its healthcare system, since the 
Chinese government is committed to increasing government funding for healthcare by 
as much as 850 billion RMB (equivalent to 78 billion GBP) over the next several 
years, aiming to provide universal basic healthcare by 2020. 78  (The latest 
developments on China’s healthcare system reforms will be discussed in Chapter 9). 
 
(2)   Healthcare Delivery in China 
 
In China there are three tiers of healthcare institutions which include hospitals, health 
centres, health clinics or units, etc – Levels I, II and III – representing increasing 
degrees of specialisation and sophistication. The Level III hospitals refer mainly to 
provincial hospitals or municipal/city hospitals. Their affiliated physicians are most 
likely to be specialists, providing specialised care, such as mental health, maternal and 
child health, paediatrics and oral or thoracic surgeries, etc. The Level II healthcare 
services are mainly provided by district level hospitals in urban areas or towns, 
providing emergency, outpatient and inpatient care. The Level I healthcare institutions 
cover community health centres, township health centres and village clinics, which 
provide basic, primary and preventative care.  
 
Under this organisational structure, institutions at each level are evaluated and ranked, 
based on quality and quantity of care, as Grade A (highest), B or C (lowest). The 
higher the grade, the more skilled the medical staff and the more advanced techniques 
an institution has. By the end of 2009, the number of health institutions in China had 
reached 916,571, within which, the number of Level III hospitals was 1,233 (within 
which there were 765 Level III Grade A hospitals), and, the number of Level II and 
Level I hospitals was 6,523 and 5,110 respectively.79  
 
The provision and distribution of healthcare delivery institutions is shown as below:  
 
                                                 
78 F. Wang, ‘Medical Reforms have led to a New Way of Thinking: Ministry of Finance’ New 
Investment in Healthcare’ (in Chinese), (October 29th, 2006) Sohu News; ‘200 Billion Yuan for 
Universal Basic Healthcare’ (in Chinese), (September 18th, 2006) Xinhua TV News. 
79 Ministry of Health of PRC, The 2009 Public Health Report (in Chinese), available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-04/09/content_1576944.htm (Last visited on April 13th, 2010). 
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Healthcare Institutions in China 200980 
Hospital  20,291 
 (within which)  General Hospitals 13,364 
                          Chinese Medicine Hospitals  2,728 
                           Specialist Hospitals  3,716 
Community Health Centres 27,308 
Health Units 39,627 
 (within which) Country Health Units 38,475 
Outpatient Clinics   7,639 
Clinics (health centres, clinics, nursing clinics)  174,809 
Country Clinics 632,770 
Blood Collection and Supply Centres             526 
Maternal & Child Health Centres     3,020 
Disease Control & Prevention Specialist Centres   1,291 
Preventive Care Units  3,536 
Health Inspection Centres  2,809 
In total    916,571 
 
At the same time, the total number of healthcare practitioners in China reached 
7,844,000:  
Health Workers in China 200981 
Urban Healthcare Staff  5,397,000 
 (within which)  Licensed (including assistant) doctors 2,205,000 
                         (within which) Licensed doctors 1,825,000 
                                                Licensed nurses 1,841,000 
                                                Pharmacists  342,000 
                                                Medical device technicians  323,000 
Other skilled workers  275,000 
Management staffs  363,000 
Technical support workers   558,000 
Medical Staffs in Rural Areas    1,251,000 
(within which)  Licensed (assistant) doctors  124,000 
                       Licensed nurses     14,000 
                         Country doctors 1,042,000 
                         Clinicians    71,000 
In total 7,844,000 
 
Although the number of healthcare workers has seen an increase, the official report 
revealed that the average workload of each Chinese resident physician had risen to 7.5 
patient appointments per day.82 Due to the under-resourced healthcare system, their 
income, however, did not follow at the same pace as their increasing workload. The 
                                                 
80 Ibid, I realise that the report shows an incorrect total number which should be 913,626, based on the 
number provided above. In this thesis, I quote it as exactly as it appears.  
81 See note 79. 
82 Ibid. 
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PRC deputy Health Minister stated that, in 2008, only 5% of government funding was 
used for healthcare workers’ incomes.83 Based on a survey conducted in 2010 by an 
independent educational statistical consulting firm, in terms of the average salary of 
college graduates from different majors six months after graduation, the bottom two 
incomes ranked are graduates from: dentistry (the lowest income, 1740 RMB per 
month, equivalent to 160 GBP) and clinical medicine (the second lowest income, 
1747 RMB per month, equivalent to 162 GBP).84 
 
“An effective regulatory framework is key to delivering system reform and to creating 
a well-functioning healthcare market.”85 The under-resourced healthcare system in 
China has deprived patients of equal assess to healthcare. It also places medics’ wages 
on a relatively low level. These have led to enormous, compounded social problems 
(which have been briefly discussed in the Introduction and will be given more detailed 
discussion in Chapter 3) and further eroded the effectiveness of the healthcare 
environment.  
 
Having explored the Chinese healthcare delivery system, the next two sections will 
address medical practice under the supervision of the healthcare regulatory framework 
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) respectively. 
 
3.2 The Healthcare Regulatory Framework and Its Impact on Chinese Medics 
 
Chinese medical practitioners are subjected to one main source of control – medical 
laws and regulations. This section starts by discussing the nature of law in China, 





                                                 
83Interviews with Deputy Health Minister Huang Jiefu, S. Wang, ‘Don’t Expect the Healthcare Reform 
will Increase Health Workers’ Incomes’ (in Chinese), (Mar 6th, 2008) China Economic Daily. 
84 The survey report was based on 500,000 random samples and 245, 000 returned filled questionnaires. 
See, MyCos HR Digital Information, College Graduates Careers and Jobs Report 2010 (in Chinese), 
June 2nd, 2010, (Beijing, Social Science and Academic Press China, 2010). 
85 Monitor, Discussion Paper: Developing an Effective Market Regulatory Framework in Healthcare, 
(Oct 18th, 2005) Independent Regulator of NHS Foundation Trust. 
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(1) The Nature of Law in China: Relationship between the State and Laws 
 
Laws are the finalization of the Party’s principles and policies; they are fixed general lines 
and specific policies of the Party put in a legal form. 
 
                                 Peng Zhen, speech to the Central Party School, 197986 
                                
The law of China is defined by Chinese officers as legislation with “Chinese 
characteristics”. 87 It is a product of policy decided by the Party/state to build an 
institutional framework to support Chinese economic growth.88 According to Peng 
Zhen, the top political legal officer of the 1980s, the legal rules in China exist not only 
to identify the thrust of CCP policy, but also to provide an organisational framework 
for the enforcement of that policy.89 Chinese law, in his opinion, is an expression of 
Party policy manifested through command rules enacted by the state apparatus.  
 
Indeed, some political ideologies are reflected explicitly in law. For example, the 
Four Basic Principles – “insisting on the socialist road; on people’s democratic 
dictatorship; on the leadership of the CCP; and on Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
thoughts and Deng Xiaoping’s theory”, appear in the PRC Law of Legislation. 90 
Similar political ideologies, such as, the Chinese Communist Party’s “Three 
Represents” posted by the former PRC President and CCP Secretary General Jiang 
Zemin,91 has also been incorporated in the PRC Constitution.92  
                                                 
86 P. B. Potter, ‘Peng Zhen: Evolving Views on Party Organization and Law’, in D. Merwin (ed.), 
China’s Establishment Intellectuals (London, M.E. Sharp, 1986), 21. 
87 The PRC State Council, ‘II: Legislation and Legal System with Chinese Characteristics’, White 
Paper: China's Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law, Feb 28th, 2008.  
88 The decision to pursue legal reform, first articulated at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee Congress in late 1978, was the result of a tentative commitment to introducing market 
mechanisms to the state-planned economy. See Communiqué of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CCP 
Central Committee (in Chinese), 1 (1979) Red Flag 14-21. 
89 See note 86. 
90 The Article 3 of the PRC Law of Legislation states: “Legislation shall follow the principles of the 
Constitution, taking economic construction as a core, insisting on the socialist road, on people’s 
democratic dictatorship, on the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and on Marxism-Leninism, 
Mao Zedong thoughts and Deng Xiaoping’s theory and insisting on reform and openness.” 
91 The “Three Represents” was promoted in China as the nucleus of Jiang Zemin’s political theory. The 
theory focuses on the future role of the CCP as “a faithful representative of the requirements in the 
development of advanced productive forces in China, the orientation of the advanced culture in China, 
and the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the people in China.” See e.g., J. Fewsmith, 
‘Studying the Three Represents’, (Fall 2003) China Leadership Monitor, No. 8, Hoover Institution of 
Stanford University;‘Three Represents’, News of the  Communist Party of China, available at: 
http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html (Last visited on Oct 29th, 2010). 




During the Cultural Revolution, all the universities including the law schools were 
shut down (more detailed discussion about the Cultural Revolution will be in Chapter 
3). China went through a lawless period when professions such as the police, 
prosecutors, and judges were smashed in the social movement of the Cultural 
Revolution.93 At that time, the rules of the CCP replaced law to control or oversee 
society. The well-known Chinese idiom “Communist Party rules and law” which 
literally puts ‘party rule’ ahead of ‘law’ in its wording, indicates party rules are 
superior to law. I agree how Chen summarises the nature of justice in this lawless 
period – the “Marxist concept of law was used to restructure society, to suppress class 
enemies, and to enforce party policies rather than protecting individual rights”.94 This 
means that the idea of justice was politicised from the start of the PRC.  
 
After the death of Mao, the CCP started its series of social and economic reforms. 
Besides the healthcare system reform, restoration of the legal system was also on the 
political agenda. Ruling the state by law rather than by people became a political 
slogan.95 This is reflected in the PRC Legislation Law, that China is “promoting the 
government of the country according to law and building a socialist country under the 
rule of law.”96  But this does not mean that the CCP handed over its power to Chinese 
legislators. Indeed, the legislative, executive and judiciary powers are still centralised 
by the CCP-led government. “The Communist Party wields ideological control, 
making sure that law in China serves Party policies.”97 More recently, the Chairman 
of the PRC National People’s Congress, Wu Bangguo stated that, “China will never 
simply copy the system of Western countries or introduce a system of multiple parties 
                                                                                                                                            
92 Preamble of the 2004 PRC Constitution states, “Under the leadership of the Communist Party of 
China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the 
important thought of ‘Three Represents’, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere 
to the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist road...” 
93 B. Liang, The Changing Chinese Legal System, 1978-Present: Centralisation of Power and 
Rationalisation of the Legal System (New York, Routledge, 2008), 20.  
94 Ibid; also see, J. Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and 
Development (Cambridge, Kluwer Law International, 1999), 36-40.  
95 See e.g., S. Yuan, ‘Significant Theoretical and Practical Problems concerning the Party’s Rule by 
Law’ (in Chinese), available at: 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/jgzn/bld/ysh/xgwz/200905/20090500133118.shtml (Last visited on 
Dec 5th, 2010). 
96 The PRC Legislation Law, Article 1.  
97 C. L. Baraban, ‘Inspiring Global Professionalism: Challenges and Opportunities for American 
Lawyers in China’, 73 (1998) Indiana Law Journal 1247; J. Wang, The Role of Law in Contemporary 
China: Theory and Practice, doctoral dissertation, Cornel University, 1988, 352. 
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holding office by democratic voting system. Although China’s state organisations 
have different responsibilities, they all adhere to the same Party line, principles and 
policies.”98 Wu’s speech further confirms that the political ideologies of the CCP are 
still reflected in the law.  
 
Therefore, one should bear in mind that the Chinese conception of justice and “rule of 
law” differ greatly from the Western democratic understanding of these concepts. In 
the Chinese conception, “law is a body or system of rules imposed on the society by 
the current political leadership regulating how people should conduct themselves in 
order to achieve modernization of the state in accordance with Marxist/socialist 
ideology.”99 It seems that, irrespective of issue and level, the Party/state is the only 
authority that is in firm control of healthcare legislation and policy making. With 
regard to healthcare, the approach undertaken by the Chinese government in 
implementing the ‘rule of law’ is to “create new or use existing administrative 
structures to supervise the compliance with relevant laws by actors, including the 
health facilities.”100 The Western-based hypothetical working model (which I offered 
earlier in this chapter) does not therefore fit the Chinese context.  
 
To sum up, law in China presents and serves the will of the Party/state. The following 
section will investigate how this authoritarian model is reflected in the healthcare 
context. What is more, it aims to identify a representation of the relationship between 
state governance, law and medical practitioners in China.  
 
(2)  The Legal and Regulatory Framework for Healthcare in China 
 
This section seeks to examine the legal and regulatory framework for healthcare 
practice in China. Attention will be placed primarily on an overview of the 
organisational structure, as well as the system of administration of health laws. This 
approach is taken with a view to analysing the practical implication of the legislative 
                                                 
98 ‘Bangguo Wu: China will never start Multi-party System or “Separation of Powers”’ (in Chinese), 
(April 16th, 2009) China.com News; ‘China “will not have democracy”’ (in Chinese), (March 9th, 2009) 
BBC News. 
99 R. A. Herman, ‘The Education of China’s Lawyers’, 46 (1981-1982) Albany Law Review 789. 
100 See note 29. 
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developments in the regulation of health rather than ascertaining the letter of certain 
laws. 
 
The PRC Constitution has the highest legal authority in the Chinese legal framework. 
In China, legal documents with lower authority than the Constitution (in decreasing 
order of legal authority) are as follows: national law enacted and amended by National 
People’s Congress (NPC) or amended by Standing Committee; 101  administrative 
regulations enacted by the State Council (SC);102 local decrees, autonomous decrees 
and special decrees enacted by the local People’s Congresses and the local people’s 
governments at various levels, organs of self-government in national autonomous 
regions; 103  and administrative or local rules enacted by relevant departments or 
ministries, such as the Ministry of Health (MOH). 104  This legal and regulatory 
framework which applies in the healthcare sector presents a remarkably complex 
network.  
 
One must also note that, this regulatory network exists within the government 
administrative structure. The health administration system, comprising the MOH at 
the national level and the Health Bureaux (HB) at the local level, is the main 
government institution responsible for the regulation of healthcare. The MOH, as a 
regulator, also concurrently serves as the top administrative and regulatory institution 
in governing public healthcare facilities.  
 
More specifically, at the national level, the major roles of the MOH in China are to 
“draft health laws, regulations and policies; propose health development programs and 
strategic goals; formulate technical protocols, health standards and supervise their 
enforcement”.105 At the local level, the MOH is responsible for guiding “the reform of 
medical institutions; to formulate criteria for medical practitioners, medical quality 
and service delivery, and to supervise their enforcement”, as well as formulating 
“national development programs on health professionals and professional ethics 
                                                 
101 The PRC Legislation Law 2000, Article 7. 
102 Ibid, Article 56. 
103 Ibid, Article 69. 
104 Ibid, Article 71. 
105 Mandates I, II and VIII of the Ministry of Health, available at: http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-
10/09/content_75326.htm (Last visited on Dec 9th, 2010).   
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protocols for health personnel; to draft and implement staffing standards for health 
institutions and accreditation criteria for health personnel.”106 
 
Inspired by Fang’s figure, 107  below is my graphic representation of the vertical 
regulatory framework of medical professions, which illustrates the position and 
relationship of regulatory institutions in China: 
 
                                                        CCP 
SC 
                                 NPC              MOH                  DIC 
 




Medical Professionals  
 
Abbreviations: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP); The State Council (SC); The National 
People's Congress (NPC); The Ministry of Health (MOH); The Discipline Inspection 
Committee of CCP (DIC); Health Bureaux (HB); The Auditing Institute (AI); The Hygiene 
Monitoring and Supervisory Institute (HMSI); The Price Division (PD); The Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA); The Industry and Commerce Administration (ICA); The Consumer 
Association (CA); The Rectifying Wrongdoing Office (RWO). 
 
The above network of government agencies is in charge of governing the healthcare 
industry that is dedicated to providing healthcare services for 1.3 billion Chinese 
people. This network also shows that the healthcare administrative regulatory 
agencies are functioning under the control of the CCP disciplinary organisations, for 
both legislation and political discipline.  
 
Under the supervision of the MOH, the Hygiene Monitoring and Supervisory Institute 
(HMSI) was established within the health administration system to be responsible for 
monitoring and supervising food and environmental hygiene, health facilities, etc. 
                                                 
106 Ibid, Mandates V and IX.   
107 J. Fang, ‘The Chinese Health Care Regulatory Institutions in an Era of Transition’, 66 (2008) Social 
Science and Medicine 959. 
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The HMSI’s role has been legitimised by a number of laws, including the Food 
Hygiene Law, the Ordinance of Medical Institution Management, the Medical 
Practitioner Act, the Law for Professional Nurses and the Law concerning Infectious 
Disease Prevention and Treatment. The HMSI is a law-enforcing institution. Besides, 
other parts of the health facilities are also regulated by the following governmental 
institutions: the Price Division (PD); the Auditing Institute (AI); the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA); the Industry and Commerce Administration (ICA); and the 
Consumer Association (CA).  
 
However, the above functional agencies do not have control over the PRC healthcare 
regulatory framework. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has power to oversee 
and supervise all political, judicial, administrative, and state-owned enterprises or 
organisations (to be discussed shortly).108 Its Discipline Inspection Committee (DIC) 
with its monitoring and supervisory unit, has the power to oversee CCP members (so 
called cadres). 109 A large number of Chinese medical practitioners (who are also 
registered as CCP cadres) are under the DIC’s supervision. The Rectifying 
Wrongdoing Office (RWO) serves directly under the leadership of the State Council 
(SC). Its role is to guide, facilitate, check and prevent wrong-doings (such as 
corruption), within the public sector.  
 
Having briefly discussed the nature and framework of China’s healthcare legislation, 
the next section analyses in general the content of medical legalisation; in particular, 
two pieces of legislation formulated during the last decade, in response to the 
healthcare system transition: the 1998 PRC Medical Practitioner Act and the 2002 
Regulation on the Handling of Medical Accidents.  
 
(3)  Healthcare Legislation  
 
There are a growing number of regulations pertaining to the standardisation of 
licensing doctors,110 nurses,111 and pharmacists,112 etc, and to procedures of particular 
                                                 
108 See note 29. 
109 Ibid. 
110 The 1998 PRC Medical Practitioner Act. 
111 The 1994 PRC Licensed Nurse Act; The 2008 Administrative Measures for the Registration of 
Practicing Nurses.  
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departments or general medical practice. This section will not examine in detail 
healthcare regulations relevant to particular medical departments, but trace the pattern 
of legislation in order to under how these regulations affect the Chinese medics’ role 
and their ability (or not) to change things in general.  
 
In June 1998, China’s legislature passed its first statute for licensed practitioners − the 
1998 PRC Medical Practitioners Act. The Act was designed for “the purpose of 
strengthening a contingent of doctors, improving occupational morals and 
professional skills of doctors, safeguarding [the] legitimate rights and interests of 
doctors, and protecting the people’s health”.113 It emphasises the need for Chinese 
medical practitioners to practise ethically for their patients’ best interest, and to avoid 
any fraud or wrongdoings. It was praised as being able to “greatly assist the 
development of professional morals in medicine”.114  
 
For example, doctors who engage in unethical conduct in healthcare settings – such as 
receiving a ‘reward’ (or ‘grey income’) from patients, recommending unnecessary 
medical tests, procedures, and services, using excessive amounts of medicine, and 
engaging in illegal surgery – breach Article 27 of the Act which reads: “Doctors shall 
not take advantage of their positions to extort or illegally accept the patients’ property 
or seek other illegitimate gains”. It states that hospitals and doctors have obligations 
to accept and treat critically ill patients rapidly, irrespective of whether or not they 
have enough money to pay for treatment.115  
 
It is clear that the 1998 Act tries to establish a legal basis for the Chinese medics’ 
ethical duty – that is to save life and to practice professionally without fraud. Apart 
from disciplining medics, the Act also aims to safeguard the legitimate rights and 
interests of doctors. It states “the whole society should respect doctors”; 116  and 
“anyone who obstructs a doctor from his medical practice according to law, insults, 
slanders, threatens or strikes a doctor, or encroaches on one’s personal freedom, or 
                                                                                                                                            
112 Legislating pharmacists is still under discussion, so far, pharmacists in China were subject to PRC 
Drug Administration Law, starts its enforcement since Dec 1st, 2001. 
113 The 1998 Act, preface.  
114 R. Peng, ‘How Professional Values are Developed and Applied in Medical Practice in China’, 30 
(2000) The Hastings Center Report 4, 23-26, 25.  
115 The 1998 Act, Article 24. 
116 The 1998 Act, Article 3. 
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interferes in one’s normal work and life shall be penalized according to the provisions 
of the Regulations on Administrative Penalties for Public Security; if a crime has been 
constituted, criminal liability shall be investigated according to law.”117 In this regard, 
the 1998 Act was trying to balance the rights and obligations of Chinese doctors and 
even extend its influence to the doctor-patient relationship (the breakdown of trust in 
this relationship, including hospital violence will be discussed in Chapters 3).   
 
With the desire to establish a credible system of medical liability, and to reduce the 
incidence of hospital violence against medical professionals, Chinese legislators 
perceived that hospital violence was a serious social problem for which a legal 
solution was required. The 2002 Regulation on the Handling of Medical Accidents 
was thus drafted to “increase the adequacy and fairness of compensation, make 
improvements to the procedure for resolving medical disputes, and overall, to reduce 
medical errors and improve the quality of care”.118 As set forth in Articles 1 and 59 of 
this Regulation, one of the purposes of the regulation is to maintain an orderly and 
safe environment for medical practice; by providing criminal penalties or other 
punishments for anyone who picks a quarrel and stirs up trouble. This corresponds to 
Article 40 of the 1998 Act as discussed earlier.  
 
Another controversial issue from the 2002 Regulation is that it assigns the burden of 
proof to healthcare practitioners in liability cases. It also imposes liability on medical 
institutions to supervise their medical staff, which includes provisions for civil 
remedies, administrative punishment, and even criminal punishment in very serious 
cases. This shows the ambition of the Chinese government in trying to deal with 
complex doctor-patient relationships. Harris and Wu have suggested that “The 2002 
Regulation is not merely a mechanism for handling individual cases of medical 
malpractice…Chinese lawmakers have combined reform of the liability system with 
efforts to improve the quality of care. Thus, this Regulation describes a 
comprehensive system of quality assurance, reporting requirements, regulatory 
supervision, administrative discipline, and compensation for injuries to patients.”119  
                                                 
117 The 1998 Act, Article 40. 
118 The 2002 Regulation on the Handling of Medical Accidents, Article 1. 
119 M. Harris and C. Wu, ‘Symposium Article: Medical malpractice in the People’s Republic of China: 
the 2002 Regulation on the Handling of Medical Accidents’ 33 (2005) Medicine & Ethics Journal of 
Law 456. 




It should be recognised that the 2002 Regulation which puts the burden of proof on 
medical professionals is a sign of improvement. Patients are given more protection 
and power because of the better regulation of patient care and healthcare institutions. 
But the side-effect of this is that, to some extent, such patient empowerment seems to 
encourage patients to make claims, and potentially, it disempowers and de-motivates 
Chinese medics. Findings in my empirical studies support this notion (more 
discussions will be given in Chapter 6). Empirical data also show that most of the 
claims are solved by monetary compensation at the pre-trial level, as hospitals try to 
avoid litigation in order to minimise the damage to their reputation.120 Since patients 
are increasingly critical of the medical profession and sceptical of their knowledge, 
medical professionals who are afraid of being sued are widely practising defensive 
medicine.121  
 
It seems necessary for both pieces of law to recognise the existing problems in 
China’s healthcare arena. In the past ten years, with an increasing number of 
healthcare laws, they begin to play an increasingly important role in governing 
Chinese medics and healthcare institutions. Although it is unclear how much effect it 
has made on encouraging or potentially de-motivating Chinese medics; healthcare 
legislation can, at best, set practice standards in this profit-driven healthcare 
environment. From a macro point of view, this is an improvement. But I recognise 
that law has its limitations, and these health laws cannot meet their ends (i.e. solving 
the crisis of trust or restoring doctor/patient relationship) without fundamentally 
reforming the healthcare financing system (more discussion in Part Three).  
 
Having discussed the healthcare regulatory mechanism (its nature, framework and 
pattern), in the next section, I will assess the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 
disciplinary controls in healthcare practice.  
 
3.3   Disciplinary Controls of the CCP 
                                                 
120 J. Yang, ‘The Side-Effect of China’s Patient-Centred Healthcare Reform’, paper presented at the 
Social Policy Association Conference 2010; also see my own empirical findings in Chapter 6.  
121 Defensive medicine means medical decisions are undertaken by medics primarily to avoid liability 
rather than to benefit the patient. Chinese medics are widely practising defensive medicine has been 
discussed by X. Chen, ‘Defensive Medicine or Economically Motivated Corruption? A Confucian 
Reflection on Physician Care in China Today’, 32 (2007) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 635-648. 




“All levels of political leadership should put healthcare as a priority on the party’s 
agenda.” 
                              
The State Council of PRC122 
 
This section aims to discuss how disciplinary control by the CCP works in China. It 
begins with an overview of the role of the CCP in general, followed by an assessment 
of the potential effect of the CCP disciplinarily controls on healthcare practice.   
 
Although no law specifies to what extent the CCP has authority to oversee healthcare 
governance, as the sole political party stipulated by the PRC Constitution, it has 
power to oversee and supervise all political, judicial, administrative and service 
institutions.123 Clearly, there is no exception for China’s healthcare facilities. Indeed, 
the CCP has penetrated into every level of Chinese society by appointing cadres to 
government and other departments and by setting up party committees and branches 
from the central government down to village committees. There were 77.99 million 
party members nationwide by the end of 2009 (about 6 percent of the Chinese 
population).124  
 
To qualify as party members, applicants must be at least eighteen years old and go 
through a one-year probationary period.125 During this period, the Party organisation 
makes serious efforts to educate and observe these probationary members. The 
selection process emphasises applicants’ technical and educational qualifications 
rather than ideological criteria. Members are expected to be “vanguard fighters of the 
Chinese working class imbued with communist consciousness” for the purpose of 
making the party apparatus “more responsive to the demands and wishes of the 
masses of the people”. The Party Constitution stresses that, 
                                                 
122 The State Council of PRC, ‘Guideline for Further reforming Medical and Pharmaceutical System’, 
available at: http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-04/06/content_1278721.htm (Last visited on Sep 29th, 2009).  
123 The Preamble of the PRC Constitution states, “Under the leadership of the Communist Party of 
China…, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people’s democratic 
dictatorship and follow the socialist road, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop socialist 
democracy, improve the socialist legal system…”.  
124 PRC Government, ‘Until the end of 2009, the Number of Chinese Communist Party Member 
Reaches 77, 995, 000’ (in Chinese), (Jun 28th, 2010) PRC Government news; Chinese Communist 
Youth League, ‘The Number of Chinese Communist Party Members Rose 16 times since the Birth of 
PRC’, available at: http://www.ccyl.org.cn/newscenter/news/200907/t20090701_264266.htm (Last 
visited on Nov 15th, 2009). 
125 The 2002 Chinese Communist Party Constitution, Chapter 1 ‘Membership’.   




“It is essential to inspire the Party members and the people with the Party’s basic line, 
patriotism, community spirit and socialist ideology, enhance their sense of national dignity, 
self-confidence and self-reliance, imbue the Party members with lofty ideals of communism, 
resist corrosion by capitalist and feudal decadent ideas and wipe out all social evils so that 
our people will have lofty ideals, moral integrity, a good education and a strong sense of 
discipline.”126 
 
Once qualified, all Party members are required to have regular training. Such training 
is done principally through the nationwide networks which combine senior officer 
management schools and administrative management schools administrated by local 
and provincial governments, the Party school system, and other specialised vocational 
training programmes.127 
 
The governors at each level of government and the heads of various government 
departments, such as the Health Bureaux and public hospitals, are usually Party 
members; while the offices of deputy governors and directors can be taken by non-
Party members. The CCP therefore can be considered to have absolute influence on 
these regulatory institutions, although it still retains many of its traditions such as 
political campaigns and exhortation as part of Party discipline.  
 
As previously noted, Chinese medical practitioners who are Communist Party 
members are under scrutiny from the monitoring and supervisory unit – the Discipline 
Inspection Committee (DIC) within the CCP. This falls under the CCP Constitution: 
“Party discipline refers to the rules of conduct that must be observed by Party 
organizations at all levels and by all Party members... Party organizations must strictly 
observe and maintain Party discipline. A Communist Party member must act 
conscientiously within the bounds of Party discipline.”128 The DIC’s role in thought 
education and disciplinary sanctions for every level of Party members indicates the 
CCP’s hierarchical structure and control in Chinese society.  
 
                                                 
126 Ibid, ‘General program’. 
127 See note 125; also see, R. L. Worden, et al. (ed), ‘CCP Membership’, China: A Country of Study 
(Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987), 106; D.L. Shambaugh, China’s Communist 
Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (California, University of California Press, 2008), 143. 
128 See note 125, ‘Chapter VII: Party’, Article 37. 
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Greenhalgh comments that, ideology is fundamental to the legitimacy of the PRC 
regime and its leaders.129 According to Wang, such political ideological education 
aims to raise the population’s “political consciousness” and “intellectual level”.130 
Nevertheless, political disciplinary control adds another dimension to the relationship 
between state governance, regulatory control and medical practitioners. This, in my 
opinion, may directly or indirectly affect the nature or function of the triplicate 
relationship or elements of its relationship in between. Under such multi-dimensional 
control, there are a lot of complexities surrounding the position and role of China’s 
healthcare practitioners.  
 
Chinese medics’ collective silence during the SARS scandal indicates that political 
propaganda and ideology have transformed the values of Chinese medics, whose first 
loyalty was no longer to the patients, but to the Party/state and to its development 
under the Marxist/socialist ideology. “The Party is like God. He is everywhere. You 
just can’t see him”.131 This expression given by a Chinese professor indicates that we 
should never underestimate the influence of the CCP, though its effects on every 
aspect of Chinese society may not seem obvious. Indeed, it is difficult to assess how 
much impact the CCP and its political disciplines have had on medical practice in 
China, from merely reading documents issued by the Party. The following Chapters 3, 
5 and 6 will therefore explore this as one of the research questions using historical and 
empirical approaches.   
 
4.   Conclusion 
 
This chapter has firstly discussed the nature of the bilateral relationship between the 
medical profession and its control mechanisms (state governance and law). Following 
the discussion, a hypothetical triangular-shaped working model of Western healthcare 
governance was suggested. This chapter then shifted its attention to the Chinese 
context, examining the healthcare state governance, as well as the control mechanisms 
                                                 
129 S. Greenhalgh et al., Governing China’s Population: from Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005).  
130 J. Wang, People’s Republic of China: Politics and Government (Beijing, Central Party School, 
1995), 29-30.  
131 Interview with a Chinese professor from Renmin University, cited by R. McGregor, The Party: the 
Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers (London, Allan Lane, 2010).  
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(including law and political discipline) and their impact on Chinese medics. It seems 
that, there is no clear boundary between law and politics in China, where law and 
political discipline are treated equally, as both are, by nature, political. The supreme 
status of Party/state in China not only presents itself in legal terms, but can also be 
seen from its governmental structure, influence and complete control in overseeing 
every level of institutions and social lives. The healthcare institutions and their 
affiliated medical practitioners are no exception. Therefore I conclude that the 
triangular-shape working model that I offer earlier does not fit the Chinese context.  
 
Since Chinese law is an expression of the will of the state, there is no clear divide 
between the respective roles of state and law. State, law and the medical profession 
can no longer form in a balanced way – a triangular model, but more as a top-down 
model as below: 
                                         State  
                                               
                                              Law 
                                     
                   Medical Practitioners/Medical Ethics 
 
This model can also be understood as a simplified Chinese healthcare regulatory 
framework (as suggested earlier), where the Chinese medical practitioners are based 
at the bottom.   
 
Having discussed both the conceptual framework and contents of administrative, 
regulatory and political controls relevant to the Chinese medics, the next chapter 
serves to orientate an analysis of the historical development of Chinese medical 
practitioners and their interactions with the state.  
 
I recognise that, though medicine is a type of applied knowledge that exists across the 
world, medical practice “is the product of the culture, the tradition, the history, and 
the personal life course of the social setting in which he or she applies that 
knowledge”. 132 Indeed, in Chapter 3, we will see that, in China, the relationship 
                                                 
132 M. G. Field, ‘The Position of the Soviet Physician: the Bureaucratic Professional’, 66 (1988) 
Milbank Quarterly 182-201, 199. 
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between state bureaucracy, regulation and the medical profession is precisely a power 
struggle between state authority and Chinese medical practitioners. The historical 
development of the Chinese medical practitioners is actually a showcase of how state 
power has been used to bring professional activities under its control.  
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CHAPTER 3   THE HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE MEDICAL 
PRACTITIONERS 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the political, economic and social background of Chinese 
medical practitioners. It aims to trace influences from the changes of traditional 
philosophies, political ideologies and social structures on medical practice, and the 
dynamic interaction between state governance and Chinese medics. This historical 
development can be divided into three chronological periods: the era of imperial and 
the Republican China; Maoist China; and lastly the Socialist market era. Finally, this 
chapter develops a preliminary hypothesis concerning state governance and law, and 
their influences on Chinese medical practice. This hypothesis, together with the 
working model (that I developed earlier) will be further tested by the empirical studies 
in the later part of this thesis. 
 
2. Chinese Health Professional Development from the Imperial 
to the Republican Era 
 
2.1   Medical Practice in Ancient China: Confucianism, State Governance and 
Bioethics  
 
Chinese medicine was based on a profound philosophy and also on a particularly rich 
empirical tradition that evolved over the last 3000 years. It took a holistic approach to 
understand the human body by its unique interventions, through diet, exercise, 
awareness of environmental influences on health, and the use of herbal remedies.133 
This section provides an overview of the professional background and its bioethical 
development in Imperial China.  
                                                 
133 J. Gawne, ‘What is Traditional Chinese Medicine’, (Jan 28th 2010) Ezine Articles, available at: 
http://ezinearticles.com/?What-is-Traditional-Chinese-Medicine?&id=3653981 (Last visited on April 
10th, 2011). 




(1)   Medical Administrative Management in Imperial China 
 
Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) began to develop in the Zhou Dynasty (1045–
256 B.C.).134 It involved many different practices employed by practitioners who had 
inherited the experience and skills from their predecessors.135 TCM gradually formed 
and grew into a more systematic ideology and practice in the Tang (618–907 A.D.) 
and Song Dynasties (960–1279 A.D.) when there was growing demand for skilful 
medics from the increasingly centralised and civilised monarchy.136Organised medical 
education, examinations, supervision and administrative management began to 
develop.  
 
Apart from the influence of the strengthening state administration, Chinese ancient 
philosophies, such as Confucianism137 and Daoism,138 also had far-reaching impacts 
on the invention and evolution of TCM. TCM allows for a tremendous amount of 
diversity via the personalisation of medical practice. Medical care was delivered by a 
variety of classes of practitioners, ranging from official Confucian physicians to 
Taoist priests and itinerant drug peddlers. 139  “All these maxims, exhortations, 
admonitions, and warnings are personal advice or suggestions of then famous and 
prestigious physicians based on their personal experience of practicing medicine, but 
not professional codes in any sense.”140  In other words, there was no unified school 
or code for TCM practitioners. Unschuld explains that, 
 
“The common underlying conceptual basis of all these practitioners [those who were well- 
educated in the tradition] was exceedingly narrow, being limited to the acknowledgement of 
certain surviving works as classic texts and a belief in the fundamental truth of the central 
theories of the five phases and the all-encompassing dualism of yin-yang. But, even the 
                                                 
134 Ibid. 
135 S. Dharmananda, ‘Understanding Chinese Medicine’, Institute for Traditional Medicine, available at: 
http://www.itmonline.org/arts/understand.htm (Last visited on Dec 13th, 2009). 
136 G. Henderson, ‘Physicians in China: Assessing the Impact of Ideology and Organization’, in F.W. 
Hafferty and J.B. McKinlay (ed), The Changing Medical Profession: An International Perspective 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), 184 -194. 
137 Confucian emphasised spiritual harmony and well-being. See, P. Lo, ‘A Confucian Philosophy of 
Medicine and Some Implications’, (2010) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1-11. 
138 Taoism emphases that following principles of the nature for the ideal life or even achieve 
immorality. See, Z. Liu, The Mystery of Longevity (Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1990), 2-3. 
139 See Note 136.  
140 R. Qiu, ‘Confucianism, Traditional and Contemporary China’, Cross-cultural Perspectives in 
Medical Ethics (London, Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2000), 293. 
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interpretation of the universally revered classics, as well as the application of these theories 
to the concrete realities of daily life, gave rise to numerous contradictions, fragmenting the 
large community of private scholars and professional medical practitioners seeking 
solutions to health-related problems into countless individuals, groups, and traditions.”141 
 
However, the absence of a unified professional code did not mean that there were no 
rules governing TCM in imperial China. The Tang Code (created in 624 A.D.) was 
the first comprehensive criminal code in Chinese history.142 It issued rules to cover 
medical malpractice disputes. For example, “if a pharmacist sold a poison instead of a 
drug, in order to poison others, and there were consequential results, the pharmacist 
would be sent to the gallows; if the above behavior existed but with no consequential 
result, the pharmacist was subject to banishment two thousand miles away; if a 
pharmacist sold a drug which could cure disease but had potential to poison, the 
pharmacist’s unknowing action of selling the drug would be not subject to 
scrutiny”143; “If a false disease was made up by a doctor in order to obtain property 
from his patient, the doctor would be charged with theft” 144 , or “if medical 
malpractice was caused by a doctor’s  wrong prescription, the doctor was subject to 
two years in jail”145 etc. 
 
With a detailed malpractice instrument such as the Tang Code in place, governors in 
the Tang Dynasty also held yearly examinations for gentry physicians (who served the 
royal families and the upper class).146 But Unschuld is right that “no comprehensive 
government regulation of the vocational practice of healthcare and, almost no 
supervision of the qualifications of the physicians and pharmacists as a whole were 
introduced during the imperial age”.147 Both the governance and legislation of the 
TCM in the Imperial period were predominantly for the benefit of the throne and the 
upper class rather than for the benefit of the general public. But this does not 
necessarily mean that ordinary people in Imperial China had less trust or respect for 
                                                 
141 P. U. Unschuld, Medicine in China: A History of Ideas (Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1985). 
142 See e.g., J. Wallace, trans., The Tang Code (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979).  
143 The Tang Code, named Tang Lv Su Yi (in Chinese) edited by Zhang Shun Wu Ji and other 18 
scholars of Tang Dynastic. Citations are originally in ancient Chinese, translated by author, Article 263.  
144 Ibid, Article 383. 
145 Ibid, Article 395. 
146 P. U. Unschuld, Medicine in China: A History of Ideas (Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1985). 
147 P. U. Unshuld, Medicine in China: A History of Pharmaceutics (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1986), 4. 
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medical practitioners. On the contrary, ancient Chinese medics were held in high 
esteem. Ancient Chinese medical ethics, which placed an emphasis on humanity and 
love, had to strike a balance between serving the Empire and the public. In the next 
section, I will review ancient Chinese medical ethics in more detail.  
 
(2) Ancient Philosophies and Traditional Chinese Medical Ethics  
 
Although the history of TCM spans more than two thousand years, the first explicit 
literature on medical ethics did not appear until the 7th century, when Sun Simiao 
(581-682 A.D.) wrote a famous treatise “On the Absolute Sincerity of Great 
Physicians”.148 Sun requires a physician to develop “the sense of compassion and pity, 
to commit himself to save every living creature, to treat every patient on equal 
grounds, and not to seek wealth by his expertise”.149 He also pointed out the necessity 
of a thorough education and rigorous conscientiousness.150 This treatise was thought 
to be the Chinese Hippocratic Oath.151  
 
As a physician, Sun’s theory reflected the social concepts inherent in Confucianism. 
Confucianism dominated China since it was founded by Kong Qiu (551-479 B.C.). 
Confucianism sought to nurture a spirit of selflessness.152 It described medicine as the 
“art of Ren (humaneness), and one was required to master the “art of Ren” to become 
a physician. 153  Specifically, the “art of Ren” required: (1) to have humanity and 
compassion at heart; (2) to practice for the benefit of patients but not oneself; and (3) 
to treat patients equally. Moreover, Ren was the fundamental human virtue that bound 
                                                 
148 S. Sun, ‘Prescriptions for Emergency worth a Thousand Pieces of Gold’ (in Chinese), in Chinese 
Medical Association (ed), A Hundred Must Read Chinese Medicine Classics (in Chinese) (Beijing, Hua 
Xia Press, 2008), 9-11; also see, P.U. Unschuld, Medical Ethics in Imperial China: A Study in 
Historical Anthropology (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979), 24-27.  
149 Ibid; also see R. Qiu, ‘Medicine- the Art of Humaneness: on Ethics of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine’, 13 (1988) the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 277-300, 278. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152 See e.g., D. C. Lau, ‘Confucius’, The Analects (Hong Kong, Chinese University, 1984); M. Elvin, 
The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford, Stanford University, 1973), 180. 
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people together, first by appropriate family relationships and then directs other winder 
social relations, such as the doctor-patient relationship.154  
 
Sun’s bioethical doctrine had many followers. For example, three centuries later, Dr 
Gong Xin wrote “Warnings to Enlightened Physicians” and “Warnings to Mediocre 
Physicians” in his Medical Lessons in Ancient and Modern Times.155 He emphasised 
that physicians should have a sense of humaneness and justice in their hearts and not 
strive for their own benefit.156 But there was also disagreement, such as, from Dr Lu 
Xi (754-805 A.D.) who pointed out that medicine was both a means to treat patients 
and to allow the group who practised medicine independently to earn money.157 In 
Unschuld’s summary, “the ‘professional’ physician, selling his medical knowledge 
and skills for money, was not socially respected in pre-modern China”. 158 Under 
Confucianism, medics are kind and skilful masters practising medicine with the virtue 
of Ren. The motivation for practicing TCM was to pursue the Confucian moral ideals 
– of self-cultivation, loyalty to the family and the state, and spiritual harmony – rather 
than material gain.159  
 
However, generally speaking, I agree with Summers that “medicine in Imperial China 
was in a peculiar position”.160 Although there were government-sponsored schools for 
training physicians and taking medical examinations, “the physician was generally 
regarded as a member of the artisan class”161 which was lower than the class of 
government officials, i.e., a gentleman- scholar, who got his job by virtue of a 
competitive civil service examination which covered classical poetry, philosophy and 
literature.162 The fact that the social status of medics was relatively low can also be 
                                                 
154 R. Fan and B. Li, ‘Truth Telling in Medicine: The Confucian View’, 29 (2004) Journal of Medicine 
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seen from the historical record. Most young people preferred to prepare themselves 
for the Imperial exams to become government officials; while becoming a medic was 
a second choice.163 
 
Unschuld explains that “the hesitation of traditional Chinese society to advance the 
medical and pharmaceutical ranks was probably grounded in a general characteristic 
of Confucian policy not to allow any experts with a specialized expert knowledge to 
rise in society as a group, because this might have led to social tensions, crises, and 
even restrictions.” 164  Indeed, every gentleman-scholar was expected to know 
sufficient medicine to care for his family, especially his parents. 165  Medical 
knowledge that was not exclusive to medical practitioners who were granted less 
power and privilege.  
 
2.2   The Practice of Medicine at the End of the Imperial Period: Western 
Medical Influence on the TCM 
 
Not only did Empire governance and ancient Chinese philosophies play roles in TCM 
development, foreign medical developments, techniques and ideas also exerted 
considerable influence on TCM. Islamic medicine had been introduced to China by 
the Arab and Persian immigrants from the Yuan Dynastic (the 8th Century) through 
the Sink Road and other overseas routes. In 923 A.D., a Chinese botanist Li Xun 
wrote Medical Matters from the Countries beyond the Sea describing 121 medicinal 
drugs imported from the Western regions, which generally referred to Central Asia, 
the Indian subcontinent, and the Middle East.166 The Islamic medical influence had 
been recorded by a Chinese scholar Zhao Rushi who wrote that more than ten Islamic 
herbs had been imported to China and been incorporated into Chinese medical 
practice.167 Despite this, the large scale of TCM and Western medicine integration did 
                                                 
163 P. Lo, ‘A Confucian Philosophy of Medicine and Some Implications’, (2010) Journal of Medicine 
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not start until the last Empire of Imperial China – the Qing Dynasty, when Western 
medical text books started to be introduced to China.168  
 
In the late 1800s, more American and European missionaries brought Western 
medicine to a number of coastal cities of China. 169  The Jennerian vaccination 
introduced to China by surgeon Alexander Pearson, had made a wide social impact.170 
Although, in general, Chinese medics still remained sceptical about Western medicine; 
a number of medical and nursing training schools, along with small hospitals, were 
established by Western missionaries.171 The following figures indicate the extent to 
which Western medicine influenced Chinese society: “By 1887, 150 missionary 
physicians had come to China, including 27 females, most of them Americans. Thirty-
three had degrees in theology or medicine. At that point, there were still no medical 
schools sponsored by foreigners.” 172  By 1915, influences from Western medicine 
further increased. There were 23 missionary medical schools, with 67 female and 238 
male students; and 36 nursing schools, with 272 students.173 At the same time, there 
were 383 missionary physicians practising in China and 330 hospitals had been 
built.174  
 
During the 1920s and 1930s, the development of Western medicine in China was 
guided by foreign advisers.175 The Chinese Medical Board was set up in 1913 by the 
Rockefeller Foundation to help develop a modern Chinese medical system, and in 
                                                 
168 Such as, Introduction to the Human Body written by Jean Terrenz and Illustrated Introduction to the 
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1917, the same Foundation founded the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC).176 
According to Bullock, this transplantation of the American medical education model, 
was based on the new Flexner model developed at Johns Hopkins University. 177 
Under an eight-year curriculum, PUMC graduated 140 students each year. These 
graduates, along with graduates from other foreign-sponsored medical schools, 
exerted considerable influence over the evolution of Western medicine in China. 
Some of them became heads of medical schools, and leaders in the Ministry of Health 
of the Republican Nationalist Government (1925-1949). However, critics noted that 
the financial and intellectual dependencies created by the Rockefeller program meant 
a Western and capitalist-dominated medical agenda only focused on teaching students 
about diseases prevalent in the West rather than improving the health of Chinese 
people.178  
 
It should also be taken into account that, at the end of the Imperial period, China 
became a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society. Western medical institutions were 
resisted by TCM practitioners who regarded these foreign aids as economic and 
political weapons intended to further colonise Chinese society.179 Chinese bioethics 
during that time had two characteristics: First, nationalism. One echo that was popular 
at that time was “transmitting one’s love for the people to one’s love of the nation”. 
During the Japanese invasion in the early 19th century, many physicians devoted 
themselves to the reform of Chinese society. Sun Yat-sen (Former president of the 
Republic of China, Taiwan), Lu Xun (a famous critic), and Guo Moruo (a writer) are 
notable figures amongst them.  
 
Secondly, “Bethune’s spirit”, meant practising medicine selflessly. Dr Norman 
Bethune was a Canadian surgeon who worked in guerrilla-based China during the 
Anti-Japanese War. He died from septicaemia caught by an infected cut whilst 
providing emergency services to Chinese patients. His heroic spirit had been praised 
by Chairman Mao and widely broadcast. Chairman Mao appealed to all Chinese 
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people to learn from him. The “Bethune’s Spirit” – selfless love is regarded as a 
moral code by Chinese medical practitioners even now (more discussions in 
contemporary Chinese medical ethics will be given shortly).  
 
To sum up, the end of Imperial China can be regarded as a period of “combat and 
survival” of Chinese medicine. It was also an important period of adjustment and 
transition for TCM practitioners who learned to practice medicine alongside Western 
medicine practitioners. Such integration brought opportunities as well as challenges to 
them; this was witnessed particularly in Maoist China. The ups and downs of medical 
practice in the Maoist China will be discussed in the next section.  
 
3.  Medical Practitioners in Maoist China 
 
In 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded by Mao Zedong after the 
end of the Civil War when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) replaced the 
Nationalist Party and set up a CCP government. Between 1949 and 1978, the Maoist 
socialist PRC was based on the Communist ideology advocated by Karl Marx, 
Friedrich Engels, and Joseph Stalin.180  
 
By the time the Communists took power in China, there was a real dilemma regarding 
how best to deal with the apparent dichotomy between Western-based medical 
practice and that followed by TCM practitioners.181 It was uncertain how many of 
these Western and TCM doctors had moved to Taiwan after the end of the Civil War, 
statistics showed there were 38,000 Western medicine doctors and 276,000 TCM 
doctors in China.182 Although the number of Western-trained physicians was much 
less than that of the TCM doctors, they were a group of people who supported the 
scientific bases of Western medicine and held more financial resources than TCM 
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doctors for  research and training opportunities; the TCM medics however were 
“oppressed, ruled and powerless.” 183  In 1949, Western medicine dominated the 
Chinese Medical Association who even called for a complete abolition of TCM.184 
Mao rejected this proposal and urged recognition and support of TCM. By 1954, the 
government officially recognised TCM practitioners as representing a “medical legacy 
of the motherland” and thus began a parallel development between Western and TCM 
practice.185  
 
This section discusses Chinese medics’ experiences in Mao’s China. Chronologically, 
it is divided into three parts: (1) Ministry of Health (MOH) and Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP); (2) doctors under attack: the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; and 
(3) the shifting power of the MOH and the status of medical practitioners.  
 
3.1 Medicine under the CCP 
 
In the initial years of the PRC, the prestige of Western medicine remained high in 
society, and the CCP relied on the cohort of Western-trained physicians for advice 
and leadership. 186 The PRC Ministry of Health (MOH) was staffed with Western 
medical practitioners who were both CCP members and had army experience. These 
practitioners set up the curriculum at the newly established, state-owned medical 
schools that were similar to the Western sponsored schools.  
 
The CCP-led government, at that time, drew heavily upon the Yugoslav experience, 
which stressed rural medical modernisation, particularly, in training local peasants in 
rural health work. In the CCP-led government’s opinion, the MOH represented the 
urban and Western professional bias which conflicted with its country-based health 
delivery policies. The MOH, on the other hand, thought that the quality of health 
workers should not be compromised by quantity. What is more, it believed that the 
most important problems facing China were the lack of the resources to expand the 
training of medical personnel and the cost-effectiveness issues raised by the 
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increasing demand of urban hospitals.187 Lampton argues that the professional and 
military backgrounds of staff in MOH “reinforced in these individuals a desire to 
resist complete Party political domination of ‘professional’ work”.188  
 
To give legitimacy to the CCP policy, four basic guidelines for the organisation of 
healthcare were high on the agenda for the first National Health Congress of the PRC 
in August 1950:  
   “1. Medicine should serve the workers, peasants and soldiers; 
    2. Preventive medicine should take precedence over therapeutic medicine; 
    3. Chinese traditional medicine should be integrated with Western scientific medicine; 
    4. Health work should be combined with mass movement”.189  
 
The guidelines confirmed that the focus of healthcare in this period was typified by an 
emphasis on prevention, and easily affordable access to basic curative care. Gradually 
political healthcare policies began to win over professional wishes, and Western 
medical practitioners in China became controlled by CCP bureaucrats.  
 
To achieve this national agenda set out by the National Health Congress, Western-
trained healthcare practitioners were losing support for learning and development of 
new diagnostic methods for treating rarer and more complicated illnesses. Instead, 
they had to take time from research to be more frequently involved in training 
peasants in the basic knowledge of medicine, while these rural barefoot doctors were 
given much more opportunity to be trained and to participate in the basic prevention 
of disease in rural areas.190  
 
By the mid-1950s, the battle between Western medics of the MOH and the CCP 
became really serious. The CCP actively campaigned to undermine the MOH’s 
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authority. It even formed a national committee – the Nine Man Sub-Committee 
(NMSC) to promote its public health agenda without involvement of the MOH. The 
NMSC, which consisted of CCP members from departments of agriculture, health and 
water conservancy, effectively established their own health apparatus by promoting 
mass campaigns guided by Mao’s socialist equity values;191 as a result of which, 
finances and human resources were diverted towards rural areas and away from the 
cities and basic research, and “the most detached” middle levels of the Party structure 
was tied to “both professional and local (peasant) pressures”.192  
 
Beside the establishment of institutions (such as, the NMSC) and rural health delivery 
policies, conventional bureaucratic strategies were also applied by the CCP, to 
increase its control over healthcare governance. Since the 1950s, physicians with CCP 
membership not only staffed the MOH, but were positioned as leaders of medical 
schools and hospitals.193 Indeed, when more loyal CCP individuals were placed in 
strategic positions and more mainstream CCP ideologies were institutionalised in the 
healthcare system, the medical community gradually lost its power to oversee medical 
education, research, or even control orthodox medical knowledge.  
 
In 1955, Mao called for a re-evaluation of TCM and incorporated it into the formal 
structure of medical education.194 Various TCM schools were encouraged to establish 
their own academies with courses based on TCM added to all medical schools.195 This 
formal integration of Chinese and Western medicine forced the assimilation of TCM 
knowledge into the Western medicine framework, such as case recodes and 
institutionalised trainings.196 More importantly, it seemed to increase the status of 
TCM and gave its practitioners access to more resources.  
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However, Henderson reminds us that such empowerment “was accomplished on party 
terms rather than those of the various leaders of traditional medicine.” 197 Indeed, 
Departments of TCM and of combined Western and TCM were set up in most 
hospitals, bringing many private practitioners into the state-run organisations under 
the planned economic framework.198 By 1966 virtually all clinics and hospitals in 
PRC were owned by either the government or by labour unions.199 Mao’s calling for 
TCM empowerment eventually brought all TCM practitioners under institutional 
control.  
 
                       3.2   Doctors under Attack: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution  
 
The economic setbacks suffered after the disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1961 
temporarily weakened the CCP and reinforced the MOH.200 However, the conflict 
between the CCP and MOH continued until 1965, when Mao expressed his anger in a 
public message towards the “elite clique” of bureaucrats running the MOH: 
 
“Tell the Ministry of Health that it only works for 15% of the total population and that this 
15% is mainly composed of lords, while the broad masses of peasants do not get any 
treatment. The Ministry of Health is not Ministry of Health for the People, so why not 
change its name to the Ministry of Urban Health, the Ministry of Lord’s Health, or even the 
Ministry of Urban Lord’s Health?”201 
 
It is noted that, under Mao’s rule, public health made most progress in rural areas. The 
creation of the paramedics by Mao in 1965, so called ‘barefoot doctors’, were assisted 
by midwives and community health workers affiliated to health clinics in rural 
areas.202 Around 1.3 million peasants were trained for 3 to 6 months and qualified as 
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healthcare workers to provide basic prevention and intervention services in rural 
areas.203  
 
The health policy led by Mao was credited with bringing almost universal healthcare 
to the population. However, the Cultural Revolution, which was set in motion by Mao, 
brought chaos to medical practice, and long-term suffering to Chinese medical 
practitioners and academics. In 1966, the CCP passed its Decision Concerning the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.204 The decision suggested,  
 
“At present, our objective is to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are 
taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic 
‘authorities’ and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to 
transform education, literature and art, and all other parts of the superstructure that do not 
correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and 
development of the socialist system.”205 
 
In 1949, there were 22 medical schools with 152,000 students enrolled in China.206 
From the 1960s onwards, most medical schools were shut, as medical academics were 
dispatched to the countryside for up to ten years, to “learn from the peasants”.207 
Others were beaten, imprisoned and publicly humiliated. 208  During that period, 
biomedical scientists were criticised for conducting research divorced from the needs 
of the masses; medical academics and practitioners were accused of arrogance and 
promoting their own interests above patients’ interests. In Mao’s 1965 directive, he 
stated the following ideas concerning medical education: 
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   “Medical education should be reformed. There is no need to read so many books. In medical 
education there is no need to accept only middle school graduates. It will be enough to give 
three years to graduates from primary schools. They would then study and raise their standards 
mainly through practice. If this kind of doctor is sent down to the countryside, even if they do 
not have much talent, they would be better than quacks and witchdoctors and the villages would 
be better able to afford to keep them. The more books one reads, the more stupid one gets. We 
should leave behind in the city a few of the less able doctors who graduated one or two years 
ago and others should go to the countryside, if medical and health work put emphasis on the 
countryside.”209 
 
It was recorded that, within health administration offices, medically qualified experts 
were replaced by those who were judged politically reliable.210 Medical organisations 
were taken over by CCP leaders who could demonstrate any revolutionary health 
work experiences, no matter how remote.211 Professional associations were curtailed. 
Academic journals stopped publishing. Anyone suspected of having a foreign 
connection or being a Western supporter was rounded up for criticism and 
punishment.212 Under such great oppression, the MOH was actually closed down. “In 
the 1967-1969 period, not a single major health directive originated with the MOH. 
All directives were, instead, given the imprimatur of Chairman Mao, the Central 
Committee, the Cultural Revolution Group, or the Standing Committee of the State 
Council.”213 
 
In short, the Cultural Revolution, which involved countless anti-professional, anti-
technological, anti-urban, anti-foreign campaigns lasted almost a decade in China.214 
No group, not even the Communist Party members, was free from suspicion. It was in 
particular a living history of deprofessionalisation (by which I mean a way of losing 
occupational control. I will explain this in more depth in Chapter 7). Ranks, salaries, 
and other signs of professional prestige were abolished in all medical institutions at 
that time. The status of the profession was reversed; for example, doctors were 
ordered to sweep floors and were forced to make self-criticism of their elitist 
behaviours and attitudes; many nurses or medical students replaced surgeons who 
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performed tasks which should have been done by physicians or their teachers. 215 
Patients were encouraged to join in medical decision-making, while doctors were 
reluctant to offer unsolicited advice or supervise patient care. Medical record-keeping 
was discontinued as few were willing to take responsibility for decision-making.216  
 
In 1971, a few medical schools reopened, but they offered a largely political 
curriculum; medical disciplines were relegated to secondary importance. It is reported 
that the medical training curriculum was reduced to three years and did not resume a 
standard five-year curriculum until 1977. 217  Policies and research protocols were 
given to TCM and grass-roots facilities.  
 
The Cultural Revolution illustrated Michel Foucault’s observation that “medicine is 
politics”.218 Foucault’s analysis of power is helpful in understanding the functions (or 
loss of function) of the medical profession (which will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7). The devastating mass campaign brought about the destruction of 
physicians’ and of other health workers’ ability to control medical knowledge and 
regulate their work. Though TCM practitioners gained legitimacy during the process, 
medicine under Mao, in essence was not a battle between Western medical 
practitioners and those who practiced TCM. It was a battle between politics and the 
medical profession.  
 
The loss of control of Chinese medical practitioners over their practice in the last 
century is still seen today. The CCP and its ruling committees emerged in charge of 
every workplace; and this remains so even now. 219  The change of the MOH’s 
organisational pattern and its political agenda from resisting to fully supporting the 
CCP reflects the CCP’s dominant position in healthcare governance. Healthcare 
delivery strategy became more bureaucratic than professional. And “because of the 
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extraordinary extent of organisational dependency to which all medics in state-run 
health institutions were subject, there were few countervailing forces available to 
break the authority of the party.” 220 Importantly, the Cultural Revolution had 
completely destroyed the confidence of Chinese medics, and it will take a long time, 
both for their confidence and their ability to say “No”, to be restored.  
 
4.  Chinese Medics in the Profit-Driven Period  
 
After reviewing briefly a long history of development of Chinese medical 
practitioners under the context of continuing political, social and economic transitions, 
this section will discuss contemporary Chinese medical practitioners’ position in 
relation to the transitional healthcare system, and healthcare regulation as well as 
political disciplinary controls. It starts by giving an overview of Chinese medical 
practitioners’ experience during the healthcare transition and post-Mao economic 
reforms. It then ponders what impacts the healthcare system and economic 
transformations have had on Chinese medical ethics and the doctor-patient 
relationship. Finally, this section maps the power structure of Chinese healthcare and 
puts forward a graphic model representing the relationship between state, law and 
medics in contemporary China. 
 
4.1   Chinese Medical Practitioners in the Healthcare Transition Period 
 
After the death of Mao in 1976, and with the end of his political campaigns, daunting 
challenges lay ahead for Chinese medical practitioners. From 1978 onwards, China 
under Deng Xiaoping, initiated market reforms to improve China’s economy. He 
labelled this as “socialism with unique Chinese characteristics”.221 Under the reform, 
economics was once again in command and law was formalised.222 Market reform has 
been the driving force of China’s social development until today, although, politically, 
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the CCP and its ideology still provide the leadership to the government and its 
legislative, executive and judicial branches.  
 
Under this trend of economic reform, university entrance examinations were 
reinstituted in 1977.223 Doctors at all levels who had received training during the 
Cultural Revolution were offered special review courses and subjected to qualifying 
examinations in order to continue practice.224 Scientists, educators, and scholars were 
permitted contact with international colleagues and to study abroad.225 For the first 
time in many years, foreign technology was imported. International agencies and 
foundations started to offer advice, staff training, loans and grants. Western medical 
equipment and pharmaceutical companies began to flood the Chinese health 
market.226 Although the health policies of the 1980s have been criticised for ignoring 
patient interests, the decade was devoted to restoration and modernization, and to 
some extent, Chinese medics were given back authority. 227  Expertise became a 
criterion for leadership. Ranks were reintroduced and salaries were increased.  
 
However, the Chinese medical education system and public health institutions have 
been detrimentally affected in the aftermath of Maoist policies. China was short of 
experienced senior healthcare professionals, epidemiologists, medical technicians and 
other specialists required to make and implement public health policy.228 In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, China was desperate to re-establish normal governmental 
health functions. However, because of the lack of educated labour from which to 
recruit, a large number of people who received little or no formal training have been 
placed in government health agencies, especially in the poorer provinces.229 
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As salaried employees of state-run healthcare institutions, Chinese medics have been 
bound closer to institutions during this period. After graduating from medical school, 
Chinese medical students were assigned to jobs that gave them housing and child-care 
benefits, healthcare subsidies and other welfare benefits making it almost impossible 
for them to leave. The terms of their medical practice (salary, type, and number of 
patients seen) were set by the state. Workplace leaders had considerable authority in 
evaluating any professional matters, to which political rather than economic criteria 
were applied. Joining the CCP therefore, became a great opportunity to show their 
commitment to the state and be promoted.  
 
Health delivery was also highly bureaucratic. For example, the decision to purchase a 
new drug was subject to many layers of committee review and to competing 
budgetary constraints of under-funded organisations.230 The state’s close relation with 
hospitals presents not only involves monetary control, but also represents a command-
and-control system – “a bureaucratic-managerial system whereby the government can 
exercise more direct control over what healthcare providers actually do”.231 Chinese 
public hospitals are subject to personnel control, political surveillance and 
bureaucratic regulation. For example, local government can exercise direct control 
over the number of posts or personnel appointments in hospitals, and over the extent 
of investment in high-tech equipment.232 
 
In short, reforms since the 1980s have restored the normal working life for physicians 
from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, but medical practitioners are still 
bureaucratised and it is difficult to determine the degree to which medics are 
empowered individually or collectively. The next two sections seek to trace the 
impact of the healthcare system transition on medical ethics and the healthcare 
delivery environment.  
 
4.2   Medical Ethics in the New Era 
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Heal the wounded, rescue the dying, practice revolutionary humanitarianism. 
 
The Motto of Chinese socialist medical ethics233 
 
In 1979, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics organised the first group of American bio-
ethicists, along with lawyers, philosophers, theologians, and physicians, to travel 
throughout China for two weeks to explore Chinese bioethics.234 However, reflection 
on their discoveries seemed intellectually disappointing. Far from what they expected, 
“a number of very sincere, [and] interested individuals deal with issues that we in the 
United States would unquestionably see as bioethical. These issues in China, however, 
have not evoked the same intellectual scrutiny; they lack a tradition of criticism and 
debate about the intellectual bases of social and moral policies.”235 
 
In Engelhardt’s report, he frankly stated that, for many Chinese intellectuals including 
physicians, “ethics was a mode of moral indoctrination or of exegesis of a single 
moral viewpoint, in this case Maoist-Leninist-Marxism.”236 The Chinese “failed to 
distinguish principles” they held from “grounds” or “conceptual foundations” that 
justified those principles for the reason that:  
 
  “(1) Their lack of extended experience with a variety of moral viewpoints; (2) unfamiliarity 
with discussions focused primarily on discovering the comparative intellectual merits of 
varying moral viewpoints apart from any immediate concern to establish or maintain a 
single one; and (3) their overriding tendency, because of dialectical materialism, to hold 
that all ethical reflections are reducible to economic forces.”237 
 
And he concluded that, in China, “there is no well-developed philosophical tradition 
of questioning basic assumptions and of seeking the underlying justifications for 
claims in ethics and sciences.”238 And though “there was a well-developed set of 
moral views”, Chinese intellectuals (including physicians) “had not attended with a 
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conceptual, analytical interest” to the nature of bioethics and had “no systematic 
regard for the justification of their presuppositions”. 239 
 
In 1981, sociologists Fox and Swazey conducted six-weeks of fieldwork at a Western 
medical hospital in Tianjin, a Northern industrial city of China.240 Chinese medics’ 
“medical morality” was described by them as “a spirit of self-sacrifice and self-
cultivation, a high sense of responsibility, modesty, self-control, devotion, and other 
virtues.”241 Their observation, analysis, interpretation and evaluation as sociologists 
of China’s medical ethics was different from that of the scholars sent by the Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics; they not only saw the existence of Chinese medical ethics, but also 
pointed out the difference between Chinese and Western medical ethics. They argued 
that, many aspects of Chinese medical morality, such as, the emphasis on personal 
virtues, holism, mutual dualism (which involved a chain of dualities: Yin-Yang, self 
and others, the individual and society, preventive and curative medicine, and so forth), 
and the principles of pragmatism and collectivism, could provide an “antidote” to 
many problems in Western bioethics.242  
 
At the same time, Fox and Swazey criticised the “American-ness” of bioethics and 
“its intellectual assumptions with a series of observations about its narrowly gauged 
individualism…, scientism, absolutism, secularism” and so forth.243 They states that 
“Bioethics is not just bioethics, and is more than medical.”244 For Fox and Swazey, 
their appreciation of Chinese medical morality came from the perspective of cultural 
comparison. They thought outside the box and had a broader view of bioethics. 
 
Referring to traditional Chinese medical ethics, one key Confucian principle that still 
strongly influences contemporary Chinese medics is– that “the practice of medicine 
as a benevolent cause to do good” has been emphasised by Engelhardt and 
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Hinkley.245 It means that physicians should try their best even when there is little 
hope of success. They must act with little regard for their own personal safety, and 
sometimes even be willing to give up their own life in order to save the patient. This 
moral duty carries a strong sense of selflessness. The Maxims for Medical Workers, 
addressed by the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, sheds some light on the 
selflessness emphasising medical ethics: 
 
“Heal the wounded, rescue the dying; Treat people equally, without discrimination; Have a    
sense of responsibility; Constantly improve one’s skill; Be honest and upright; Seek no 
personal gain; Words cordial and kind; Be dignified and sedate; Put patient’s interest first; 
Unite with one’s colleagues.”246 
 
Medical ethics must be set within the context of the healthcare system in order to be 
understood properly. In February 1982, the PRC Ministry of Health (MOH) published 
Maxims for Medical Workers in Hospitals: 
 
  “1. Ardently love the motherland, the Communist Party, socialism, and the thought of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong; 
2. Try hard to study politics and endeavour to gain professional proficiency…; 
3. Display the spirit of healing the wounded, rescuing the dying, and …serve the people 
whole-heartedly; 
   4. Take the lead in observing the laws and decrees of the state…; 
5. Submit oneself to organizations, be concerned with the collective…; 
   6. Have a boundless sense of responsibility in one’s work; rigorously enforce rules and 
regulations and operating instructions; 
7.  Be honest in performing one's duties; stand fast at one’s post…; 
8.  Pay attention to politeness; actively take part in the patriotic health campaign...”247  
 
The official publication of medical practice disciplines which emphasised “the 
motherland, the Communist Party, socialism, and the thought of Marxism-Leninism 
and Mao Zedong” indicated that merely being selfless to serve patients is not enough 
for Chinese medics. They are required to be loyal supporters of the CCP-led 
government and be willing to submit themselves to the organisations. They need to be 
both technically accountable and politically obedient.  
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One question to be raised is whether such selflessness and loyalty emphasising 
bioethics is still relevant to Chinese medical practitioners today. More recent research 
found that Chinese medics were less familiar with the contemporary presentation of 
bioethics and more likely to be confused about their ethical responsibilities in this 
new era. After two decades of healthcare and economic reforms, more recent research 
showed that Chinese medical practitioners were confused about the meaning of 
bioethics. According to an investigation of the medical school of Zhejiang University, 
about 91.5% of 687 surveyed students were unable to define professional ethics.248 At 
Jinzhou Medical University, 230 freshmen participated in a quantitative study. Only 
19.57% of the students believed it was a professional ideal to rescue the dying and 
heal the wounded, or to practice humanitarianism. About 73.04% students responded 
that their idea of being a medical professional was one with high medical skills; and 
this was also the foundation for one to gain respect and future career promotion. 
7.39% of students responded that their professional ideals were driven by personal or 
financial interests.249 
 
Indeed, under rapid socio-economic transitions, the ways that Chinese medical 
students view bioethics, its conceptions and applications, and how much these ethical 
norms are mandatory may have changed. Chapters 5 and 6 will revisit this issue and 
present empirically-based answers, where I am going to explore contemporary 
Chinese medics’ understanding of medical ethics; and how they would prioritise 
bioethics with other control mechanisms (such as, law and political disciplines) when 
they come into conflict in practice.   
 
To sum up, in the new economic reform era, the actual influence of Chinese medics 
over the healthcare system transition has been limited; what is more, they might have 
become more passive than their predecessors in the early decades of the PRC. Chinese 
medical ethics which had been influenced largely by Chinese ancient philosophies, 
such as Confucius, have moved into an undefined transitional era. 
 
4.3   A Breakdown of the Doctor-Patient Relationship 
                                                 
248 B. Zhang, ‘The Important Role of Case Studies in Ethical Teaching in Medical Education’, in O. 
Döring (ed) Ethics in Medical Education in China: Distinguishing Education of Ethics in Medicine 
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249 Ibid.  




Under health reforms, cost recovery and expansion of revenue-earning services were 
the main strategies adopted by hospitals in China.250 Health providers were inclined to 
respond to the financial incentives embedded in fee-for-service payments by 
providing more services, thereby earning more for themselves and their institutions.251 
They pursued their own ‘survival’ agenda by increasing user charges and favouring 
expensive prescriptions and new medical technologies and pharmaceuticals.252 The 
distorted financial arrangements led to so-called ‘Public identity, private behaviours’, 
with revenue maximization overshadowing traditional Confucian ethical standards.253 
This eventually caused a breakdown of the doctor-patient relationship in China.  
 
With limited regulatory activities and the absence of a pricing policy, according to 
data from the Chinese Ministry of Health, drug prices increased dramatically, by up to 
68% in 2007 and 74% in 2008.254 Consumer dissatisfaction around such issues as 
reduced benefits of previously publicly-funded insurance schemes, the poor attitudes 
of doctors, and poor quality of hospitals and physician services have been frequently 
reported. 255  When the relationship between patients and the medical profession 
became increasingly tense, healthcare violence emerged when conflicts escalated.256 
There have been alarming reports that Chinese medical practitioners have been 
attacked by patients or members of patients’ families.257 From 2000 to 2003, there 
were 502 reports of violence against the medical practitioners in Beijing, in which 
medics were wounded or disabled. 258 From January 1991 to July 2001, in Hubei 
                                                 
250 A. P. den Exter (ed) International Health Law: Solidarity and Justice in Health Care (Apeldorn, 
Maklu, 2008), 203. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid. 
253 H. Zhao, Governing the Health Care Market: Regulatory Challenges and Options in the 
Transitional China, PhD thesis, La Trobe University, School of Public Health, 2005, 37. 
254 Ministry of Health, PRC Healthcare Service Data Report 2008 (in Chinese), available at: 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohwsbwstjxxzx/s8208/200904/40250.htm 
(Last visited on Dec 1st, 2010). 
255 Ibid, 30. 
256 See e.g., P. Zheng, et al., ‘Public hospitals in China: Privatization, the Demise of Universal Health 
Care and the Rise of Patient-Doctor Violence’, 4 (2006) Journal of Law & Medicine 465-70; E.G. Hui, 
‘The Contemporary Healthcare Crisis in China and the Role of Medical Professionalism’, 35 (2010) 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 477- 492. 
257 See note 4.  
258 Ibid. 
Chapter 3   The Historical Development of Chinese Medical Practitioners 
 
64 
province, 568 attacks on healthcare facilities and medics were reported, and some 
medical practitioners were even killed.259  
 
It has been noted that medical disputes raised by medical malpractice have increased. 
According to the Chinese Medical Doctor Association’s the 2004 Research Report of 
the patient-doctor relationship in China, on average, there are 66 medical disputes 
raised with each hospital a year. And there are 5.42 attacks on healthcare facilities and 
5 on medical professionals in each hospital each year.260 In the city of Shenzhen, 
medical practitioners at one hospital even have to wear helmets to work.261 Those acts 
of hospital violence have been attributed, in part, to the tremendous surge in 
healthcare costs and public grievances, but, mainly, to a decline of trust in and respect 
for medical practitioners (more discussion about this problem will be given in Chapter 
9).  
 
The healthcare reforms after Mao have been mainly driven by market forces. During 
this process, medics have been perceived by the Chinese public as more like share-
holders of a profit-driven healthcare market, rather than public-interest guardians. 
Hospital violence reflects conflicting interests between patients and the system 
Chinese medics are serving.  
 
5.  Conclusion  
 
Thousands of years of Chinese history suggest that it is the state that decides whether 
it confers authority on medical practitioners or not. China demonstrates a remarkable 
system of state power. This state power is ruled by a single Communist party system. 
Until today, Chinese medics have continuously met with daunting challenges. Fifty 
years ago, the Cultural Revolution condemned thousands of Chinese practitioners to 
labour camps. Today, medics play an important role in China’s drive to modernise its 
healthcare system. The number of medical practitioners has increased dramatically, 
yet the public remains unsure of them and reports of corruption surround them.  
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The evidence-based nature of Western medicine does not necessarily grant its 
practitioners the status of being held in high regard in the political arena. Henderson 
says, 
 
“Much like the controversy between Confucian and independent practitioners in imperial 
China, the conflict between Western and traditional medicine can be understood on several 
levels. It reflects debate over the virtue of two different worldviews in China, identifying 
themselves through different responses to the models of state medicine, and it signifies the 
struggle between two warring factors within the leadership of the country.”262   
 
In China, both TCM and Western medics are subjected to political ideological 
surveillance and to the organisational dependency forced on them by the Soviet-style 
bureaucracy established in 1949.  
 
Today, under a different economic system, questions raised are, how have these 
historic and contemporary, political and economic factors, contributed to professional 
authority? How do Chinese medical practitioners react to state governance and law? 
In Chinese medics’ daily practice, whether, how and why do laws or political 
ideologies take priority over medical ethics and professional knowledge? 
 
In order to find answers to these questions, Part Two of this thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 
6) presents first-hand responses from medics about their interactions with law, state 
bureaucracy and Communist Party. In short, the main purpose of the empirical studies 
is to explore the ways in which the medical practices of health workers are affected by 
guiding principles, such as law, political ideologies and bioethics, whether they have 
experienced and how they resolve any ethical dilemmas caused by conflicting 
principles and moral duties in practice.   
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SUMMARY OF PART ONE AND HYPOTHESIS 
FORMULATION FOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
1. Summary of Part One: Mapping the Power Structure of 
Healthcare Governance in China 
 
After outlining the general healthcare governance model from the Western 
experiences, Part I of this thesis has explored the historical development of China’s 
healthcare practitioners from the ancient Imperial era to the contemporary Socialist 
economic age. The power structure of China’s healthcare governance shows that the 
determinants of China’s healthcare regulation are mainly political. Though some 
individual medical practitioners were invited to participate in the National People’s 
Congress meetings, without a regime of transparent elections with democratic voting, 
it is unclear how representative their views will be. The influence of Chinese medics 
as a group is still too small to be able to challenge state dominance.  
 
In China, the state engages actively in deciding what is morally right or wrong in 
medical practice. It is known that not all Chinese medics are CCP members and not 
all of them are subject to the internal party disciplinary sanction. However, political 
ideological education has been given to all Chinese through the media as a way of 
propaganda. Medical ethics, under this circumstance, can hardly be regarded as the 
medics’ own business.  
 
As argued previously in Chapter 2, the Western triangular-shape working model was 
found unfit in the Chinese context. Generalised from the above conceptual discussion 
and historical observations, the triangular model was replaced by a re-formulated 
Chinese top-down model as below:                                                                   
                                                        State  
                                                 
                                                               Law 
                                     




In this model, the state remains at the top of the power structure determining the 
healthcare law and overseeing the law-ruled Chinese medics.  
 
However, such a top-down model fails to provide enough details about how Chinese 
medical practitioners perceive their position in this governing structure. It is also 
uncertain whether the hypothetical model generated from literature reflects “the real 
world” in terms of medical practice. And therein lies the need for further testing and 
re-evaluation. Indeed, this objective informed the methodology adopted in this thesis: 
to listen to the voices of the Chinese medical practitioners who have been hidden 
behind a veil of silence about their views on law, political ideology and bioethics. At 
the end of Part One, the last section aims to bridge the literature review with the 
following empirical studies in Part Two. Drawing from what has been discussed in 
Part One, I will develop an empirically testable hypothesis to be examined in the 
fieldwork.  
 
2. Hypothesis Formulation for the Empirical Studies 
 
In this section, several ethically distorted cases, that originally drew my attention to 
this research project, will be reviewed and used to generate hypotheses to be 
examined in the quantitative and qualitative studies in Part Two.  
 
The empirical studies aim to lift the veil of silence from Chinese medical practitioners 
who are incompetent through their lack of professional ethical judgement, or even 
actively involved in immoral governmental actions that might endanger the health and 
lives of their patients. The hypothetical top-down relationship of China’s healthcare 
power structure will also be examined. In short, the empirical studies seek to explore 
the Chinese medics’ perceptions of the extent of control they have over the regulation 
and governance of their profession. More specifically, research questions to be 
addressed in the empirical study are:  
 
(1) How dynamic are Chinese medical practitioners’ views on hospital rules, law, 
political order and medical ethics and how do they shape their views?  
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(2) Do ethical dilemmas exist in the Chinese medics’ daily practice? If so, how do 
they resolve them? 
And (3) what is or are perceived by Chinese medics as problematic? What changes do 
they expect to happen?    
 
Before seeking answers to these questions, I attempt to probe preliminary answers 
concerning the Chinese medics’ legal consciousness from the following two case 
studies.  
 
Case One happened in Beijing where it was reported that the hospital had the 
capability to save a pregnant woman and her unborn child’s life by giving her an 
emergency operation. 263  When the pregnant woman lost consciousness, and her 
husband who was sceptical of the doctors’ diagnosis refused to sign the consent form 
authorising a C-section to be preformed on his pregnant wife, doctors tried 
unsuccessfully to contact the patient’s other relatives through the police. They asked 
for permission to perform the operation from the local administrator overseeing the 
hospital. But the response was that “the operation cannot proceed without the patient 
or her families’ consent.” Consequently, none of the thirty doctors dared to take the 
risk of providing the emergency surgery for her without valid consent. In the end, the 
woman and her unborn child died in the hospital.  
 
Case Two concerns organ transplantation. Two patients were in need of kidney 
transplants, but neither of their families were compatible organ donors. 264  Yet, 
coincidently, their organ donors’ kidneys were suitable for transplant to the 
counterpart patients. They proposed to the hospital that they exchange their organ 
donors in this manner. But their proposal was refused by that hospital’s ethical 
committee by referring to the PRC Organ Transplant Law that says living organ 
donation cannot be approved between non-relatives.  
 
These two cases suggest that, in the face of ethical-legal dilemmas, while authoritative 
bureaucracy was not involved in the medical decision-making, Chinese medics did 
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prioritise law over ethics. My speculation on the underlying causes or motives is that, 
in today’s China, the media and public would attack medics for their “callousness”. 
Under such pressures, Chinese medical practitioners have learned to be cautious. They 
put “free from responsibility” ahead of patient safety; that is why they wait for 
authorisation before starting an operation, rather than taking their own professional 
decisions. When the patients’ trust in doctors and hospitals has been severely 
damaged, Chinese medics frequently practice defensive medicine so as to justify their 
treatment and protect themselves from being sued or even physically attacked.   
 
Besides a high level of legal consciousness, Chinese medics also have great political 
sensitivity. After the Sanlu dairy scandal broke out in China - a food safety incident 
in 2008 with an estimated 300,000 victims, with 6 infants dying from kidney stones 
and other kidney damage, and a further 860 babies hospitalised,265 several families 
who were victims of the scandal sought legal advice. The Chinese government put 
pressure on the lawyers who were in touch with victims’ families. 266 Based on an 
interview with a doctor’s wife, the media reported that, her husband (the doctor) had 
reminded her never to tell any journalist that the hospital he worked for had received 
an internal order from a government department to “close their mouths and make no 
comment on the milk scandal”.267  
 
As is shown by the problematic and ethically-distorted SARS case, a whole nation of 
physicians, except one, had participated in the cover-up (more discussion will be 
given in Chapter 7). This, to some extent, indicates that Chinese medics lack power in 
the healthcare system as a group. In the course of studying the case of dairy scandal, 
and especially the doctor’s reaction to the state’s internal order, many new questions 
are also raised:  
(1) How does a Chinese medical practitioner prioritise between medical ethics, law 
and political ideology when these are in conflict?  
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(2) Does a medical practitioner exercise his or her own professional judgement, but 
feel disempowered and dare not speak or act?   
(3) Does a medic simply agree with the authority and believe that no criticism or 
resistance is the best way to contribute to a “harmonious” society?   
 
Based on the literature review, and my own observation and pilot interviews 
conducted in China in August 2007, my hypothesis is, that Chinese medical 
practitioners may have a relatively high legal consciousness. They would use law to 
protect themselves but not as a vehicle for protecting the best interests of patients. The 
Party/state still remains as a supreme power in supervising healthcare practice. When 
there is a legal or policy gap (which also means neither state governance nor the law 
is in place to supervise behaviours), a commercial interest would become the main 
motive for their behaviour. Medical ethics may play the least important role in the 
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CHAPTER 4   METHODOLOGY 
 
It is much easier to recognise error than to find truth; the former lies on the surface, this 
is quite manageable; the latter resides in the depth, and this quest is not everyone’s 
business.  
 
                       Johann Wolfgang von Goethe268 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Part Two of this thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) aims to present empirical evidence of the 
degree to which medical practitioners think seriously about law, political norms and 
bioethics, and how these pluralist guidelines impact on or are impacted by Chinese 
medical practitioners. Specifically, I will report the findings of empirical studies 
designed to explore the extent to which my initial question − how do medics prioritise 
laws, political ideology and medical ethics − is supported by empirical data. This 
chapter seeks to highlight the dilemmas and problems experienced when designing, 
conducting and analysing the empirical research.  
 
2.  Sampling  
 
2.1   Choice of Venues and Respondents 
 
A representative sample “reflects the population accurately so that it is a microcosm 
of the population.”269 It is generally assumed that a representative sample is more 
likely to be the outcome of random selection, though random selection of a sample 
cannot guarantee an absence of bias.  By the end of 2009, the number of Chinese 
healthcare workers reached 7,844,000.270  The need to sample was inevitable, and the 
first question raised in the field was how to select representative samples for my 
qualitative and quantitative studies. 
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Bryman says, “it is incredibly difficult to remove any bias and deliver a truly 
representative sample, what needs to be done is to ensure that steps are taken to keep 
bias to an absolute minimum.”271 Considering the probability of using a randomly 
selected sample of Chinese health professionals, I realised that to do this, I would 
have to seek governmental support. In other words, only by seeking governmental 
cooperation and permission for such a top-down approach, would I be able to access 
those randomly chosen healthcare workers.  
 
When conducting large-scale social research in China, authorisation - getting 
approval from relevant authorities - is unavoidable. Though authorisation might 
allow me to access a large pool of respondents, it would bring more uncertainty to the 
fieldwork management. Not only would my research questions be scrutinised, but also 
the way I planned to conduct the research would be subject to political guidance. The 
frequent need to obtain authorization from the relevant authorities when undertaking 
survey research would make it difficult for me to retain direct control over the data 
collection activities. 
 
What is more, I worried that, once I finally received the governmental permission, my 
academic research might be tainted by this top-down approach, at least in the eyes of 
potential participants who might confuse this fieldwork with a governmental survey. 
Informed-consent to participation might be misunderstood by research subjects as a 
forced duty. This problem was compounded by a lack of guarantee that subsequent 
studies would not be disrupted or challenged, especially since my research was 
supported by a foreign university. There is a lack of transparency about what is 
permissible in a social survey in China.272 
 
Manion has noted that “sampling is not the only serious obstacle to survey research in 
the People’s Republic of China. Many other problems challenge the ingenuity of 
social scientists in adapting standard methods to distinctively non-standard 
conditions.”273 Given the considerations outlined above, I decided against nationwide 
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random sampling using a top-down approach, but decided to use snowball sampling in 
order to access different hospitals and healthcare institutions by means of existing 
relationships. Though the limitations of this survey method meant that this fieldwork 
could not provide a full picture that represented all Chinese medics, my hope was that 
these small-scale “local” survey samples, could serve as a “snapshot” of the thoughts 
of a number of contemporary Chinese healthcare practitioners and get at least a few 
medics’ voices heard, so as to end this group’s long-term silence.  
 
Snowball sampling means sampling through a process of reference from one person to 
the next.274 I used this method to help me gain access to the largest possible number 
of healthcare institutions. The survey ultimately covered 18 hospitals in 6 cities of two 
provinces. However, I realised that snowball sampling could cause problems in 
generalisation. Once I became familiar with a particular institution, I conducted 
simple random sampling of healthcare workers in order to keep sampling biases to a 
minimum. Therefore every healthcare practitioner in that institution had an equal 
chance of being selected.  
 
Within a research process, gate-keepers are persons who are in charge of allowing or 
denying researchers access to the respondents’ institutions or settings. “In the ‘real 
world’ in which we conduct our research, researchers remain dependent on the 
goodwill of gatekeepers to a very large extent.”275 I selected the gatekeepers in my 
fieldwork more or less through personal relationships (so-called “Guanxi” in Chinese), 
which I will explain more in the next section.  
 
Using a snowball sampling technique, I made initial contact with 6 gate-keepers in 
China who either worked at or knew people who were working at 10 different 
hospitals in 3 cities of one province (which I named Province A). When talking to 
these 6 gate-keepers, I first asked them which level of hospital they were working in 
or could approach. Then I asked them to introduce me to their hospital colleagues, 
who happened to be on duty and were available at the time when I was disseminating 
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questionnaires. I started my research in Province A, a southeastern province in China 
where the general population are relatively well-off.  
 
In order to further eliminate sampling bias, I increased the sample size from one 
province to two. At the same time, another 6 gate-keepers from a central southern 
province (named Province B) were contacted. Province B is less developed and its 
general population is less well-off than that of Province A. As provinces in China are 
not developing equally, these two provinces at different stages of socio-economic 
development might affect medical practitioners’ working experiences, and that might 
be reflected in the medics’ views about their interactions with law, bioethics and 
healthcare governance.  
 
In the end, the fieldwork covered 18 hospitals in 6 cities of 2 provinces (with three 
cities in each province). My research subjects were, medical practitioners including 
doctors, nurses, and a few pharmacists and laboratory staff, of different ages, who 
currently work at three different levels of hospital, in two provinces of China. Below 
is the summary of the questionnaire samples that I collected from the different 
classifications of hospitals: 
  
Province A Province B Total  Hospital 
Classification276 Hospitals Questionnaires Hospitals Questionnaires Hospitals Questionnaires 
III A 4 27 4 48 8 75 
III B 0 0 1 38 1 38 
II A 5 57 1 26 6 83 
II B 1 6 0 0 1 6 
I 1 10 1 11 2 21 
Total  11 100 7 123 18 223 
 
This thesis focuses on the general pattern of findings from a macro perspective, 
without digging into the data to analyse them from a micro-comparative point of view. 
Most of the data analyses have not been broken down by province except in one key 
question – the causes of ethical dilemmas. The data analysis would benefit more from 
a larger scale comparison of the data on provinces, gender, professional basis etc. Due 
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to the research scale of this thesis, I have left this micro-comparative data analysis for 
future study. 
 
I was also aware that there should be an even spread across the levels of hospitals so 
that data bias could be better eliminated. However, the fact was that those gate-
keepers whom I was able to approach were mainly based in urban areas, as a result of 
which provincial and municipal/city hospitals (in other words, hospitals of the Level 
II and Level III) were overrepresented in my data. 
 
A choice was given to the questionnaire participants as to whether or not to they 
would agree to take part in future interviews. Therefore, interviewees were sampled 
from questionnaire respondents who consented to participate and left their contact 
details. To preserve the confidentiality of each informant and his or her serving 
hospital, no name, signature or any identifiable information about their work place 
was presented in this thesis (issues of confidentiality will be explored further shortly). 
 
2.2   Access 
 
There are many restrictions when studying a social phenomenon in China in its real-
life context, especially when data collection is based on surveys and interviews 
conducted by members of foreign academic institutions and research institutes. 
Therefore, flexibility was built into the basic research design. Due to the difficulties in 
collecting data in China, Croll has recommended that empirical data be limited to the 
“icing on the cake” with the main study being based on documentary studies. 277 
However, based on personal contacts and connections (guanxi) in China, individual 
scholars have been able to carry out their own research.  
 
Guanxi is conventionally translated into English as “relationship”. China is an 
example of “a society resting on networks [which] contains no sharp boundary lines, 
but only ambiguous zones of more or less dense and more or less institutionalized 
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network configurations”. 278  Traditional relationships or networks (with relatives, 
friends, colleagues and former classmates) are still dominant in daily, personal or 
social life.  
 
With the help of personal Guanxi, I could easily access some of the medical 
practitioners who were working at the sampled hospitals in one city from each 
province. Because of the trust relationship built previously when I was in the field, 
respondents emerged through a process of reference from one person to the next, and 
the sample snowballed into three cities from each province. I realised that such 
snowball sampling might result in potentially biased findings. So I tried to extend the 
informant pool from my own social network of Guanxi to the widely extended social 
networks of friends’, families’, relatives’, and former-classmates’. This ripple-effect 
helped me to reach medics with a range of different lengths of practitioner experience, 
specialism, affiliations to different levels of health institutions from various 
classifications and locations.  
 
In this respect, the fieldwork was not a personal effort; it reflects a range of different 
Guanxi that have made possible the project results. Guanxi is important in conducting 
research in China. Besides its snowballing effects, it is extremely helpful for building 
trust between researchers and research participants. Trust is a key factor in influencing 
people’s willingness to collaborate and supply honest and full answers, especially in 
China where public speech is sometimes under scrutiny. 
 
There were several occasions when I myself did not know the gate-keeper personally, 
as he or she may have been introduced by friends or relatives. I started by introducing 
myself and the purpose of my research, by saying “I am a doctoral research student 
who is interested in understanding medics’ dilemmas at work. I hope my research 
might help to improve your and your colleagues’ working environment.” Then, I gave 
the gate-keeper one questionnaire with its covering letter to read and fill in. Once the 
gate-keeper had finished the questionnaire, I then asked whether he or she was willing 
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to introduce me to his or her colleagues.  Most of the time, I managed to build a 
relationship with this gate-keeper and successfully gained their help.  
 
Though gate-keepers played an important role in my research, I did not entirely rely 
on their introductions in order to disseminate these questionnaires. Once I became 
familiar with a hospital environment, I tried as much as I could to introduce myself to 
medical practitioners who were at that time seeing no patients but were on duty. As a 
young female, I found middle-aged and young female medics were more likely to 
accept my request than elderly females. I also found male medics to be generally 
accessible, yet on three occasions I was refused by elderly male physicians from three 
different hospitals. So in general, senior physicians were cautious and more likely to 
be sceptical or distrustful of the purpose of my research.   
 
Without the help from gate-keepers, I found that medics were more distrustful of my 
self-introduction approach, even though they might accept a questionnaire. Of the 42 
completed questionnaires that I received without the help of a gatekeeper, only 2 
respondents expressed willingness to participate in the follow-up interview. By 
comparison, 42 out of the 181 I approached with the help of gatekeepers agreed to 
participate in the follow-up interview. 
 
3.  Methods 
 
Statistical survey data are often used to provide a summary of major patterns whilst 
interview data support these patterns by providing depth, detail and meaning.279 This 
study is based on a combination of questionnaire surveys followed by in-depth 
interviews. Considering the difficulty of approaching potential interviewees in China, 
I employed a survey as a method of helping me reach those whom I had no 
acquaintance but who were willing to share their feelings and experiences. Every 
questionnaire informant was given an option to choose whether or not to participate in 
a follow-up interview. I anticipated that those who chose to tick the box were ready to 
be open and honest; otherwise it would be a waste of their precious time. In short, the 
empirical study was conducted in two main stages. At a preliminary stage, 
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questionnaires were pilot tested (details of the pilot test will be given shortly), and 
then delivered either by post or in person. At the second stage, research questions 
were further explored in in-depth interviews.  
 
 3.1   Planning the Quantitative Research – Survey  
 
The research started with a questionnaire in order to obtain a general idea of the 
medics’ consciousness and attitude towards laws, bioethics, and political ideology. 
The initial hypothesis that – “Chinese medical practitioners may have a relatively high 
legal consciousness for practising preventively. The state/party has supreme influence 
over medical practice, while commercial interests may also affect medical 
judgements.” – was converted into testable survey questions (details of survey design 
will be given shortly).  
 
Once the questionnaire had been designed, the first question that arose was how to 
conduct the survey. In quantitative research, researchers are uninvolved with their 
subjects and in some cases may have no connection with them, such as in research 
based on postal questionnaires or on hired interviewers doing market research.280 This 
lack of relationship with the subject of an investigation is regarded as desirable by 
Bryman and Bell, as investigators may feel their objectivity will be compromised if 
they become too involved with the people they study. 281  I considered this 
methodological approach, and it would have been possible to collect the quantitative 
data without having any interactions with any participants in order to achieve 
objectivity. But in China, it would have required me to gain admission and 
cooperation from the hospital management team or local health administrative officers. 
The advantage of using this method was that the potential sample size would be much 
larger and I could remain more objective.  
 
In the first hospital piloted in Province A, the gate-keeper, Pharmacist A, did 
approach his hospital management team on my behalf. He gave a copy of my 
questionnaire plus its covering letter to the hospital director and the secretary of 
hospital Communist Party branch for them to look at. Both read my questionnaire and 
                                                 
280  Ibid, 287. 
281 A. Bryman and E. Bell, Business Research Methods (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), 425. 
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finally agreed to ask the hospital’s medical administration department to disseminate 
it to 160 medical practitioners based at that hospital. I refused their suggestion. 
Feedback from some doctors who participated in the questionnaire pilot test had 
indicated a negative attitude towards this method of top-down questionnaire 
dissemination. One doctor told me, getting a questionnaire from the hospital 
administration department would be more like an “external examination”, rather than 
social research. Depending on who is organising the research, doctors like him who 
are too busy with their jobs would either complete it casually or give “correct” 
answers rather than honest ones.  
 
I decided later not to approach either hospitals’ management team or local health 
administrative officers when I conducted my quantitative study in China. My reasons 
were as follows: first, it would be unethical if academic research was to be coloured 
by the political or administrative order, and medics could not opt in or out as they 
wished, but would be forced to participate. Second, if their answers were uniformly 
“correct”, the research would lose its purpose. In the field, I insisted on going to 
different hospitals to disseminate the questionnaire myself for as long as time and 
finance permitted. During this process, I began to genuinely understand their working 
environment. Such observations could be used to supplement the quantitative data by 
giving it a context. At the same time, I also tried to have a dialogue and foster a 
relationship of trust with medics. 
 
3.2   Planning the Qualitative Research – Semi-structured Interviews  
 
Although the survey research method is able to help researchers to collect information 
from a relatively large number of respondents (in this case over 220), a major 
drawback of this survey research method is that one loses the clarity of detail and the 
supplementary, interpretative information that one obtains in a qualitative study. 
Based on information given by questionnaire respondents who agreed to participate in 
a follow-up interview, I contacted these potential interviewees. This process can be 
described as triangulation, which refers to a process of cross-checking findings 
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deriving from both quantitative and qualitative research.282 The combined method of 
survey plus interviews meant that I could start seeking “close involvement with the 
people being investigated”.283 
 
The interviews were carried out using qualitative research interview methods as 
described by Kvale.284 This method attempts to grasp opinions, feelings, attitudes and 
the meanings that are implicit in medics’ actions from their own viewpoints. 
Technically, my qualitative research interview was semi-structured and carried out 
following an interview guide, which contained certain themes such as the 
interviewees’ interpretation and prioritisation of law, bioethics or political ideology, 
personal experience of ethical dilemmas, ways of resolving dilemmas, etc.285 The 
object of the qualitative research was not only to clarify the responses in the 
questionnaires, but to understand how the respondents had prioritised different forms 
of guidance in work, and the meanings they ascribed to such guidance. It sought to 
elicit descriptions of specific situations, as opposed to general opinions, and to obtain 
concrete descriptions of what the informant had experienced and how she/he had 
reacted in a situation where ethics, law, or political ideology are in conflict.  
 
Interviews provided me with rich information about how the respondents felt, why 
they prioritised one set of guidelines over another, the dilemmas they faced and their 
causes, how they solved the dilemmas and what expectation they had of their working 
environment. However, I also realised that there were potential problems in 
conducting in-depth interviews in China: 
 
First was Chinese culture. Chinese scholar Chen has pointed out the problem of trying 
to apply Western research methods to China, as Chinese people do not like to express 
their personal opinion in this way and tend to convey opinions in accordance with 
                                                 
282 D. Deacon, et al., ‘Collision or Collusion? A Discussion of the Unplanned Triangulation of 
Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods’, 1 (1998) International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology 47 – 63; also cited by A. Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 275. 
283 A. Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), 286. 
284 S. Kvale, InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (London, SAGE 
Publications, 1996).  
285 The guide sheet for this semi-structured interview is available in the appendices.  
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social norms.286 Before conducting interviews, I was cautious about the validity of 
their responses to politically sensitive issues and the possibility therefore of reluctance 
to respond to some of my questions. 
 
My second concern was that patriotism or nationalism might affect Chinese medics’ 
expressions and feelings. Though the Chinese people in their own ways may be 
pressing for their rights and improved lives, they have simultaneously exhibited 
unmistakable signs of nationalism that make them less receptive to the virtues of 
democratization. My worry was that participants would feel embarrassed to say 
anything bad about the system in which they were working, and especially when they 
realised that my report would be open to foreign investigators. Their loyalty to the 
state might mean that nationalism would bias them against telling the truth and 
speaking their minds. 
 
Thirdly, I was concerned about the influence of state propaganda or political thought 
education. The recent political agenda has broadly focused on building a “harmonious 
society”.287 Through its media, textbooks, and propaganda machinery, the Chinese 
government emphasises that democratisation, political liberalisation, a free press, and 
anti-government protests will only bring about the collapse of the current regime and 
hence are dangerous and destabilising for Chinese society. Chinese medical 
practitioners might feel hesitant to criticize the government and might even treat their 
problems in work as a necessity for China’s economic modernisation. Therefore, it 
would be difficult to know the extent to which they face dilemmas and problems in 
the system.  
 
                                                 
286 Y. Chen, ‘Out of Traditional Halls of Academe: Exploring New Avenues for Research on Women’, 
in C. K. Gilmartin, et al. (ed), Engendering China (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994), 70-71; 
also cited by C. N. Milwertz, Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-Child 
Family Policy (Surry, Curzon Press, 1997), 207.  
287 ‘Harmonious society’, a theory was originally derived from Confucian thinking. It has been adopted 
by the current president Hu Jintao as the latest political slogan. The objective of the harmonious society 
envisioned by Confucius was to bind individuals and groups to preciously defend social roles and to 
regulate permanently the relationships between these roles by means of a hierarchical, tightly-knit 
nexus of mutual obligations. China published a resolution on building a harmonious society in 2006. 
The resolution was adopted at the conclusion of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central 
Committee of the PRC Communist Party. The resolution stresses the harmonious socialist society is to 
be built and shared by all Chinese along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics and under 
the CPC leadership by 2020, available at: http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Oct/184810.htm (Last 
visited on Nov, 13th 2009). 
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The above concerns were taken into account when I designed this research. First, I 
decided to approach potential interviewees by asking questionnaire respondents 
whether they would like to take part in follow-up interviews, on the assumption that 
those medics who expressed their willingness would be likely to be more open and 
honest in the interview. Second, I kept a fieldwork diary to record my everyday field 
observations, including short and long conversations with the medics whom I met, 
their facial expressions after I introduced myself, my research purposes, their reasons 
for refusing to participate and messages written on the bulletin boards hanging on the 
walls of hospital halls, corridors and offices. Third, I paid more attention to the 
wording I used in both questionnaires and the interview questions. I eliminated 
sensitive expressions and tried to ask respondents more open questions rather than 
closed ones. And finally, in the field, I reassured them of their anonymity and that 
confidentiality would be protected. They were told that no signature was required in 
the questionnaire, and their interview transcripts would not be recorded without their 
permission.  
 
4.  Data Collection Procedure  
 
4.1   Pilot Testing and Modification  
 
The first task in the field was to get the English version of the questionnaire translated 
into Chinese and for it to be pilot tested. I pilot tested the preliminary questionnaire 
with Pharmacist A who also served as a gate-keeper to his hospital. He was initially 
conscious about the sensitivity of my questionnaire, but I received positive feedback. 
He pointed out a few unclear expressions used in my questionnaire and said that he 
was especially interested in questions with regard to the functions of hospital party 
branch to medical practices. He said he had never come across such questions before. 
He also discussed the time taken to complete the questionnaire. It took him 20 
minutes to finish it, yet he doubted whether busy professionals such as physicians 
would be willing to take 20 minutes out of their working day. He recommended, 
therefore, that I simplify some of the time-consuming questions (especially the ones 
requiring them to rank answers in order).  
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After pilot testing with him, I made changes to a few words and expressions, and 
started to think about the ways I could keep the time-consuming questions as close to 
the original as possible, while also reducing the time needed to complete the 
questionnaire. I added an additional column and changed the format of choices from 
letters to numbers. I was not sure whether these changes would help or not.  
 
Pharmacist A later introduced me to six of his colleagues working at the same 
hospital. Four of them were doctors, one a nurse, and one another pharmacist. The 
questions on the original questionnaire were modified, based on feedback from these 
7 participants in the small pilot study. Most of them responded that several questions, 
which required them to rank answers in order according to level of importance 
(starting from the most important one), were time-consuming. If the survey was not 
introduced by gate-keepers, they said, they would not have bothered to take part.  
 
To simplify the survey, I reduced the number of this type of question from 6 to 3. 
With fewer significant questions, participants were asked to choose only the answer 
they considered to be most relevant. In three important questions, I asked them to 
rank the answers in order of preference (from the most important to the least). To 
make the questionnaire appear less sensitive, I also made changes to the sequencing 
and section titles. In the modified Chinese version, I put law at the beginning instead 
of state governance. I changed the original title “state governance and healthcare 
professionals” to “the healthcare system and healthcare professionals” (copies of the 
questionnaire in both the English and Chinese version are available in the appendix). 
 
4.2   Questionnaires, Interviews and Informal Discussions 
 
Interestingly, I found it was easy to talk to medics when they returned their completed 
questionnaires, even though they had not indicated a willingness to be interviewed in 
response to the last question of my questionnaire. So I decided not to wait until I 
finished collecting all the questionnaires before conducting follow-up interviews. 
Rather, I tried as much as possible to talk to medics in the field, especially after they 
completed the questionnaires. Questions asked in these more informal interviews 
followed the same structure as the more formal organised ones. I managed to make 
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notes during and after the talks, as I noticed that Chinese medics are uncomfortable 
talking openly to researchers while having their answers tape-recorded. 
 
There were three focus group discussions which were not pre-organised and happened 
at the end of the doctors’ work period. When I went to one of the offices to collect 
completed questionnaires, a few physicians happened to be gathering to have a break. 
I tried to start an informal talk with one physician, asking him, “What do you think 
about the questionnaire?” The other physicians started joining in the conversation. It 
was interesting as I found they were intrigued to hear about my experience in the 
West and my understanding of their working conditions. Then they started to 
complain about their situation.  
 
However, informal talks can never replace formal ones. The locations of our informal 
talks were mostly in public areas where both I and medics were very careful with 
what we said. In this situation, sensitive questions are hard to ask, develop and answer. 
To some extent, their careful attitudes demonstrated the medical practitioners’ ethical 
dilemma between telling the truth, and their need to balance them with other 
considerations (details of their ethical dilemmas will be explored later).  
 
In the last question of my questionnaire, respondents who agreed to take part in a 
follow-up interview were asked to fill in their email address or telephone number. 
However, I found that contacting 44 potential interviewees who gave their consent in 
the questionnaires was a much harder process than I was expecting. There were 3 
medics who said “yes” without leaving contact details. Some email addresses were 
mistakenly written or unidentifiable, and 15 medics who left me their office number 
where 5-10 doctors were sharing the same room and using the same telephone. I could 
not approach all these medics who had indicated willingness to participate in the 
follow-up interviews. I managed to contact the remaining 26 interviewees and asked 
them to choose how and when they felt comfortable participating. Two medics 
changed their minds, which left 24 formal interviews in total which were conducted 
through face to face interviews or by phone. Below is a brief summary of the sample 
sizes of both the survey and interview data: 
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 Sample Size/ Gender Breakdown 
 
Questionnaire Respondents Female Male     TOTAL 
Doctor 52 77 129 
Nurse288 54 0 54 
Pharmacist 8 2 10 
Laboratory worker 5 3 8 
Others 3 8 11 
Occupation unknown 4 2 6 
Subtotal 126 92 218 
Refused to provide any personal information 5 
Total  223 
 
Interview Respondents Female Male TOTAL 
Doctor 5 6 11 
Nurse 6 0 6 
Pharmacist 0 2 2 
Laboratory worker 0 2 2 
Administrator 1 2 3 
Total 12 12 24 
 
Informal Talks Female Male TOTAL 
Doctor 2 2 4 
Nurse 2 0 2 
Laboratory worker 1 0 1 
Total 5 2 7 
 
Group Discussions Female Male TOTAL 
2 2 4 
1 1 2 
Group 1 from Ophthalmology 
Group 2 from Radiotherapy 
Group 3 from Department of Medicine 0 4 4 
Total 3 7 10 
 
 
4.3    Response Rates  
 
“A response rate is the number of completed surveys with reporting units divided by 
the number of eligible reporting units in the sample.”289 Groves and Lyberg suggested, 
“there are so many ways of calculating response rates that comparisons across 
                                                 
288 Nurses in China are mostly female; it is rare to find male nurses in China. 
289 A response rate is the number of complete surveys with reporting units divided by the number of 
eligible reporting units in the sample. Definition given by the American Association for Public Opinion 
Research, ‘Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys’, 
Revised 2008.  
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surveys are fraught with misinterpretations.”290 Response rates, cooperation rates,291 
refusal rates292 and contact rates293 are commonly utilised in survey reports and in 
research literature. In this thesis, I used response rates to report the degree to which 
my empirical research was accepted by those Chinese medics I approached.  
 
In this empirical research, the 223 completed questionnaires were distributed in three 
different ways - solely by gate-keepers (49 cases), by me in the presence of gate-
keepers (132 cases), and by me alone (42 cases). In total, 174 questionnaires were 
disseminated by me directly to medical practitioners and all returned to me directly 
in the field. The 49 questionnaires distributed by gate-keepers were those whom I 
could not approach due to the difficulties of time and cost to me in travelling. I gave 
these gate-keepers large envelopes and repeatedly emphasised to them that all 
questionnaires were to be anonymous and unidentifiable. I trusted them to tell the 
respondents that they could answer truthfully and in confidence. All of those 49 
questionnaires were returned to me by post.   
 
As Cornish notes, potential respondents who have been contacted may refuse to 
cooperate for a variety of reasons including inconvenience, the sensitive subject 
matter, or lack of trust in the researcher. 294  In this research, I found that, when 
approaching respondents, the degree of reliance on gate-keepers might affect the 
respondents’ attitude to participation, and possibly yield variable response rates. In 
order to have a clearer picture of whether and how response rates changed, these were 
calculated separately. Moreover, since it was impossible to calculate the response rate 
when questionnaires were distributed solely by gate-keepers, the calculation in this 
survey disregards this method of questionnaire distribution, but considers responses to 
                                                 
290 R. M. Groves, and L. E. Lyberg, ‘An Overview of Nonresponse Issues in Telephone Surveys’ in R. 
M. Groves, Telephone Survey Methodology (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1988).  
291 Ibid. A cooperation rate is the proportion of all cases interviewed of all eligible units ever contacted.  
292 Ibid. A refusal rate is the proportion of all potentially eligible cases in which a respondent refuses to 
do a survey, or breaks-off a survey. See e.g., R. Kent, Data Construction and Data Analysis for Survey 
Research (New York, Palgrave, 2001), 57. 
293 Ibid. A contact rate measures the proportion of all cases in which some responsible member of the 
eligible reporting unit, such as, housing unit, was reached by the survey.  
294 J. Cornish, ‘Response Problems in Surveys: Improving Responses & Minimising the Load’, 
available from: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/statorg/Workshops/Yangon/Session4_Surveys_Cornish_Paper.pdf 
(Last visited on May 1st, 2010); M. Denscombe, The Good Research Guide: for Small-scale Social 
Research Projects (Philadelphia, Open University Press, 2003), 20. 
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the questionnaires that were distributed by myself alone or in the presence of 
gatekeepers.  
 
When questionnaires were distributed by me with introductions from the gate-keepers, 
almost every informant whom I encountered (except 3) agreed to participate. This 
included cases of refusal before or after reading questionnaires. So the response rate 
where there was an introduction from a gate-keeper was: 129/132= 97.7%. This 
indicated that, when the gate-keepers were introducing me to participants or 
disseminated the questionnaires on my behalf, the chances of receiving all or almost 
all of the questionnaires was very high. 
 
In comparison with this, the response rate dropped when questionnaires were 
disseminated by me without any introduction from gate-keepers. During the time I 
disseminated these questionnaires, I recorded in my fieldwork diary that, when I 
introduced myself alone and requested their participation, there were 34 medics who 
refused to participate, and 42 who agreed. So the response rate for self-introduction 
was calculated as follows: 42/(34+42) = 55.3%.  
 
Within the total number of 223 returned questionnaires, 44 respondents (19%) agreed 
to participate in interviews having left their email addresses or telephone numbers. 
However, only 24 of these respondents (11%) were successfully contacted and agreed 
to be my interviewees. Within the 44 potential interviewees, the contact success rate 
was 54%. Below is a brief summary of the response rate of the survey and interviews:  
 
 Questionnaire distribution and collection (including pilot tests) ran from 30th 
November 2008 to 7th January 2009, during which time face to face interviews 
and informal talks were conducted. 
 Follow-up face to face or telephone interviews (including interview pilot tests) 
ran from 22nd January 2009 to 28th February, 2009. 
 223 questionnaires were collected, 218 were fully completed.295 
                                                 
295 Due to various reasons, such as, not applicable, refused to answer, don’t know, forgot to answer, not 
all respondents answered all the questions. I entered all 223 questionnaires into the data matrix, 
including the 5 cases, of which values are missing, for whatever reasons. Those partially answered 
questions were counted individually.  
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 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted (13 were face-to-face interviews, 
11 were telephone interviews); there were 7 informal individual talks; and 3 
informal group discussions, making a total of 34 conversations.  
 19.7% of questionnaire respondents expressed interest in participating in follow-
up interviews, and 70.8% of interviewees agreed to be re-contacted for future 
studies. 
 
5.   Question Format and Data Analysis  
 
When creating the questionnaire and interview guide, emerging themes from Part One 
(Literature Review: Conceptual Framework and Historical Background) were 
converted into several main groups of research questions. These research questions 
were formulated into closed and open-ended questions for the questionnaire and 
interview.  
 
In the questionnaire, a number of closed questions were used in order to minimise the 
amount of time that respondents would have to spend completing them. Space was 
given at the end of each closed question to enable the respondents to add additional 
comments. This type of question was formulated as a single or multiple choice 
question and mainly asked for the respondents’ attitudes towards, and knowledge of 
law, state and bioethics. Before analysing the questionnaire data, completed 
questionnaires were given unique identifiers so that apparent inconsistencies 
generated in the data could be located and checked. Data were then typed into 
Microsoft Excel’s spreadsheet, analysed by cumulative frequency distribution, and 
presented in the report as ratios. 
 
The open-ended comments in the questionnaires and interviews were used for 
generating detailed, descriptive data mainly for explaining the impact on professional 
work of law, state and bioethics. Such data were textual, and so were transcribed into 
a raw data spreadsheet and further categorised in terms of their common themes. Data 
collected from open-ended comments were interpreted on both cumulative and 
individual bases.  
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6.  Ethical Considerations  
 
The empirical research focused on getting medical practitioners’ perceptions. The 
hypothesis did not require research with patients, and there was no need for analysis 
of their medical files or their use of hospital equipment, so there was no difficulty in 
gaining ethical approval for this research from the ethics committee of the University 
of Edinburgh. However, the fact that ethical approval had been sought at a British 
university did not mean that ethical issues would not be raised in a local Chinese 
environment. Also, it should not be taken for granted that Chinese medics are less 
vulnerable than patients. Ethical considerations therefore underlie virtually all the 
decisions made about the research, particularly when the positions of medical 
practitioners within Chinese hospitals were unknown.  
 
A number of scholars have expressed concerns that empirical research could be 
exploitative and oppressive. They argue that it consists of research in which there is 
an uneven distribution of power between researchers and research participants.296 The 
power wielded either by gate-keepers or researchers can be seen in terms of their 
ability to determine what needs researching, the ways of approaching the questions, 
timing of the questions and the power to interpret respondents’ answers. In this sense, 
researchers have considerable autonomy whilst those who are researched have little.  
 
In my attempts to tackle ethical issues in this research, I was guided by the provisions 
of the College of Humanities and Social Science Code of Research Ethics and the 
Ethical Code of ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) 2005.297 All research 
participants were assured that I considered myself bound by these ethical codes. It 
meant that “the research was designed and conducted in such a way that meets certain 
ethical principles; and the research subjected to proper professional and institutional 
                                                 
296 R. Sapsford and P. Abbot, Research Methods for Nurses and Caring Professionals (Buckingham, 
Open University Press, 1992); M. Miles, ‘Towards a methodology for feminist research’, in M. 
Hammersley (ed) Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice (London, Sage, 1993).  
297 ESRC, Research Ethics Framework, the 2005 version has been recently amended. The ESRC 
Research Ethics Framework 2010 is available from: 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/esrcinfocentre/images/esrc_re_ethics_frame_tcm6-11291.pdf (Last visited on 
May 2nd, 2010). 
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oversight in terms of research governance.”298 This ethical statement was also stated 
clearly in the cover letter of each questionnaire. 
 
It was recognised that the issue of the function of the hospital Communist Party 
branch and the medical practitioners’ ethical dilemmas could be sensitive topics for 
medics to talk about. The first principle of all ethical codes was that research subjects 
should not be harmed by the research. It was uncertain whether or not criticism of the 
system would have a negative impact on medics and their affiliated hospitals.  
 
Assurances as to the confidentiality of their participation were clearly stated. There 
was no question in the questionnaire asking the participant to provide details of his or 
her name, the hospital at which he or she worked or the district in which they were 
based, so even I myself could not tell the identity of the particular individuals 
involved (except the identities of gate-keepers). In order to minimise disturbance to 
respondents and their hospitals, the identities of individuals, their affiliated hospitals, 
and the location of cities and provinces were kept confidential in this thesis. Return 
envelopes, with names and addresses, distributed by gate-keepers were destroyed after 
they were received. Questionnaires were not given unique identifiers until they were 
coded for analysis.  
 
With regard to coding, I coded the questionnaire and interview participants separately. 
Every questionnaire participant was given a number “1, 2, 3 or 4 etc”, with an initial 
“A or B” standing for the province in which the participant is based, such as A1, A2 
or B1 etc. Each of the 24 interview respondents was identified by a letter “A, B, C or 
D etc”, with an initial “D (for doctors), N (for nurses), P (for pharmacists), L (for 
laboratory), and A (for hospital administrative staff).  
 
Because of concerns about confidentiality, I ignored several opportunities to start 
informal talks with medics, when a gate-keeper was standing besides me. Gate-
keepers normally introduced me to colleagues they knew quite well; so my concern 
was that some medics might have agreed to participate because they felt pressure from 
friendship, colleague-ship, or otherwise, and therefore had not freely chosen to 
                                                 
298 Ibid. 
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participate. In the field I tried to make sure medics were not required to complete the 
questionnaire, but instead were asked to ‘opt in’ to the study. In an effort to ensure 
that their decisions were informed, the aims of the research project, the methods 
employed, the funding body and possible uses of the data were all outlined in the 
covering letter accompanying each questionnaire.  
 
I was aware that there would be a possible response bias to consider. “Correct” 
responses might exist in questionnaires. On one occasion, when collecting completed 
questionnaires from doctors, one female middle-aged doctor came forward to ask for 
reassurance that I would not put her name onto her complete questionnaire. I worried 
that there might be other respondents who also believed their anonymity would not be 
well protected. Their previous experience of surveys had probably been related to 
official Party or governmental investigations, so a concern about giving a “politically 
incorrect” answer might well have overshadowed their honesty and openness in my 
survey.  
 
I was also concerned about the method of questionnaire collection. At hospitals, I was 
walking around, especially when collecting questionnaires; I would stand outside 
some of the physicians’ offices waiting for them to complete them. My presence 
might have put additional pressures on the physicians who might have felt forced to 
complete and return the questionnaire to me quickly. Once I realised that one 
participant had noticed my presence, I tried to ease their pressure by saying “Thank 
you very much for your time. I understand that you have been very busy. Please take 
your time”. Though my presence in collecting the questionnaire was unavoidable, I 
worried that other hospital staff would know who was completing it because of my 
presence. Identification of respondents in this way was therefore another issue that I 
had to take into account.  
 
One thing I did not anticipate was that some physicians would ask me for a little 
incentive. They thought I should have prepared some little gift for those who had 
participated. What I could give was my name card, with which they could contact me 
whenever they had questions. Some of them asked whether my research report would 
be available in the future, and said that they would like to have a copy of it, as a 
favour in return for their participation. The response I gave was that I would love to 
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let them have a copy, but this depended on whether the Chinese version of my thesis 
would be available, and if it was, whether they would be approachable at that time.  
 
At the end of the questionnaire, so as to preserve medics’ autonomy, they could opt 
out of the second stage of the project – the interview – and most did, since only 44 out 
of 223 questionnaire respondents agreed to participate. Where they gave their 
telephone number or email addresses, without requiring names, such details were 
copied and coded into an interview note book which was kept locked in a cabinet at 
my home.  
 
Research subjects can be harmed by research in a psychological way, which was not 
an impact I had anticipated, though I was aware of its possibility. There was a 
physician who was suspicious that I would record our telephone interview without 
getting his consent, on the basis that I was using a landline rather than a mobile phone. 
I assured him that I would not record his responses without his permission. With 
medics who had agreed to have the interview recorded, I would use an internet phone 
to call, and made it was clear that only I would listen to it for note-checking purposes. 
There were several physicians who asked me to be friends at the end of the interviews, 
saying they would like to keep in touch with me. This was beyond my expectation. I 
did not reject their requests directly, but as a researcher, in order to preserve my 
objectivity within the project, I have not communicated with them since the 
interviews.   
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined issues faced during my research design and given reasons 
for any methodological choices: the sampling approach, the access to research 
participants, the research procedure for conducting the questionnaires and interviews, 
and how I proceeded with the data analysis. Problems that arose before and during the 
fieldwork have also been given recognition and solutions found if those were 
available. The limitations of this research have been acknowledged, though they do 
not undermine the integrity and strength of my findings.  
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The research allowed me to hear the voices of a particular group of Chinese medical 
practitioners, namely, doctors, nurses and other healthcare staff, at a significant and 
unique moment in their history. The findings allow us (1) to assess the impact of 
healthcare law, state governance and bioethics on Chinese medical practitioners, (2) to 
explore the ways in which medics understand these controlling mechanisms as 
relevant to them, and how physicians react to these different mechanisms when they 
are in conflict with each other. In Chapters 5 and 6 that follow, I will present the 
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CHAPTER 5   QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS 
 
1.    Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the questionnaire findings. It was designed to gather evidence, 
from the perspectives of the Chinese medical practitioners, to show how, and to what 
extent their medical practice is affected by medical law, political ideology and 
bioethics. The chapter is divided into four parts according to different themes: 
attitudes, motivations, interactions, and prospects for the future. First, it will assess 
the Chinese medics’ attitudes towards law, governance and bioethics, followed by an 
analysis of the motivations for their attitudes. Their interactions with the healthcare 
system, medical law and political ideology will be the third part of this chapter. The 
final aim is to explore Chinese medical practitioners’ views on the prospects for the 
development of “professionalism”.  
 
2. Medics’ Attitudes towards Law, State Governance and 
Bioethics 
 
2.1   Attitudes  
 
(1)  Levels of Importance 
 
At the broadest level of abstraction, three main questions were asked in the 
questionnaire–“how important is it to apply bioethics, medical law or political 
thoughts in medical practices” in order to understand whether there is a discrepancy 
between medics’ attitudes towards these pluralist control mechanisms. Responses to 
the questions were as follows:  
 
Of the 223 medical practitioners surveyed, 199 practitioners stated that it was very 
important to apply law to their practice, especially laws that regulated their area of 
practice. Only 42 practitioners thought it was very important to apply political 
ideology to their practice; and 60 medics stated that bioethics very important to their 
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work. In addition, 114 practitioners stated it was only relatively important to apply 
bioethics or political norms to their practices (see Figure 1).  
 
Comparing the medical practitioners’ legal, political and ethical consciousness, 218 of 
them (99%) thought applying law to their practice was either “very important” (199 
medics, 90%) or “relatively important” (19 medics, 9%); while their attention to 
medical ethics and political ideology was significantly less. Over half of them (114 
medics) commonly classified political ideology or medical ethics as “relatively 
important” governing norms; and less than one third of medics perceived political 
ideology (42 medics, 19%) or medical ethics (60 medics, 30%) as “very important” 
(see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: The importance of bioethics, law and political norms (based on answers to questions ‘In your 
opinion, do you think medical ethics are important to your practice?’, ‘Do you think it is important to 
apply the law regulating your area of practice to your work?’ and ‘Do you think you should connect the 











             1. Yes, it is very important. 
             2. Yes, it is relatively important. 
             3. No, it is not. 
             4. I am not sure. 
             5. No comment. 
             6. Missing data. 
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 223. 
 
Almost one third of the medics (63) stated that either political thought was “not 
important” (35 medics) or that they were not sure about its importance (28 medics). 
The percentage of negative or tentative attitudes towards medical ethics was slightly 
lower, yet, there were still 19 medical practitioners who thought bioethics was “not 
important” to their practice, plus 4 medics who were not sure about the importance of 
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These figures show the high degree of legal consciousness of Chinese medics, who 
perceived law as the most important guideline, followed by bioethics, with political 
thought to be the least important. This finding has been replicated through another 
survey question asking each practitioner to rank the most important practice guideline 
to him/her (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Guidelines classified by levels of importance (based on answers to the question, ‘Could you 
please classify what is the most important practice guideline to you? Please choose whatever is relevant 
















1 2 3 4
 
1 Practice guidelines of the hospital to which you belong.  2 Medical law.  3 Medical ethics.  4 Political norms.  
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 218. 
 
Before discussing findings from this question, it should be noted there might be a 
discrepancy between how I had asked this question and how the question had been 
answered. In this question and two others (see Figures 7 and 15) of a similar format, I 
required respondents to choose and rank them based on one specific criterion. 
However, when coding responses to this type of question, I found it difficult to judge 
from the many answers formulated as “1234”, “123” or “34”, whether the respondents 
were choosing and ranking in order, or simply making multiple choices without the 
ranking. Such concern had been raised in my pilot studies when the medics pointed 
out that these types of “choose-and-rank” questions were time-consuming and so 
potential respondents would not bother to answer in the way I had asked. But amongst 
these doubts, I also found some answers were ranked correctly, like “2134”, “3412”, 
etc. Because of this discrepancy, I decided to analyse the data in terms of the 
percentage of respondents, rather than calculating the ranking order (or not). Although 
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Of the medics surveyed, 87% agreed “medical law” was the most important guideline, 
whereas 84% agreed that the “practice guidelines of his/her affiliated hospital” came 
second most. Medical ethics was third and political norms were rated as the least 
important (see Figure 2). These responses support Griffiths’s argument that legal 
reality anywhere is a collage of obligatory practices and norms emanating both from 
governmental and non-governmental sources alike, rather than law being “an 
exclusive, systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative propositions’ 
emanating from the state.”299 The question of whether Chinese medical practitioners 
see the “practice guidelines of his/her affiliated hospital” as part of the “legal reality” 
will be addressed in Chapter 6 (interview findings). 
 
(2)  Norm-Behaviour Discrepancies  
 
As Selznick writes, “a legal order is known by the existence of authoritative rules.”300 
Rules issued by hospital authorities are directly authoritative and assert control over 
medics by sanctioning those who are believed to have broken the rules. “When an 
institution possesses authority and issues rules, it is, according to this foundation, a 
legal order.” 301 The hospital rules are seen, therefore, by medical practitioners as 
almost equally important as laws.  
 
The survey results further illustrated that, law seemed to be the key element that 
affects medical practice in China. In second place came bioethics, leaving political 
norms as the least effective element. This raised a question about whether medical 
practitioners’ stated attitudes necessarily correlate with their behaviours. In order to 
assess this, a supplementary question was added on the application of law: “If you 
think law is important, how often do you apply law to your professional practice?”  
 
The survey showed that while 90% of medical practitioners said law was very 
important to their practice, only 64% followed the law carefully. One reason 
accounting for this lower rate may be a lack of understanding ─ 14% of medics 
                                                 
299 J. Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ 24 (1986) Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 3.  
300 P. Selznick, Law, Society, and Industrial Justice (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), 5.  
301 M. M. Feeley, ‘The Concept of Law in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on Expanded View’, 
10 (1976) Law & Society Review 4, 501.  
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belonged to this category. Another 18% of respondents said that they would rather 
apply medical ethics than law to their professional work (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Norm-behaviour relationship in terms of applying laws (based on answers to the question, ‘If 

















Number of practitioners responding to this question: 221. 
 
The norm-behaviour discrepancy regarding the application of law to medical work, to 
some extent also corresponds to a gap between attachment to ethical norms and actual 
behaviour (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Norm-behaviour relationship in terms of applying medical ethics (based on answers to the 
















Number of practitioners responding to this question: 198. 
 
As discussed before, more than half of the medics thought medical ethics were at least 
“relatively important” in response to the question asking them about the importance of 
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ethics (see Figure 1). However, only 30% of them admitted that they would stick to it 
in practice (see Figure 4). The remaining 58% said that they sometimes had to balance 
it for practical reasons. The question of whether this answer equated with these 58% 
of medics acting “unethically” is hard to discern within a survey, but it will be 
addressed in interviews.  
 
2.2   Concept Comprehension  
 
The discrepancy between knowing the importance of law and not really applying it in 
practice disclosed a discernible gap between norm and behaviour. According to 
Anderson and Whitman, law is a rule of conduct that “specifies the consequence of 
certain actions, and the knowledge of these consequences can be assumed to 
futuristically ‘rule’ or control behaviour”.302 Thøgersen points out that the general 
problem of norm versus behaviour is particularly important in China, “where there 
seems to exist a set of ready-made, socially acceptable value judgements about almost 
everything”. 303  The norm-behaviour discrepancy among Chinese medical 
practitioners may be caused by a lack of clear comprehension regarding the interplay 
between ethics and law.  
 
In the realm of professional practice, it was necessary to clarify whether Chinese 
medical practitioners understood the meaning of law and bioethics, and whether they 
saw either of them as socially acceptable values. In other words, with respect to 
concepts like “law” and “bioethics”, which I used in questionnaires and interviews, a 
Chinese medic might mean what he/she said, but they might not know or even agree 
exactly what those “abstract” concepts meant. Reflecting on the difficulty of how to 
elicit a more personal level of reality, precise and concrete questions related to 
behaviour would be a solution to break through this problem.304  
 
Medics’ responses to questions – how active their awareness and comprehension of 
laws regulating medical practice, seemed to show that, although law seemed very 
                                                 
302 D. C. Anderson and T. L. Whitman, ‘The Control of Behaviour Through Law: Theory and Practice’, 
47 (1972) Notre Dame Lawyer 831. 
303 S. Thøgersen, ‘Official Interviewing in China − Notes from Four Trips’, in O. Bruun, et al., (ed), 
Modern China Research: Danish Experience (Copenhagen, University of Copenhagen Press, 1991), 37. 
304 Ibid.  
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important to them, the majority of medical practitioners were aware of a few of them 
(see Figure 5). Even then, the majority admitted they only understood what the law 
meant occasionally (see Figure 6).  
 

















1 2 3 4
 
      1 Study laws and regulations relevant to my practice closely;   
      2 Aware of afew medical laws;  
      3 Don’t know much detail about medical laws;   
      4 Don’t know any medical laws. 
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 222.  
 
Figure 6: Comprehension of laws and regulations relevant to medical practice (based on answers to the 
















1 2 3 4 5
 
      1 Understand what the law requires me to do in any situation;  
      2 Understood law occasionally; 
      3 Often not sure what the law requires;   
      4 Never sure what the law requires;   
      5 No comment.  
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 223.  
 
Similar responses to two of my questions on the comprehension of medical ethics also 
supported my interpretation of a possible confusion between the Western conception 
of “bioethics” and the Chinese interpretation. In response to the question “what is 
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to the Chinese medics, were firstly “improve the quality of patient care” (83%), 
secondly “no disclosure of patients’ medical records” (79%), and thirdly “team work 
between colleagues” (78%). The three options ranked least relevant were: “non-
maleficence” (61%), “ethical aspects of biotechnological development” (60%) and 
“combining professionalism with patriotism” (44%) (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Medics’ understanding of medical ethics and their levels of importance (based on answers to 
the question, ‘What is your understanding of modern medical ethics? Please choose whatever is or are 
relevant to you, then to put them into order according to level of importance (start from the most 

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
     
        1. Improve the quality of patient care; 
        2. No disclosure of patients’ medical records;  
        3. Team work between colleagues; 
        4. Respect patients’ autonomy;  
        5. Safeguard public health; 
        6. Non-maleficence; 
        7. Ethical aspects of biotechnological development; 
        8. Combining professionalism and patriotism.  
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 223.  
 
Medical ethics has a broad application in all cultures due to its potential to affect the 
moral dimension of medical practice. Between Western and Chinese medics, differing 
understandings of bioethics are worthy of investigation (Chapter 3 has discussed this, 
but a later chapter will elaborate further). The options given by this question to 
Chinese medics were based on the ethical principles and values set out  in the World 
Medical Association’s International Code of Medical Ethics 305  and the officially 
issued Oath of Medical Students306 set out by the PRC Ministry of Education in 1991 
(further discussion is in Part III). These choices were set out in random order.  
 
                                                 
305 World Medical Association, International Code of Medical Ethics, available at:  
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c8/index.html (Last visited on Dec 14th, 2010).  
















Chapter 5 Questionnaire Findings 
103 
However, the last option, “combining professionalism with patriotism”, does not 
belong in modern bioethics. It was deliberately put into the questionnaire in order to 
identify whether medics answered this question from a patriotic perspective. The 
result indicated that the majority of medical practitioners did agree that it was not part 
of modern bioethics and was therefore ranked as the least important consideration. 
But there were still 44% of respondents who agreed it was part of modern bioethics 
(see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 8: Confidence in their understanding of medical ethics (based on answers to the question ‘Do 


















Number of practitioners responding to this question: 219 
 
Compared with their comprehension of medical law, many Chinese medical 
practitioners were unsure about their understanding of bioethics. When asked whether 
they were confident in their understanding of bioethical guidelines, 54% of them 
agreed they understood in general, while only 7% were confident of their 
understandings. Some 30% of medics declared that they were occasionally confused 
about medical ethics and 6% admitted they were often confused (see Figure 8). This 
result suggested that, when resolving ethical dilemmas, medics were more likely to 
refer to a set of principles or laws than use medical ethics.  
 
Having analysed the findings concerning the medics’ prioritisation of law over either 
ethics or political ideologies, this section presented data showing their comprehension 
of legal and ethical concepts. This data showed that, where there was a conflict 
between law and ethics, Chinese medics were more likely to apply law, even though 
they had slightly more confidence in understanding ethics than law. An optional 
answer (the choice 8, see Figure 7), deliberately placed within the multiple choices, 
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identifies that less than half of those surveyed did not reply from a purely personal 
point of view. To some extent, a nationalistic perspective was involved which 
affected or coloured their answers.  
 
2.3   Education of Law and Bioethics  
 
By comparison, Chinese medical schools did not seem to pay as much attention as 
hospitals to the education of their students in medical law. In response to a question 
concerning whether medics learnt about medical law in medical school, as few as 
11% agreed. In response to a question concerning the teaching of bioethics, 77% of 
medical practitioners stated that they were taught this at medical school. Their 
learning experience can be divided into three categories: systematic learning of 
medical ethics, limited learning of medical ethics, and informal learning (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: Bioethical education (based on answers to the question ‘have medical ethics lessons been 
















Number of practitioners responding to this question: 219. 
 
Responses indicated that, although bioethics was taught at medical school, only 
around one third of them (27%) had studied it systematically; 39% of medics 
responded that they had limited study of bioethics and 11% of them had learned 
bioethics from optional courses rather than compulsory ones at medical school. The 
statement “almost no bioethics was taught when at medical school” was selected by 
20% of the medical practitioners (see Figure 9). Traditional Chinese bioethics which 
used to learned through from apprenticeship seems had lost its tradition.307 Survey 
                                                 
307 See discussion in Chapter 3.   
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data indicated that Chinese medical schools have not paid much attention to the 
professional ethics courses either. A further question therefore was identified for the 
follow-up interview, that is: where do Chinese medics get their understanding of 
medical ethics from?   
 
In terms of legal education, survey responses showed that legal promotion campaigns 
were widely undertaken in hospitals. In response to the question “how do you know 
about medical law?” half of the medics admitted that they learned about it mainly 
from the hospitals’ legal promotion campaigns. Almost a third of medics (29%) 
surveyed stated that they learned medical law from hospital on-the-job training. And 
only 26% of medical practitioners stated that they learned about law through self-
learning via libraries, the internet or the media (see Figure 10). This also meant that a 
relatively small number of Chinese medics learned medical law spontaneously or 
independently. 
 
Figure 10: Legal education resources (based on the question ‘How do you know about the laws that 
















1 2 3 4 5
            
       1. Through law promotion campaigns;  
       2. Through hospitals on-the-job training;  
       3. Self-learning from libraries, internet, or media;  
       4. At school;  
       5. From colleagues. 
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 222. 
 
This section has explored the findings of surveyed Chinese medics’ different degrees 
of prioritisation, understanding, and sources of education in law, state governance and 
ethics. Having presented these findings concerning their attitudes and knowledge, the 
next section will look into the reasons why medics prioritise one set of guidelines 
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legal promotion campaigns, and will moreover, probe into their experiences of and, at 
the moral dilemmas caused by conflicts between law, state governance and ethics.   
 
3.   Motivations and Moral Dilemmas  
 
3.1   Motivations  
 
As discussed when formulating the initial hypothesis for this empirical study, it was 
disclosed by a doctor’s wife that an internal order had been given to medical 
practitioners to “close their mouths and make no comments on the milk scandal”.308 
This raised questions of whether Chinese medics believed that political interest 
outweighed public interest; and whether they thought that refraining from criticism 
was the best way to contribute to a “harmonious society”,309 or whether Chinese 
medics simply just felt powerless to express their views. 
 
When asked whether they agreed or not with the statement that “good medical 
practice is important to secure a politically-advocated ‘harmonious society’”, 96% of 
medics agreed, while only 4% disagreed or were unsure. The results showed that the 
value they accorded to their profession was, at least in part, politically motivated. 
However, in a complementary question, medics were asked why they thought 
healthcare services were important in contributing to a “harmonious society”. 
Significantly more than half of the medics (69%) believed that medical services 
benefited public interest, while 8% thought good medical services mattered to the 
society was because it was emphasised by Chinese politicians (see Figure 11, below). 
If most medical practitioners thought the purpose of medicine was to protect public 
interest rather than political interests, it raises a question about whether they have 
experienced dilemmas when political interests conflicted with their professional 
ethics (safeguarding public interests).  
 
As the World Health Report 2008 notes, conditions of “inequitable access, 
impoverishing costs, and erosion of trust in healthcare constitute a threat to social 
                                                 
308 See notes 267. 
309 See note 287. 
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stability.”310 The remaining 23% of medics stated that the current trust crisis between 
doctors and patients had showed that the unequal healthcare system had affected 
Chinese social stability (see Figure 11). The struggles of medical practitioners to cope 
with public disappointment about the healthcare system which they are servicing are 
implicitly revealed by this answer too (I will further explore this issue in the interview 
findings).  
 
Figure 11: The benefits of medical service (based on the question ‘Why do you think good medical 


















Number of practitioners responding to this question: 223.  
 
3.2  Moral Dilemmas 
 
When designing this questionnaire, I realised that it would be very sensitive to ask 
medics directly whether they had ever experienced a work-related moral dilemma. 
This kind of question seemed to presume that Chinese medics had been put into 
difficult positions in making decisions that they would not want to make. To eliminate 
sensitivity, while still providing a chance for respondents to express their feelings 
towards the job, I asked whether respondents found it easy in practice to apply 
bioethics and furthermore, whether they had experienced feelings of depression 
during or after work and the frequency of this.    
 
The result of this first question was that, 11% of those surveyed medics totally agreed, 
29% partly agreed, while 54% did not agree and indicated that ‘I had to make difficult 
                                                 
310 World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2008: Primary Health Care (Now more than 
ever), available from: http://www.who.int/whr/2008/en/index.html (Last visited on Nov 13th, 2009) 
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decisions in some situations.’ (see Figure 12) These responses implicitly referred to 
the existence of ethical dilemmas, though the question did not allow for them to 
indicate directly the reasons why it was difficult to apply bioethics in practice.  
 
Figure 12: Existence of ethical dilemmas (based on answers to the question ‘In the current situation, do 
you think it is easy for you to apply your understanding of medical ethics to your practice?’). 




Yes, it is 
easy.
11%












Number of practitioners responding to this question: 220. 
 
On the question of whether they experienced any feelings of depression and the 
frequency of these feelings, the responses revealed a high degree of depressive 
experience: 47% of medical practitioners had felt depressed many times, while, 36% 
of them had experienced depression a few times. In total, 83% of those surveyed 
medics had experienced depression a few or many times. Only 7% of respondents had 
never experienced any depression and as few as 5% of medics responded that they 
were pleased with their jobs (see Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13: Feeling depression (based on answers to the question ‘Have you ever had a feeling of 























Number of practitioners responding to this question: 221. 
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These survey findings corresponded to one recent piece of government sponsored 
research - the 2009 Chinese Doctor Career Survey, conducted by the Chinese 
Medical Doctor’s Association.311 Based on 3182 returned questionnaires, researchers 
found that 63.61% of Chinese doctors were dissatisfied with their practice 
environment, 63% of physicians would not encourage their children to choose 
medicine as their future career, and 44.82% of medics had even considered giving up 
their medical careers.312  
 
Besides this government sponsored research, in 2008, a nation-wide joint survey was 
conducted by one Chinese newspaper Life Times, together with two health-focused 
websites “Sohu Health” and “Ding Xiang Yuan” on Chinese doctors’ living and 
working conditions.313 This on-line survey collected views from 2067 internet-user 
medics. It also showed that a majority of those surveyed were worried about their jobs. 
In response to the question “Do you enjoy your medical career?”, only 6% of medics 
said that they liked it very much. The remaining 94% held either negative views (21% 
admitted practicing merely to make ends meet; 23% felt medicine was a meaningless 
and a disappointing career; while, 6% worked for money) or partly positive views 
(44% liked it but were scared of being confronted by angry patients).314 What is more, 
as many as 95% of those surveyed medics felt tired with the job, both physically and 
mentally (39% felt very tired and 56% felt a bit tired).315  
 
The research cited above found that a majority of medics had feelings of depression, 
dissatisfaction, and tiredness with their medical careers. However, the question 
remains as to why Chinese medics were dissatisfied and discouraged with their 
careers. In my empirical study, a multiple choice question was given in order to 
further understand, where depression existed, what caused it. As shown in Figure 14, 
                                                 
311 Chinese Medical Doctor Association, The 2009 Chinese Doctor Career Survey, available at: 
http://www.cmda.gov.cn/News/huodongzhuanti/yishifashizhounian/diaoyan.html (Last visited on Dec 
15th, 2010). 
312 Ibid.  
313 N. Jiang, L. Yang and J. Liu, ‘Chinese Doctors’ Living and Working Conditions Survey Report 
2008’(in Chinese), available at: http://health.sohu.com/s2008/yisheng/ (Last visited on Dec 15th, 2010).  
314 Ibid.  
315 Ibid. 
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Income (reason 1), Reputation (reason 2) and Commercial interest conflicting with 
bioethics (reason 3) are three of the most commonly stated causes of depression.  
 
Figure 14: Reasons for different levels of depression (based on answers to the question ‘Why did you 




















1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 
          1.  Income is too low; 
       2.  Medics’ reputation has been damaged. We were misunderstood by the public; 
       3.  Sometimes commercial interests conflict with my medical ethics;   
       4.  Lack of Professional independence; 
       5.  Sometimes law conflicts with my medical ethics;  
       6.  Guidelines and requirements are much too confusing;    
       7.  Others. 
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 223.  
 
The three most-commonly selected answers indicate that Chinese medics felt they 
were under-paid, under-valued, and were even forced to face dilemmas of the 
possibility of using corruption or other unethical behaviour to gain financially. The 
role of commercial treatment in China has been discussed in Part One of this thesis. 
Although the majority of Chinese medical practitioners intended to retain their 
integrity, the profit-driven behaviour of some Chinese medics has seriously damaged 
the medics’ public reputation. The trust-crisis between Chinese medics and patients 
has also been mentioned in an earlier chapter.  
 
In the above Figure 14, other causes of depression were: lack of professional 
independence (reason 4); law conflicting with bioethics (reason 5); and confusing 
guidelines (reason 6). These three reasons seemed not to stem from Chinese medics’ 
financial concerns. Instead they were related more to an underlying issue – that of a 
lack of professional autonomy and control. Dilemmas caused by conflicting and 
confusing control mechanisms were essentially due to a lack of professional power. 
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Both government-sponsored research and the media-led online survey have also 
traced reasons for professional depression. Both surveys found that low-paid careers, 
decline of public esteem, highly-stressful work loads and the increasing demands of 
regulatory requirements were the main causes of dismay among Chinese medics. 
These survey results corresponded with my questionnaire findings. However, I 
realised that the multiple-choice survey questions on depression (both mine and others) 
tended to be generalised or even oversimplified, and thereby may not give sufficient, 
and systematic explanation for why neither service providers nor recipients found 
China’s healthcare delivery system desirable. I have attended to this question in more 
detail in the follow-up interviews.  
 
Figure 15: Areas that need improvement (based on answers to the question ‘which area that relates to 
you work needs most improvement? Please choose whatever you think is or are relevant, then to put 
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1. Healthcare system; 2. Legislation in healthcare; 3. Income; 4.  Medical ethics; 5. Public opinions. 
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 217. 
 
To further understand the extent to which medical practitioners are affected by their 
working environment, one of my survey questions asked the medics “which area 
relating to your work needs most improvement (start from the most important 
one)”. 316  As shown in Figure 15, as many as 80% of medics indicated that the 
healthcare system needed to be changed. In other words, a majority of practitioners 
thought that healthcare governance should be tackled as a priority task. The second 
common choice was medical law legislation. The response showed that 72% of those 
surveyed were dissatisfied with the current legislation in healthcare. The remainder 
                                                 
316 As stated earlier, this ranking type of question has been analysed by the percentage choosing the 
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hoped for changes in income (70%), medical ethics (61%) and public perceptions 
(52%). The least commonly mentioned hope was change to public perceptions.  
 
This section has presented findings about Chinese medics’ motivations for prioritising 
law, political guidelines or ethics and their moral dilemmas, as well as feelings of 
depression caused by low income, low social status, and lack of occupational control. 
The following section will present further survey findings exploring the interactions 
between Chinese physicians and pluralist forms of control from law, state and ethics.  
 
4.   Interactions between Medics and Pluralist Governance 
 
Previous sections have discussed findings about Chinese medics’ attitudes to pluralist 
governance, and their motivation and dilemmas in prioritising one form of guidance 
over another. This section shows their perceptions of the effects of the healthcare 
system, medical law and political ideology on their practices.  
 
4.1   Effects of the Healthcare System on Medical Practice  
 
To start with, when asked whether they agreed or not with the statement that “China’s 
health service is currently in harmony with the public”, 44% of medics disagreed, and 
they commonly chose the optional answer “Conflicts can’t be solved in the short term; 
the situation is too complicated”. Disagreement was also expressed by another 28% of 
medics who chose the answer “there are often conflicts, but I believe things will be 
better in the future”. Only 9% of medical practitioners agreed with the statement “yes, 
China’s health service is always in harmony with the public”, but 19% stated that 
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Figure 16: The relationship between the health service and the public (based on answers to the 






















Number of practitioners responding to this question: 223. 
 
When they were asked how their practice had been affected by China’s health sector 
reform, 31% of medical practitioners stated that the reform had affected their practice 
in a negative way, while 31% stated they were not sure. On the other hand, only a 
minority of medics (20%) reported either a positive or a neutral effect. Medics who 
answered that their practice hadn’t been affected at all made up 17% of the 
respondents (see Figure 17, below).  
 
Figure 17: Effect of China’s health sector reform (based on answers to the question ‘Has your practice 















1 2 3 4 5
               
1. Affected in a bad way; 2. Not sure; 3. Affected in a good way; 4. Not affected at all; 5. No comment.  
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 218. 
 
Due to the sensitivity of the question which can be interpreted as a potential criticism 
of the central government, underlying dissatisfaction can arguably be presumed to 
exist, even if unspoken. An unusually high rate of surveyed medics (31%) stated “I 
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as a third of medics commonly responded “I am not sure”. It is not clear to me 
whether they were simply unsure or whether some of them were hesitant to judge. 
Hypothetically, if some of them simply hesitated to criticise the state governance by 
choosing this “third way”, their answers may foreshadow some of their ethical 
dilemmas between “one’s ethical belief system and what one feels compelled to do or 
is told to do by someone in a position of power”.317   
 
This assumption was supported by answers to the subsequent open question in the 
survey, by asking how their medical practice had been affected by the health sector 
reforms. Some practitioners contradicted their initial positive answers “Medical 
practice has been affected in a good way” by putting negative answers in this open 
question, such as: (1) “Chinese medics have become more passive in medical 
disputes”; (2) “Medics are indeed one of the vulnerable groups in Chinese society”; (3) 
“Practising medicine in China bears high risks while receiving low-income”; and (4) 
“Patients and their families are making more unreasonable claims for compensation. It 
seems the obligations of paying compensation are all transferred from hospitals to us”.  
 
Medics’ responses to the open question were informative. In my opinion, although 
only 51 of 223 respondents chose to answer this question, those who were willing to 
take the time to write down how their practices were affected can be considered to be 
honest in their answers. The open question, in this regard, is particularly helpful for 
hearing some medics’ hidden dissatisfaction. 
 
In their answers to the open-ended question, shown in Figure 18 below, the following 
aspects were mentioned by medics from Province A (the relatively developed 
province) and B (the relatively underdeveloped province). 318 The most commonly 
experienced effects reported from both provinces were that, they must use “defensive 
medicine” to protect themselves; followed by the second most commonly experienced 
effect – the worsening doctor/patient relationship. Although attention to both 
problems was significantly higher compared with the other effects reported; both 
these negatives might prove to be an even greater challenge to those from a less 
                                                 
317 K. E. Des Jardin, ‘Political Involvement in Nursing-Politics, Ethics, and Strategic Action’, 74 (2001) 
AORN Journal 5, 613-622. 
318 I have ‘grouped’ medics’ responses to this open-end question together for ease of showing it in a 
table. 
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developed province where less financial support had been given from its local health 
service department 
 
Figure 18: The effect of China’s health sector reform (based on answers to the question ‘Has your 

















Effects of health sector reform: answers to the open question  
1. Have to practice defensive medicine; 
2. Low income, high risk & low social status; 
3. Disturbing working environment, conflicting doctor-patient relationships, trust crisis; 
4. Dilemma in choosing between profits and ethics; 
5. Work overtime, increasing work pressure; 
6. Will be less commercialised and more accessible to poor people, community service in the future; 
7. Long-term treatments are unaffordable to patients; 
8. Practices tend to be more standardised; 
9. Poor working conditions. 
Number of practitioners responding to this open question: 51. 
 
Figure 18 showed that medics form Province A and B varied in the extent to which 
they answered negatively. Some from Province B mentioned that, because of the new 
health legislation, healthcare services had become more standardised, though no 
respondents in Province A referred to this point. Speculation may be that unequal 
economic development might affect the medics’ perception of local health regulations. 
In Province B they were subjected to more serious doctor-patient conflicts, thus they 
welcomed law to bring standardisation to their practice, so that they could provide 
better services and increased patient satisfaction.  
 
It is understandable that medics from a less developed province would be more likely 
to suffer from poor working conditions, facing patients who can not afford to pay for 
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staff. Such negative effects caused by financial strain have been reflected by the 
answers of medics from Province B (see Figure 18). 
 
Beyond these differences, medics in both provinces commonly reported that they had 
experienced “low income and low social status” and had “dilemmas in choosing 
profits or ethics”. What is more, they also expressed similar positive beliefs in the 
latest healthcare reforms. They thought the future trend of the Chinese healthcare 
system would be “less commercialised, more community based, and more accessible 
to poor people”, even though the frequency of mentioning positive effects was much 
less than for the negative ones (also see Figure 18).  
 
This section has presented the survey findings concerning the Chinese medics’ views 
on the healthcare system. In their answers to the open question about the effects of 
health sector reforms, few of them mentioned medical law. This, however, does not 
mean the effect of medical law on their practice was less than the effect of the state’s 
healthcare infrastructure. The following section presents findings specifically on their 
perceptions of medical law.  
 
4.2   Effects of Medical Laws on Medical Practice 
 
In response to my main research question – “what influences medics’ decision-
making?”, the questionnaire found that medics in China have a high legal awareness. 
As discussed earlier, 99% of surveyed medics stated that they thought law was very 
important to their practice (see Figure 1). Their preference raises questions about why 
law is their most important guideline, which laws practitioners are paying most 
attention to and where they are getting their required legal knowledge from.  
 
Answers to the multiple-choice question “why is it important to apply law to your 
practice?” illustrated a strong tendency towards self-protection from medical 
practitioners in China, as 54% of those surveyed agreed “law can be a tool for self-
protection again a possible suit”, and 34% regarded law as “my guide to a better 
understanding of patients’ rights”. At the same time, as many as 39% of medics 
agreed that they would hold on to law even when legal requirements conflicted with 
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bioethics, as this would be the least risky way to practice medicine in China; and 30% 
who said they did so for fear of punishment (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Motivations for medical law application (based on question ‘If you think it is important to 

















1 2 3 4 5 6
 
 1 Self-protection; 
2 Obligation as a citizen; 
3 It is the safest way to practise medicine; 
4 To better understand patients’ rights; 
5 Fear of punishment;  
6 Political education encourages me to obey law. 
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 221 
 
A further 50% explained that their motivation for applying law to practice was to 
fulfil their duties as a decent citizen. This answer expressed an elite Chinese 
nationalist sentiment. It was unclear whether this patriotic expression of loyalty and 
desire to serve one’s country was a consequence of political propaganda; for example, 
on-the-job legal training provided by the hospital Communist Party branches and the 
mass media. A relatively small number of practitioners (14%) admitted their 
motivation for using medical law was influenced by the state’s well-known political 
slogan – “rule the country by law” (also see Figure 19). Their responses suggested 
that the state may play an important role in motivating them to apply law to practice. 
Indeed, “observing laws and regulations and following the technical and operating 
rules” was highlighted as the first obligation of all Chinese medical practitioners by 
Article 22 of the 1998 PRC Medical Practitioner Act. 
 
Responses to another question as to which areas of law the medics paid most attention, 
explained the reasons behind their high degree of legal consciousness. Of the 7 areas 
of medical law listed, the most “popular” area was that relating to medical and 
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medical practice regulations (63%), and professional codes and bioethics was rated in 
third place (55%) (see Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20: Area of law to which medics paid most attention (based on the question ‘What sort of law 

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 
1 Regulating medical and clinical malpractice;  
2 Regulating general medical practice; 
3 Professional codes;    
4 Legal aspects of medical product and medical device usage; 
5 Legal procedure of medical law making;    
6 Legal aspects of medical research; 
7 Legal and moral questions concerning the beginning and the end of life. 
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 222. 
 
The fear of malpractice suits accounts for a vast growth in the use of defensive 
medicine. As discussed in Part One, the trend towards defensive medicine has led to 
an enormous increase in the cost of medical care, and the compensation that Chinese 
medics must pay from their own incomes. This has led to a pattern of defensive 
medical practice. In other words, Chinese medical practitioners are constantly aware 
of the need to cover themselves against the possibility of an accusation of malpractice. 
The principle of respect for informed consent as a prerequisite to medical treatment 
has had a huge impact on the Chinese practitioners’ reactions to life-saving treatment 
in emergencies. Where law and bioethics conflict and there was fear of being sued, 10 
out of 14 medics interviewed agreed that they would rather wait for consent from 
patients or their families, than immediately give life-saving treatment.  
 
The drive for better knowledge of medical law does not come solely from 
practitioners, but also from hospitals. As noted earlier, legal promotion campaigns 
have been widely undertaken in hospitals. Yet the precise role these hospitals played 
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these answers. To further understand why the hospitals promoted the study of law in 
workplace training, I noticed that the two main responses to this question were first, 
“To reduce conflict between patients and medics in order to maintain a harmonious 
working environment” (33% agreed) and second, “In reaction to patients’ increasing 
demand, legal knowledge can be used for defending medical practices and protecting 
medics” (31% agreed). Only 12% of medics thought that the motivation for 
promotion of the hospital legal campaign was to better protect patients’ interests (see 
Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21: Motivations of hospital law promotion campaign (based on the question ‘What do you 
think is the motivation of law promotion campaigns?’). 




















Number of practitioners responding to this question: 222. 
 
These results show that hospitals are playing an important role in enabling medics to 
equip themselves with an awareness of protective strategies and “tools”, thereby 
protecting institutions from being sued.  
 
4.3   Effects of the Political Ideologies on Medical Practice 
 
As is stated by the PRC State Council, “All levels of political leadership should put 
healthcare as a priority on the party’s agenda.”319 The CCP retains much of its long 
tradition of control mechanisms, i.e. political campaigns and exhortations, which 
extend to hospitals. Figure 22 shows that education about political ideology was 
accessible to most surveyed medics at their affiliate hospitals (73%). 
                                                 
319 The State Council of PRC, ‘Guideline for Further reforming Medical and Pharmaceutical System’, 
available at: http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-04/06/content_1278721.htm (Last visited on Sep 29th, 2009). 
Chapter 5 Questionnaire Findings 
120 
 
Figure 22: Accessibility of political ideology education (based on answers to the question, ‘Besides the 
















1 2 3 4
 
1. Yes;   2. No;    3. I don’t know;   4. Missing data. 
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 222. 
 
The medics mostly received guidance on political ideology via hospital staff meetings 
(51%) and the media (46%). Since not every medical practitioner was a member of 
the CCP, and there were different percentages of communists in each hospital, only 
25% of medics learnt political ideology from CCP branch discussion groups within 
the hospitals (see Figure 23).  
 
Figure 23: Political ideologies education sources (based on answers to the question, ‘where do you 
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1. Hospital staff meetings; 2. Media; 3. Hospital Party branches; 4. Not relevant; 5. No comment. 
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 222. 
 
The function of a CCP branch in hospital management will be explained in the 
discussion of interview findings. Here in the questionnaires, most medical 































Chapter 5 Questionnaire Findings 
121 
(47%). (see Figure 24). Hospital party branches often organised after-work socialising 
activities within the hospitals, involving both party members and non-members.    
 
Figure 24: The main function of the hospital’s party branch (based on answers to the question, ‘What 
functions does the hospital’s party branch play in hospital management?’). 






















Number of practitioners responding to this question: 220. 
 
5.   Prospects for Change 
 
5.1   Interest in Health Legislation   
 
Due to the sensitivity of the issues, in this survey, I did not ask medical practitioners 
directly about their considerations of, or thoughts on, challenging either the structure 
of their healthcare system or any official or unofficial rules guiding that system. In 
my view, a response which indicated an awareness of de-professionalisation, was 
implied by signs of demand for change in the present system. Several questions in the 
survey refer to the central questions, either explicitly or implicitly − How do 
practitioners see their own capacity to exercise power within the tripartite relationship 
of law, ethics and state regulation? Do medical practitioners perceive a need for self-
regulation?  
 
Of those surveyed, 86% (190 out of 222) of medical practitioners stated that it was 
very important to involve medical practitioners in healthcare legislation (see Figure 
25).  
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Figure 25: The importance of involving professionals in law-making (based on answers to the 
question,’ Do you think there should be more involvement of medical professionals in medical law 















1 2 3 4
 
1.Very important; 2. Relatively important; 3. Not important; 4. Not sure. 
Number of practitioners responding to this question: 222. 
 
As Lord Horder puts it, “only the doctor knows what good doctoring is”.320 Chinese 
medics expressed similar concern in interviews. As one doctor from Province A said, 
“Medical work is so technical that only medical professionals can understand, assess 
and regulate it.” This answer further confirmed the Chinese medics’ expectation for 
self-regulation. 
 
In terms of what drove their expectations for self-regulation, a subsequent multiple-
choice question showed that the Chinese medics’ desire and hope to be involved in 
medical law-making comes from the following reasons: one third (34%) thought that 
a professional review of medical law could provide better protection of patients’ 
interests; just over a quarter (27%) would like to be involved in arguing for the 
medics’ own interests, and just under a quarter (24%) of medics stated that their 
involvement might make an impact on changing the Chinese Medical Association’s 
inactive role in defending their interests. A small percentage of practitioners (8%) 
thought that more medics should be involved in medical law making, though they 
personally had no interest in being involved in this (see Figure 26). 
 
In addition to the above reasons, a few medics added two more when answering this 
question. They were: “professional knowledge” (3%) and “rights of speech” (1%). 
                                                 
320 K. Barnard and K. Lee, Conflicts in National Health Service (New York, Neale Watson Academic 
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Although such comments were given by a relatively small number of those surveyed, 
they indicated a slight sign of professional awareness in wanting to take control over 
these areas.  
 
Figure 26: Reasons for involving professionals in health legislation (based on answers to the question 
‘If you think it is important to involve medical professionals in medical law making, could you please 

























Number of practitioners responding to this question: 222.  
 
Generally speaking, these findings suggest that, either individually or collectively, 
more than half (51%) of the surveyed medics suggested engaging in legislation for 
their own interests, although 34% were interested in legislation for the benefit of 
patients. It showed that patients’ interests seemed a less significant reason for 
motivating the Chinese medics in a willingness to be involved in law-making. But 
how much of this can be interpreted as their indifference towards patient care is 
unclear. On different occasions during interviews, the medics did express their 
concern about patients. But they also told me they felt that the law had empowered 
patients while disempowering them. To be involved in health legislation was for 
balancing power, rather than going against patients’ interests.  
 
The Chinese Health Law Society (CHLS) was set up by the Chinese Ministry of 
Justice, as an organisation for the education of medics in medical laws.321 However, 
the survey finding showed that its impact on medics’ self-regulation awareness 
seemed rather limited. Although as many as 86% medical practitioners thought that 
                                                 
321 China Health Law Society, available at: http://www.chls.net/ (Last visited on Nov 9th, 2009).  
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more involvement in medical law making was “very important” (see Figure 25), only 
7% of those surveyed expressed an interest in joining in the CHLS, while 46% of 
them showed ignorance or uncertainty regarding this organisation (see Figure 27).  
 
Figure 27: Current awareness of self-regulation (based on answers to the question ‘Have you ever 

















Number of practitioners responding to this question: 222.  
 
To sum up, a majority of those surveyed expressed an interest in being involved in 
health legislation. Although their motivations varied, almost half of them referred to 
using law to better protect their own interests; a slightly lower percentage was 
motivated by a wish to improve patients’ interests. Despite a wish to be involved in 
legislation, there was a lack of awareness as to how to achieve this end and so make 
their voices heard, not to mention exploring the possibilities for self regulation. 
 
5.2   Membership of Professional Associations 
 
Figure 28 showed that the Chinese Medical Association (CMA) is well-known to 
medics. 81% of the medics had heard of it, yet slightly below half of respondents 
intended to become a member or were members already. Due to a fault in the question 
design, it is unclear how many of those who expressed interest in joining were in fact 
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Figure 28: Interested in joining professional association (based on the question ‘Have you heard of and 














Number of practitioners responding to this question: 216.  
 
One potential reason for their lack of interest in joining professional associations is 
that, from a socio-cultural point of view, Chinese society is not group orientated. 
Instead, Chinese society is centred on the individual and is built on networks of ties 
that link the individual with discrete categories of other individuals (more discussion 
will be given in Chapter 7).322 More importantly, the limited impact that professional 
associations had on professional practice could be another reason for their lack of 
popularity.   
 
Figure 29: Impact of professional association (based on the question ‘Has the “Chinese Medical 













Number of practitioners responding to this question: 218.  
 
                                                 
322 See A. Y.C. King, ‘The individual and Group in Confucianism: A Relational Perspective’, in D. 
Munro (ed), Individualism and Holism (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1985), 57-70; H. 
Nakamura, Ways of thinking of Eastern Peoples (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1971), 247-258.  
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When asking whether the CMA had had any impact on their work, 22% of the 
respondents thought the Association had made almost no impact and 8% were 
ignorant of its impact; 49% stated that the CMA had limited impact, leaving as little 
as 21% who thought that the CMA had a significant impact on their jobs (see Figure 
29, above).  
 
Having discussed the survey findings with regards to the Chinese medics’ interest in 
involvement in healthcare legislation and professional associations, the next section 
seeks to examine the surveyed medics’ interest in learning about international 
bioethical guidelines.    
 
5.3 Interest in International Bioethical Guidelines 
 
Chinese medics expressed a great interest in learning about international bioethical 
guidelines and the Western experience of dealing with conflicts between law and 
ethics. Of those surveyed, although 18% of medics have never heard about 
international bioethical guidelines, and 15% of them made no comment or considered 
learning about them as unnecessary (4%); 43% were interested in learning about them, 
15% already had some knowledge and 5% stated they already knew about them (see 
Figure 30). This meant that a majority of the surveyed medics had an interest in 
accessing more information about medical ethics.  
 
Figure 30: Interest in international bioethical guidelines (based on the question ‘Have you ever 
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Number of practitioners responding to this question: 218. 
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However, only a small percentage of those had learned about them. This indicated that 
in both medical schools and/or Chinese hospitals, bioethics was taught from a 
domestic perspective. Those who expressed no interest in international bioethical 
guidelines might argue that they seemed irrelevant to their work, and that it did no 
harm if they learned nothing about them. However, I argue that this can be seen as 
one aspect of deprofessionalisation.323 Information is powerful and can be used for 
good; but if it comes from one sole source, it could be confusing and even misleading. 
Most surveyed medics’ expectation for broadening their bioethical knowledge, in this 
regard, could be seen as a sign of willingness to open up their ethical dilemmas for 
wider discussion. 
 
6.   Summing up Questionnaire Findings 
 
This chapter has presented the questionnaire findings from 223 Chinese medical 
practitioners. It has examined their different levels of awareness and concept 
comprehension of medical law, governance and bioethics. Having examined the 
motivations behind their principle prioritisations and moral dilemmas; it has analysed 
and discussed the effects that medical law, state governance and political ideologies 
have had on medical practices. It has demonstrated the medics’ current status and 
their future expectations of gaining more professional control, such as self-regulation, 
memberships of more effective professional associations and a broader knowledge in 
bioethics.  
 
The questionnaire findings inform us that Chinese medical practitioners tended to 
prioritise law and hospital rules over ethics or political slogans in making medical 
decisions. Potential political-ethical tensions and power struggles amongst medics 
exist, especially when their priorities clash with the allocation of limited resources or 
ethics. What is more, differences in personal and professional understanding of ethics, 
conflicting loyalties, and a negative public image, create ethical tensions for Chinese 
medics. A large percentage of them expected changes to allow them to gain more 
professional control in work, i.e. involvement in healthcare legislation and a more 
                                                 
323 More exploration of deprofessionalisation will be provided in Chapter 7. Briefly speaking, it means 
a loss of control and power.  
Chapter 5 Questionnaire Findings 
128 
active participation in their professional associations. However, among these wishes, 
fewer of them wanted to become active advocates for either their colleagues or their 
patients.   
 
Nevertheless, the questionnaire findings have their limits, as they tend to lead 
respondents to answer according to preconceived responses that could be unclear, 
and/or lacking nuance and detail. In the next chapter I discuss the findings from the 
interviews. These offer more in-depth, qualitative and subjective perspectives about 
Chinese medics’ understanding of pluralist guidance, their experiences of and 
resolutions to ethical dilemmas, and their expectations for empowerment. Specifically, 
the following three themes were highlighted in interviews, and the findings presented 
in the next chapter are organised around them:  
 
(1) Medics’ understandings and relevant educational experiences of professional 
ethics, health law and Chinese Communist Party discipline, and their reasons for 
prioritising one over the other when facing ethical dilemmas. 
(2) Chinese medics’ perceptions of their position in China’s healthcare power 
dynamics and 
(3) Their expectations for future change.  
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CHAPTER 6   INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
 
Q: What do you interpret as professional power? 
 
A: I don’t think we have a consciousness of the need to change anything actively, though 
we are well educated. No one wants to be the first to show signs of resistance, including 
hospitals. We are all passive in controlling our own rights, in affecting other medics’ 
unethical behaviours. The only thing that I and my colleagues care about is that our 
professional work is done carefully, without leading us open to question.   
                                                                                                           
                                                                                                 A male doctor, January 2009 
 
1.    Introduction 
 
Scholars suggest that in-depth interviews help a researcher to gain insights into 
people’s attitudes, behaviours, value systems, motivations, etc, and how these 
elements contribute to their decision-making.324 Such a qualitative method provides 
an opportunity to get people to talk about their personal feelings, opinions, and 
experiences, it is thus more likely to achieve a fuller and more coherent picture than 
other methods (for example, questionnaires) of ascertaining what happened and 
why.325 In-depth interviews are also appropriate for addressing sensitive topics that 
people might be reluctant to discuss in a group setting, and allow questions that are 
difficult to assess through multiple-choice survey questions. 
 
In this study, the interviews were conducted after the questionnaires with a small 
sample of surveyed medics, in a semi-structured, open-ended format. The interviews 
probed into medics’ understanding of different guiding norms, letting them exemplify 
their experiences of and resolutions of ethical dilemmas. Finally I led medics to 
discuss more complex issues, such as, how ethical, legal and political issues 
underpinned medical practice and professional power.  
 
Having discussed survey responses in Chapter 5, this chapter analyses findings from 
interviews. The analysis of interview findings is divided into three main sections, each 
                                                 
324 C. Boyce and P. Neale, ‘Conducting In-Depth Interview: A Guide for Designing and Conducting In-
Depth Interviews for Evaluation Input’, (May 2006) Pathfinder International Tool Series: Monitor and 
Evaluation -II, 3; N. Mack, et al, Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector’s Field Guide 
(North Carolina, Family Health International, 2005), 29-30. 
325 Ibid.   
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of which addresses the following themes: guidance comprehension and prioritisation; 
ethical dilemmas and resolutions; and expectations for power and control.  
 
2.    Comprehension and Prioritisation of Guidance 
 
2.1   Chinese Medics’ Understanding of Bioethics  
 
Beauchamp and Childress suggest that professional morality “specifies general moral 
norms for the institutions and practices of medicine” and is “generally acknowledged 
by those in the profession who are serious about their moral responsibilities”.326 By 
codifying professional morality, informal morality is then formulated into formal 
instructions recognised by the profession. In China, besides the government’s version 
of medical ethics, there is no commonly recognised code adopted by any medical 
body. When asked questions, “Are general moral standards informally transmitted in 
the profession?” and “What are the Chinese medics’ understanding of professional 
ethics?” I found that the medics’ views concerning their experiential knowledge and 
understanding of medical ethics varied with their seniority.327 Interviewees’ responses 
to the above questions can be divided into three categories:  
 
(1) The first type of answer came from relatively senior medics. They said that they 
did not know much about medical ethics. Typical answers were “I graduated from a 
medical school in 1988. I had not learned law or ethics in classes, so I don’t really 
understand them.”328 Or “I am over 50 now. At the time when I was at medical school, 
medical morality was not a compulsory course, so we learned it only at a most general 
and superficial level.”329 Or “I did not learn much about it at [medical] school. The 
school paid more attention to our technical and practical skills than to ethics.”330 This 
first type of response showed that Chinese medical institutions in the early years did 
                                                 
326 T. L. Beauchamp and J. F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2009, 6th edn), 6.  
327 Demographic information was collected in questionnaires, in which respondents were asked to take 
the box in order to indicate their belonging ago groups: under 25; 26-35; 36-45; 46-55; 56-65, and over 
65. At the same time, technical titles (primary; intermediate; associate senior; or senior) and length of 
one’s professional serving time were also asked. 
328 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 20 years. 
329 A female doctor from an outpatient clinic, length of service: 34 years. 
330 A male laboratory technician from a Level IIB hospital, length of service: 16 years. 
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not pay much attention to teaching medical ethics. Thus the concept of medical ethics 
was not commonly known to these senior medics.  
 
(2) The second type of answer was mainly from less senior medics, who believed that 
professional medical ethics was equivalent to social morality or social values. For 
example, interviewees said, “Bioethics is changing in the process of social morality 
and cultural development. The era of dedication to becoming a noble, self-sacrificing 
hero has gone. Now social values are accommodating both the public interest and 
self-interests and this is the same in medicine.”331; and “medical ethics are essential to 
us medics. In my opinion, it is a socially and culturally related standard for being a 
decent person.”332 Responses from the younger generation of Chinese medics showed 
that they may have more awareness concerning medical ethics than their predecessors. 
The reason for this could be partly because of changes in medical school curricula, or 
the increasing emphasis on ethics in healthcare institutions (more discussion of this 
will follow shortly).  
 
(3) The third type of response was given by the rest of interviewed medics of various 
ages. They commonly mentioned “a hospital requirement” instead of giving me a 
description of their understanding of bioethics. For example, one answer was 
“Medical ethics are important. It has been emphasised by my hospital that we must 
abide by medical morality which forbids us to accept commission fees from 
patients.” 333 Or they referred to “hospital-based medical ethical assessment” – a 
reward system which has been widely set up by different hospitals in order to 
motivate professional moral behaviour. Medics seemed to think that the assessment 
guidelines were codes of professional ethics. Healthcare institutions, in this regard, 
played an important role in influencing Chinese medics’ understanding of ethics.  
 
The medical assessment guidelines, however, vary between hospitals. A male 
pharmacist (from a IIA hospital, length of service: 9 years) told me that his hospital 
ran yearly medical ethics assessments, and the assessment results related to a bonus 
and the chance to receive a hospital party branch good performance award. In his 
                                                 
331 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 6 years. 
332 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 10 years.  
333 A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 15 years. 
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hospital, the staff medical ethics assessment had no link to political education or party 
branch activity; what was more, the most popular medics (chosen by the highest 
number of patients) were not necessarily registered CCP party members. The most 
popular medics would be regarded as the ones judged to be most ethical, and they 
would receive the hospital-based medical ethics assessment awards. He added that 
such popular medics were most likely to be those who worked overtime, otherwise it 
would be impossible to see so many patients in a day.  
 
In terms of the hospital-based medical ethics assessment process, one interviewee told 
me, “Every one of us in the hospital had to go through an annual medical ethics 
assessment. According to the assessment instructions, we firstly underwent self-
assessment; then we had individual department assessments; finally our practice 
records were assessed by the senior hospital administrator. The result of annual 
bioethical assessments affected our wages.” 334  She further explained that the 
assessment guidelines included clauses like “saving life and curing pain; 
confidentiality; the obligation to provide treatment without considering the patients’ 
ability to pay; respect for patients, etc”, and added, “generally speaking, if we work 
carefully, that will be fine. Patients also have rights to watch our work and complain 
about any misbehaviour to the hospital management team.”  
 
After listening to medical staff, I also managed to talk to a hospital administrator 
about his opinions of the role of an institution in training and assessing medical ethics. 
According to the hospital administrator, “The degree of one’s ethical understanding is 
related to one’s political motivation. Only those who receive high marks in their 
medical ethics assessment can be allowed to enrol in the party. The basic rule of my 
hospital’s ethical guideline is not to over-charge patients or accept commission fees 
from drug companies. If this rule is broken, the medics can expected to be fined 
double to triple the money paid to them by the drug company. We organise meetings 
at different levels of administration to disseminate medical ethics and political 
ideology. We also have yearly medical ethic assessments. These results would affect 
our yearly bonus, and would act as a factor to be taken into account when assessing 
                                                 
334 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 4 years.  
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those who are CCP members in their regular membership assessments.”335 This senior 
officer’s comments reinforced my speculation about the key role of bureaucratic 
institutions in moulding Chinese medics into being more institutionalised. 
 
To sum up, these three kinds of answers showed that the notion of professional 
medical ethics in China has been influenced by general social values and the 
hospitals’ ethics examinations. Carr-Saunders and Wilson state, “Of more importance 
to the social control of the professional is the silent pressure of opinion and 
tradition…which is constantly around him throughout his professional career”336 This 
socially-influenced sense of bioethics will be explored further in Part III of this thesis. 
In terms of the medical ethics assessment, the level of hospital made no significant 
difference. What is more, hospitals’ medical ethics assessments seemed to play a key 
role in affecting the medics’ understanding of professional standards. This was 
supported by answers to the survey question, discussed previously, which showed 
limited systematic medical ethics instruction had been given to medics in medical 
school. Overall, interviewees’ responses to this question suggested that the Chinese 
medics’ understanding of bioethics varied widely with age, hospital setting and 
background. Hospitals in China were not only a main source of legal knowledge, but 
were also actively engaged in bioethical teaching and assessments. 
 
2.2   Chinese Medics’ Understanding of Regulatory Mechanisms  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Chinese medical practitioners were subjected to two main 
sources of surveillance control– medical law and CCP disciplines. The role of 
hospital guidelines and their medical ethical assessments, however, was not explored. 
This was partly because institutional rules varied from hospital to hospital. 
Technically, it was difficult for researchers to examine systematically the guidelines 
of all hospitals and their medical ethics assessments. However, the role of institutional 
rules, which might have been underestimated by researchers, was repeatedly referred 
to during interviews. Hospital rules are therefore included in the analysis of the 
medical regulatory framework, alongside discussions of medical law and CCP 
                                                 
335 A male hospital administration officer from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 years. 
336 A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, the Professions (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933), 403.  
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disciplines. This section presents Chinese medics’ perceptions of this regulatory 
framework: hospital rules, medical law and CCP disciplines.  
 
(1) Views of Hospital Rules 
 
Article 31 of the 1998 PRC Medical Practitioner Act (the 1998 Act) indicates that 
hospitals in China have a legal obligation to assess and evaluate medical 
practitioners.337 Indeed, hospital guidelines were referred to by several interviewees, 
as previously cited. As institutions directly managing and controlling the quality of 
service, hospitals are a major source of authoritative guidance to medics in their daily 
practice. Two thirds of interviewees referred to hospital rules when answering 
questions about their understanding of medical ethics and law. Why did they use 
hospital rules to interpret their understanding of bioethics or law? My hypothetical 
explanation would be that Chinese hospitals operate not only as administrative 
agencies, but also as the Chinese medics’ workplace training programme providers for 
legal, ethical and political disciplines. One male doctor (from a IIIA hospital, length 
of service: 11 years) said, “We did not have much teaching about law in the hospital. 
Instead hospital guidelines and departmental technical requirements were taught.” 
 
 Article 35 of the 1998 Act adds that, 
 
“Institutions of medical treatment, prevention or health care should guarantee training and 
continued medical education of their own doctors according to provisions and planning. 
 
Medical and health institutions entrusted to the administrative department of health under 
the people’s government at or above the county level are to undertake the evaluation of 
doctors and should provide and create conditions for training and continued medical 
education of doctors.” 
 
Chinese hospitals that are “entrusted to the administrative department of health under 
the people’s government” formulate institutional rules and staff training programmes 
that reflect the state’s policy and regulations. The fact that so many interviewees 
                                                 
337Article 31 of the 1998 PRC Medical Practitioner Act states that, “Institutions or organizations 
entrusted by the administrative department of health under the people’s government at or above the 
county level should make evaluation of doctors at regular intervals in respect of their professional 
skills, achievements in work and occupational morals in accordance with practising standards of 
doctors. Evaluation institutions should report evaluation results of doctors to the administrative 
department of health granting registration for the record”. 
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spontaneously included hospital rules in their discussions of ethics and law suggest 
that hospital rules have a strong influence on their daily practice. Reflecting on this, 
one male doctor (from an IIA hospital, length of service: 20 years) said, “Since last 
year [2007], I can’t prescribe some relatively high-priced drugs to patients, even if 
they are the most effective ones. There are maximum prices set by the hospital. Once 
we prescribe over the quota, we have to pay for the outstanding amount of money 
ourselves. So now, I only prescribe basic drugs in order to sustain my income.”  
 
These maximum price guidelines can be traced back to the drug administration 
legislation introduced in 2001, by the PRC State Price Commission, to address the 
problem of outrageous drug prices and drug-related corruption in Chinese hospitals. 
The problem has been commented on by Chinese scholars: “Driven by financial 
pressure, hospitals have found many ways to survive including over-charging for 
services, either by grossly violating the price regulation or by taking advantage of 
loop-holes in the system.”338 In light of the prevalent over-charging behaviour among 
hospitals, the Drug Administration Law was introduced in 2001, and its relevant 
implementation regulations gradually implemented. 339  From this interviewee’s 
remarks, it is clear that the legislation was designed to stop corruption but is having an 
unintended effect of circumscribing treatment. Although various interviewees 
admitted that over-charging for drugs can not be tackled effectively without 
fundamentally reforming the healthcare financing structure, the effect of hospital rules 
on Chinese medics’ daily practice can be powerful and should not be underestimated.  
 
One of the flaws in the interview design was that I did not realise the importance of 
hospital rules before conducting this fieldwork. Therefore the content of hospital rules 
was not a specific question in my semi-structured interviews. Consequently, very few 
interviewees discussed the contents of their hospital rules. Instead they either referred 
to them when answering questions related to the application of medical ethics or law 
to their practice, or as a reason for explaining why their behaviour had changed in 
practice. However, I noticed one phenomenon that was common to all hospitals that I 
visited. Hospital rules and practice guidelines were publicly posted like campaign 
                                                 
338 X. Liu, et al., ‘The Chinese Experience of Hospital Price Regulation’, 15 (2000) Health Policy and 
Planning 2, 157-163.  
339 The 2000 PRC Drug Administration Law, its enforcement starts since Dec 1st, 2001; also see 
Regulation for the Implementation of the 2002 PRC Drug Administration Law. 
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texts in hospital hallways or corridors. I managed to record some of them (hospitals in 
which I conducted such observations were not deliberately chosen according to any 
particular criteria but depended on whether I had spare time before or after meeting 
respondents), such as:   
 
“Patient’s interests are our sole concern. Patients’ interests are our service priority.”340 
 
“Practice medicine following clinical guidelines and law; Understanding discipline clearly 
will ensure trust; Regard the hospital as home, love the colleagues; Be aware of cost-effective 
measures; Contribute to our medical career without considering personal interests.”341 
 
“To study political ideological theories and reform one’s worldview.” 
“Strictly follow the Eight Medical Career Disciplines given by the Ministry of Health (June, 
2005):   
(1) No commission fee is allowed to be taken in any medical treatment by any medical 
organisations or their departments;  
(2) Financial revenues and expenditures of all hospital departments should be managed by the 
financial department of that institution only. No department is allowed to distribute its income 
to its contracted medical staff;  
(3) Medical practitioners are not allowed to accept any kind of benefit from their patients;  
(4) Medical practitioners are not allowed to take any commission fee by issuing or prescribing 
any medicines, medical devices, equipment or examinations;  
(5) Medical practitioners are not allowed, any kind of financial benefits, from introducing 
patients to other medical institutions to receive medical examinations, treatment, drug-
purchasing or use of medical equipment;  
(6) Both the medical organisation and medical practitioner can only charge patients under the 
categories and price standards set by the state. No over-charging, separating items in order to 
incur overlapping charges or increasing the price above the standard is allowed;  
(7) Medical institutions should abide by state pharmaceutical bidding and purchasing rules, in 
accordance with contract procurement to buy drugs;  
(8) No counterfeit and inferior drugs are allowed to be used in the hospital; hospitals are not 
allowed to produce, sell or use drugs or formulations made by the hospital itself without 
getting full official approval.”342 
 
“Deepening our understanding of Scientific Development – current dominant political 
ideology urged by President Hu. This is an important political thought which should equip our 
Socialist theoretical system with Chinese characteristics; further strengthen the Economic 
Open-door Policy, promote social harmony and stability, and most importantly, increase our 
Party’s political administrative ability. It is one of the necessities for our Party to maintain its 
advanced characteristics.”343 
   
“Promoting patriotic education, increasing patriotic sentiment for the State; Promoting legal 
education, increasing staff legal awareness; Calling for trustworthy and honest medical 
                                                 
340 Outside an administration office of Hospital A of Province A (Hospital Level: IIA).  
341 Corridors of Hospital A of Province A (Hospital Level: IIA).  
342 Hallway of Hospital B of Province A (Hospital Level: IIA). 
343 Hallway of Hospital C of Province A (Hospital Level: IIA). 
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practice, strengthening trust; Calling for polite practice and better doctor-patient 
relationships.”344 
 
Literally, these ‘campaign’ texts appeared like proverbs, presented in simple language 
with a promising and encouraging tone. In some respect, these texts gave me the 
impression that they were used to give public promises. It was unclear whether 
hospitals followed strictly these campaign texts, or whether they were intended to 
only be used as slogans to give patients reassurance that this hospital was under strict 
quality control. Possibly they were positioned to remind medics of their 
responsibilities and practice rules. On one occasion, I asked one interviewee, “What 
does ‘the viewpoint of scientific development’ mean exactly? I saw the text in your 
hospital hallway.” He replied, “I don’t know. The hospital managers asked us to learn 
this and bear it in mind. So even though I know nothing about it, I still have to 
remember it. I suggest you check the meaning on the internet.” 345  His answer 
indicated that, though Chinese medics do not always seem to understand the substance 
of the rules, they understand that the rules are important.  
 
The extent of the influence and variety of content of the hospital rules in China can 
hardly be examined in this “snapshot” manner. But one thing seemed clear; the impact 
and degree of authority that hospital rules had differs from hospital to hospital. 
Though hospital rules have referred to repeatedly by interviewees and the hospitals 
that were observed seemed to be promoting their rule-obeying culture actively, the 
responses below show that hospital corruption is still a problem that has not been 
solved: 
 
“Giving big prescriptions is a common phenomenon in the environment in which I am 
working. As long as the drug does no harm, and the pharmaceutical company pays 
some benefits, the doctors, including senior doctors with professorships, constantly 
over-prescribe drugs.”346  
  
“We were told each week by the hospital managers about medical ethics. But I don’t 
think medical ethics itself is working by merely mentioning its importance. Hospital 
                                                 
344 Corridors of Hospital D of Province B (Hospital Level: IIIA). 
345 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 9 years. 
346 A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 15 years. 
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corruption is still a serious problem. Good ethical behaviour is dependent on one’s 
self-control.”347  
 
“I personally never accept commission from patients. I always remit it to the hospital 
if a patient has given gave me ‘a red pocket’ [money]. But I know my colleagues and 
former classmates do accept ‘red pockets’ or valuable gifts from patients, as our 
income is not high.”348  
 
These testimonies corresponded with my argument in Part I that, without a 
fundamental reform of the healthcare financing system, health rules or law could only 
play a limited role in regulating professional behaviour (interviewees’ further 
discussion about their colleagues’ misbehaviours in practice will follow in the ethical-
financial dilemmas section).  
 
When discussing the role of hospital rules, one interviewee added his perception about 
the position of Chinese medics: “Working under the supervision of both hospitals and 
courts, we medics need to practice very carefully; if we are careless, we could get 
complaints or even be sued. No one wants to find him or herself ending up either in 
the hospital manager’s office or in the court room.”349  
 
Having presented the interviewees’ perceptions of hospital rules, the following section 
turns its attention to the medics’ understanding of the impact of law on medical 
practice. Medical law, according to the questionnaire findings, was regarded as the 
most influential mechanism for supervising the Chinese medics’ conduct. The next 
section aims to explore whether interviewees’ responses were consistent with this 
finding. 
 
(2)  Views and Understanding of Medical Law 
 
As mentioned in Part I, Chinese medical practitioners are governed by a growing 
number of health laws, for example, the 1998 Medical Practitioner Act and by the 
                                                 
347 A female doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 6 years. 
348 “Red pocket” in Chinese means a monetary gift. A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of 
service: 15 years. 
349 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 9 years. 
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2002 Regulations on the Handling of Medical Accidents. Healthcare legislation during 
the 21st century in China has sparked off by the unethical and profit-driven conduct of 
many public hospitals and medics, which has, accordingly, given rise to a crisis of 
trust in healthcare. After applying legal standards for almost a decade, one purpose of 
the empirical study is to briefly sketch the factual situation of the Chinese medics’ 
legal awareness and their perception of legal influence (if any) on their medical 
practice. This section presents the interviewees’ views on medical law and their 
motives for following (or not following) legal standards.  
 
The survey showed that Chinese medics have a relatively high level of legal 
consciousness compared with their bioethical understanding and level of interest in 
political ideology. The survey found that nine out of ten questionnaire respondents 
agreed that applying law to their medical practice was “very important”. 
Questionnaire results also showed that medics’ relatively high attention to learning 
and applying medical law was not just because they cared about standards of patient 
care, but also to an increasing distrust of medics by patients who might sue or 
physically attack them. Because of this, preventive measures have come to be used by 
Chinese medical practitioners.  
 
In answering the question about medical practitioners’ legal consciousness, one 
interviewee told me, “I have been keeping track of the latest developments in medical 
legislation and practise carefully under legal instruction.”350 A similar answer was 
repeated by many other interviewees. However, it should be considered that there may 
be a divergence between Chinese medics’ own interest in learning medical law, and 
their interest in law (if any) that was affected by other factors, such as hospitals. One 
interview finding was that most interviewees stated that their knowledge of medical 
law was largely mediated by healthcare institutions. Six interviewees commented on 
their hospital which has often actively engaged in training its staff in legal knowledge. 
For example, 
  
                                                 
350 A female doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 13 years. 
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“The hospital I am working for emphasises the importance of law. It organised our 
law study (especially the regulations of medical malpractice), so that we could have 
more preventative awareness.”351   
 
“I work in a maternity department where complicated cases are more common. We 
study law every week as there are an increasing number of new medical malpractice 
guidelines.”352  
 
“Our hospital chief has emphasised the importance of law in order to reduce the costs 
of lawsuits.”353  
 
“Our hospital would organise and provide those relevant medics with medical law 
education for any department which was likely to handle risky cases, such as on the 
emergency ward. I have also learned medical regulations at medical school where it 
was taught as an optional course.”354  
 
“Since 2006, the hospital has emphasised medical law and the doctor-patient 
relationship. We were told this was required by the Health Minister. Every year we 
get a booklet called ‘medical law’, on which we need to pass an informal test. 
Personally, I don’t think this is necessary. The hospital is making a big deal out of it 
simply because patients are becoming more aware of their rights.”355  
 
“Senior managers of our hospital pay more attention to medical law. I haven’t thought 
and don’t know much about it.”356 
 
However, one could not deduce from these responses that all medical practitioners are 
passively learning law because their hospitals required it. Some responses from 
interviewees expressed appreciation for their hospital’s legal training. Coincidently or 
not, such responses were all from female nurses: 
 
                                                 
351 A female doctor from an outpatient clinic, length of service: 34 years. 
352 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 13 years.  
353 A male pharmacist from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 4 years. 
354 A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 15 years. 
355 A male pharmacist from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 9 years. 
356 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 11 years. 
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“My hospital emphasises medical law everyday, in order to prevent medical disputes. 
Yet, medicine has not promised to cure every disease. There is so much we don’t 
know or can’t do. When patients are paying more attention to claiming their legal 
rights, we need to keep every prescription and treatment in accordance with law. 
Risks are unavoidable, not only to doctors but also to nurses. We need to pay attention 
to drug usage; we have to check and double-check, so our workload and pressure are 
increased.”357  
 
“We learn legal standards in the hospital. It distributes a booklet to each of its staff 
which we need to read to pass the test. This is helpful for our jobs. I can now explain 
medical records to my patients more clearly.”358  
 
“The hospital organises seminars on medical law for us. Medical law was an optional 
course when I was in medical school. Learning medical law is important, as it helps us 
to protect ourselves from legal disputes. Similarly, patients are also protected by more 
careful practice.”359  
 
“We study medical law in hospital as the managers think it is necessary for us. This 
afternoon we were studying legal cases. We have a person responsible for giving the 
seminars so that we can discuss and study. It is helpful for both patients and 
medics.”360 
 
Why did these nurses appear more cooperative with the hospital’s legal training 
programmes than the rest of the respondent healthcare workers? I interpret their views 
as representing a group of Chinese medics who take the law seriously. They were not 
afraid of legal sanctions and they are not being defensive. They thought law was a 
useful tool for better equipping them with the standard-based rules that they needed in 
order to give their patients the best possible healthcare service. So law they thought 
could be both enabling and empowering. It became a means for improving the doctor-
patient relationship.  
 
                                                 
357 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 years. 
358 A female nurse from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 5 years. 
359 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 10 years. 
360 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 4 years. 
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Aside from hospital-organised legal training, responses also showed that in recent 
years, medical schools in China had been paying more attention to teaching medical 
students about medical law. The Chinese media also play an active role in raising 
public interest in medical law by broadcasting controversial legal and ethical cases. 
Some interviewees, who might not have opportunities to study law in their job, had 
either learned law at medical school or sought legal knowledge from other sources. 
The following responses illustrate these findings:  
 
“We learned medical law at [medical] school. It was a compulsory course.”361  
 
   “I learned it from the media. I haven’t studied it systematically in hospital. It is 
helpful in writing medical records. Medical malpractice cases are becoming 
increasingly common.”362  
 
  “We need medical law. Its importance has been repeatedly emphasised by my hospital 
and the local health bureau during on-the-job training. Also the Chinese Medical 
Association organises relevant legal study on-line.”363  
 
In terms of the practitioners’ views of the impact of medical law, not every 
interviewee agreed that law was either important or helpful in their job. Some 
interviewees expressed their disappointment in law because they thought “the 
patients’ interests are better protected than the medics’”. But these medics admitted 
that they lacked motivation to learn about law. One interviewee even said, “Law does 
little to protect medics. It is confusing and useless to learn law.”364 Other interviewees 
gave more detailed explanations as to why they felt disappointed with the law, such as: 
 
“Currently I am have been training at a Level IIIA hospital, having finished training at 
a Level II hospital. Both these hospitals provided legal training for staff. I used to 
work in a township where we didn’t have many opportunities to study medical law. 
My knowledge of law was from disputes that happened around me. Disputes were 
most likely to be solved by pre-trial resolution, such as the payment of money claimed 
                                                 
361 A male pharmacist from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 4 years. 
362 A male administrator from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 years. 
363 A female doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 6 years. 
364 A female nurse from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 30 years. 
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by patients. Law has become the patients’ tool to threaten the hospital or medics. We 
pay money in order to fulfil our government’s calling for a ‘harmonious society’. To 
some extent, I think law protects doctors, but in most cases, disputes have been solved 
before going to trial. Whether they save the patient or not, doctors are likely to face 
criticism anyway. Nothing backs up the medics.”365   
 
“Lawyers think differently from medics. There is no law adequately protecting 
doctors, so we have to protect ourselves. That which is legally reasonable does not 
necessarily mean medically acceptable. As a doctor, I am under increasing pressure to 
practice. The pressure not only comes from patients, but also comes from the 
increasing demands of legal requirements.”366  
 
“Law has no real function. I met a patient who miscarried and was totally 
unreasonable. The medics’ practice was faultless, but the patient asked our hospital to 
pay compensation of 2000 Chinese Yuan [equivalent to 200 pounds] for her 
miscarriage. Otherwise she refused to leave the hospital. The hospital, concerned for 
its reputation, paid the amount the patient claimed. Apart from this, for example, you 
can also tell that the law is useless where property developers force locals to leave in 
order to clear the land to build new buildings, roads, railways, etc. The law in China 
only protects those who are financially and politically capable.”367 
 
In contrast to the previously discussed female nurses’ supportive attitudes to legal 
training, these comments from male medics expressed disappointment. One might 
tentatively suggest that male and female medics differ in terms of their perception of 
the impact of medical law. This gender difference in perceptions of medical law is a 
subject beyond the scope of this thesis but worth pondering in the future.  
 
To sum up, it seems clear that Chinese medics have contradictory feelings towards the 
study of law and the influence of law. Some of the interviewees liked it, because it 
provided them with tools to aim for and to achieve self-protection and better patient 
care. Others hated it, because law seemed not to solve the problem of loss of trust and 
                                                 
365 A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 15 years. 
366 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 6 years. 
367 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 20 years. 
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did not fulfil medics’ expectations of being better protected. Instead they felt more 
pressure caused by the legal demands on them. 6 out of 24 interviewees did not 
comment directly on the influence of law or tell me how they felt. They simply stated 
whether or not they knew about law, and the source of their knowledge.    
 
One might argue that these control mechanisms provided by healthcare institutions 
and healthcare legislation are not unique to China. Similar systems of quality control 
and institutional training exist elsewhere. What makes the Chinese way of governing 
medical practitioners unique is the role of the Chinese Communist Party, which 
penetrates healthcare governance, including the management of Chinese medics. The 
following section reveals how medics perceive the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
disciplinary controls.  
 
(3) Views of CCP Discipline 
 
As discussed earlier, hospital rules, CCP discipline and medical law are employed as 
the three main controlling mechanisms to govern Chinese healthcare practitioners. 
Having reviewed interviewees’ perceptions of hospital rules and medical law, this 
section reveals medics views on CCP discipline. As noted previously, the number of 
registered CCP members reached 77.99 million by the end of 2009.368 Although the 
number of Chinese medics who are also registered as CCP members has not been 
revealed, it is pointed out by the Chinese government that 17.72 million registered 
CCP members hold professional qualifications.369 Chinese medical practitioners who 
have CCP membership are under scrutiny from the CCP’s monitoring and supervisory 
unit – the Discipline Inspection Committee (DIC).  
 
From the highest level hospital to a small local clinic, political propaganda and 
professional ethics are highlighted on the bulletin boards of hospital registration halls. 
The CCP has never loosened its propaganda role in governing Chinese medics. 
However, both the questionnaire and interview findings revealed that the measures 
taken by the DIC, such as political campaigns and political education activities, have 
become less effective than they were in Mao’s era. Questionnaire data show that in 
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practice, compared with medical law and medical ethics, political ideology came as a 
last resort for medics to consider.  
 
Although the survey data found that there was less influence from political ideology, 
it also showed that half of those surveyed (52%) claimed that education given by the 
Party branch in bioethics and medical law was relatively important to them. Only 16% 
of medics stated that political norms were irrelevant to their practices. To verify these 
survey findings, I asked the same question again in interviews. “How do you react to 
political thought education in your hospital?” Surprisingly, interviewees’ opinions and 
attitudes differed significantly from the dominant attitude expressed in the survey. 
Five interviewees stated that political thought had nothing to do with medicine, three 
held negative views about it, while only two out of 24 interviewees said they thought 
political norms were important to them. The remaining 14 medics chose not to answer 
this question.  
 
This discrepancy between the survey and the interview findings concerning the 
importance of political thought may show that medics who decided to opt into the 
interviews were a self-selecting group who held a rather different attitude from the 
rest of the respondents. Considering the political sensitivity of this question, it was not 
surprising that many interviewees refused to answer it. Loyalty to the CCP seems still 
dominate China’s healthcare arena. Apart from that, the indifferent attitude towards 
political guidelines was shared among the following five interviewees,  
 
“There are 50 party members within our hospital’s 300 medics. All of us need to learn 
party guidelines, as is required by our senior managers. But I have no idea and no 
interest in knowing what the party thoughts are really about.”370   
 
“I am not a communist member and I don’t think it affects our work much.”371  
 
“We learnt medical ethics and attended anti-corruption campaign meetings organised 
by our hospital party branch. Honestly, it offered little help. Because our medics are 
human, we still have to think about our incomes and working hours. Receiving a 
                                                 
370 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 9 years. 
371 A female nurse from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 29 years. 
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commission fee from patients has become common practice among medics. Most of 
my colleagues are on the practical side.”372  
 
“We have a lot of Party members in my hospital. They are people who have political 
motivations. But it doesn’t mean they are technically active or excellent. Political 
ideologies are separate from doctors’ practice.”373 
 
“The Party branch in my hospital does not play a leading role but more of a 
coordinating one. The relationship between it and the hospital administration 
department is complicated. These political thoughts are not meaningful any more, as 
social values have changed. In practice, economic interest has taken over political 
ideology’s previous supreme status.”374 
 
Negative attitudes towards the CCP rules were found among three interviewees. They 
suggested that the CCP political doctrines had no real meaning in practice. The 
following answers showed such perceptions:  
 
“In public hospitals, we have to study the latest political ideologies, even though I am 
not a communist party member. I think the doctrine is hypocritical, because those 
thoughts or disciplines serve no practical purpose.”375  
 
“I am not a communist, but I do think those heroes or model medics who were 
publicised by politicians were fake. Ideological education is to achieve President Hu’s 
so-called harmonious society.”376  
 
“All the staff in my hospital have to attend meetings which disseminate political 
ideology. Two thirds of my colleagues including myself think technical skill is what 
matters in medicine. Political education has no real meaning.”377  
 
                                                 
372 A male pharmacist from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 4 years. 
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These attitudes regarding the CCP rules in the healthcare environment may indicate 
that not all Chinese medics are subjected to the CCP rules, especially non- CCP 
members. Another possibility might be the supervisory unit – the Discipline 
Inspection Committee (DIC) – has a diminishing influence on Chinese medics. 
However, it does not mean that the CCP and DIC have completely lost power. The 
DIC still possess the power of policy making and political supervision and is 
becoming increasingly important to the Party’s life-or-death struggle against 
corruption (including hospital corruption).378 In contrast to the negative comments, 
two interviewees held positive views toward the CCP rules and its influence on 
medicine. They said: 
 
“I heard that most hospitals classified as IIIA are active in training staff in political 
thought and Party activities. The Communist Party branches prop our professional 
motivations and ethics up.”379  
 
“We learn political thought, so that our jobs can be done more safely. We will be less 
likely to make mistakes if we follow political orders. There are many Party members 
in my hospital. Communist Party membership gives one more opportunity for 
promotion. The Party branch provides our education which I think is necessary.”380  
 
These comments from interviewees all confirm the existence of political education at 
their hospitals. However, assessment of the impact of the CCP branch and its political 
disciplinary training differed between interviewees. Although eight interviewees held 
similar views to the CCP, its political ideological campaign does not seem to have had 
a significant effect on their medical practice. Two interviewees’ positive attitude 
toward the CCP and its influence suggested that Chinese medics’ political perceptions 
are not black and white. There may be “grey” areas concerning their attitudes or 
feelings. What is more, due to the sensitivity of this subject, the inconsistent responses 
to this issue may pose a question of validity.   
 
                                                 
378 T. Gong, ‘The Party Discipline Inspection in China: Its Involving Trajectory and Embedded 
Dilemmas, 49 (2008) Crime, Law and Social Change 139-152. 
379 A female nurse from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 13 years. 
380 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 years. 
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Despite some respondents holding negative or indifferent views towards the CCP in 
hospitals, and their explanations that political ideology is no longer spiritually 
inspiring as Chinese social values have become more materialistic and economically 
driven; we should not ignore the fact that CCP branches are engaging either directly 
or indirectly in hospital management. Chinese politicians are closely involved in 
monitoring China’s healthcare delivery and its workers. As to the role of Party 
branches at different public hospitals, a healthcare administration officer, who holds a 
medical degree and then worked for a local healthcare bureau in Province A, told me:  
 
“First of all, I need to clarify that my answer would not be representative. In my own 
opinion, the party branch is there to provide hospital medical ethics education and 
career direction. In short, it has to control thoughts and minds. In some hospitals, the 
secretaries of their Party branch are more powerful and authoritative than the hospital 
directors. They have the power and authority to decide job promotion within the 
hospital.”381  
 
This officer kept a straight face when making this comments. It was difficult to tell 
from her comments whether she held a positive or negative attitude towards political 
doctrines. But her remarks indicated that the power of the secretaries of the Party 
branches should not be underestimated. “As the sole political party stipulated by the 
Constitution of PRC, the CCP has power to oversee and supervise all political, 
judicial, administrative, and service organizations.” 382 Although some respondents 
said political doctrines were not so relevant any more, the CCP still keeps its grip on 
power of healthcare governance (as discussed in Part I).    
 
This section has presented Chinese medics’ perceptions in relation to three regulatory 
frameworks: hospital rules, medical law and CCP discipline. These mechanisms are 
being used in China in the hope of improving professional performance. Responses 
from most interviewees showed that they held different degrees of respect for, and 
interest in, learning them. Compared with the CCP disciplines, hospital rules and 
medical laws were held in relatively high esteem. This finding also corresponds with 
the survey results, discussed in Chapter 5.  
                                                 
381 A female administrator from the local health bureau, length of service: 11 years. 
382 See note 29. 
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In short, there is a consistency between the survey and interview findings in terms of 
medics’ understanding and prioritisation of medical ethics and the regulatory 
mechanisms. However, interview responses revealed the complexity of the medics’ 
views. They not only presented factual findings that were similar to those of the 
survey, but also revealed their emotional and personal feelings with regard to these 
practice guidelines. The next section discusses the consequences of the relationship 
between legal requirements, political commands and bioethical considerations. It aims 
to examine how medics interact within these guidelines particularly when there are 
ethical dilemmas. It also explores whether there are consistencies or inconsistencies in 
medics’ stated preference for particular guidelines.  
 
3.   Legal Requirements, Political Commands and Bioethical 
Considerations: Any Ethical Dilemmas? 
 
“Law is so important. Without it, there is no order in society. However, medical legislation 
does not always meet medical needs, especially when it conflicts with bioethics. It could cause 
more harm than good. Law-makers are not medics. The standards that they set to regulate 
medical practice could become barriers hindering medical development. In this circumstance, 
no medic dares to provide medical services containing risks.” 
 
                                                                               A senior doctor383, December 2008 
 
Questions concerning the existence of conflicting control mechanisms or medics’ 
dilemmas were inserted into the draft before conducting the semi-structured 
interviews. These questions were hypothetically based, as there was no evidence from 
literature reviews or media reports that Chinese medics experienced any specific 
ethical dilemmas, even in the case of SARS (mentioned earlier). However, lack of 
official reports does not mean ethical dilemmas or conflicts are non-existent.  
 
The purposes of questioning on this hypothetical theme are manifold. First, the aim 
was to examine whether medics’ prioritisation of guidelines were consistent when 
raised in sample cases. Secondly, it aimed to explore whether there were any 
unspoken inner dilemmas that interviewees had experienced. It was presumed in that 
                                                 
383 A female doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 29 years. 
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case they had to do something unethical, which they would not have chosen to do, had 
they been allowed to have more control over their work. Thirdly, this was a question 
one step closer to the core theme of this interview study, to unlock the Chinese 
medics’ hidden voice so that their perception of professional power, experience of 
ethical dilemmas (if any) and emotional feelings could be captured when examining 
the relationship between state, law and medics in China.   
 
Realising the limitation of information that can be elicited concerning this sensitive 
issue, I have searched and found data from a Chinese medics’ online forum (assuming 
it to be mainly medics), their comments and discussions were posted after they read 
“the 2008 Chinese Doctors’ Living and Working Conditions Survey Report”. I have 
referred to this survey in the questionnaire findings. The Ding Xiang Yuan website is 
one of the main communication methods used by Chinese medical practitioners.384  
According to the website introduction, it has 1.95 million registered users who are 
medical practitioners working in any field of medicine in China. 385  The website 
posted the 2008 Survey Report online in March 2008.386 Up to January 2011, it has 
raised 820 relevant topic-discussions and debates and has generated, in total, over 
66,000 comments from its registered users.387  
 
Dholakia and Zhang indicate that, “The internet is much more than a communication 
medium—it is also an evolving nexus of cross-referenced databases.”388 They also 
suggest that “A bulletin board is a medium that displays all messages that have been 
                                                 
384 Ding Xiang Yuan, available at: http://www.dxy.cn/ (Last visited on Jan 5th, 2011).  
385 ‘About us’ (in Chinese), Ding Xiang Yuan, available at: 
http://www.dxy.cn/cms/upload/html/about.html (Last visited on Jan 5th, 2011).  
386 The report (in Chinese) was divided into four serials to be post perspective on the Ding Xiang Yuan 
website. Serial I ‘How Chinese Public Views on Medical Practitioners’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/topic/11206971; Serial II ‘How Tired Chinese Medical Practitioners are’, 
available at:  http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/topic/11261320; Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes 
Relatively Low or High’, available at: http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/topic/11326004; and Serial IV ‘How 
Chinese Medics Judge about Themselves and Their Work’, available at: 
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/topic/11388369 (Last visited on Jan 5th, 2011).  
387 Ibid. The number of topic discussion was found from key word ‘The 2008 Chinese Doctors’ Living 
and Working Conditions Survey Report’ search result of the website. Comments numbers are 
calculated and shown below each post. Up to Jan 5th 2011, Serial I had attracted 15242 comments; 
Serial II had attracted 27683 comments; Serial II had attracted 17439 comments; and Serial IV had 
attracted 5746 comments.  
388 N. Dholakia and D. Zhang, ‘Online Qualitative Research in the Age of E-Commerce: Data Sources 
and Approaches’, 5 (2004) Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung /Forum: Qualitative Social Research 2; 
M. Poster, The Mode of Information (London, Blackwell, 1990) and M. Poster, The Second Media Age 
(London, Blackwell, 1995).  
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posted on it and their respective replies.”389 So it is one of the ways of accumulating 
qualitative data in cyberspace. 390  This thesis is going to cite some online users’ 
comments placed on this website. They are to be used as complementary data in the 
following discussion of my interviewees’ perceptions of ethical dilemmas.  
 
However, I am also aware of a possible weakness in using data from an online forum. 
There can be an over-representation of views or experiences from medics of a 
particular age group. Though more and more seniors are accessing the internet and 
becoming part of the online community, presumably most comments posted on Ding 
Xiang Yuan’s discussion forum would be from junior medics.391 But the advantage of 
this medium would seem to outweigh the disadvantages. Thanks to anonymity, 
comments posted by forum users contributing to the discussion, can conceivably be 
frank and honest. 
 
Due to the sensitivity of this issue, not every interviewee responded to the direct 
question – “Have you experienced any dilemma with political ideology or law 
conflicting with your understanding of medical ethics? Could you give me an example? 
If you haven’t, have you heard from a colleague who has? ” Out of the total 24 
interviewees, 13 explicitly or implicitly responded to this question. Those reminding 
either answered, “No, neither I nor my colleagues has experienced any ethical 
dilemmas.” or declined to answer to the question. 
 
Answers from the 13 interviewees indicate that ‘hypothetical’ dilemmas do exist. 
Specifically, these dilemmas could be divided into two types. The first caused by 
conflict between professional ethics and financial stress; the second by conflict 
between the application of medical law and bioethics. These two types of dilemmas 
could also be found in comments from Ding Xiang Yuan. Putting these two kinds of 
                                                 
389 Ibid. 
390 Ibid. 
391 We can see this from the contents of their comments which often referred to their salaries as 
residents and working history; second, due to the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, elder Chinese 
are generally less open to express their feelings in public; and third, research shows that seniors’ use of 
the internet normally are more limited than those of younger people, and it is less common for people 
over 60 to uses online purchasing, online gaming, and online photo or idea sharing. See e.g., M. Notess 
and L. Lorenzen-Huber, ‘Online Learning for Seniors: Barriers and Opportunities’, 5 (2007) eLearn 
Magazine 4;  J. Goodman, et al., Older Adults' use of Computers: A Survey, in Proceedings of HCI 
2003, Bath, UK, Sep 2003. 
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dilemmas into the top-down model (I suggested at the end of Part I), the medics’ 
answers revealed that, within the relationship between state governance, medical law 
and bioethics in China, conflicts did occur either between state governance (lack of 
funding) and bioethics, or between medical law and bioethics, see graph below:  
 
                                                        State  
                                                  
                                                        Law 
                                     
                           Medical Practitioners/Medical Ethics 
 
In order to distinguish these two dilemmas, the first type of dilemma concerning 
conflict between Chinese medics’ moral understanding and financial strains, will be 
called “ethical-financial dilemmas”; the second type concerning conflicts between 
medics’ moral understanding and legal rules, will be called “ethical-legal dilemmas”.  
 
3.1   Ethical-Financial Dilemmas 
 
As discussed in Part I, most Chinese medical practitioners (apart from the medical 
élite) are poorly paid, not only by comparison with their colleagues in other non-
Communist countries, but even within their own society. In interviews, six physicians 
told me, on different occasions, that some of their colleagues were looking for 
controversial means to supplement their income, such as gaining commission by 
prescribing special brands of medicine or by accepting valuable gifts from patients. 
This has become a well-known but publicly unspoken phenomenon inside the medical 
community. They also added that they were doing this as there was no choice. “The 
system is forcing good women to become prostitutes.”392 Two of them mentioned this 
common proverb when expressing their dismay. One interviewee added, “It is the 
state’s healthcare financing system that should be blamed not medics”. Another 
interviewee stated, “We are the powerless victims, not patients.” I heard similar 
comments from several medics who expressed disappointment towards the health 
system during interviews and informal talks.   
 
                                                 
392 A female doctor from an outpatient clinic, length of service: 34 years. 
Chapter 6 Interview Findings 
153 
Dissatisfaction was also shown from their answers to this open-ended question – 
“Has your practice been affected by China’s health sector reform? If “yes”, could you 
explain how it is affected? ” Though the exact cause of their ethical-financial 
dilemmas may vary, the common theme emerging from both the interviews and 
questionnaires could be summarised by one interviewee’s words, “I believe all the 
medics do want to help, but we have no choice.” 393  Three interviewees further 
expressed their personal experiences of ethical-financial dilemmas as listed below:  
 
“I would love to do more research into the subject of maintaining a healthier lifestyle 
in order to help patients with chronic disease. But this idea was rejected by our 
hospital managers, simply because they thought this was not profitable. Do you know 
what I have gained from trying to help patients in the long term? Nothing. I haven’t 
received support from my colleagues. Because I am not a Communist Party member 
and my political awareness is low, there is no chance for me to get career 
promotion.”394  
 
“I had a dilemma once. A woman was due to give birth at our hospital. She didn’t 
have any family to accompany her and had no money to pay for the deposit. We still 
operated. The woman left without paying anything. In the end, the whole team who 
participated in saving her, had to pay for the medical cost ourselves, and even got 
fined for doing this.”395  
  
“The healthcare system needs to be changed. We have some patients who are too poor 
to pay for the treatments. We had to repeatedly ask the patient to pay. We have 
sympathy for these poor patients, but if we can’t claim back the medical bill, we 
medics have to pay the cost ourselves. Our incomes are not high. In a public hospital, 
we have a profit-making target for each department. If one department reaches the 
profit target, everyone in that department will get a bonus. Commercialisation has 
changed the ‘public’ meaning of the hospital.”396   
 
                                                 
393 A laboratory technician from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 16 years. 
394 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 20 years. 
395 A female doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 13 years. 
396 A female nurse from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 5 years. 
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These answers feature ethical-financial dilemmas that three of my interviewees had 
experienced: a hospital rejection of a medic’s research proposal because of its non-
profitability; being fined for proceeding with life-saving surgery without considering 
cost; an additional role of being a nurse in China – medical bill-chasing. These 
ethical-financial dilemmas involved the tensions for medical practitioners between 
helping financially limited patients and sustaining their own or their hospital’s 
incomes. Essentially, these were caused by the financial strains put upon Chinese 
hospitals.  
 
Aside from these interviewees’ stated experiences, some comments from other 
medics’ ethical-financial dilemmas are also found on Ding Xiang Yuan. Take some of 
their statements for example:  
 
“There is a serious income-inequality problem among Chinese medics. Working in 
the same city, physicians in some departments of a Level III Central hospital could 
receive a salary plus bonuses totally over 10,000 RMB [equivalent to 1000 GBP] a 
month; while we physicians who work at a Level II hospital are very demoralised as 
most of us are getting less than 2000 RMB [equivalent to 200 GBP] a month. Our 
workloads are similar to the others; we have to keep diagnosing, writing prescriptions, 
double-checking for mistakes, chasing patients for payments, earning medical security 
savings, and thinking how to achieve the hospital and departmental income target. If 
we can’t achieve the target, we can’t receive a fully paid salary. We feel so tired!”397 
 
“Compared with the average salary of 1500RMB [equivalent to 150 GBP] for the 
general Chinese public, many of our resident doctors and general practitioners’ 
incomes are at or below the average public income level. Only a very small 
percentage of medics can receive a relatively high income, such as 5000-6000 RMB 
[equivalent to 500-600 GBP] a month. Healthcare reform should have focused on 
encouraging medical research, motivating medics to practice to the best of their ability; 
so that we can be better prepared to treat patients, rather than being forced to do 
accounting. Only when Chinese medics’ hard labour and low pay have been 
                                                 
397 Ding Xiang Yuan user qiu0628 posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a discussion 
thread on Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes Relatively Low or High’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11352248 (Last visited on Jan 3rd, 2011). 
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recognised, understood and respected, cam we return to the focus on medicine! It is 
meaningless to discuss something else if the medics’ normal life pay can’t be 
secured. ”398 
 
As discussed in Part I of this thesis, following economic reforms, public hospitals in 
China now receive very limited financial support from the government, as a result of 
which, hospitals have been forced to generate income to cover costs. Cuts to hospital 
subsidies have left Chinese medics reliant on finding ways to make ends meet. 
Moreover, it implies a financial incentive to over-investigate and over-treat. The 
conflict of financial interest and ethical responsibility pose a threat to the Chinese 
medics’ ability to retain their professional integrity. In their own words – “The system 
is forcing the good women to become prostitutes” – sheds some light on such 
struggles and hardship.  
 
The following online comment expressed in practice, not only the feeling of being a 
medic who has to bear financial pressures, but also thinking about the reasons for and 
consequences of this financial-ethical dilemma: 
 
“Most medics’ delegates to the National People’s Congress are senior doctors. Those 
who are on high payrolls may not understand the struggles of the large number of 
low-paid junior medics. Some of those have started to accept financial kickbacks from 
drug companies; other juniors refuse to practise unethically and quit for better paid 
jobs outside medicine. One of my colleagues said publicly, ‘Because being a surgeon 
earns me so little, my main income has to come from somewhere else, such as stock 
trading’. Since Chinese medics cannot concentrate on their profession, I would not be 
surprised if medical malpractice will happen more frequently in the future. But then, 
whom should we blame for the adverse consequences?”399 
 
The comment above is consistent with my interviewees’ answers. The common 
ethical-financial dilemmas that they have to face are that the financial reality does not 
                                                 
398 Ding Xiang Yuan user nayucy posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a discussion 
thread on Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes Relatively Low or High’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11389000 (Last visited on Jan 3rd, 2011).  
399 Ding Xiang Yuan user niguansen posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a 
discussion thread on Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes Relatively Low or High’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11392538 (Last visited on Jan 3rd, 2011). 
Chapter 6 Interview Findings 
156 
allow them to practice ethically. Failure of state healthcare governance has put 
Chinese medics in a difficult environment which does not nurture professional 
development. The loss to the medical community is much more than monetary. It is 
the medics’ confidence in moving forward that suffers the most. One of the forum 
users said, “We practitioners who are working at the frontline of healthcare service 
are really tired. We wait for changes to come in the future… if we have a future.”400 
 
3.2   Ethical-Legal Dilemmas 
 
Changes in legislation are having a significant impact on medics’ ethical-legal 
considerations when making medical decisions. The 2002 Medical Malpractice Act 
which assigns the burden of proof in liability cases to healthcare practitioners, as 
discussed in Part I, is an example. Conflicts between regulations and ethical 
responsibility may lead to ethical-legal dilemmas in medical practice. This section 
reveals Chinese medics’ experiences and thoughts about ethical-legal dilemmas. 
 
The questionnaire findings showed that the highest percentage (87%) of Chinese 
medical practitioners regarded medical law and regulation as the most important 
guideline, along with hospital rules (second), medical ethics (third) and CCP 
discipline as the least important. In an attempt to triangulate these findings, I asked 
interviewees to rank ethics, law and political ideology according to their importance 
to their work. Surprisingly, 8 out of 13 interviewees who responded to this question 
prioritised bioethics above the others. This discrepancy between questionnaire and 
interview findings is worth pondering, because it reveals the probability of the 
existence of ethical-legal dilemmas for many Chinese medics.  
 
An ethical-legal dilemma only occurs when, on the one hand, ethics is treated with 
seriousness, but on the other, a doctor still has to base a decision wholly on the law. 
For a medic with no regard for ethics following whatever he/she was taught of law or 
regulation, ethical dilemmas are unlikely to happen. The 8 interviewees who ranked 
ethics as the highest guideline have as much awareness of law as those who ranked 
                                                 
400 Ding Xiang Yuan user stone32 posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a discussion 
thread on Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes Relatively Low or High’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11419594 (Last visited on Jan 3rd, 2011). 
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law the highest. However, they were most likely subject to ethical dilemmas because 
of the high regard they hold for both law and ethics. Their answers to the questions – 
“Have you ever experienced any ethical dilemma in your workplace or heard from a 
colleague who has? If you have, how did you or your colleagues resolve those 
dilemmas?” – proved my assumption.  
 
Five of the eight medics who had originally said ethics was the most important 
guideline, contradicted themselves by saying they had or would resolve their 
dilemmas by following law rather than ethics (details of their own examples of 
ethical-legal dilemmas will be discussed shortly). On one occasion, I said to an 
interviewee, “You just told me ethics was the most important guideline. How is it that 
ultimately you used the law to resolve your dilemma?” He replied, “Oh…yes, I did 
not realise that.”401 He then laughed, embarrassed, and added he thought it was a 
morally wrong decision, but had to compromise with practical realities.  
 
This contradictory response echoes one of the survey results that 55% of respondents 
replied “I had to make difficult decisions in some situations.” In balancing the 
requirements of law and ethics, interviewees gave me contradictory answers. A 
conflict between what one wants to follow (such as, ethics) and what one sees as more 
practical (such as, law) indicates the existence of an ethical-legal dilemma.  
 
Examples of ethical-legal dilemmas can be seen from the following statements given 
by my interviewees. They addressed several areas of ethical-legal dilemmas that they 
faced in practice: 
 
“This is a case I heard about. Blood transfusion law requires blood to be used only 
after testing. One pregnant woman who had a difficult labour was in need of a blood 
transfusion. Yet her blood type was O negative, a rare type. The media broadcast this, 
and a volunteer came to the hospital, willing to donate blood. As the patient was an 
emergency, there was no time to do blood testing. Her family begged the hospital to 
transfuse the blood without testing, and were willing to sign their awareness of the 
                                                 
401 A male pharmacist from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 9 years. 
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risk, promising they wouldn’t sue the hospital. The hospital refused and the patient 
died 20 minutes before the blood test result was released.”402    
 
This legal but ethically problematic decision is a classic example of an ethical-legal 
dilemma. Such a defensive attitude can also be found in emergency care, where 
instead of taking a medical decision, medics tend to wait for legal authorisation before 
starting an operation. Two statements from my interviews illustrate the medics’ 
thoughts and feelings during such dilemmas: 
 
“I believe all medics want to help, but we have no choice. In one case, a patient was in 
need of emergency surgery. The whole medical team had to wait for the patient’s 
family to sign before taking action. This delayed life-saving treatment. The patient 
died soon afterwards. Since the law requires medics to bear the burden of proof, we 
have had to become defensive. There are a lot of patients who could have been saved, 
but they died because no medics dared to do high-risk procedures to save them. In the 
end, it is the patient who bears the bad consequence, but state policy is at fault. It is so 
unfair that medics who have every intention of helping have to carry this bad 
reputation or worry all the time about being sued.”403  
 
“It happened once. We couldn’t save a patient in time because of our changing shifts. 
The patient’s family was unavailable to sign the consent form during the emergency, 
and we dare not to go ahead. We are now cautious about accepting very sick patients. 
We even make notes of every conversation with the patient’s family and ask them to 
sign that they are fully informed.”404  
 
Other examples of ethical-legal dilemmas can be found on online Ding Xiang Yuan, 
on which the users had expressed their concerns and frustration over problematic 
tensions between healthcare law and ethics. One example is as follows:  
 
“We have been discussing the recent case from Fujian province, where the Sanming 
No.2 Hospital offered patients’ families high financial compensation after four 
                                                 
402 A female doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 29 years. 
403 A laboratory technician from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 16 years. 
404 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 years. 
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anaesthesia-related deaths occurred during surgery. There are doubts about the way 
that the hospital dealt with these medical incidents. The law assigns the burden of 
proof to healthcare practitioners in cases of liability. And it does not allow us to 
perform an autopsy without family consent. The problem is that an autopsy is barely 
acceptable to most Chinese; a medic cannot prove his innocence without an autopsy. 
Under such circumstances, the hospitals tend to offer financial compensation to ease 
the anger of relevant families. My question is why should we pay compensation 
without confirming the cause of incident? In reality, the compensation has to be paid 
by all the medical staff of the hospital, including those who had no involvement; the 
compensation sum would be deducted from our salaries. This is unfair and very de-
motivating. Chinese medics are trapped in a vicious circle. More good doctors are 
quitting their jobs, and more incidents are likely to happen.”405 
 
Cases such as these demonstrated that medics who have a high level of consciousness 
of legal regulation are careful to avoid accusations. Two of these cases involved 
failing to provide life-saving treatment to a patient simply because the medical team 
could not get the informed consent in time. It also seemed that self-protection has 
become the main motive for medics to obey the law. This is shown especially in the 
blood-transfusion case. The fourth comment expressed the Chinese medics’ difficult 
circumstances where they have to obey the law but the law itself has deficiencies. It is 
a dilemma where both ethical-legal and ethical-financial conflicts are in play. 
Dilemmas in such cases are therefore not mutually exclusive. Instead they interplay 
with each other, making the Chinese medics’ practice environment even more 
difficult.    
 
In the 2009 report – “the Chinese Doctor Career Survey”, conducted by the Chinese 
Medical Doctor Association,406 74.79% of its 3182 doctors thought that the 2002 
Medical Malpractice Act which assigned the burden of proof to healthcare 
practitioners in liability cases, had an adverse influence upon medical development as 
                                                 
405 Ding Xiang Yuan user xtagtfn posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a discussion 
thread on Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes Relatively Low or High’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/13010165 (Last visited on Jan 3rd, 2011). 
406 Chinese Medical Doctor Association, The 2009 Chinese Doctor Career Survey, available at: 
http://www.cmda.gov.cn/News/huodongzhuanti/yishifashizhounian/diaoyan.html (Last visited on Dec 
15th, 2010). 
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no one dared to take any risks in practice.407 The report also showed that Chinese 
medics had little trust in Chinese legal system. In the pilot test of the same survey, as 
few as 12.63% of medics thought that medical malpractice was handled fairly by the 
courts.408 This suggests that there were many reasons for the Chinese medics’ high 
levels of legal consciousness. The reason for this may be because their fear of legal 
sanctions, and not because they believed that the law has put public interest protection 
as its main aim.   
 
The existence of both ethical-financial and ethical-legal dilemmas indicates 
conflicting interests in China’s healthcare system and underlying problems in Chinese 
medical law. The conflicts between financial pressure, legal requirement and ethical 
obligations implies that, in China, healthcare governance, medical law and bioethics 
have not created a balanced state of  power dynamics in guaranteeing that both patient 
and medics’ best interests are secured. 
 
4.   Questioning Professional Power and Control 
 
Having overviewed interviewees’ prioritisation and experience of pluralist guidance, 
the last section revealed that Chinese medical practitioners felt ethically compromised 
and stressed when faced with ethical-financial and ethical-legal dilemmas. This 
section presents interviewees’ views on their need or desire to gain some form of 
power and control over their practice.    
 
4.1     “I am Physically and Mentally Exhausted” 
 
(1) Mixed Feelings  
 
As discussed in Part I, the decline of patient trust has become a major challenge to the 
health system in China. Pre-trial resolution and patients’ claims indicated that law 
could be a tool for public use in order to threaten hospitals for monetary 
compensation. In the field, I found that Chinese medical practitioners had become a 
target of public anger and grievance. Some of them might have become corrupt; some 
                                                 
407 Ibid. 
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might even refuse to stay in their profession, but the majority of Chinese medics were 
working under great pressure in order to compromise with reality. The empirical 
study found that, along with a loss of trust in professionals had come a loss of 
influence. Chinese medical practitioners tended to feel undervalued, threatened, and, 
at times, exerted little authority over the structure of the healthcare system. 
 
Talking of their feelings about their jobs in general, interviewees gave me answers 
that indicated dissatisfaction and frustration. One interviewee said, “I am disappointed 
with the job. My income is low. The patients do not respect me. I am physically and 
mentally exhausted. My family life has been ruined, as both my husband and I are 
medics, and we are both working under a lot of stress. I don’t have confidence in the 
healthcare environment.”409 More specifically, the medics’ frustrations were caused 
by two main concerns: firstly, financial problems, and secondly, the decline of public 
trust and respect.    
 
Firstly, according to a doctor, the financial concern was: “Generally speaking, the 
whole healthcare environment has developed very slowly. There is less financial 
investment in our hospital as compared to other hospitals. But our hospital is applying 
for an upgrade to Level III, so our incomes are expected to increase and the hospital 
will get more investment. But this means workloads and pressures will also increase 
dramatically. One department is a team. Whoever makes a mistake, the team will 
sacrifice part of their income to pay for it.”410  
 
Secondly and more frequently, interviewees indicated that their reputation and public 
image were eroded. Examples of their comments are as follows: 
 
“Most doctors feel that they have lost their reputation in society. While patients are 
eager to fight for their rights, doctors are learning how to evade or dodge angry 
patients, and to timorously consult higher level administrative officers so that the 
patient can be transferred to a higher level hospital.”411  
 
                                                 
409 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 years. 
410 A female doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 years. 
411 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 6 years. 
Chapter 6 Interview Findings 
162 
“We have lost the meaning of medical jobs. Although salaries are increasing, the 
whole environment is disappointing.”412  
 
“Doctor-patient relationships are getting worse. Patients’ distrust forces us to learn 
how to be better at self-protection. For example, we dare not operate without informed 
consent from patients. Even if we have patients’ consent, that doesn’t mean their 
families won’t protest at the hospital if anything goes wrong. Most of the patients’ 
families don’t want to go to the court. They just hire a group of trouble-makers to 
protest and show their grievance in the hospital. They also reveal their cases to the 
media in order to add pressures to the hospital to give in and offer them 
compensation.”413  
 
Referring to what this interviewee said, it is clear that the Chinese media play an 
important role in provoking tension between medics and patients. For example: the 
alleged greediness of Chinese medics in cheating patients; their irresponsibility 
exemplified by medical malpractice, and hospitals becoming profit-driven without 
considering public interest can be frequent topics in Chinese newspapers, on 
television, and on the internet.414 Another interviewee expressed concern about the 
role of the media. He said, “I rarely feel too bad about my career, but I know that 
some of my colleagues do, especially after meeting a patient who called nurses 
‘servants’. Nowadays, TV programmes and newspaper reports are full of medical 
negligence cases. These have seriously damaged our reputation and greatly changed 
our practice environment. When my grandfather was a doctor, no matter whether his 
treatment was successful or not, the patient would be thankful. Now the patient will 
make trouble if one cannot cure him. We are misunderstood by patients.”415 
 
I agree with this interviewee that the media in China has increased the tension 
between medics and patients rather than easing it. More often than not, it is hard to 
                                                 
412 A male laboratory technician from a Level IIIB hospital, length of service: 6 years. 
413 A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 15 years. 
414 See e.g., different scandals of greedy healthcare workers and their for-profited hospitals have been 
reported (in Chinese) by Sina News (http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-03-06/220222063570.shtml); 
Ifeng TV (http://news.ifeng.com/society/2/detail_2010_11/16/3118544_0.shtml); People.com 
(http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/14077159.html or 
http://society.people.com.cn/GB/41158/13233810.html); Beijing Newspaper 
(http://news.bjnews.com.cn/news/2010/1027/95856.shtml), (Last visited on March 8th, 2011).  
415 A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 15 years. 
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tell whether media reports reflect the truth; whether some were misreported due to the 
reporters’ lack of medical knowledge, or motivated by a desire to catch an audience’s 
attention with sensational stories. As a result, Chinese medics’ public image and 
doctor-patient relationships have been damaged. It seems natural that, since patients 
have become increasingly sceptical and distrustful of medical community, medics 
have learned to be more cautious and defensive.  
 
In Ding Xiang Yuan’s online forum, users’ comments about their feelings concerning 
the healthcare environment are also worth consideration: 
 
“Nowadays, my hospital is employing more doctors and nurses on short-term 
contracts. These hospital staff are treated like cheap labour. They were given 400-500 
RMB [equivalent to 40-50 GBP] a month. They have to use this little amount of 
money to pay rent, examination fees and their own living costs. They are 
discriminated against and vulnerable. I really feel sad for them. But no one seems to 
care about this disadvantaged group of healthcare workers.”416   
 
   “We junior physicians are feeling extremely tired. One of my longest shifts was two 
nights and a day without any sleep. It is like fighting a war. One of my colleague has 
four more years working experience than me, and has a master’s degree from a well-
known medical school, he also said, within the four years, he had never had the time 
to travel a long-distance to visit his family. He told me he had never accepted any 
‘grey income’. After graduating from medical school, he never bought himself 
expensive clothes. All his income has been used to pay his living costs, and support 
his elderly parents, and this has left him with no savings. He couldn’t even afford a 
decent gift for his younger sister’s wedding. He cried many times and even planned to 
quit his medical job to work in a hotel. He said he is just fed up with this inhumane 
treatment.”417 
 
                                                 
416 Ding Xiang Yuan user wuxiangqian posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a 
discussion thread on Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes Relatively Low or High’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11514538 (Last visited on Jan 3rd, 2011). 
417 Ding Xiang Yuan user cyz306 posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a discussion 
thread on Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes Relatively Low or High’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11552096 (Last visited on Jan 3rd, 2011). 
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   “We are feeling tired physically and mentally. We have to work carefully from day to 
night, but this does not gain us public respect. The public thinks we have no morality 
and we are suspects. The government does not support us. All social conflicts raised 
by ineffective medical investment and inadequate healthcare security have been 
transferred to us. It is heart-breaking.”418 
 
The above comments showed that Chinese medics have noticed a drop in public 
esteem towards them. Medics felt that although they were praised when they were 
seen as keepers of discipline, their status has been damaged, not because they 
deliberately wanted to destroy their own professional honour, but because they have 
been put into the difficult position of having to choose between public interest or self-
survival strategies, neither of which they wanted to sacrifice. Their answers to 
questions and feelings about their job generally corresponded to the earlier discussion 
about dilemmas, i.e. in essence there are problems embedded in China’s healthcare 
financing system causing ethical-financial dilemmas.  
 
When asking about the causes of depression in survey and interviews, the medics’ 
responses were consistent. Their answers indicated conflicts between state 
governance, medical law and bioethics, and healthcare governance was a major cause 
of dissatisfaction. In my opinion the trend of patient empowerment has produced a 
positive change in healthcare culture, but this implies that the government has 
responsibilities to educate the public to be more responsible and reasonable ‘power-
owners’. As discussed in Part I, there have been countless incidents where Chinese 
medics have been physically threatened by patients’ families, and become victims of 
violence. A doctor asked me during the interview, “Who will protect the medics’ 
human dignity and safety when facing the extreme behaviours of patients’ families? I 
know the Medical Practitioner Act has clear regulations for this, but in practice the 
law is not working. ”419 Another interviewee concluded “Lots of my colleagues said 
they wouldn’t want to be a doctor, if they had a second life.”420  
 
                                                 
418 Ding Xiang Yuan user 杏林一僧 posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a 
discussion thread on Serial II ‘How Tired Chinese Medical Practitioners Are’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11306052 (Last visited on Jan 9th, 2011). 
419 A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 15 years. 
420 A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 15 years. 
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In the Ding Xiang Yuan online forum, similar angry comments were also evident. For 
example, “It is not the medics who are extorting money from patients; it is society that 
is killing medics.”421 Or, “A physician is also a human being who needs to lead a life. 
How can we go and save lives when we are hungry. How come the government does 
not understand this simple theory? Ridiculous!! Being a physician in China is 
miserable!”422 There was a doctor who even showed anger when refusing to take part 
in my fieldwork, “I don’t want to participate. Whatever we medics complain about 
wouldn’t lead to any change. Only those who have power can make an impact.”423  
 
However, medics did not only express negative feelings such as depression and anger. 
There were also positive comments, such as: 
 
“Although the current situation is not so good, medics should be satisfied with what 
they already have. They are middle class and are better off than a lot of people. We 
should not demand too much.”424  
 
“I believe that healthcare reform will change the situation for good.”425  
 
“We need to stick to this profession since we have chosen it. Years of effort have got 
us to this position. There is nothing wrong in being a doctor. Eventually society will 
recognise how much we have put into it as we became good doctors.”426 
 
Speaking of political campaigns that never stop requesting that Chinese health 
workers must serve the people and act in the best interests of patients, there were 
interviewees who expressed support for patient empowerment. Some others said, 
                                                 
421 Ding Xiang Yuan user gaodan posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a discussion 
thread on Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes Relatively Low or High’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11466261 (Last visited on Jan 3rd, 2011). 
422 Ding Xiang Yuan user wuxiangqian posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a 
discussion thread on Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes Relatively Low or High’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/12509102 (Last visited on Jan 3rd, 2011). 
423 A female doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: unknown.  
424 A male hospital administrator from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 years.  
425 A male pharmacist from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 9 years. 
426 Ding Xiang Yuan user 诊疗常规 posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a 
discussion thread on Serial III ‘Are Chinese Medics’ Incomes Relatively Low or High’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/15368821 (Last visited on Jan 3rd, 2011). 
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“Chinese politicians are sacrificing Chinese medics to win over public support.”427 Or, 
“Disappointingly, the late 20th century healthcare reform hasn’t brought good changes 
so far. It is the government’s responsibility to secure health insurance, and we medics 
are paying a terrible price for its irresponsibility.”428  
 
Responses from interviewees shed some light on the Chinese medics’ general views 
on their career. I found that medics had mixed feelings, with a strong sense of 
disappointment and tiredness. As a group with skills that can cure and save, Chinese 
medics are squeezed by the distorted healthcare system, medical liability reforms and 
growth of litigation culture. They need support, but they lack the confidence in getting 
their messages across, and in interacting with the state.   
 
(2)  Suffering in Silence  
 
Looking at all the comments given by both my interviewees and in the on-line forum, 
the most prevalent feeling seems to be that of disappointment. But this disappointment 
and even anger has not led to large-scale resistance. In the face of insufficient 
government support and erosion of public trust, most Chinese medical practitioners do 
not act spontaneously, nor do they act responsively to call for change. In resolving 
dilemmas, medics would passively compromise their ethical beliefs for these practical 
reasons. As one of the interviewees put it, “Whenever I feel depressed after work, I 
will adjust my mood, or will I just get used to it.”429 The most common resort of 
interviewees when feeling depressed or disappointed was to turn to families or friends. 
 
Interviewees either expressed indifference concerning their dilemmas, or told me they 
did not want to take risks which might lead to them losing their jobs. For these medics, 
even when they are dissatisfied with the system, they do not have the courage or 
confidence to voice their disagreements. For example, one senior doctor stated, “I 
tend to ignore political corruption and dictatorship. There is no need for us to react 
                                                 
427 Ding Xiang Yuan user zyent posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a discussion 
thread on Serial II ‘How Tired Chinese Medical Practitioners Are’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11302494 (Last visited on Jan 9th, 2011). 
428 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 11 years. 
429 A male laboratory technician from a Level IIIB hospital, length of service: 6 years. 
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actively or to hope that we could change anything. The communist party is simply too 
strong.”430 
 
But if someone is willing to speak up, even after considering the consequence, they 
might have to be prepared to give up their job. For example, one young pharmacist 
told me, “I don’t feel there is any need for resistance, even though the way I or my 
colleagues sometimes have had to practice goes against our medical ethics. I have 
grown up in a practical profit-driven world, and I myself am practical. Even though 
something is morally wrong, once we accept it as a common practice, it eventually 
will become a norm. I am planning to quit my job, so I dare to tell you this under-the-
table truth. If you publish it one day, it will not affect me or my career.”431 
 
This young pharmacist further suggested that corrupt behaviour amongst Chinese 
medics could be perceived as a form of empowerment and resistance. He said, “I 
think Chinese medics are not so powerless. Economically, at least, they are seeking 
their power. Medical practitioners have to work very hard, thus I think they deserve 
decent incomes no matter where the money comes from”.432 Though, personally I do 
not agree that corruption is justifiable behaviour, I argue that the financial benefits 
taken by a few medics could lead to greater long-term harm to the profession, their 
patients and society. Nevertheless, this comment represents the standpoint of some 
medics.  
 
Most of the time during the interviews, I did not feel their pride in their work, but 
their indifference, silence or even fear. A few of my interviewees were still haunted 
by the terrible memories of the Cultural Revolution. One senior health administrator 
who used to be a physician said: “Medic’s voices are too low. Their influence is too 
limited. Yes, we have the knowledge to save lives, but that knowledge doesn’t mean 
power. We were deprecated in the Cultural Revolution, with Chairman Mao’s idea, 
we were – so called ‘chou lao jiu’.433 Power has never been granted or gained by 
doctors since then. Chinese medics are passive about their careers. This does not mean 
                                                 
430 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 20 years. 
431 A male pharmacist from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 4 years. 
432 A male pharmacist from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 4 years.  
433 ‘Chou lao jiu” means stinking ninth category (of class enemies next to landlords, reactionaries and 
even spies, etc). It was a term of abuse by ultra-leftists for teachers and other professional people in the 
1966-1976 Cultural Revolution.  
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that they are less active towards patients or that they intend to harm patients. They 
have just lost their passion for making change.”434 
 
Another doctor held similar views about Chinese medics’ impassivity. He said, 
“Being a doctor has not much social power. Corruption in the hospital management 
team acts like a protective umbrella. Even if a medic has enough courage to speak up 
for the public interest, he or she needs to prepare for being punished. No one wants to 
take the risk of losing their job by resisting in any form or by any means, because 
security of employment to feed the family is always a priority.”435 His statement 
answered one of my research questions, explaining why Chinese medics might feel 
indignant but dared not say a word in public. This comment tied in with another 
comment given by a doctor about the unspoken truth of an event that occurred in low 
level hospitals, including hospital corruption and distrust of patients:    
 
“The trust crisis between patients and doctors is serious, especially at the lower level 
of hospital where I used to work. Patients always doubted our expertise and the 
hospitals’ medical facilities. Worse still, many hospital managers at the township and 
countryside levels are corrupt. They care about pleasure and money but not the further 
development of the hospital. By sustaining good relationships with the higher level 
authority, they keep their jobs. The complex problems at the lower level of the 
healthcare delivery system cannot be solved by government investment only. 
Although the government now regards China as a “rule-by-law” country, in reality, it 
is a people-ruled society. Social networks and personal background dominate the rules 
of the game.”436 
 
This comment included a complex knot of factors bound up with the loss of 
professional power and control, especially for general medics who were working at 
lower level Chinese hospitals. It indicated that the difference between rich and poor 
hospitals was not only in their capacity to access resources, but also in how they 
managed ethical-financial conflict. It seemed that medics who work in the lower level 
hospitals have been pushed to the extremes of frustration by their working 
                                                 
434 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 9 years. 
435 A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 15 years. 
436 A male doctor from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 15 years. 
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environment, their relationships with patients, and hospital corruption. This 
interviewee also recognised that law, by itself, has a limited role in fixing the complex 
problems of China’s healthcare governance. So my next question would be: what do 
Chinese medics expect to happen in order to untie this knot that intertwines legal, 
ethical, social and political problems in their professional practice?  
 
4.2   Chinese Medics: Expectations of Changes  
 
By the end of interviews, when asked what changes needed to be made in the future, it 
became clear that interviewees in the main cared about two issues: the healthcare 
financing system and its legislation. In terms of the healthcare financing system, 
interviewees said: 
 
“I hope we will have investment from the state. Because patients are paying more for 
their medical service, consequently they expect more. But medical service 
development has increased at a slower pace. If patients can’t see that their payment 
has resulted in a satisfactory treatment outcome, the medics will have to suffer their 
anger. I also expect a growth of incomes.”437 
 
“The healthcare system needs to be changed. Our value hasn’t been recognised by the 
public. As the public has to pay more to get their medical services, they have higher 
expectations of us. If the treatment outcome is disappointing, they will vent their 
anger on us. In the current system, we doctors are disappointed and helpless, while 
patients are vulnerable.”438 
  
In Ding Xiang Yuan, the users also expressed their wishes for change to the 
healthcare system. Moreover, they discussed how to make their voices heard, so that 
the truth about what was happening could be heard by the Chinese healthcare 
authority. One comment said, “The health reform implemented by the Ministry of 
Health should not sacrifice Chinese physicians’ rights and interests in exchange for 
their public support.”439 In general, medics hoped to receive more support from the 
                                                 
437 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 years.  
438 A male pharmacist from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 4 years. 
439 Ding Xiang Yuan user zyent posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) to a discussion 
thread on Serial II ‘How Tired Chinese Medical Practitioners Are’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11302494 (Last visited on Jan 9th, 2011). 
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public and more government policies launched in order to ease the physical and 
mental suffering that Chinese medics are experiencing. 440  
 
Besides medics’ requests for healthcare system reform and a more medic-friendly 
practicing environment, they think legislators should take medics’ legal needs into 
consideration. In recent years, hospital violence has been increasingly fierce, claims 
for medical malpractice are increasing, and the problem of practicing defensive 
medical service is becoming obvious. In practice, there is no legal solution to end 
hospital violence, “we can only change our priority from saving patients to self-
protection”, a doctor said. 441  Twelve interviewees stated this similar view. Their 
views echoed one survey finding, that 86% (190 out of 222) of medical practitioners 
stated that it would be very important to involve more medical practitioners in change 
to China’s legislation on healthcare so that the medics’ rights could be better protected.  
 
However, a senior medic commented on the Chinese political environment and 
criticised this idea, saying that, merely changing the legislation would not bring any 
differences to medics’ lives, “We can’t be an entirely democratic China. Society will 
become disorderly. As to my understanding, by reading your survey questions, your 
research is to propose changes in legislation. This is impractical. Like ‘the Great Leap 
Forward’ period, we aimed to chase British industrialisation and overcome America 
as the super power of the world. It turned out we were all day-dreaming. Changes to 
the political system should be a priority. China has a long history of being a power-
controlled society. Chinese people have got used to this and are patriotic. We would 
rather not have democracy so as to keep our society in order.”442 
 
This interviewee referred to the history of Mao’s Great Leap Forward443 to support his 
argument that reform should start from politics rather than legislation. I agreed with 
him, but I could not tell him that questions related to proposals for political reforms in 
China, was too sensitive for me to ask in the fieldwork. However, questions about the 
                                                 
440 See e.g., Ding Xiang Yuan user bwr20060515 posted a comment (in Chinese, translated by author) 
to a discussion thread on Serial II ‘How Tired Chinese Medical Practitioners Are’, available at:  
http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11306052; Ding Xiang Yuan user 寻医问药 posted a comment (in 
Chinese, translated by author) to a discussion thread on Serial II ‘How Tired Chinese Medical 
Practitioners Are’, available at:  http://www.dxy.cn/bbs/thread/11278986 (Last visited on Jan 9th, 2011).  
441 A male doctor from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 9 years. 
442 A male hospital administrator who used to be a doctor, from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 
28 years. Also see note 200 on ‘the Great Leap Forward’. 
443 See note 200. 
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legitimacy of legislation are much less politically sensitive, thus they were put into the 
questionnaire. Apart from his criticism of the purpose of my fieldwork, one idea 
raised by this interviewee raised attracted my attention. He did not believe a 
democratic system would work in China, his reason being that the Western way of 
democracy would bring chaos to Chinese society.  
 
This was not the only occasion that I encountered interviewees who stated expressly 
that they were against democracy. But their reasons for opposing it were similar, i.e. 
they believed democracy would bring chaos and disorder in China’s stable society. 
One interviewee added, “From watching TV, we observed that Western democracy is 
making a mess of social stability. People can fight in parliament or even throw shoes 
at the president.”444 Discussion concerning this comment would be outside the scope 
of this thesis. But it revealed the influence of political propaganda and the media had 
on Chinese people, including the medics. 
 
In short, Chinese medics have expectations of the healthcare system and legislative 
reforms. They hoped they could be trusted by both the government and the patients, 
and supported by law. Despite heavy pressures put on them to follow the standardized 
hospital rules and regulations, no interviewee regarded them as a problem. But they 
would like to be treated more humanely and be given discretionary power to make 
decisions when they are capable of doing so. 
 
Weber’s definition of power is “the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” 445  Though none of the 
interviewees or Ding Xiang Yuan users have clearly stated that they would like to 
have more power in this healthcare arena, words like “powerless”, “helpless” or 
“suffering” were used repeatedly in interviews so indicating their desperation for 
change. Moreover, Chinese medics expressed the view that they wished their voices 
could be heard and that more medics would engage in Chinese healthcare legislation 
so that their rights and interests could be better protected. In an obscure way, Chinese 
                                                 
444 A male hospital administrator, from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 years. 
445 M. Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978), 53. 
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medics are looking for more control or power over their medical careers and the 
general healthcare environment in China.  
 
5.  Interview Findings: Summing up and Verification 
 
In this chapter, I stressed that the Chinese medical practitioners’ views and 
experiences of state, law and ethics were diverse, complicated, and intriguing. Voices 
from those medics in both formal interviews and informal conversations enhanced my 
understanding of my previous hypothetical questions as to what reactions Chinese 
medical practitioners would have towards these dilemmas. 
 
Under current circumstances, Chinese medics were dissatisfied with the healthcare 
system and their medical careers.446 Though the “black market” serves to adjust the 
low salaries imposed by central authorities, medics who I approached in the hospitals, 
either informally or through interviews, admitted they wished that public health 
welfare was not only public in name, but also financed properly by government. 
Chinese medics also wished that the healthcare system reform could start from the 
state and focus on resources. 
 
The interviews explored some of the existing questionnaire findings in greater depth, 
i.e. on medics’ perceptions and resolutions to their ethical-legal and ethical-financial 
dilemmas. Medical practitioners’ complex feelings about their own experiences, 
insights and constructive ideas about the impacts of healthcare governance, law and 
ethics on their practice were also explored in more detail.  
 
What is more, when crosschecking my quantitative and qualitative data, I found that 
some qualitative interview data contradicted the previous questionnaire findings. In 
earlier questionnaires, four respondents held the opinion that political thoughts were 
very important’ to their practice. However, they had contradicted themselves during 
interviews by expressing views that political ideologies were indeed separated from, 
                                                 
446 M. K. Lim, H. Yang, et al., ‘China’s evolving health care market: how doctors feel and what they 
think’, 69 (2006) Health Policy 329-327. 
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irrelevant to or even useless in medical practice.447 Instances of contradiction could 
also be found in interviewees’ clarification of their prioritised guidelines – law, ethics 
or political discipline. In answering the same question in the questionnaires, three 
respondents stated that law, ethics and political discipline were all very important 
without significant difference, but all held different views in the follow-up 
interviews.448 One respondent who stated in the questionnaire that she never had to 
make difficult decisions in practice was not short of ethical dilemmas in response to a 
similar question asked in the interview.449  
 
There was also one occasion where a respondent’s answers to the questionnaire and 
the interview were self-contradictory.450 Initially, she prioritised political guidance as 
the most important guideline to her practice; then contradicted herself by telling me in 
the interview that medical ethics was the most important guideline. When explaining 
her past experience of ethical dilemmas, she then admitted that she had to 
compromise her ethical understanding with orders from the authorities. This 
respondent also gave me contradictory answers in terms of her professional titles – in 
the questionnaire she stated she was a pharmacist, and then in the interview she turned 
out to be a nurse. 
   
My speculations on the cause of these discrepancies between quantitative and 
qualitative findings are: the respondents’ changes of view; their possible dilemmas 
with telling the truth to a researcher; and/or the giving of incorrect data by mistake. I 
recognise that the use of differing research methods can lead to different or even 
conflicting findings, but there is an increased potential for data validity and 
enrichment of our understanding for a wider variety of views.  
 
This chapter tried to set out the Chinese medical practitioners’ personal experiences 
by recording their voices directly, rather than making use of sweeping generalisations. 
                                                 
447 They are a female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 36 years; a male pharmacist 
from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 4 years; a female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length 
of service: 10 years; a male hospital administrator, from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 30 
years. 
448 They are a male medical laboratory technician from a Level IIIA hospital, length of service: 6 years; 
a female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 36 years; a male pharmacist from a Level 
IIIA hospital, length of service: 4 years.  
449 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 4 years. 
450 A female nurse from a Level IIA hospital, length of service: 10 years. 
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I fear that my interpretation may fail to capture the full meanings and complexity 
behind interviewees’ socio-cultural, political, and moral status, and even the full 
extent of the struggles behind those voices. Still, I tried to put myself in the 
professionals’ shoes, moreover, to interpret medics’ views as a researcher; to 
understand their unimaginable hardship, courage and weakness, the complexity of 
local social-political context, as well as the hope that their voices embody. 
 
Lastly, the medical profession, like all social organisations, relies upon and is enacted 
with an interlocking set of factors which include language, cultural norms and 
expectations, and interpersonal relationships. The interview findings shed light on my 
previous historical and conceptual analyses, and I realise that the heart of the problem 
in China’s healthcare governance and medical law is that in the fast economic 
development, the Chinese government has been trying to fix the health governance 
problems by increasing regulation in a piecemeal manner, whilst ignoring pressing 
problems that require action, e.g. the need to examine systematic deficiencies in 
governance and restoration of trust between medics and patients.  
 
In the current failed system, a key element that has been paid little attention to is that 
Chinese medical practitioners lack leadership and a sense of cohesion, which would 
enable them to work together more effectively both for themselves and their patients. 
Chinese medics hold in their hands the power of life and death. The hybrid approach 
adopted by the Chinese Party-state combining legal and ethical campaigns to regulate 
and educate health providers, demonstrated institutional constraint and an 
authoritarian regime. Under such a regime, Chinese medics will find it even more 
difficult to gain the necessary voice required to enable change. Without the active 
participation of the Chinese medical practitioners, there is a slim chance of success for 
China’s healthcare governance reforms.  
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CONCLUSION TO PART TWO:  
HYPOTHESES EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION 
 
1. Hypotheses Evaluation  
 
Having discussed both the survey and interview findings, it is necessary to revisit the 
initial hypothesis concerning how medics prioritise law, political ideology, and 
medical ethics. The empirical research has not only demonstrated that law is the most 
important instrument for Chinese medics, but also explained their motivation, 
confusion and ethical dilemmas. It seemed that “right or wrong” tended to be less 
important to medics than the security of their jobs. They seemed not to have a clear 
understanding about their possible role in influencing law or law-making. Some of 
them did not even care. They paid most attention to instructions given either by law or 
by a hospital mandate. Breaking either set of instructions risked the loss of jobs. What 
was more, cultural acceptance contributed to their silence. The submission of the 
individual to the state conformed most closely to the stereotype of the captive 
practitioner. A large scale of resistance, therefore, would be less likely to happen 
amongst Chinese medical practitioners.  
 
The state’s influence over “ethics” has been enormous. This influence was not only 
seen from the bulletin board information provided by Party branches, but also from 
medics’ own viewpoints and their understanding of medical ethics as part of a 
commitment to the state and its political ideology. Their unfamiliarity with varying 
international moral viewpoints highlighted their lack of extended experience from a 
variety of moral angles. Taking away other choices may not necessarily have led to an 
increase of faithfulness towards one prevailing ethical source, but lack of choice could 
be dangerous to an intellectual group of experts. The Chinese Medical Association 
does not function independently by representing the associational power of a 
professional group or corporate body, but rather like an instrument of control over 
health personnel. Its major function is to protect the interests of state first and its 





To sum up, the model below outlines the relationship between state, law and medical 
practitioners in China.  
                                                        State  
                                                  
                                                        Law 
                                     
                           Medical Practitioners/Medical Ethics 
 
In the West, healthcare power dynamics has evolved from a model of governance 
which is more bottom-up democratic, humanistic, empowering, and based on 
decentralised decision making. In contrast, in my opinion, the Chinese healthcare 
power structure reflects a top-down, authoritarian model with centralised command 
and control. The authorisation of state intervention is obviously the strongest element 
within the relationship between state, law and medics (and their ethics). The empirical 
investigations have contributed to an enhanced understanding of the medical 
practitioners’ position in China’s healthcare power dynamic: i.e. they are based at the 
bottom; however this does not mean Chinese medics have absolutely no sense of 
resistance. The findings of this empirical study verify the top-down structured 
hypothesis offered at the end of Part I. 
 
2. New Ideas  
 
As well as supporting my hypothesis, more importantly, this empirical research has 
revealed new findings. One important finding that needs further attention is that 
different levels of medical institution and healthcare practitioners are taking law 
seriously. Chinese medics said bioethics (or professional morality) was very important. 
However, in practice, they did not follow their professional ethics, but law. As 
discussed in Part One, law and policy in China are essentially political. Further 
empirical study found that hospitals’ Party branches acted as a main source for 
training Chinese medics about medical laws and bioethics.  
 
In my pilot study before the survey, one of the medics who read my questionnaire told 
me directly she did not understand the point of my questions: “Since we have to 
follow whatever we are told, discussing which guidance is more important than the 
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other is simply meaningless.” In medics’ eyes, there seems to be no clear divide 
between state governance, medical laws and bioethics in China. A circle-like 
relationship is drawn as below to show this new finding: 
 
                                            Medical Laws  
                           
                                              Practitioners 
 
This circular relationship is based on my interpretation of the Chinese medics’ 
perceptions of state governance, medical law and bioethics. Findings from my 
empirical study show the high level of legal consciousness within most Chinese 
medics, therefore I highlight this at the top of the circle. By disregarding ethics or 
morality, Chinese medical practitioners seem only to follow law in resolving ethical-
legal dilemmas. At the same time, the state has never loosened its control on the 
medics’ ethical and legal education. Most of the respondents admitted that CCP 
branches were working alongside their hospital managers. Although some medics 
seemed to believe political discipline did not have a significant impact on their 
professional practice, in general, the empirical study found that political propaganda 
was mixed with law and bioethics in hospitals’ training sessions. The multi-functional 
nature of the Party branch symbolises its power and potential influence. It seems, at 
least, that there is no a clear divide between state governance, medical laws and 
bioethics at the educational level. 
 
3.  Summing up Empirical Findings  
 
The following points constitute a summary of my research findings from both the 
survey and follow-up interviews.  The survey found that: 
▪   Medics prioritised the authority of law (as most important) over ethics (2nd most 













▪    Their main motive for prioritising law was to protect themselves from being sued;  
▪   Most medics had experienced after-work depression. The main causes of their 
depression were low incomes and loss of trust from patients;  
▪   Most medics thought the effect of China’s market-led healthcare system caused 
conflict between medics and the public. They thought medical legislation affected 
professional autonomy and caused ethical-legal dilemmas.  
▪   The CCP has easy accessibility to most medics and it coordinates with hospital 
management teams; 
▪    Medics expected or hoped that more of them could be involved in medical law-
making.  
 
The interviews found that: 
▪  In terms of comprehension of guidance, the Chinese medics’ bioethical 
understanding has either been influenced by social values or hospital ethics 
examinations. Medical law, party disciplines and hospital moral norms are mainly 
taught through on-the-job trainings;  
▪   In practice, priority was given to legal guidance even though for some of them 
ethics was their stated priority in the beginning; 
▪    Both legal-ethical and financial-ethical dilemmas existed in their practices; 
▪    Medics hoped for more change in the healthcare financing system and legislation.  
 
After discussing the position of Chinese medical practitioners from a historical 
(literature review) and a contemporary perspective (empirical study), the next three 
chapters, which form Part III of this thesis, turn to a closer examination of what I 
argue is the root problem – deprofessionalisation. Questions to be answered in Part 
III are, how could a powerful elite like the medical practitioners in China, seldom 
question but most of time accept any state intervention in their practice? Is it 
problematic for medics to have lost control over their professional practice? If this is 








PART THREE  
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FACING UP TO THE PROBLEM AND 
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CHAPTER 7 DEPROFESSIONALISATION 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
The empirical studies in Chapters 5 and 6 presented the view of Chinese medical 
practitioners of state governance, law and ethical guidelines. Within the present social 
and economic situation in China, evidence has shown that not only do most Chinese 
medics accept the state’s control over medical practice through healthcare governance, 
regulation, political and ethical education, but they also have experienced the 
dilemmas caused by ethical-financial and ethical-legal conflicts. After discussing the 
position of Chinese medical practitioners from both a historical and contemporary 
perspective, Part Three of this thesis seeks an answer to the question - how could a 
powerful elite like the medical profession in China, seldom question, and mostly 
accept passively, any state intervention in their practice?  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualise the analysis in Part One (Theoretical 
and Historical Background) and the findings in Part Two (Empirical Studies). In 
particularly, it undertakes a closer examination of political motives and the context of 
medical deprofessionalisation in China. From the perspective of the top-down power 
of state, it starts by analysing theories of bio-politics, bio-power, medicalisation and 
instrumentalisation. It concludes from the analysis that there is a trend towards 
deprofessionalisation amongst China’s medical practitioners.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections: First, a discussion is framed in terms of 
Foucault’s bio-politics and bio-power theories, and their developing theory – 
medicalisation. Secondly, it ponders relationships between the state and medical 
professionals in the context of medicalisation and biopolitics; and considers political 
instrumentalisation as their adverse consequence. Thirdly, this chapter maps this view 
from the Chinese medical practitioners’ perspectives, and includes two case studies, in 
order to offer more insight and to assess the context of medical deprofessionalisation 
in China. The central argument of this chapter is that, in the face of the challenges 
posed by the state, Chinese medical practitioners have lost their professional power 
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and autonomy in safeguarding the public interests. Therein lies their need to be 
relocated into a more professional and responsible role. 
 
2.   State: Bio-politics and Medicalisation 
 
Michel Foucault’s analyses offer a methodological direction and a perspective that 
links medicine and politics. He recognises that “society’s control over individuals was 
accomplished not only through consciousness or ideology but also in the body and 
with the body. For capitalist society, it was biopolitics, the biological, the corporal, 
that mattered more than anything else”.451 Even though Foucault’s theories refer to a 
capitalist society, Foucauldian approaches are helpful in understanding the politics of 
life at the collective level in China. They shed some light on the bio-political situation 
and its effects on Chinese medics that have rarely been explored.  
 
I begin this section by clarifying how I use key Foucauldian terms such as “bio-
politics” and “bio-power”. Being careful to note that there might be incompatibilities 
and differences between Foucault’s concepts and the situation in China, I address the 
question of what relevance Foucault could possibly have to the Chinese context and 
indicate how his theories might inform a macro level understanding of medical 
deprofessionalisation in China.  
 
2.1   Bio-politics and Bio-power  
 
Bio-politics was first introduced by Roberts to stress a notion that life appears as the 
object of political strategies during a historical process.452 Foucault reinterprets the 
notion “bio-politics” in his work. Since Birth of the Clinic,453 then the lectures given 
at the Collège de France,454 and lastly with the History of Sexuality,455  he argues that 
                                                 
451 M. Foucault, ‘The Birth of Social Medicine’, Power: Essential Works III 1954-1984 (New York, 
New Press, 2001), 137. 
452 M. Roberts, Bio-Politics: An Essay in the Physiology, Pathology, and Politics of the Social and 
Somatic Organism (London, Dent, 1938). 
453 M. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, first published by Naissance de la in 1963 (London, Routledge, 
2003). 
454 M. Foucault, Society must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976, translated 
by D. Macey (New York, Picador, 2003). 
455 M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. I: the Will to Knowledge (Paris, Gallimard, 1976), ‘Part Five: 
Right of Death and Power over Life’. 
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bio-politics represents the emergence of new forms of power-knowledge primarily 
concerned with life.  
 
The attempt to understand how medical questions came to be articulated as social 
problems led Foucault to examine the tension between bio-politics and populations. 
Since “population” in the West arose as a central domain of modern power, bio-
politics emerges around the processes of administration and optimisation of the health 
of the population.456 He explained “the interest of governmental power in the life of 
the governed in terms of a politics of health.” 457  Bio-politics, understood as a 
government-population-political economy relationship, refers to the power dynamics 
which “coordinates, institutionalizes, stratifies and targets” the population.458 In other 
words, it could be understood as the political mission of a government to take control 
of anything related to the reproductive capacity of bodies, and related to the 
population’s health, birth, and morality.459 In a more specific sense, regulation of 
customs (e.g. drinking/smoking/even eating habits), of “well-being”, of disease and 
epidemics, of the policing of water, sewage, foodstuffs, graveyards, and of 
reproductive practices are examples of bio-politics – “administering life”.460 
 
Politics has long been concerned with the interests and lives of those whom it 
governed. According to Fehér and Heller, hygienic prescriptions and health 
regulations were closely intertwined with religious ritual in every pre-modern 
arena.461 In Aristotle’s view, human beings must be subject to the authority of the 
city-state in order to attain the good life.462 Foucault writes: “The way in which a 
rationalization was attempted, dating from the eighteenth century, for the problems 
posed to governmental practice by the phenomena specific to an ensemble of living 
                                                 
456 M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction (London, Penguin, 1979). 
457 N. Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and the Subjectivity in the Twenty-First 
Century (Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2007), supra n.3; also cited by R. Ciccarelli, ‘Reframing 
Political Freedom in the Analytics of Governmentality’, 19 (2008) Law and Critique 307-327. 
458 Ibid. 
459 See note 456, at 139. 
460 Ibid, 138. 
461 F. Fehér and A. Heller, Biopolitics (Aldershot, Avebury, 1994), 63. 
462 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), ‘Aristotle's Political Theory: Presuppositions of 
Aristotle’s Politics’, (July 2002), available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-
politics/supplement2.html (Last visited on Sep 17th, 2008). 
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beings: health, hygiene, birth rate, longevity, races…” 463  In short, according to 
Foucault, what was central to the politics of health in the 18th century was the 
emergence of governance in health and population well-being.  
 
From the nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, bio-politics tried to manage the quality 
of the population. It turned to regulation of customs, habits, reproductive practices, 
family, blood, etc. Indeed, the Nazi regime, in its attempts to racially “purify” the 
population, brought bio-politics to a point that had never been reached before. China’s 
One-Child Policy is another controversial example of population control (which I will 
address in detail shortly). The last half-century has witnessed the dynamics of 
biotechnical development, and bio-political strategies have been modified along with 
these changes.464 As some scholars predicted, we are entering “a biotech century - an 
age of marvellous yet troubling new medical possibilities.”465 The rapid advance of 
biotechnology, genetic screening, reproductive technologies, organ transplantation, 
genetic modification of organisms, new drugs, even the possibility of the medical use 
of stem cell research, etc, have sparked heated ethical debates amongst politicians, 
regulators, theologians, ethicists, philosophers, and others.  
 
In the field of bio-politics, bio-power is not a single power which is confined to the 
territory of medicine alone, but a power-field comprised of interacting, agonistic 
powers in strategic relation to each other. This power-field can be interpreted as a 
power that involves increasing organisation of human life by bureaucratic, legal, and 
administrative means. Though bio-power is not a true source of power that has 
capacity to legislate or legitimate, it is the characteristic form of power in modern 
society where life itself becomes the central object. “It was life more than the law that 
became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through 
affirmations concerning rights.”466  
 
                                                 
463 M. Foucault, ‘History of Systems of Thoughts, 1979’, 8 (1981) Philosophy and Social Criticism 3, 
352-360, 353.  
464 See note 457. 
465 See note 457, introduction. 
466 M. Foucault, ‘Part Five: Right of Death and Power over Life’, History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An 
Introduction (London, Penguin, 1979), 145. 
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Foucault uses the term bio-power to describe 20th century “political strategies” which 
“lay further stress on the proliferation of political technologies that ensued, investing 
the body, health, modes of subsistence and habitation, living conditions, the whole 
space of existence.”467 Rose further defines contemporary bio-power as “a sum of 
policies of life in which the state devolves its power to near-autonomous legislative 
organs (for example, bioethical commissions; private companies like fertility clinics; 
biotechnological multinationals, which sell products like genetic tests direct to 
consumers; and professional groups such medical associations, regulated at a distance 
by complex mechanisms of certification, standards, bench-marketing and 
balances).”468 (It should be noted that this is not what has happened in China. The 
relevant issues will be dealt with shortly). 
 
Although Foucault’s writings on bio-power were fragmentary, his concepts have 
inspired the development of studies on the politics of life in the modern era.469 The 
Foucauldian approach allows us to think about shifting social movements and the 
struggles of the governed. They are also helpful for our understanding of the 
phenomenon of resistance that occurs in Western societies. However, there are limits 
on the Foucauldian notion of bio-power. Calhoun argues that Foucault’s theories 
cannot achieve historical specificity or grasp the particular traits of different 
cultures.470 Applying Foucault’s approaches to China poses challenging questions of 
political contextual relevance.  
 
As regards political structures, power is more centralised in China than in many 
modern Western countries. Foucault’s claim in 1976 - “power would no longer be 
dealing simply with legal subjects whom the ultimate domination was death, but with 
living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be 
                                                 
467 Ibid, 143-144. 
468 See note 457.  
469 The terms ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’ have been used by two of our leading contemporary 
philosophers – Giorgio Agamben and Antonio Negri who have made these terms central to their critical 
analyses of politics. See e.g., G. Agamben, Homo Sacer (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998); G. 
Agamben, ‘Form-of-Life’, in P. Virno and M. Hardt (ed), Radical Thought in Italy (Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 151-156; M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2000); M. Hardt and A. Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the age of Empire 
(London, Penguin, 2004).  
470 C. Calhoun, Structure of Power and Constrain (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); C. 
Calhoun, Critical Social Theory (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995); S. Verma and A.K. Pandey, ‘Knowledge, 
Power and Culture: Towards a Critical Perspective’, 11 (2009) Journal of Social Science 1, 159-166. 
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applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat 
of death, that gave power its access even to body.”471 –directs no attention to the 
Chinese government’s direct special control of its population. The same is true of his 
notion of bio-politics, which was developed mainly as a critique of liberal governance 
and the consequence of modern power. China is not yet a liberal state, but far from 
making Foucault’s ideas irrelevant, this thesis embraces Foucauldian notions calling 
for liberal modes of governance and acknowledges that power needs to be balanced. I 
propose ways of dispensing power and a mechanism for realising the professionals’ 
self-ownership of power and responsibility (more discussions in Chapter 9).   
 
Another concern of relevance arises from the level of analysis. Foucault critiques 
medical discourse and bio-politics at the macro-level of state, the regulation of the 
population, or social body; I am interested in examining Chinese medics’ perceptions 
and causes of medical deprofessionalisation in China, which is more at the micro level 
of an individual professional group, and at its self-disciplinary and institutional 
control. But different analyses can be complementary rather than contradictory. 
Applying a top-down approach – by showing how state power is exercised and 
internalised in medicine, as well as how the control of the medical profession in China 
is achieved through the production of various disciplines from political, social, 
cultural, legal and institutional channels – I aim to create an overall account of the 
evolution of state-achieved bio-political power over Chinese medical practitioners at 
both macro and micro levels. 
 
Therefore despite these apparent incompatibilities, the Foucauldian bio-political 
approach and the mechanisms used by the Chinese government to govern its 
population, do converge in some respects. Foucault’s ideas provide insights for 
analysing power relations in health governance. Taking a bio-political approach 
broadens our appreciation of the role of the Chinese government in governing its 
population and its effect on medical practitioners. The concept of bio-power that 
emerges from Foucault’s investigation of bio-politics indicates that power arose from 
modern techniques to create “a new bio-politics around the administration and 
                                                 
471 See note 466, at 143.  
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optimization of the process of life.”472 As I will argue later, these elements also exist 
in the discourse of China’s bio-politics, especially in governing China’s population. 
Adopting Foucault’s analytical approach thus offers a wider and deeper perspective 
which allows us to probe more generally central questions related to professional 
governance in Chinese healthcare politics and of medical deprofessionalisation. 
 
In short, Foucauldian bio-politics and bio-power refer to a broad range of relations 
between the forces that extend throughout the social body, governing “the 
management of towns and routes, the conditions of life (habits, diet, etc), the number 
of inhabitants, their life span, their ability and fitness for work”.473 To narrow down 
the concepts of bio-politics and bio-power, the next section discusses a more 
medically focused theory developed from Foucault’s – medicalisation.   
 
2.2   Medicalisation  
 
Having discussed the concepts of bio-politics and bio-power – the political strategies 
of the power field, this section directs attentions to medical jurisdiction, which has 
expanded in recent years and now encompasses many problems which hitherto were 
not defined as medical issues. The increasing use of medicine as a channel to 
understand social problems represents medicalisation as - “a process whereby more 
and more of everyday life has come under medical dominion, influence and 
supervision.” 474  Alcoholism, obesity and mental disorders are examples of 
medicalising social problems.  
 
This section begins by briefly reviewing the development of medicalisation in 
Western society, followed by an exploration of its causes and effects. It then focuses 
on the relevance of the term ‘medicalisation’ to the Chinese context, especially on 
how this conception links the previous discussions of bio-power and bio-politics to 
                                                 
472 S. Greenhalgh et al., Governing China’s Population: from Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005), 6. 
473 M. Lazzarato, ‘From Biopower to Biopolitics’, 2 (2002) Tailoring Biotechnologies 2, 11-20. 
474 P. Conrad, ‘The Discovery of Hyperkinesis: Notes on the Medicalization of deviant Behavior’, 23 
(1975) Social Problems 12-21, 12; P. Conrad, ‘Medicalization and Social Control’, 18 (1992) Annual 
Review of Sociology 209-232. 
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the next section – the examination of political instrumentalisation of medicine in 
China. 
 
Pasquino suggested that, in the 20th century, a great campaign of medicalisation was 
launched across Europe. 475  The commentary given by the Dean of a Catholic 
University in 1969 on the revival of witchery on a college campus indicates the shift 
in handing social problems,   
 
  “We’ve really become progressive around here. A couple of hundred years ago we would 
have burned them. Twenty-five years ago I would have expelled them. Now we simply send 
them all to psychiatrists.”476   
 
Indeed, although Foucault may not use the term ‘medicalisation’, he has analysed 
changes from non-medical to medical definitions and their treatment in the Birth of 
the Clinic477, Madness and Civilization478, and Discipline and Punish479. Foucault 
shows that people who incarcerate others for “madness” gain power and control.480 
One of Foucauld’s followers’ central contentions is that “society is medicalised in a 
profound way, serving to monitor and administer the bodies of citizens in an effort to 
regulate and maintain social order as well as promoting good health and 
productivity.”481 Medical interventions in dealing with social problems exist in many 
countries, including China (I will explain this in detail shortly). Critics argue that we 
are experiencing a medicalisation of social problems, arguing that medics are 
intruding into moral and political matters.482  
 
                                                 
475 P. Pasquino, ‘Theatrum Politicum’: the Genealogy of Capital - Police and the State of Prosperity, in 
G. Burchell, et al. (ed), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (England, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991), 116.  
476 Reported in the New York Times, 1969, cited by I. K. Zola, ‘In the Name of Health and Illness: on 
some Socio-political Consequences of Medical Influence’, 9 (1975) Social Science Medicine 83.  
477 M. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, first published by Naissance de la in 1963 (London, Routledge, 
2003). 
478 M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization (New York, Random, 1965), 239. 
479 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London, Allen Lane, 1977). 
480 See note 478. 
481 D. Lupton, ‘Foucault and the Medicalisation Critique’, in A. Peterson and R. Bunton (eds) Foucault 
Health and Medicine (London, Routledge, 1997), 100.  
482 I. K. Zola, ‘Medicine as an Institution of Social Control’, 20 (1972) Sociological Review 487; I. K. 
Zola, ‘In the Name of Health and Illness: on some Socio-political Consequences of Medical Influence’, 
9 (1975) Social Science Medicine 83; also cited by S. J. Williams and M. Calnan, ‘The ‘Limits’ of 
Medicalization?: Modern Medicine and the Lay Populace in ‘Late’ Modernity’, 12 (1996) Social 
Science Medicine 1609-1620.  
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With regard to the causes of medicalisation, one side of the argument considers 
medicalisation to be the result of broader social processes to which medical 
professionals are merely passively responding. Take Illich for example. He developed 
his original critique of medicalisation in the mid-1970s, in which he highlighted that 
as part of the wider process of industrialisation and bureaucratisation, medical 
professionals have taken away the public’s right of self determination, especially in 
the situations of death and dying.483  
 
The other side of the argument perceives that the tendencies of medicalisation to offer 
many aspects of life are mainly due to medical professionals’ quest for power and 
control.484 Freidson notes that professional dominance and monopolisation have had a 
significant role in giving medicine jurisdiction over virtually anything to which the 
label “health” or “illness” could be attached.485 Pawluch agrees with this by giving a 
well-researched historical example to provide an insight – the changing focus of 
paediatrics in a changing social environment. 486  His research shows that 
paediatricians were able to adapt their orientations to maintain their practices when 
there were fewer sick children by becoming “baby-feeders” and new “behavioural 
paediatricians” “treating” children’s troubled behaviours.487 Pawluch’s accounts echo 
what Clark says,  
 
  “We have grown used to speaking of medicalisation as a byword for all things negative 
about the influence of modern medicine on life and society. The term has become 
synonymous with the sense of a profession reaching too far: into the body, the mind, and 
even the soul itself.”488 
 
                                                 
483 I. Illich, Limits to Medicine – Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1976); also cited by S. J. Williams and M. Calnan, ‘The ‘Limits’ of Medicalization?: 
Modern Medicine and The Lay Populace in ‘Late Modernity’’, 42 (1996) Social Science and Medicine 
12, 1609-1620; D. Clark, ‘Between Hope and Acceptance: the Medicalisation of Dying’, 324 (2002) 
British Medical Journal 7342, 905-907.  
484 E. Freidson, Professional Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care (New York, Atherton 
Press, 1970). 
485 E. Freidson, Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (New York, 
Dodd, 1970). 
486 D. Pawluch, ‘Transition in Paediatrics: a Segmental Analysis’, 30 (1983) Social Problems 449-65; 
also cited by P. Conrad, ‘Medicalization and Social Control’, 18 (1992) Annual Review of Sociology 
209-222. 
487 Ibid.  
488 D. Clark, ‘Between Hope and Acceptance: the Medicalisation of Dying’, 324 (2002) British Medical 
Journal 7342, 905-907. 
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Looking at both sides of the argument in terms of the causes and nature of 
medicalisation, I argue that medicalisation would move into the jurisdiction of the 
medical profession whether medics themselves were directly involved or not. And I 
agree with Conrad who says that medicalisation “consists of defining a (non-medical) 
problem in medical terms, using medical language to describe a (non-medical) 
problem, or using a medical intervention to ‘treat’ it … This is a socio-cultural 
process that may or may not involve the medical profession, lead[ing] to medical 
social control or medical treatment, or be the result of intentional expansion by the 
medical profession.” 489  Osborne further suggests that we “replace the negative 
language of ‘medical monopoly’, ‘medicalisation’ or ‘medicine as an instrument of 
social control’ with a more positive form of explanation that would be concerned, not 
with a critique of medical power, but … with the ways that such programmes are tied 
or seek to tie themselves to wider rationalities of government”.490 This is the position 
I hold in this thesis. What is more, I will argue that medical deprofessionalisation and 
medicalisation could happen at the same time.   
 
There is a substantial literature about debates on, or critiques of, medicalisation, 
concerning the relationship between medicine and lay people and the expansionist 
tendencies of medicine in the West. 491  However, one seldom finds the term 
‘medicalisation’ used in the literature relating to underdeveloped countries, partly 
because, it is a concept introduced by Western scholars who assume that 
medicalisation benefits medical professionals who are mainly based in the West. It 
might also be because, if one views medicalisation narrowly as “what doctors actually 
control and do”, then for medical professionals from underdeveloped countries whose 
                                                 
489 P. Conrad, ‘Medicalization and Social Control’, 18 (1992) Annual Review of Sociology 209-232. 
490 T. Osborne, ‘Security and Vitality: Drains, Liberalism and Power in the Nineteenth Century’, in A. 
Barry, et al. (ed), Foucault and Political Reason (London, University College London, 1996), 99. 
491 See note 489; also see P. Conrad, ‘The Discovery of Hyperkinesis: Notes on the Medicalization of 
deviant Behavior’, 23 (1975) Social Problems 12-21; A. T. Scull, ‘From Madness to Mental Illness: 
Medical Men as Moral Entrepreneurs’, 16 (1975) European Journal of Sociology 218-61; S. J. Pfohl, 
‘The Discovery of Child Abuse’, 24 (1977) Social Problems 310-323; J. W. Schbeide, ‘Deviant 
Drinking as a Disease: Deviant Drinking as a Social Accomplishment’, 25 (1978) Social Problems 
361-372; I. Illich, Medical Nemesis (New York, Pantheon, 1976), 294; P. Conrad and J. Schneider, 
‘Looking at Levels of Medicalization: A Comment on Strong’s Critique of the Thesis of Medical 
Imperialism’, 14 (1980) Social Science and Medicine 75-79; I. K. Zola, ‘The Medicalization of Aging 
and Disability’, in Advances in Medical Sociology (Greenwich, JAI, 1991), 299-315; S. J. Williams and 
M. Calnan, ‘The ‘Limits’ of Medicalization?: Modern Medicine and The Lay Populace in ‘Late 
Modernity’’, 42 (1996) Social Science and Medicine 12, 1609-1620; J. E. Davis, ‘How Medicalization 
Lost Its Way’, 43 (2006) Society 6, 51-56. 
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medical power has not yet reached maturity, medicalisation simply would not be a 
problem.  
 
The reason why this thesis applies the term ‘medicalisation’ to the Chinese context is 
because I see this as a complex phenomenon. It encompasses more than the doctor-
patient interaction. Medicalisation could also happen merely because the state wants 
to use medicine as one of its social control mechanisms. But if medical practitioners 
have to do what they are asked to do in the state’s interest, then in these circumstances, 
medical professionals would be disempowered rather than empowered. But this would, 
nonetheless, still be an example of medicalisation. This thesis views medicalisation in 
a broad sense and argues that the use of medicine is not only for medical 
professionals’ benefit or patients’ interest; it can also serve other purposes, such as the 
state’s interests.  
 
According to Zola, in war time, physicians were put in the position of choosing 
between the best goals of treatment and rehabilitation and the “war effort”, and all too 
often, medical practitioners had to sacrifice the long term health of their patients to the 
short term goal of the army commander. 492  When the roles which medical 
professionals play in medicalisation are passive, it is the state interest behind the 
medicalisation movement which prevails. In this case, medical practitioners no longer 
take the lead to extend their jurisdiction but serve as the state’s instruments of social 
or political control. This is how medicalisation happens in China. My argument is that, 
in the name of health and the control of illness, medicalisation – potential uses and 
abuses of medical techniques and discoveries by the state through the medical 
profession – would unavoidably cause moral dilemmas for physicians. It thus raises 
the obvious question as to how these dilemmas are to be resolved. Indeed whether the 
medical profession is sufficiently empowered to resolve them in ways other than 
quietly following the will of the state.  
 
Instrumentalisation and deprofessionalisation will be discussed in the next section, 
followed by analyses of two cases – both reflect issues of medicalisation, 
instrumentalisation and deprofessionalisation in China. The case studies to be 
                                                 
492 I. K. Zola, ‘In the Name of Health and Illness: on Some Socio-political Consequences of Medical 
Influence’, 9 (1975) Social Science Medicine 83. 
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discussed shortly provide examples of the Chinese government’s bio-political 
strategies as well as Chinese medics’ instrumentalisation and deprofessionalisation, 
where technology and knowledge are serving as a means for political ends.  
 
3.   State and Profession: Instrumentalisation 
 
Previous discussions of bio-politics and medicalisation have shown the lack of 
separation between politics and medicine. When a professional group is politically 
integrated and not independent, biomedical techniques are even more likely to be used 
to solve the state’s social and political problems. The aim of this section is to provide 
a critical appraisal of the political instrumentalisation of medicine in China. In 
particular, I will address two questions: firstly, how are medical professionals 
entangled in the state’s political activities and secondly, how does the state’s 
medicalisation strategy affect their professional judgement and ethics?  
 
3.1   The Political Instrumentalisation of Chinese Medical Practitioners 
 
According to Hivon, the concept of instrumentalisation is “a process through which 
the user places the artefact in his/her hand and personalises it. Often seen as a misuse 
of the functions for which it is designed.”493 In my opinion, instrumentalisation means 
a process in which one subject is used for serving purposes other than those for which 
it was originally intended. The prohibition of the “instrumentalisation” of human 
subjects is widely referred to in bioethical debates. Conceptions of instrumentalisation 
in the bioethical context borrow heavily from the Kantian imperative - “never treat 
people merely as a means to an end”.494 In contrast to the non-instrumentalisation 
principle in bioethics, the meaning of instrumentalisation in this thesis is the control 
of medics by outside actors, e.g. parties, politicians, social groups or movements, or 
                                                 
493 L. Hivon, et al., ‘From network of Calculators to Collaborative Knowledge Construction in the 
Class’, (2008) Repères - IREM, 72(1), 79-102, 13. 
494 In contrast with instrumentalisation, Western conceptions of respect and, specially, the principle of 
respect for persons is influenced heavily by the 18th century philosopher, Immanuel Kant. In his 
celebrated work Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics, Kant prescribes the practical 
imperative: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in any 
cases of as an end withal, never as means only.” This practical imperative has been translated to mean 
that people should always be treated as ends to themselves, and never as mere means (for instance, as 
objects) to the ends of others. See, I. Kant, translated by. L. W. Beck, Foundations of the Metaphysics 
of Morals (New York, Macmillan, 1959 [1785]), 56. 
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economic actors seeking political influence, who use them to intervene in the world of 
politics. 495  I use the term instrumentalisation to refer specifically to political 
instrumentalisation in this thesis.  
 
Both the population management strategy and the control of psychiatric practices 
show the power of the political regime in China, which decides its forms of 
intervention differently to its contemporary Western counterparts. Weak consensus on 
medical ethics and limited development of professional self-regulation reflect the fact 
that healthcare workers in China have, to a significant extent, not been members of 
autonomous institutions, but have been ruled by politicians. Within the conflicts over 
medical professional autonomy and “instrumentalisation” of medicine, there is a 
strong sense of deprofessionalisation. 
 
We witness that, from both historical and empirical studies, Chinese medical 
practitioners have a relatively high tendency to cooperate with the Chinese 
government’s bio-politics. As Beetham says, 
 
  “If power is one person’s ability to achieve their purposes through others, then it cannot be a 
matter of capacities and resources alone, but all depends on the degree of the others’ 
willingness to cooperate. And that willingness cannot be sufficiently created by incentives 
and sanctions on their own; it depends on the normative status of the power holder; and on 
normative considerations that engage us as moral agents.”496 
 
However, there appears to be a general understanding that the medical profession 
should not to be the subject of political instrumentalisation. We would expect medical 
professionals, not merely to accept the consequence of governmental desire, but rather 
that they would show possible conflict “between the aims and desires of government 
and the norms of the domain to be governed”.497 Possible conflict does exist. In the 
empirical studies, I discovered there is a high percentage of dissatisfaction from 
medical practitioners toward their working conditions, either due to the financial 
stress, to doctor-patient relationships, bureaucracy or simply the stress of the work 
                                                 
495 See e.g., D. C. Hallin and P. Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and 
Politics (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
496 D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (New York, Palgrave, 2003), 38. 
497 P. M. Strong, The Alcoholic, the Sick Role and Bourgeois Medicine, paper given at the Medical 
Sociology Conference, Warwick; also cited by D. C. Hallin and P. Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: 
Three Models of Media and Politics (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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load. The fieldwork findings indicate that there is not an absolute acceptance of bio-
politics among Chinese medics, though there is a strong political influence and a lack 
of autonomy in their practice. This finding affirms Foucault’s notion of power and 
resistance: “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, 
this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”498 (More 
detail discussions about the notion of resistance will be given in Chapter 8)  
 
3.2   Examples of Medicalisation and Political Instrumentalisation in China 
 
I want to continue the current argument - political instrumentalisation is likely to 
happen when medical professions are too powerless to follow their professional ethics 
- with two case studies, which I hope will illuminate part of the Chinese bio-political 
realities and their “side-effect” on medical professionals: medicalisation and 
instrumentalisation. Of the two cases below, the first example is about the One-Child 
Policy and family planning legislation; the other is about the politically-controlled 
psychiatric units.  
 
(1)  Case Study I: The One-Child Policy and the Population and Family Planning 
Law 
 
China’s population policy has been implemented very effectively since the late 
1970s.499 Chinese population policies were unique in two crucial ways. Firstly, China 
approached limiting population growth as a matter of state planning of births. 
Secondly, in the early stages of the policy, Chinese politicians attempted direct state 
intervention, not only in the number of children allowed to each couple, but also by 
the timing of marriage, the initiation of childbearing, and the spacing between 
children (where the couple was allowed to have more than one child).500 
 
                                                 
498 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction (New York, Vintage, 1980), 95. 
499 Compared with 1970, in 1994 China’s birth rate dropped from 33.43 per thousand to 17.7 per 
thousand; the natural growth rate, from 25.83 per thousand to 11.21 per thousand; and the total fertility 
rate of women, from 5.81 to around 2. See e.g., Permanent Mission of P.R China to the United Nation 
Office at Geneva and Other International Organisation in Switzerland, Family Planning in China, 
available at: http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t176938.htm (Last visited on May 1st, 2008). 
500 S. Greenhalgh et al., Governing China’s Population: from Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005), 38-42. 
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“Despite its indigenous political philosophies, its long history of imperial bureaucracy, 
and its more recent revolutionary history of Maoist socialism”, 501 bio-politics has 
seldom been discussed in Chinese studies until the advent of modern medical 
developments. In China, with the well-known One-Child Policy and its subsequent 
legislation the 2001 Population and Family Planning Law, medical decisions went 
beyond a private contract between the doctors and individual patients. The distinctive 
quality of the political power embodied in the One-Child policy and in subsequent 
legislation can be regarded as an attempt by a government to control its entire 
population in all aspects of human life. In Foucault’s words, it is “an exploration of 
numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the 
control of populations”.502  
 
The controversial One-Child Policy was implemented by the Chinese government to 
control “birth according to plan”.503 Greenhalgh and Winckler’s indicate that, “with 
population as their object, Chinese political leaders constructed an enormous edifice 
of knowledge and state bureaucratic power that sought, and largely managed, to take 
charge of the production and, to a lesser extent, the “quality” of life itself.”504 Since 
the One-Child Policy became central to the state, the PRC Marriage Law was revised 
in 1980 in order to align itself more closely with the family planning policy.505 
 
Though the One-Child Policy was one that has been successful in statistical terms, it 
was controversial in terms of its implementation.506 Reports are available of forced 
abortions, forced sterilisation, infanticide and strict penalties.507 To regulate its policy 
implementation, in 2000 and 2001, China issued two major legal documents on 
                                                 
501 J. Farquhar and Q. Zhang, ‘Biopolitical Beijing: Pleasure, Sovereignty, and Self-Cultivation in 
China’s Capital’, 20 (2005) Cultural Anthropology 3, 303-327.  
502 M. Foucault, ‘Part Five: Right of Death and Power over Life’, History of Sexuality, Vol. I: the Will 
to Knowledge (Paris, Gallimard, 1976), 140. 
503 A. Jenkins, ‘Defining and Defending the Chinese State: Geopolitical Perspective’, in T. Cannon and 
A. Jenkins (ed), The Geography of Contemporary China: The Impact of Deng Xiaoping’s Decade 
(London, Roultedge, 1990), 117-123.  
504 See note 500, at 286. 
505 Article 2 of the 1981 PRC Marriage Law states “Family planning shall be practised”.   
506 See note 500, at 38.  
507 R. Knapp, ‘China’s populations: Readings and Maps’, available at: 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/china/geog/population.htm (Last visited on April 20th, 2008); M. 
Weisskopf, ‘One Couple One Child: Abortion Policy Tears at China’s Society’, (January 7th, 1985) 
Washington Post, A1 20.   
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reproductive policy, the 2000 Decision 508  and the 2001 Population and Family 
Planning Law. They finally brought the One-Child Policy, which has been operating 
in China for almost twenty-five years, into line with legal norms − an overall post-
Mao regime shift from party fiat towards “a state ruled by law” (as noted in Chapter 
2). This major transition also reflects how the concept of the birth programme was 
granted legal authority and legitimate enforcement.509  
 
Instead of relying on coercive measures, Article 2 of the Population and Family 
Planning Law states that, “the State adopts comprehensive measures to control the 
population and to improve the quality of life. The State relies on publicity and 
education, advancement of science and technology, and comprehensive services to 
establish and perfect the systems of healthcare and social security, and to carry out the 
tasks involved with population and family planning.” The law also aims to set high 
demands on government administrative procedures, especially on local family 
planning administrative departments, to reduce corruption and coercion.510  
 
However, I argue that the reform of family planning administration is far from 
complete, both in principle and practice, by merely implementing a new piece of 
regulation. It is reported that from late 2004 to early 2005, in three districts and nine 
counties in Linyi city, Shandong province, there were family planning officers 
engaged in a large-scale population planning campaign, which included coercive and 
forceful actions such as imprisonment and assault, in order to force 22 women to have 
late-term abortions and sterilisations.511 To make matters worse, activist lawyer Chen 
Guangcheng who provided legal advice to these pregnant women, exposed this issue 
and consequently was sent to prison in 2006.512 According to his defence lawyers513:  
 
                                                 
508 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China and the State Council on Enhancing Work of Population and Ensuring Stable and Low 
Level of Birth, Document No. 8, March 2, 2000. 
509 Note 500, 158-160. 
510 See, in particular, the Article 4 and Article 39 of the PRC Population and Family Planning Law 
2001. 
511 ‘Has China’s One-Child Policy worked?’ (September 20th, 2007) BBC News; ‘Chen Guangcheng, 
who uncovered abuses of family planning policies, will be behind bars for more than four years’, Los 
Angeles Times, (August 25, 2006); W. Yuan, ‘China Vs. My Husband: A Dissident's Ordeal’, 
Washington Post A 27 (October 12, 2006). 
512 Ibid.  
513 Their names are Li Jinsong, Zhang Lihui, Li Fangping, Teng Biao, and Xu Zhiyong.  
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      “Chen Guangcheng, a blind advocate for the rights of Chinese villagers, recently made 
headlines around the world when he was sentenced to four years and three months in prison. 
But, as his chosen lawyers, we were prevented from presenting a fair defence by obstacles 
erected by Chinese authorities. A local court imposed unacceptable terms on us defending 
our client at his August 18 trial. Before the trial, we had been detained by police, 
intimidated, and one lawyer was not freed until the trial was over... Chinese officials 
punished Mr. Chen for disclosing their own criminal activities-forcing villagers to undergo 
sterilizations and forced abortions, even though these are officially illegal under Chinese 
law.”514 
 
In Chen’s case, the Population and Family Planning Law was disregarded by family 
planning officers, government officials and even judges who made legal judgments in 
Chen’s case. Local authorities and the legal system did not provide justice and punish 
those who infringed the law. Instead they provided a protection umbrella over the 
family planning officers, who forced women to undergo unwanted abortions or 
sterilizations in order to meet birth-control quotas.  
 
There are no medical practitioners reported to have been involved in Chen’s case and, 
currently there is scant evidence about how Chinese medics reacted in the face of 
enforced abortions and sterilizations ordered by family planning officers. In Nie’s 
understanding, Chinese medics who work for a department of obstetrics and 
gynaecology (OB/GYN) carry a strong sense of social responsibility and patriotic 
nationalism.515  
 
In Nie’s fieldwork, one doctor from a department of obstetrics and gynaecology told 
him that she saw delivering babies and performing terminations as two totally 
different matters. Performing abortions was a task she undertook to help implement 
the national birth control policy and she strongly supported it. The doctor considered 
abortion as “a remedial measure when contraception fails”. She also said,  
 
“Westerners just don’t understand the Chinese family planning program. It isn’t the women 
who are forced to have abortions as they [foreigners] say. I never encountered a case in 
which the woman wasn’t willing to have an abortion – very rarely. As far as my experience 
is concerned, no one was ever forced. No one grumbled… The actual situations of the two 
countries [China and the United States] are different. If everyone just carried on having 
children, how will China develop industry, agriculture, and advanced technology?”516  
 
                                                 
514 J. Li, et al., ‘Blind Injustice’, (September 13th, 2006) Asian Wall Street Journal, 200. 
515 J. Nie, Behind the Silence: Chinese Voices on Abortion (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 1. 
516 Ibid, 2. 
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What is more, the interviewee suggested to Nie that it was Nie’s duty to help the 
world, especially the West, to understand the “national reality” of China and the truth 
about China’s population program. His interviewee’s reaction reminds me of my own 
personal experience. I encountered one young Chinese doctor in Edinburgh in 2008 at 
a seminar where I presented a poster about Chinese Doctors’ Ethical Dilemmas. This 
Chinese doctor was angry with my criticism that Chinese medical practitioners were 
forced to follow state orders rather than their professional ethics. He said, “You are 
misleading the foreigners who have been misled a lot by foreign media.” Both Nie’s 
and my own experience show a strong sense of nationalism and patriotic pride 
amongst Chinese medics. Nie’s small-scale study even suggests that, under the One-
Child Policy, most of the OB/GYN doctors were proud of their contributions to the 
important cause of slowing population growth and accepted birth-control surgeries as 
part of their routine medical practice. With reference to comments from Greenhalgh 
and Winckler, “as employees of the state, China’s medical practitioners were 
sometimes required to violate both professional and human ethics by conducting mass 
surgeries in substandard conditions, aborting fully developed foetuses, and 
administering lethal injections to unauthorized newborns.”517 
 
Yet there have also been occasions when professional calm was disturbed. In 2000, 
McElroy reported a case in Hubei province where a retired female doctor saved the 
life of a newborn baby who was scheduled for late-term abortion as a fourth child.518 
When local family planning officials heard of this, they demanded that the doctor 
hand over the baby to them to be drowned in a nearby rice field.519 According to the 
news report, the elderly doctor was devastated. She said “How could they be so cruel? 
Yes, the child was born outside the family planning system, but it could have been 
looked after in a children’s welfare home. How could they do this?” A week after the 
event, it was reported that the doctor was still too traumatised to talk in detail about 
the killing. She said the incident had made her ill. “I’ve lost weight with the worry. 
My blood pressure is very high. I can't talk about this again.”520 
 
                                                 
517 See note 500, at 252-253. 
518 D. McElroy, ‘Anger Sweeps China over Baby-killers’, (August 27th, 2000) Sunday Telegraph. 
519 Ibid. 
520 Ibid. 
Chapter 7 Deprofessionalisation 
198 
China’s One-Child Policy encourages families to raise the best offspring they can. 
Infanticide (especially when children are born with birth defects) is another ethical 
compromise forced upon Chinese doctors.521 “Discrimination against, maltreatment, 
and abandonment of baby girls are prohibited” 522  - the Population and Family 
Planning Law also explicitly acknowledges the problem of maltreatment of female 
infants. 
 
The case study of China’s One-Child Policy has shown a complex dimension in bio-
politics. It not only shows how the state’s bio-political strategy has placed people’s 
lives under its control; it also shows the state can lose power in incidents of resistance. 
More discussion and reflection will come after the second case study – the political 
involvement in psychiatric practice.   
 
(2)  Case Study II: Psychiatric Units and the Political Definition of “Mad”   
 
   There is a reason for the general deterioration as regards liberty. This reason is the 
increased power of organizations and the increasing degree to which men’s actions are 
controlled by this or that large body.  
 
                                                    Bertrand Russell523 
 
Psychiatry was the area that first called attention to critics of medicalisation.524 Szasz 
argues that the principle of the rule of law is threatened by many contemporary 
psychiatric practices, which he defines as “psychiatric abuses of power”. 525 
Controversy continues, and the continual question is what methods are justified and 
which are not, in promoting so-called mental health? 
 
                                                 
521 Infanticide in China has not been legally defined as it is in English law, where the killing of a baby 
is by its mother after birth. E. K. Kim, ‘Neonatal Euthanasia in Modern China’, Vol III-1 the Lantern 
23. Also see the Parliament of the United Kingdom, has declared that China's family planning 
programs contribute to incidences of infanticide, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199697/ldhansrd/vo961218/text/61218-08.htm (Last 
visited on May 1st, 2008). Infanticide, especially female infanticide, in this context refers to the crime 
of killing child, either by the child’s parents, medical staffs or family planning officers.  
522 The 2001 PRC Population and Family Planning Law, Article 22. 
523 B. Russell, Portrait from Memory: and Other Essays (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1956), 205. 
524 T. Szasz, Law, Liberty and Psychiatry (New York, Macmillan, 1963), 281. 
525 Ibid, 6-7. 
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Documentary evidence shows that the political use of psychiatry existed in China 
during the Cultural Revolution, when virtually all forms of mental illness in officials’ 
perception were caused by politically deviant thoughts.526 What is more, it is reported 
by various Western researchers that such political use of psychiatry still exists in 
contemporary China, through which involuntary “treatments” are applied to dissidents 
and nonconformists including Falun Gong members, independent labour organisers, 
and whistle blowers.527 According to Munro, there are uncountable numbers of people 
held in institutions for mental illnesses, based solely on a politically motivated 
diagnosis.528 The Human Rights Watch report Dangerous Minds states that during the 
1980s, the percentage of people held in asylums who were being punished for 
committing political offences was as high as 15 percent of the total criminal 
psychiatric caseload.529  
 
Munro claims that “political criminals”, the subset that includes Falun Gong 
practitioners, are those who evince “a perplexing absence of any normal instinct for 
self-preservation [and], wind up in mental institutions.”530 As to reasons for confining 
Falun Gong practitioners in mental facilities, judgments of the appropriateness of the 
detentions do not seem to be made on the basis of generally accepted psychiatric 
criteria. Several pragmatic reasons have been suggested, such as, practitioners are sent 
to mental hospitals when they have been held in traditional detention facilities longer 
than the law allows, or when overcrowding becomes too severe, or when the 
authorities at detention centres are trying to reduce their own costs.531 Human rights 
organisations estimate that, since July 20, 1999, over 1000 healthy Falun Gong 
                                                 
526 See e.g., R. Munro, ‘Political Psychiatry in Post-Mao China and Its Origins in Cultural Revolution’, 
30 (2002) Journal of American Academic Psychiatry Law 97-106; J. Birley, ‘Political Abuse of 
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Psychiatry in China Today and Its Origin in the Mao Era (New York, Human Rights Watch, 2002); R. 
Munro, China’s Psychiatric Inquisition: Dissent, Psychiatry and the Law in Post-1949 China (London, 
Wildy, Simmonds and Hills, 2006); A. A. Stone, ‘The China Psychiatry Crisis: Following Up on the 
Plight of the Falun Gong’, 6 (May 1st, 2005) Psychiatry Times XIII; M. Muminovic, ‘Psychiatric 
Association to investigate abuse in China’, 325 (2002) BMJ 513; and E. Eckholm, ‘Psychiatric Abuse 
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practitioners have been imprisoned in mental hospitals and drug rehabilitation centres, 
where they have been injected with toxic, nerve-damaging drugs, tortured with 
electric shocks, tied down for extended periods and force-fed etc. It was learned that 
over 100 Chinese mental hospitals at provincial, city, county and district level 
participated in the persecution.532 
 
During May to August 2001, different international psychiatric communities, 
including the World Psychiatry Association (WPA), the [British] Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, Global Initiative and the American Psychiatric Association have 
responded to the problem of politically abusive psychiatry in China and voted to urge 
the WPA to send an investigative team to China to assess the validity of the charges of 
psychiatric mistreatment of Falun Gong members.533  
 
In response to this, China Mental Health Watch (CMHW) agreed that in April 2004, 
the WPA and the Society of Psychology (SP) would conduct a collaborative 
investigation in Beijing. However, this investigation was indefinitely postponed at the 
Chinese government’s insistence. 534  Instead of a collaborative investigation, in 
November 2004, the Chinese Society of Psychiatrists (CSP)’s investigation identified 
“instances in which some Chinese psychiatrists failed to distinguish between spiritual-
cultural beliefs and delusions, as a result of which persons were misdiagnosed and 
mistreated.” 535  The statement attributed these acts to “the lack of training and 
professional skills of some psychiatrists rather than [to] systematic abuse of 
psychiatry.” In addition, the CSP agreed to take steps to “educate [its] members” 
about the issues that led to misdiagnosis and mistreatment and said it welcomed the 
WPA’s “assistance in correcting this situation” so that there could be an improvement 
in psychiatric diagnosis and treatment throughout China.536  
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The CSP’s investigation can be seen as progress in that, the Chinese government has 
admitted that there are problems in China’s psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. 
However, it is not ideal as it overlooks systemic problems. On the one hand, it lacks 
the transparency of the country’s existing national and local-level legislation and 
administrative regulations in governing psychiatric assessment; on the other hand, 
there are potentially biased influences from police and prosecution agencies who have 
close interactions with psychiatrists or the dual-role of psychiatrists serving at army or 
armed force hospitals. Last but not least, the CSP did not provide clear guidelines 
concerning the medical or legal basis for psychiatric custody. It blamed individual 
doctors’ “misdiagnoses and mistreatment”, but did not point out that the country’s 
prevailing political or ideological orthodoxies should not be used to “educate” doctors 
in order to provide a medical or legal basis for the diagnosis of mental illness. Most 
importantly, Chinese legislation should promptly formulate and enact its long-delayed 
Mental Health Law by referring to internationally accepted provisions. Though the 
law itself cannot be seen as a once-for-all solution (as discussed in the case of the 
One-Child Policy), it would at least show a first-step attitude change from the state, so 
that in the future misbehaviours of mental health clinicians could be judged by a 
transparent standard.  
 
Human Rights Watch and the Geneva Initiative urged the U.N. “Special Reporter on 
Torture and Ill-Treatment” to address the issue of political psychiatric abuse in 
China.537 They also called on the Chinese government to conduct a systematic review 
of China’s legislation and administrative regulations governing forensic psychiatric 
assessment, and of the interactions between police and psychiatrists, and to remove all 
provisions stating or implying that dissident or nonconformist beliefs provide a 
justifiable basis for the diagnosis of mental illness. 538  Acknowledging that most 
Chinese psychiatrists are not involved or complicit in the abuses, the 
recommendations given by Human Rights Watch to the Chinese psychiatric and 
mental healthcare community are:  
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   “China’s mental healthcare professionals should resist any pressure or inducement from the 
country’s law-enforcement and judicial agencies to become personally involved in the legal 
handling or psychiatric assessment of persons detained by the police solely or mainly on 
account of their peaceful and non-violent political or religious views or activities…Where 
direct conflicts of interests are encountered between their ethical obligations and their 
professional duty to examine police detainees, they should refuse to participate.”539  
 
It is significant that Human Rights Watch points out that pressure or inducement from 
the country’s law-enforcement and judicial agencies would influence psychiatrists’ 
decision-making. However, it overlooked the historical institutionalisation of the bio-
political power structure in China, through which Chinese medical practitioners have 
little power or capacity to refuse participation. My criticism is that this 
recommendation would lose its practical impact unless Chinese psychiatrists were 
sufficiently empowered with the capacity to resist such pressures. Without 
professional autonomy, psychiatrists are only tools for fulfilling the state’s bio-
political social control mechanisms. 
 
3.3   State and Medics: Case Reflection 
 
The two case studies have shown how bio-political power comes from a central 
authority in China, and medical power is likely to be abused in the name of the quality 
of the population and welfare of society, especially when professionals themselves 
have no autonomy. The two cases exemplify the existences of medicalisation and 
instrumentalisation in China. Lord Acton says, “Power tends to corrupt; absolute 
power corrupts absolutely.”540 It is hard to find abuse cases (except the German Nazi 
one) in Foucault and his followers’ biopolitics arguments. I assume that one important 
reason is that the contexts of their bio-political arguments are generally based within 
liberal societies. In a liberal society, power is no longer in a central and symbolic 
place.  
 
Bearing in mind that Foucault’s work was completed against the background of 
Western liberalism, I did not attempt to find in Foucault’s work an answer to the 
question – what causes medical instrumentalisation in China? But I found Foucault’s 
                                                 
539 Human Rights Watch and Geneva Initiative on Psychiatry, Dangerous Minds: Political Psychiatry 
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reconfiguration of “the concept of power” to be particularly helpful to illuminate the 
complex power relation for analysing the causes of medicalisation and 
instrumentalisation in China. Foucault’s understanding of power is productive and it 
does not operate through any form of strong force. Instead it controls the subject 
through successive discipline.541 “The succession of disciplinary forces results in a 
dominating form which both constructs the subject and subjects him to subtle forms of 
control.”542 “The successive disciplinary forces” exist at different levels of China’s 
party-state institutions and have instructed medics to be bureaucratic technocrats. In 
this bureaucratic structure, they submit to hierarchical control, and are subject to rigid 
hospital rules and regulations; if a physician is a communist party member, one is also 
subject to the Party’s disciplinary surveillance; consequentially, they are likely to 
experience a loss of autonomy within their medical practice.  
 
To understand how the “disciplinary forces” work in China’s healthcare bureaucracy, 
it is importance to examine, not only the power of the state over physicians but also of 
political parties. In search of the résumés of all previous Chinese Health Ministers 
since Mao, I found that with the exception of the current Health Minister – Dr Chu 
Chen, who was appointed in July 2007, as the first medically qualified Health 
Minister without CCP membership – his predecessors, who were appointed to lead the 
Ministry of Health, did not necessarily have a medical background, rather they had 
strong politically reliability records. It is difficult to tell whether this signals a 
significant change to the power dynamic of China’s healthcare or whether it simply 
reflects the flexibility of the CCP in response to increasing demands from the public. 
Nevertheless, the conventional bureaucratic strategies used by CCP (at least 
previously) could be regarded as bio-political attempts – by placing politically reliable 
individuals in key positions of healthcare administration, the Party’s mainstream 
ideology would be institutionalized within the system, and the state’s exercise of bio-
power would instrumentalise the professionals.543  
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China lacks the flourishing professions and self-governing subjects of the liberal 
societies that Foucault studied; and more generally, power is more centralised in 
China than in modern Western states.544 As one Chinese political analyst has stressed: 
 
“As China is a socialist country in which the working people are the masters, we employ 
the system of the National People’s Congress rather than the system of “separation of 
powers.” Some people regard the separate organizational setup of the state organs as a kind 
of separation of state power. This is a misunderstanding of China’s situation. The separate 
organizational setup of the state organs is for the convenience of management and the 
division of responsibility for state affairs does not mean the separation of state powers.”545 
 
In a trend of increasing state-led medicalisation, one of the adverse consequences – 
medical instrumentalisation - highlights the serious underlying problem of state-
professional conflict, providing little room for individual professional autonomy 
under such centralised power. 546  In a Communist society, professional power is, 
according to Lo and Shape, “state-centred” in nature.547 In a “state-centred” country 
like China, the state has authoritarian regimes and maintains considerable 
administrative control over the medical profession. The psychiatric case indicates that 
a medical term could be used to “order”, define or even “treat” a political or social 
problem. Political ideology is likely to influence scientific understanding and affect 
medical decisions. For example, dissidents would likely be ‘diagnosed’ as insane. A 
“state-centred” medical form of social control is achieved via this complex interplay 
between processes of medicalisation and instrumentalisation.548  
 
In contrast to Chinese bureaucratic technocrats, the Western conception of doctors is 
profession-centred, based on notions of complexity and procedural technicality.549 
This profession-centred conception coincides with the democratic notion of “a new 
citizenship based on the techniques of self-esteem, self-empowerment, self-
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entrepreneurship and individual well-being.”550 Such a phenomenon does not exist in 
China. Instead, China’s bio-political strategy has disempowered its medics, 
transforming them from knowledge-based medical practitioners into bureaucratic 
technocrats.  
 
I have argued in this section that influences from institutional and political 
“successive disciplinary forces” instrumentalise Chinese medical practitioners. Both 
case studies also show that China’s bio-political strategies, not only control the life 
and birth of populations, but also deeply affect the medical practitioners’ professional 
autonomy. Medicalisation and instrumentalisation, as two contributing factors, lead to 
the trend of deprofessionalisation which I will discuss in the following section.  
 
4.   Medical Practitioners: Deprofessionalisation in China 
 
Against the background of the state’s bio-politics, the use of bio-political power and 
its medicalisation strategy, I have introduced the concept of instrumentalisation to 
discuss the relationship between the state and medics and those relevant cases that 
represent political instrumentalisation of Chinese medical practitioners. Although I 
realise that political instrumentation of healthcare is not always the consequence of 
the existence of biopower, biopower does play a role in affecting professional 
judgements, especially in China. 
 
In this section, I argue that Chinese medical practitioners have become 
deprofessionalised as a means to a political end; serving the country as a bio-political 
instrument rather than a real profession. Moving from the state’s bio-politics, and 
state driven medical instrumentalisation, this section focuses on the 
deprofessionalised status of Chinese medical practitioners, examining intrinsic 
reasons that might prevent Chinese medics from behaving more professionally (the 
concept of a profession and its characteristics will be explored in the following 
chapter).  
 
4.1   Definition of Deprofessionalisation  
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The term deprofessionalisation has been used by Haug to explain the phenomenon 
whereby the traditional autonomy of the profession of medicine has been eroded and 
medicine has become subject to hierarchical controls outside the profession. 551 
According to Haug, professions lose control and status through a commoditisation and 
loss of ownership over the professional body of knowledge. 552  Qualities such as 
professional ethics, a monopoly of knowledge, authority over clients, and autonomy 
over work are seen to decline in the face of public questioning concerning their 
general professional status. This can be called the phenomenon of 
deprofessionalisation.553  
 
Krause indicates that the trend towards “welfare states” after World War II shows 
examples of “the state challenges [to] professional group power”. 554 As a greater 
percentage of medical graduates work for the state or under contract to it, the state 
begins to exert leverage over professional group power, and the profession may be 
progressively losing its position of supremacy”. 555  As distinct from Haug’s 
deprofessionalisation argument, some scholars argue that medicine is becoming 
“proletarianized”.556 Certain aspects of bureaucratisation and government control over 
medicine, such as, increase to government regulation, changes in provider-patient 
relationships as a result of consumerism, the demystification of medical knowledge 
through the Internet, increasing use of corporations for healthcare delivery, and the 
increasing number of physicians working as salaried employees, were regarded as 
causes of proletarianization, especially in the United States. The bureaucratic 
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requirements of the modern state that are linked to cost-control and profit measures 
are viewed as possibly challenging medical power and authority.557 
 
In essence, both deprofessionalisation and proletarianisation suggest that there has 
been a loss of professional power. Although neither deprofessionalisation nor 
proletarianisation introduced by Western scholars has been applied to the Chinese 
context, I will argue in the following section that elements raised in these theories are 
nonetheless relevant to China, for example, in the decline of medical ethics, and the 
increasingly high levels of governmental control and bureaucratisation. Although the 
loss of the once valued ethics is obviously different from the non-existence of 
power/autonomy, and there is no unified terminology in the theories, I will still use 
the term “deprofessionalisation” in this thesis to describe Chinese medical 
practitioners’ relatively powerless professional status and its reduced influence on 
professional ethics.  
 
4.2   Is Knowledge Power? 
 
There is a great social need for knowledge to explain illness and physical health and 
to help us to cope with difficult and painful situations. The medical profession, with 
its control of knowledge, is a source of power. Szasz observes a parallel between the 
role of doctors in modern society and the role of priests or religious men in earlier 
times.558 In Brazier and Cave’s words, “the doctor deals with the individual’s most 
precious commodity, life and health…He(sic) is the man with the skill and experience. 
In his hands, as the patient sees it, rests the power to cure.”559 Likewise, the monopoly 
that the medical profession enjoys gives them considerable political power. In 
Western sociologists’ opinions, medics are naturally powerful as they control 
knowledge about health.  
 
Power, in Foucault’s view, is inseparable from knowledge. The issues of professional 
knowledge, power and the power struggle over state control, resonate with Foucault’s 
notion of power:  
                                                 
557 Ibid.  
558 See e.g., T. Szasz, The Theology of Medicine (London, Open University Press, 1979). 
559 M. Brazier and E. Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law (London, Penguin, 2007, 4th edn), 6.  
Chapter 7 Deprofessionalisation 
208 
  
  “No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, records, 
accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power and which is linked, in its 
existence and functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely, no power can be 
exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge. On 
this level, there is not knowledge on one side and society on the other, or science and the 
state, but only the fundamental forms of knowledge/power.”560 
 
Foucault thinks power is based on knowledge and its usage.561 However Foucault 
does not see having knowledge itself as a means to generate and gain power, but it is 
the “use of knowledge” that decides the place of power.  
 
In Western society, politicians have been more apt to allow professional 
encroachment to transform political power into professional power, while in China, 
the government asserts and defends the sphere of politics as opposed to the authority 
of the professionals. The relationship between state and medical professional bodies 
in the West is akin to a partnership, where the government determines priorities, 
guidelines and standards, and at the same time, professionals decide how they should 
be applied in individual situations on the basis of their expertise.562 Power, according 
to Foucault, is ubiquitous: 
 
   “The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything 
under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every 
point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not 
because it embraces anything, but because it comes from everywhere… One needs to be 
nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain 
strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical 
situation in a particular society.” 563 
 
There is a limitation in trying to apply Foucault’s power theory to China. Foucault’s 
view on “power” theories is based on Western liberal societies, where power is 
diffuse rather than concentrated; is embodied and enacted rather than possessed; is 
discursive rather than purely coercive; and constitutes agents rather than being simply 
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deployed by them. In an authoritarian country like China, the relationship between the 
state and the body of medical practitioners is one of control and being controlled. 
Though power may not be a straight-forward top down approach, it is not diffused to 
the extent that Foucault describes. 
 
Henderson says about China that, “This was a world in which physicians were not 
only employees in large bureaucratic organisations, but they and their organizations 
were subject to vertical as well as horizontal rule by Chinese Communist Party 
cadres”.564 Indeed, in China, the power of bureaucratic organisations lends authority 
to a small number of people who are in responsible positions in healthcare 
organisations and their attached Party branches; while the autonomy of a large 
number of medical staff and Party members have been limited, especially when their 
career prospects are greatly dependent on reviews from bureaucratic leaders. But I 
agree with Foucault’s notion that power may not take the same shape all the time. 
Power has ‘life’, it is dynamic and productive. Thus Chinese medical practitioners 
will not necessarily remain short of power in the future. It is their bio-ethical 
consciousness that will decide their future.   
 
4.3   Intrinsic Reasons for Being Deprofessionalised  
 
This chapter has argued that bio-politics and political instrumentalisation have 
affected professional autonomy. These are external forces contributing to the 
deprofessionalised intellectual. Besides these external forces, in my opinion, intrinsic 
factors – cultural factors and medics’ missing bioethics – may play an essential role in 
bringing about medical deprofessionalisation in China.  
 
(1) Cultural Dimensions of Deprofessionalisation  
 
The US Country Studies note that “historically, Chinese intellectuals rarely formed 
groups to oppose the established government. Rather, individual intellectuals or 
groups of intellectuals allied themselves with cliques within the government to lend 
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support to the policies of that clique.” 565  This section argues that the culturally 
influenced character amongst the majority of Chinese people, such as thoughtless 
obedience to leaders and lack of group identity, makes Chinese medics less likely to 
challenge a dominant power.  
 
In the interviews, many interviewees, may indeed, have called themselves 
Communists, as they may have been influenced by Marx or Lenin and been registered 
members of the Chinese Communist Party. But they also admitted that they were not 
likely to be acting at the behest of Khrushchev or Communists of a former generation. 
So in this sense they were not traditional Communists any more. Their responses raise 
a question: why do these Chinese medics who themselves are not believers in 
communism pretend that they are? I could not find an answer from my empirical 
study, nor from any body of published literature.  
 
I began to question myself, and I wonder whether the Chinese character produces 
these Chinese medics’ contradictory responses. Rooted in Chinese culture, Chinese 
people can suppress their feelings, whether of love or hatred, for long periods. The 
submission of the individual to the state inhibits the development of a sense of social 
responsibility. Yinhe Li, a professor of sociology, pointed out that there are three 
kinds of people in China, just like the subjects in Hans Christian Andersen’s Allegory 
the Emperor’s New Clothes: Audience crowd; the little child; two weavers and 
courtiers.566  
 
According to Li, in contemporary China,  
(1) The first group of people resembles the “audience crowd”. In their hearts, they 
know what has happened, but they choose to be silent. The majority of Chinese 
people belong to this category; within which some are playing safe; some experience 
schadenfreude for dissidents; a few are heartless or unfeeling.  
(2) A small number of people in the second category behave like “the naive little 
child”. Yet, their dissidence does not necessarily bring them to a happy ending. They 
are either in custody, have become political asylum seekers, discovered their websites 
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have been closed, or are even sent to psychiatric units. The Nobel Peace Price 2010 
winner Liu Xiaobo belongs to this category.  
(3) The third group of people behaves like “the two weavers”. They lie as if “the new 
suit is real”, or even behave like those courtiers who said “I have seen the new cloth. 
How magnificent, beautiful and excellent the new suit is.” The third group of people 
staff different levels of the Communist Party schools.567 Most of them have been 
promoted to key positions.568 
 
Foucault says, “Governing people is not a way to force people to do what the 
governor wants, it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and 
conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the 
self is constructed or modified by oneself”.569 Within these three kinds of people, the 
naive little child has called on the world to notice that the Chinese government “fool[s] 
public opinion through propaganda”,570  
 
“We clearly realize that you may use your confirmed trick of interclass struggle to attach a 
label of “unwitting masses” at first to delimit[delineate] us from the ordinary people, then to 
attach another label of “lawbreaker fewness” to cast in a bone between ourselves which 
intends to destroy all of us one by one at last. We know it–in fact, we encourage it. The 
more you look on the people in this way, the more beautiful the emperor’s new suit speaks 
for itself.”571 
 
It is difficult to find evidence about how many Chinese medical practitioners belong 
to the first category “the audience crowd”, or the second one “the naive little child”. 
One thing for sure is that the voices from the “naive children” are not strong enough. 
(To illustrate this assertion, a section of Chapter 8 focuses on whistle-blowing by 
contemporary Chinese medical practitioners.) Very possibly, there are a large number 
of medics who belong to this first category. Dr Unschuld, director of the institute of 
medical history at the University of Munich says “Chinese physicians developed no 
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group identity of safeguarding the entire population or, if the government goes in the 
wrong direction, of voicing criticism.”572  
 
One Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong’s theories also support the notion that Chinese 
people develop no group identity. His sociological analysis offers a possible reason 
why a large number of Chinese medics prefer to remain silent rather than speak up for 
patients and their own interests. Fei uses the following two extended metaphors to 
convey the contrast forcefully to his readers. 573  He thinks Western society is 
represented by straws collected from a haystack (i.e. organisations), and Chinese 
society is represented by the ripples flowing out from the splash of a rock thrown into 
water (i.e. discrete categories of social relationships).574 These two metaphors do not 
share any common ground.  
 
In Fei’s view, Chinese people create their society by applying the logic of cha xu ge ju 
- the “differential mode of association, society is composed not of discrete 
organizations but of overlapping networks of people linked together through 
differentially categorized social relationship.”575 In other words, the Chinese society 
is centred on the individual and is built from networks created from rational ties 
linking the self with discrete categories of other individuals.576 Under such separate 
mode of organisation, Chinese society can hardly become group-oriented.  
 
What is more, according to Fei, power in the sense of how people control and are 
controlled by others, is configured in a very different way in Chinese society from the 
West.577 In the West, where individuals are presumed to be autonomous with the 
ability to exercise the will and authority (the right to exercise power), is based on the 
rule of law. Individual rights, as identified in and secured through a constitution, 
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specify the basis of autonomy. In contrast, Chinese society is ruled through rituals.578 
Order in this type of society depends primarily on people’s obedience to their 
principal moral obligations to their network.  
 
Ladany supports this view by saying, “Taoism, the most typical Chinese religion and 
the Taoist mentality have created an individualist society. The traditional Chinese 
society has no in-built defence against dictatorial central power, no cohesive 
intermediate infrastructure between individual families and the state.”579 Therefore, in 
China, there are no professional guilds which formed cohesive forces and structural 
society, no self-governing city units as in medieval Europe, and no balancing forces 
that could assert their own opinions in the face of central power.  
 
He further points out that China could only be kept together only by a powerful 
central organisation or ruler - “China might break into pieces in separate kingdoms, 
but each local ruler would assume the title of Emperor in his part of the country. 
There was never an organic social infrastructure capable of asserting its own 
views.” 580 His theories to some extent explain why professional groups and civil 
societies have never prospered enough to become changing forces in China. It is in 
this respect that there is an absence of power; instead, power is centralised and 
institutionalised.   
 
(2) Missing Bioethics in China 
 
Apart from cultural dimensions, missing bioethics also contributes to medical 
deprofessionalisation. Case studies show how Chinese medical practitioners have 
been complicit in the state’s bio-political control in ways that we would not expect of 
healthcare professionals; and in doing so they did not act according to biomedical 
ethics – that is, as medical professionals who seek first to avoid harm to patients and 
always put patients’ best interests above every other consideration.  
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Freidson noted, “As applied work it [medicine] is either deliberately amoral – which 
is to say, guided by someone else’s morality–or it is actively moral by its selective 
intervention.”581 Medical ethics cannot be an isolated discipline; professional morality 
is deeply influenced by the social moral and values that permeate the whole society. 
In my empirical findings, I have demonstrated that many Chinese medics take 
political ideology plus their own interpretation of social morality as a professional 
guide. As Freidson put it, they are “guided by someone else’s morality”. In my 
opinion, they are confused about bioethics, which is one of the reasons contribute to 
their inability to challenge state power (apart from political ideological influences, 
bureaucratic controls and the Chinese cultural environment).  
 
A study which analysed textbooks on medical ethics, adopted by nine key Chinese 
medical schools, showed that these text books were either organised or published by 
the Ministry of Health or municipal or provincial governments.582 The text books 
commonly included three sections: theoretical, practical and operational aspects of 
medical ethics, 583 in which latter two formed a majority of the text.  
 
Nie states that the topics covered in Chinese medical schools’ ethics courses are 
usually the morality of the physician-patient relationship, morality in preventive 
medicine, clinical diagnosis and treatment, for different clinical branches, e.g. nursing, 
scientific research, hospital administration, and so on.584 It seems that the way that 
ethical courses are usually taught in Chinese medical school, is more similar to moral 
preaching, rather than professional ethics.585 The researchers who conducted the text 
book study even claimed that “medical ethics involves doctors and everyone in 
society. The development of medical ethics is an important component in the building 
                                                 
581 See note 485, at 346. 
582 R. Chen and X. Qiu, ‘The Present Status of Medical Ethics Education in the Key Medical 
Universities in China’, in O. Döring (ed) Chinese Scientists and Responsibility: Ethical Issues of 
Human Genetics in Chinese and International Context (Hamburg, Mitteilungen, 1999), 45-55.  
583 Ibid. 
584 J. Nie, ‘Bringing Ethics to Life: A Personal Statement on Teaching Medical Ethics’, in O. Döring 
(ed) Ethics in Medical Education in China: Distinguishing Education of Ethics in Medicine from Moral 
Preaching (IFA, Hamburg, 2000), 63-73. 
585 The Cambridge Dictionary draws a distinction between morality and ethics: morality means “a 
personal or social set of standards for good or bad behaviour and character, or the quality of being right, 
honest or acceptable”; while ethics means “a system of accepted beliefs which control behaviour, 
especially such a system based on morals”. 
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of the spiritual civilization of our society.”586 Therefore, they concluded that Chinese 
medics should strictly obey the principles of socially recognised medical ethics.587  
 
Although it is fair to say that culture, philosophy, religion, and even political ideology 
can influence people’s interpretation of social morality; and it is conceivable that 
some notions of medical ethics are embedded in every country’s culture and national 
traditions. I argue that socially recognised medical ethics could be an obscure concept; 
the use of it can be part of the problem rather than the solution. In China, the purpose 
of medicine seems to have become entangled with monetary terms. The medics’ low 
incomes have become a source of demoralisation rather than a symbol of loyal 
sacrifice, as it was during the Mao’s era. With changing social values, and in the 
absence of any obvious professional code of ethics, Chinese medical practitioners are 
very likely to be confused as to their roles in this increasingly capitalist society which 
is still rooted in socialist ideology.  
 
The confusion in medical ethics may not just come from a change of social values, but 
from the influence of political slogans. The officially published Chinese medical 
ethics, are to some extent, educating Chinese medics to be passive − e.g. one should 
love one’s country, obey the CCP rules, and learn the latest political thoughts, etc. 
Such politically attached bioethical understanding might affect medics’ professional 
lives, their decision-making or even their interaction experience with the healthcare 
system (my interviews have attempted to illustrate this idea). 
 
Farquhar concluded that, at least during the early 1980s, Chinese medical 
practitioners’ attitudes towards conflicting morality have been “relativistic”:  
 
  “Doctors must act, and they must have an ethics and a politics. But they must intervene in    
illness while knowing that there is …no single objective standpoint, no absolute truth. One 
key to their efficacy lies in their willingness to accept teaching from the past and from 
elsewhere, their understanding that slowly embodies virtuosity cannot be finally verbalized, 
and their politics that can function in a world of multiple biases and bodies.”588 
 
                                                 
586 See note 584, at 55. 
587 See note 584, at 45-55. 
588 J. Farquhar, ‘Multiplicity, Point of View, and Responsibility in Traditional Chinese Healing’, in A. 
Zito and T. E. Barlow (ed), Body, Subject and Power in China (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1994), 93. 
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Fraquhar’s conclusion addresses the relationship between medical practitioners, 
politics and ideology in the use of medicine in China. In the face of state power, 
Chinese medical practitioners are, for the most part, the passive instruments of the 
state and they “exercise little or no influence of their own over the substance and 
direction of institutional policy and everyday affairs.” 589  The state’s top-down 
management, and the intertwining influences of Chinese culture and social history 
have produced an environment unfriendly to medical professionalisation, where the 
decline of medical professionals’ own sense of ethics determines their inability to gain 
control. (The next chapter includes a detailed discussion of the concept of medical 
professionalisation) These three factors postulate “a trend towards powerlessness – a 
steady decline of professional power that is described as deprofessionalization or 
proletarianisation.”590 This is also supported by my own empirical findings. 
 
Colton warns us,  
 
“I think that one of the most serious things that one can say about the scientific community, 
and by extension the research community and academic community in Germany, is not that 
it didn’t throw itself into some kind of political effort to stop Nazism, but it did not even 
protest when the government itself began to interfere with universities and tell them what to 
do. The scientists accepted this; and then step by step some of them went down the path to 
very active cooperation.”591  
 
If similar patterns can be detected in China, this suggests an increasing need for 
medical practitioners themselves to establish their own ethical guidelines. Those 
guidelines should be based on their ethical and clinical judgements rather than 
mainstream political ideology. 
 
5.   Conclusion: The Question of Professional Power 
 
The thesis has moved the discussion from the hypothetical tripartite relationship 
(between state, law and bioethics) to a top-down model. Based on empirical studies, I 
modified the top-down model that I developed from the literature review into a 
                                                 
589 E. Freidson, ‘How dominant are the Professions?’, in F. W. Hafferty and J. B. McKinlay (ed), The 
Changing Medical Profession: An International Perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), 
54. 
590 Ibid. 
591 J. Colton, et al., ‘Special Supplement: Biomedical Ethics and the Shadow of Nazism’, 6 (1976) The 
Hastings Center Report 9. 
Chapter 7 Deprofessionalisation 
217 
circular model of the medics’ understanding of their position (among state, law and 
bioethics) and thus identified a problem that has never previously received sufficient 
attention – medical deprofessionalisation in China.  
 
This chapter focused on discussing the problem of deprofessionalisation in China. 
Following an initial analysis of the state (bio-politics, bio-power and medicalisation), 
I explored the relationship between the state and the medical profession 
(instrumentalisation), and the profession itself (deprofessionalisation, cases studies). I 
reflected upon the relationship between knowledge and power, and moreover, on the 
Chinese medical practitioners’ inability to obtain professional status due to the 
influence of cultural character and a lack of bioethics.  
 
Rudolf Virchow made a famous statement, “Medicine is a social science, and politics 
nothing but medicine at a larger scale.”592 In the golden age of medical developments, 
the politicians’ bio-politics and bio-power strategies can be understood as using 
medicine as a means to serve the end of a political super-power. Chinese political 
authorities embrace the management of life in the name of the well-being of the 
population. It should also be clear that medicine is likely to be used to achieve certain 
political aims, especially when medical practitioners are in the position of 
deprofessionalisation. With life becoming a political object, Chinese medical 
practitioners, whose expertise does not offer them power and authority over issues 
beyond curing illness, have played a passive role in the field of bio-politics.  
 
Drawn from the analysis above, I recognise that none of the triangular, top-down or 
circular models is sufficient to maintain balanced and effective healthcare governance. 
The consequence of deprofessionalisation in China not only undermines development 
of the medical community and advances in technique, but is also harmful to patient 
care and the long-term physician-patient-public relationship. A square model below 
demonstrates this need for professionalism (the meaning of this model is discussed in 
the following chapter):  
 
                                                 
592 E. Ackerknecht, Rudolf Virchow: Doctor, Statesman, Anthropologist (Madison, University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1953); also cited by J. P. Mackenbach, ‘Politics is Nothing but Medicine at a Large 
Scale: Reflections on Public Health’s Biggest Idea’, 63 (2009) Journal of Epidemiology Community 
Health 181-184. 
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State Governance                     Medical Law 
 
    Medical Ethics                       Medical Professionals 
 
Biopower is power over life. “For capitalist society’, wrote Foucault, “it is the bio-
political which is of first importance, the biological, the somatic, the bodily. The body 
is above all a bio-political reality; medicine is a bio-political strategy.”593 I do not 
oppose a “bio-political strategy”. Rather, I argue for the importance of professional 
autonomy and a more active role for professionals in the state’s bio-politics. Neither 
do I assert that there is nothing good in biopower. Instead, I argue that a top-down 
approach to biopower is likely to be abused, especially when medical professionals 
are deprofessionalised and instrumentalised, to be merely political tools.  
 
Bioethics is key to medical practitioners. But it is not enough for a society that medics 
should merely understand ethics. Professionals must be placed in the position of 
power, so that they can act according to their ethics. As Adam Smith wrote in The 
Wealth of Nations, “the law ought always to trust people with the care of their own 
interest, as in their local situations they must generally be able to judge better of it 
than the legislator can do”.594 The liberal idea of good governance depends on the 
active participation of the governed in their own government, even their resistance 
which can be seen as a first sign of power-seeking. This idea should not be treated as 
alien to Chinese medical governance. The participation of medical professionals in 
the formulation of medical law, and in the political system, may constitute an 
effective force in China’s current health reform. The question is how to transform 
Chinese medical practitioners’ status from deprofessionalisation to a position of 
power and responsibility? 
 
                                                 
593 M. Foucault, ‘La naissance de la médicine sociale’, in Dits et écrits, 1954-1988 (Paris, Gallimard, 
1994), 207-228; also cited by B. Curtis, ‘Foucault on Governmentality and Population: the Impossible 
Discovery’, 27 (2002) Canadian Journal of Sociology 4. 
594 A. Smith, in E. Cannnan (ed), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(London, Methuen, 1904, 4th edn), 32. 
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Professionalism is an indispensable element that has been neglected in the power 
structure of China’s healthcare service.595 While state governance interacts with law 
and bioethics, medical professionals perceive themselves as a passive and powerless 
group, according to my empirical research. To achieve a balance of power in the 
healthcare arena, the system needs not only a structural realignment between 
(decentralized) communities, professional experts and the state, but also to encourage 
change in the practitioners’ values, attitudes and behaviours. 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that:  
· Bio-power in China represents a complex dimension of political sovereignty. 
After exemplifying medicalisation and political instrumentalisation in China, I 
have provided insights into how political, cultural and bioethical environments can 
undertake roles in China’s medical deprofessionalisation. 
· Law is important. Regulations give a first step of political determination to tackle 
the problem. But we should look beyond law if it merely plays a symbolic role. I 
still have faith in the law, but I also realise law does not give a complete answer to 
the problem of medical deprofessionaliation in China. In this case, professionals 
play a more important role in leading the fight for autonomy. 
 
In short, I have examined the underlying issues which lead to medical 
deprofessionalisation. Professionalism is an indispensable element that has been 
neglected in the power structure of China’s healthcare arena. Looking into the future, 
I suggest that a new professional ethics for medicine in China needs to be rebuilt. 
Chinese medical practitioners should play a more proactive role. The process of 
professionalisation increases professional autonomy and limits instrumentalisation.596 
 
The next two chapters will elaborate on the possibilities of how to exercise 
professional power in China and the mechanisms for achieving professionalism. 
However, I also realise there are limitations and pitfalls in the model of medical 
professionalism. Professionalism is a controversial notion to Western societies where 
                                                 
595 Concepts of professionalisation and professionalism will be explicated respectively in Chapters 8 
and 9. Briefly speaking, professionalism is to be achieved through the process of professionalisation. 
596 Ibid. 
Chapter 7 Deprofessionalisation 
220 
it is sometimes said that too much power has been vested in professions. How to hold 
medical professionalism accountable is a question to be answered in Chapter 9.  
 
Thus I will complete this thesis with a suggestion – a pentagon model of accountable 
professionalism (as below): 
                                       State         Law 
                
                                                






                                       Medical Ethics 
  
The pentagon model suggests the involvement of patients in the discussion of medical 
professionalisation in China. This helps us to find a balance between a necessary 
freedom for medical professionals and a sufficient measure of accountability to ensure 
their responsiveness to social needs and agreed social purposes. 
 
The following Chapters 8 and 9 will discuss how to change the current 
“deprofessionalisation” model to a new “professionalism” model by means of 
professionalisation in China. And it will elaborate on the possibility of exercising 
professional power in China and mechanisms to hold professionalism accountable in 
empowerment. 
Medical Professionals Patients
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CHAPTER 8   OUT OF THE SHADOWS:  





The conceptual and historical background of interactions between Chinese medical 
practitioners and the state has been provided in Part I. The problem of medical 
deprofessionalisation in China has been also examined from both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. Chapter 7 pointed out that, in a deprofessionalised healthcare 
system, the state’s power can be easily abused without surveillance. To address the 
problems associated with medical deprofessionalisation and respond to the Chinese 
medics’ frustration, this chapter argues for the empowerment of Chinese healthcare 
practitioners. By doing so, the top-down power structure of China’s healthcare arena 
will leave more room for professional ethical discussions and the development of a 
Chinese medical profession that is both fit for its members and best suited to attend 
the needs of its patients.  
  
Chapter 8 attempts to justify a model of empowering the Chinese medical 
practitioners. An understanding of the professionalisation process and what it is that 
constitutes a profession is helpful in clarifying the future development of Chinese 
medical practitioners. It begins by looking at what is meant by “profession” and the 
characteristics of being a professional, followed by a discussion of whether Chinese 
medics want to achieve a professional status and why this ought to take place. It then 
considers the process of becoming a profession – “professionalisation”. Ultimately 
this chapter ponders whether it is practical or realistic to propose medical 
professionalisation in China. 
 
2. The Characteristics of A Profession 
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines a profession as “the occupation which one 
professes to be skilled in and to follow.” 597  This definition, however, does not 
distinguish a professional from other skilled occupations. The characteristics of a 
profession have been addressed by numerous scholars. For example, Last and 
Ghavunduka see a profession as consisting of the following elements: autonomy; 
monopoly; an ideology of service (codes of ethics); and a body of esoteric 
knowledge. 598  Greenwood summarises: systematic theory, community sanction, 
authority, an ethical code and a professional culture as “constituting the distinguishing 
attributes of a profession”.599 In general, professional behaviour is defined in terms of 
three essential and somewhat independent variables: its role in a society; 600  the 
control of its knowledge;601 or the powerful knowledge itself.602  
 
Taking these definitions together we can posit that the central themes surrounding the 
meaning of the word “profession” refer to “knowledge”, “role” and “value in the 
society”. It also means that merely possessing the knowledge itself does not qualify a 
person to be a professional. A person with knowledge and skills is a technician, and it 
is only when the technician acquires a role to serve in the society then he/she would 
be perceived as a professional. Durkheim values professional ethics. He views it as 
the fount of a new model order which would provide the model for corps-
                                                 
597 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989). 
598 M. Last and G. L. Ghavunduka (ed), The Professionalisation of African Medicine (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1986), 6.  
599 E. Greenwood, ‘Attributes of a Profession’, in M. Zald (ed) Social Welfare Institutions: A 
Sociological Reader (London, Wiley, 1965), 509- 523.  
600 Parsons defines a profession as “a cluster of occupational roles, that is, roles in which the 
incumbents perform certain functions valued in the society in general, and, by these activities, typically 
earn a living at a full-time job.” See, T. Parson, Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, Free Press, 
1954), 372.  
601 On the theory of the professions, see e.g., E. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals 
(London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957); T. Parsons, ‘The Professions and Social Structure’ 17 (1939) 
Social Forces, 457-467; B. Barber, ‘Is American Business Becoming Professionalized? Analysis of a 
Social Ideology’ in E.A. Tiryakian (ed), Sociocultural Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change: 
Essays in Honor of P.A. Sorokin (Glencoe, Ill.: the Free Press, 1963); B. Barber, ‘Some Problems in the 
Sociology of the Professions’ (Fall 1963) Daedalus 669-688; H. Wilensky, ‘The Professionalization of 
Everyone?’, 70 (1964) American Journal of Sociology 137-158; B. Barber, ‘Compassion in Medicine: 
Toward New Definitions and New Institutions’ 295 (1976) New England Journal of Medicine 939-943; 
W. E. Moore, The Professions: Roles and Rules (New York, Russell Sage, 1970); N. Reingold, 
‘Definitions and Speculations: The Professionalization of Science in America in the Nineteenth 
Century’ in A. C. Oleson and S. Brown (ed), Knowledge in the Early American Republic (Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); P. Wilding, Professional Power and Social Welfare (London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982); J. B. Morrell, ‘Professionalisation’, in R. C. Ollby, et al. (ed), 
Companion to the History of Modern Science (London, Routledge, 1990), 980; and, F. W. Hafferty and 
J. B. Mckinlay, The Changing Medical Profession (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993).  
602  Ibid. 
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intermediaires, that is, a level between the individual and the state.603 He suggests that, 
for example, professions are to be distinguished from any other occupation by their 
altruism which is expressed in the “service” orientation of professional people.604 The 
view that professions are activated by the common good was restated by Parsons,605 
Halmos,606 and Marshall607. And this holds especially true in “medicine” (I provide a 
more detailed account in Chapter 9).  
 
Goode points out that, at the heart of every profession is a legally sanctioned control 
over a specialised body of knowledge, and a commitment to service.608 I agree that a 
professional should be both technically qualified and ethically capable. Where either 
of these is missing, one cannot be called a “professional”. Professions must be 
distinguished from mere occupations. An occupation may require no specialised skill; 
by contrast, a profession may require skilled labour or craft knowledge but, if one 
assesses it in a rough and ready way, it is privilege, power and prestige that designate 
a professional. So “profession” is also a symbol of esteem. Its esteem can only be 
earned according to the quality of service, specifically, how well it compares with the 
standards or codes developed by and associated with the profession, rather than 
sought or bought. For these reasons, professional reliability is a key element of a 
profession, though technical knowledge is also indispensable.  
 
The meanings and definitions of profession can be varied according to different 
contexts, but the general features of profession – being both technically and ethically 
capable – should be applicable to different cultures. As one of the traditional 
professions, “medicine” has a long history of emphasising professional ethics to 
ensure that persons who enter the medical world are competent and trustworthy. 
Medical professionals’ collective service orientation – the avowed promise of the 
medical profession – which have enjoyed a remarkable degree of continuity from the 
days of Hippocrates until the twentieth century – grants them public trust and 
                                                 
603 E. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civil Morals (New York, The Tree Press, 1957). 
604 Ibid. 
605 T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (New York, Free Press, 1954). 
606 P. Halmos, The Personal Service Society (Cardiff, University College, 1970), 5. 
607 T. H. Marshall, ‘The Recent History of Professionalism in relation to Social Structure and Social 
Policy’, 5 (1939) Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 32, 325-334. 
608 W.  J. Goode, ‘Encroachment, Charlatanism and the Emerging Professions: Psychology, Sociology 
and Medicine’, 25 (1960) American Sociological Review 6, 902.  
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support for their desire for autonomy.609 What I am going to argue in the following 
sections is that there is a need for Chinese medical practitioners to become more 
professionalised. Not only does Chinese society need to see the value of professions, 
but Chinese medical practitioners themselves need to appreciate their value and make 
use of it to contribute to their society.  
 
3.  Needs for Chinese Medics to become a Profession 
 
3.1   A Calling from Society 
 
Professionalisation and professionalism are elements that have been left out of the 
power structure of China’s healthcare arena. The consequence of this is that medical 
practitioners are too powerless to take control of themselves, not to mention to serve 
patients’ best interests. The two examples of abuse of state power discussed 
previously are extreme consequences of this. Without professional independence, it is 
the state that controls law and bioethics, whilst medical professionals passively accept 
state control, and neglect their professional ethics and/or their professional judgement.  
 
The common recognition of the failures of the healthcare system from the 1980s 
offers an opportunity to redefine the role of the Chinese medical practitioners. 
However, the latest Chinese healthcare reform initiative, which includes the setting up 
of broad health insurance plans to cover a greater number of citizens, especially rural 
citizens, did not mention medical professionalisation or professionalism.610 What is 
more, the lack of literature dealing with the subject of professionalism available to the 
average Chinese medic is striking. Moreover, the absence of relevant ethical material 
in the curriculum of most medical schools611 explains why, in a rapidly changing 
world, Chinese medics may not have a clear understanding of what the public expects 
from them.  
                                                 
609 J. C. d’Oronzio, ‘Practicing Accountability in Professional Ethics’, 13 (2002) The Journal of 
Clinical Ethics 4, 361-362.   
610 ‘State Council Passes the Proposal of Health Reform’ (in Chinese), (January 21st, 2009) Xinhua 
News; PRC Council of State, ‘Healthcare Reform Initiative’ (in Chinese), 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-04/08/content_1280732.htm (Last visited on Oct 10th, 2010). 
611 B. Zhang, ‘The Important Role of Case Studies in Ethical Teaching in Medical Education’, in O. 
Döring (ed), Ethics in Medical Education in China: Distinguishing Education of Ethics in Medicine 
from Moral Preaching (IFA, Hamburg, 2000), 113. 
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Professionalism is a concept new to general Chinese medics. In my field studies, most 
Chinese medics did not fully understand the obligations they must fulfil to satisfy 
public expectations and maintain professional status. Promoting medical 
professionalism will firstly help to train Chinese medics in the value of ethical codes, 
self-regulation, and interaction with colleagues; and secondly, promote cross-cultural 
bio-ethical debates on conflicting positions and visions, such as professional ethics 
and commercialisation; patient autonomy and paternalism. 
 
In Profession of Medicine, Freidson focuses on medicine’s achievement of autonomy 
and social control. In Macdonald’s words, one of the important elements in Freidson’s 
analysis is that “professions have to strive to gain autonomy and, having once done so 
they can begin to establish a position of social prestige independent of their original 
sponsoring elite and with its own distinctive niche in the system of social 
stratification.”612 If Chinese medical practitioners can begin to consider themselves as 
independent from the government and the Party, they may start to see medicine from a 
more professional point of view. If they understand the broader goal of practising 
medicine within its ethical codes, they will be better placed to meet their obligations 
for patients. In addition, they will be able to better resist political forces given their 
growing ability to understand and articulate to the public their accountability and 
reliability.  
 
In light of the above considerations, it is suggested that we require a 
reconceptualisation of the imbalances of power dynamics between state power and 
medical professionals. I recognise that this reconceptualisation would not be a 
complete solution to fix all the problems in China’s healthcare system. Ultimately, the 
system needs to find an answer to the question of how to balance power and 
responsibility. However, it would be a good start to relocate the role of Chinese 
medics from the relative powerlessness in the original power structure to a position in 
which they are actually involved in healthcare governance. Even though medical 
                                                 
612 E. Freidson, Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (New York, 
Dodd, 1970); also cited by K.M. Macdonald, The Sociology of the Professions (London, Sage 
Publications, 1995), 8.  
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practitioners would still be under the surveillance of the state, they might be able to 
play a more active role in the healthcare arena under professionalism.  
 
Moving from the top-down relationship, and the “circular” understanding that Chinese 
medics expressed, I suggest that a new professionalism model is needed in which 
medical professionals (note: not merely practitioners) are involved in healthcare 
governance. By including medical professionals as key players in healthcare 
governance, this square-like model also suggests a change to the original triangular 
model where medical professionals together with their codes of professional ethics 
can work hand in hand more actively in healthcare.  
 
Building a Square-like Model 
 
State Governance                      Medical Law 
 
                               Medical Ethics                       Medical Professionals 
 
The square-like model also indicates that, along with professional empowerment, 
bioethics should be emphasised as another important element. In this model, medical 
professionals are more directly in control of their codes of ethics, rather than just 
being passively taught by the state. This model still recognises the function of the 
state and its control over medical legislation and influence in bioethics, but medics 
would no longer be disempowered in the healthcare system. In this model, the role of 
medical law also implies that medical professionals will no longer be perceived 
merely as the subject of medical legislation, but rather have more influence on 
legislative changes.  
 
Getting a more balanced system might eventually enable health workers’ voices to be 
heard. When facing orders from the authorities, Chinese medics who are used to being 
accepting or passive may start questioning their legitimacy. This change in the system 
may also encourage more effective dialogues and cross-party engagement, which 
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could have a wider impact on the development of China’s civil society and, eventually, 
might encourage society to embrace the notion of democracy.    
 
3.2 Do Chinese Medical Practitioners want to become Professionals? 
 
Before considering whether Chinese medical practitioners want to be professionals, 
the first question that needs to be answered is whether the Chinese medics are 
considered to be professionals. I would like to consider this question from two angles. 
On the one hand, from the standpoint of the Chinese medical practitioners where, in 
interviews, they saw themselves as skilled labour with specific knowledge; but at the 
same time did not consider themselves a group with privilege, power and political 
influence. On the other hand, from documentary and theoretical analyses, Chinese 
medics could hardly be considered as members of a profession under the Western 
criteria of a profession, the main reason being that they lack a binding code of conduct. 
Case studies in Chapter 7 showed that, in some situations, they even became like 
political instruments and were deprofessionalised.   
 
While Chinese medics are not yet a profession, their expectation of becoming a 
profession exists. Referring to my survey findings, 86% of the 223 Chinese healthcare 
workers agreed that they would wish to be involved more actively in healthcare 
legislation. I also found a high degree of dissatisfaction with the health system and a 
great desire for changes among medics. Chinese medical practitioners are requesting 
less profit-driven hospital policies, a more trusted patient-doctor relationship, and a 
more secure working environment, both financially and physically. Although the 
Chinese medical practitioners I encountered in the field did not expressly state that 
they would like to become professionals (my interpretation is that they may not have 
realised that they do not actually meet the Western criteria for “a profession”), 
medics’ voices, asking for more power over control their careers, have been heard 
clearly.  
 
Previous chapters, from both the historical, empirical and theoretical perspectives, 
have pointed to the problem of the Chinese medics’ relative powerlessness in China’s 
healthcare governance. To tackle the problem of deprofessionalisation, one might 
argue that the solution does not only lie in professionalisation. One could also argue 
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for a change of government policy, a reform of particular legislation, or better 
management of healthcare institutions. In other words, in the top-down approach, one 
could hope that Chinese bio-political strategy and biopower could be more 
professional-friendly from the top level. But power, including biopower, needs to be 
balanced. As indicated before, absolute power is more likely to corrupt. Empowering 
medics is not only a way to solve deprofessionalisation, but also a step towards a 
much more open and democratic society, in which the interests of the vulnerable are 
better protected. Professionalisation, or the route towards professionalism, is part of 
the answer. Let us consider its role before asking what else might be required.  
 
4.  Achieving Professional Status: Professionalisation 
 
To distinguish the terms “profession” and “professionalisation”, Freidson points out: 
“professionalisation is the process of an occupation attempting to obtain the status and 
recognition of a profession.”613 In other words, Freidson thinks that, a profession is an 
identity, while professionalisation is a process, “working towards the acquisition of a 
number of defining characteristics, namely codes of ethics, professional associations, 
specialised skills and governance.” 614 However, there is much ambiguity in the 
definition of professionalisation. Professionalisation – in the context of health related 
professionals or services – is defined by Unschuld as the process by which “one group 
(or a number of them) endeavours to expand its possession of medically-related 
resources available in culture, until it exercises exclusive control over those 
resources”.615 But I do not fully agree with the process of professionalisation asserted 
by Unschuld. Professionalisation, in my opinion, goes beyond the concept of a “trade 
union”.  
 
Unschuld’s understanding of professionalisation is an example of deductive reasoning 
based on Western concept of professionalisation. In seeking a professionalised model 
that I can adapt to China, the Western standard of professionalisation, as Unschuld 
                                                 
613 E. Freidson, Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (New York, 
Dodd, 1970), at 13.  
614 B. Willians, et al., ‘From stretcher-bearer to paramedic: the Australian paramedics’ move towards 
professionalisation’, 7 (2009) Journal of Emergency Primary Health Care 4. 
615 P. U. Unschuld, Medical Ethics in Imperial China: A Study in Historical Anthropology (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1979), Introduction: Medical System, Resources, Professionalization. 
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describes, raises the question of whether this definition of professionalisation applies 
only in the West or as a universal model. Obviously, these dimensions of 
professionalisation implicate different aspects of professional development in Western 
biomedicine. The relative development of these dimensions in a group indicates the 
degree of professionalisation compared to other groups. 
 
In terms of the developmental process of professionalisation, Wilensky emphasises 
that occupations pass through four sequential stages:  
(1) creation of a full-time occupation;  
(2) the formation of training schools;  
(3) creation of professional associations, and  
(4) the development and creation of a code of ethics.616  
 
Professionalisation, therefore, can be defined as a process involving the pursuit of 
various forms of occupational control and by taking control, professionals are able to 
enforce their codes of professional conduct. This process is gradual and it may go 
through several stages. For Chinese medical practitioners, Wilensky’s insight is very 
helpful, as it indicates that in becoming a ‘profession’, Chinese medics need to obtain 
two crucial missing characteristics – “creation of professional associations, and the 
development and creation of code of ethics” (Chapter 9 will offer a detailed 
suggestion for the possible process of professionalisation in China).  
 
5.  Medical Professionalisation in China: Mission Impossible?  
 
Before pondering how to promote medical professionalism in China (in Chapter 9), 
we need to consider the following three questions: How did Western 
professionalisation, especially medical professionalisation, develop from its early 
stages? And if we can hypothesise the development of medical professionalisation in 
China, will it adopt the same model as that of the West? How far can this 
development overcome possible challenges and gain momentum? 
 
 
                                                 
616 H. Wilensky, ‘The Professionalization of Everyone?’, 70 (1964) American Journal of Sociology 2, 
137-87. 
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5.1   The Development of Professionalisation 
 
(1)  Western Experiences  
 
Hallin and Mancini summarise three main dimensions in professional journalism: 
autonomy, distinct professional norms and public service orientation of the 
profession.617 Autonomy has always been a central element for being a profession, 
whether as a professional journalist, a lawyer or a doctor. Medicine is one of the 
classic occupations that has tried to “professionalise” itself, to justify greater control 
over its work processes. Krause says, “the degree of professional group power and the 
autonomy of individual workers in the work place are the result of complex social, 
historical, and economic process.”618  
 
Professionalisation is also part of social development. Certain professions such as law, 
medicine and ministry, have emerged since the Middle Ages and these “were used as 
referents for the traits and occupational characteristics of professional status”.619 By 
the mid-twentieth century, sociologists revealed that professionalisation was a major 
feature of industrial societies, as well as bureaucracy and industrialism.620 Vollmer 
and Mills state that an “increasing[ly] complex division of labour and specialisation of 
occupational function is not only induced by industrialisation, it also appears to be 
required by it”.621  
 
                                                 
617 D. C. Hallin and P. Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics (New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 34-37.  
618 E. A. Krause, ‘Doctors, Partitocrazia, and the Italian State’, 66 (1988) Milbank Quarterly (suppl.2), 
165.  
619 M. M. Moloney, Professionalization of Nursing: Current Issues and Trends (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott Company, 1986); also cited by B. Willians et al., ‘From Stretcher-Bearer to Paramedic: the 
Australian Paramedics’ move towards Professionalisation’, 7 (2009) Journal of Emergency Primary 
Health Care 4. 
620 See e.g., B. Barber, ‘Is American Business Becoming Professionalized? Analysis of a Social 
Ideology’ in E. A. Tiryakian (ed), Sociocultural Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change: Essays in 
Honor of P.A. Sorokin (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1963); B. Barber, ‘Some Problems in the Sociology of 
the Professions’, (Fall 1963) Daedalus 669-688; H. Wilensky, ‘The Professionalization of Everyone?’, 
70 (1964) American Journal of Sociology 137-158; B. Barber, ‘Compassion in Medicine: Toward New 
Definitions and New Institutions’ 295 (1976) New England Journal of Medicine 939-943; W. E. Moore, 
The Professions: Roles and Rules (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1970); N. Reingold, 
‘Definitions and Speculations: The Professionalization of Science in America in the Nineteenth 
Century’ in A. C. Oleson and S. Brown (ed), Knowledge in the Early American Republic (Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).  
621 H. M. Vollmer and D. L. Mills (ed), Professionalization (New Jersey, Prince-Hall, 1966), 46. 
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According to Strand, since the Industrial Revolution in the West, many occupations 
have become professionalised, increasing in status and prestige, often in association 
with increasing specialisation.622 Wilding supports this view by saying “An increase 
in the number of professional workers has long been recognised as one of the 
characteristics of industrial society.” 623  Although “an industrialising society is a 
professionalizing society”,624 the process of professionalisation has differed among 
Western countries.  
 
Medical professionalisation is the process of historically specific socio-political 
processes. Medical professionalisation began in societies where the control and 
possession of the resources still remained in family-run practices. At present, in the 
US and in other industrial countries, medical professionalisation has culminated in a 
concentration of resources in the hands of physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and others 
including the pharmaceutical industry, health insurance and hospitals.625 
 
Take the UK's experience of medical professional development for example. Ham and 
Alberti illustrate that, before the late 19th century British physicians were private 
practitioners and functioned independently.626 There was a strong moral and ethical 
background to medicine and a tradition of voluntary work in the poor areas as well as 
in the community. Self-regulation began in the 16th century with the foundation of the 
Royal College of Physicians which “functioned both as a setter of standards and as a 
closed shop”.627 The Royal College of Surgeons followed two centuries later.  
 
In the 18th century, medical education was based in a few medical schools and an 
apprenticeship system. Self-regulation and a more uniform educational approach were 
strengthened in the 19th century with the establishment of the General Medical 
Council (GMC) and the introduction of Royal College examinations. Throughout this 
                                                 
622 J. Strand, ‘Chapter 3: Professions Theory and Physician Acceptance of PAS’ in Enabling 
Legislation for Physicians Assistants in Puerto Rico: A Socialcultural Policy Analysis, PhD thesis of 
the University of North Carolina (2008), 29.  
623 P. Wilding, Professional Power and Social Welfare (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 1.  
624 W. J. Goode, ‘Encroachment, Charlatanism and the Emerging Professions: Psychology, Sociology 
and Medicine’, 25 (1960) American Sociological Review 6, 902.  
625 P. U. Unschuld, Medical Ethics in Imperial China: A Study in Historical Anthropology (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1979), Introduction: Medical System, Resources, Professionalization, 4. 
626 C. Ham and K. G. M. Alberti, ‘The Medical Profession, the Public and the Government’, 234 (2002) 
British Medical Journal 838-842. 
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period, standards and quality were implicit rather than explicit, with government and 
society trusting the medical profession to protect the public and in the process 
granting the profession considerable autonomy. The creation of the British Medical 
Association (BMA) in the 18th century was intended to “promote the medical and 
allied sciences and to maintain the honour and interests of the medical profession”628 
These aims remain the same today. The BMA’s political agenda which seeks to 
influence government policy and legislation, reflects Freidson's belief that the 
“foundation of medicine’s control over work is thus clearly political in character, 
involving the aid of the state in establishing and maintaining the profession’s per-
eminence”.629  
 
Similar development has taken place in the US, where medicine did not enjoy high 
status and prestige when medical education began to be formalised in the 1800s. Since 
medicine increasingly relied on science and resulting specialisation, medical licensing 
was reinstituted: “the American Medical Association (AMA) became a major political 
force, waging a campaign against patents for medicine and establishing the physicians 
contract, and physicians gained in income and prestige.”630 As Starr argues, the basis 
of medical professions’ high income and status is its authority which “arises from lay 
deference and institutionalized forms of dependence.”631 The lay deference to trust 
professional knowledge and the institutionalised form of dependence both conferred 
power on medical professionals.  
 
The cross-national variations in the pattern of professional development have been 
attributed to differences in basic constitutional structures, regime types, cultures, and 
social traditions.632 However, generally speaking, science and knowledge alone do not 
account for medicine’s rise to power. The process of professionalisation was achieved 
through “control of entry, education and regulation”. 633  Furthermore, 
                                                 
628 The BMA, ‘An Outline History of British Medical Association’, available at: 
http://www.bma.org.uk/about_bma/BMAOutlineHistory.jsp (Last visited on Oct 7th, 2010). 
629 See note 485, at 23.  
630 See note 622. 
631 P. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York, Basic Books, 1982). 
632 See note 136, at 184; G. V. Larkin, ‘Medical Dominance in Britain: Image on Historical Reality’, 66 
(1988) Milbank Quarterly (suppl.2), 120; E.A. Krause, ‘Doctors, Partitocrazia, and the Italian State’, 
66 (1988) Milbank Quarterly (suppl.2), 148-66.  
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professionalisation is an ethical and political process, involving the exercise of power 
and authority in the struggle between competing interests, retention of codes of ethics 
for credibility and trust. It is a process in which the struggle for control of professional 
power is central.  
 
In short, medical professionalisation is one of the basic processes of industrialisation 
in the West. During the process of industrialisation, intellectuals, such as medical 
professionals, played an important role in developing the ideology of liberalism. 
Compared with the analyses of Western medical professionalisation, there is little 
research on professionalisation in developing countries.634 Kautsky notes the role of 
the intellectuals in the nationalist movements of underdeveloped countries.635 That 
these intellectuals with advanced standing in the humanities, sciences, and social 
sciences have played a key role in the politics of underdeveloped countries “is largely 
due to their paradoxical position of being a product of modernisation before 
modernisation has reached and become widespread in their countries.” 636  Seton-
Watson also stresses the leading role of intellectuals in the development of Russia, 
South-eastern Europe and other developing countries.637  
 
The following section will trace the experiences of Chinese intellectuals’ 
empowerment - if it exists - and examines whether there is any difference between 
Western professionalisation and the movement in favour of Chinese intellectual 
empowerment. 
 
(2) The Past Experience of Intellectual Empowerment in China  
 
According to Barlow, in China, since the late 19th century, intellectuals have 
“empowered themselves through a moralist discourse of hyper-nationalism.” 638 
                                                 
634 See e.g., M. Last and G.L. Chavunduka (ed), The Professionalisation of African Medicine, 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1986); D. D. O. Oyebola, ‘Professional Associations, Ethics 
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637 H. Seton-Watson, ‘Twentieth Century Revolution’, 22 (1951) the Political Quarterly 3, 251-165. 
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Hyper-nationalism, in his understanding, is “an ideology and politics of nation 
building that transforms its agent or subject into an imaginary equivalent of the 
nation.”639 Nationalist discourses empowered intellectuals to speak and write as the 
nation’s representatives. Sun Yatsen, a former medical doctor and later so-called 
“father of the Republic of China” offers an obvious example of nationalism and the 
intellectual in the early 20th century. Sun promoted nationalism and stressed to the 
Chinese public that:  
 
“The Chinese people have shown the greatest loyalty to family and clan but not the 
nation…Nationalism is that precious possession which enables a state to aspire to progress 
and a nation to perpetuate its existence.”640     
 
Under the conditions of “semi-colonialism”, Japanese occupation, general lawlessness, 
and political and economic chaos, Chinese intellectuals tried to empower themselves 
with reference to “National Salvation”. However, after years of discord between the 
Nationalist and Communist Parties, this nationalism, according to Barlow, has been 
translated into Party loyalty.641   
 
The intellectual empowerment evolution in the early 20th century failed “because for 
the most part zhishifenzi [intellectuals] appeared not as the saviour of the people-
nation, but rather as a ranked position in the system of ‘class status’.”642 They [the 
Nationalist Party] were criticised by the Chinese Communist Party that their 
professional class status was closely related with power, social status, privilege and 
political wealth. Along with rich landowners, capitalists, etc, their class status put 
them into the hated position of “old stinking nine” (chou lao jiu) during the Cultural 
Revolution.643 
 
It is interesting to find that Chinese intellectuals empowered themselves through 
neither the state nor market specialisation, but through appeals to nationalism or 
                                                 
639 Ibid. 
640 Y. Sen, The Principle of Democracy (in Chinese) (Taipei, China Cultural Service, 1972) Volume 2, 
2, 20. 
641 See note 638. 
642 Ibid, 216. 
643 See note 433 on definition of ‘Chou lao jiu”.  
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modernisation.644 Although the intellectual empowerment evolution did not succeed, 
this history implies that Chinese professions are likely to gain power if they are 
motivated by the benefits of society and patriotism. Undeniably, given the reactions to 
power struggles in the past, it also suggests that any future struggle will face barriers 
and challenges.  
 
Another example of Chinese professionalisation is concerned with the Barefoot 
Doctors. As a political creation to meet Mao’s need for better serving the rural masses 
in the 1960s, certain agricultural workers were trained to be health-workers. The 
policy was not intended to create physicians, although the label “doctor” was used. 
The Barefoot Doctor was chosen, trained, paid, and functioned differently from 
conventional medical practitioners based in urban areas and towns. However, 
Rosenthal and Greiner notice that these Chinese Barefoot Doctors were empowered, 
with the central government standing behind them.645 The policy for upgrading the 
Barefoot Doctors in order to improve their quality of care included increased technical 
education, broadening higher educational opportunities, and incentivising greater 
motivation. “It is part of the commitment to modernisation of the current leadership 
and an example of the professionalisation process …. It also reflects the general return 
to power and dominance of professionals and experts.”646  
 
The above two cases of Chinese professionalisation in recent history illustrate these 
things. First, Chinese professionalisation started either with reference to the state 
interest or being backed up by state policy. Secondly, the process of 
professionalisation was temporary and did not turn into a social movement where 
professionalisation took place in other segments of the occupation. And thirdly, even 
within the same nature of the occupation, hints of professionalisation developed at an 
uneven pace. For example, the promotion of the Barefoot Doctor programme could 
only be implemented where professional doctors were relatively weak and lacked the 
                                                 
644 More than that, the Chinese Communist Party/state also empowered themselves with reference to 
the nation. Partha Chatterjee states the CCP claimed power to act as the “state-representing-the-nation”, 
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political power to resist such a threat to their control of medical knowledge and 
healthcare delivery. Looking to the future, we must ask, whether the road to 
professionalisation has been opened for contemporary Chinese medical practitioners. 
If so, where does it lead, and how well will it be paved? Answers to all these 
questions remain unclear.  
 
5.2   Whistle-Blowing within Chinese Medics: Attempted Professionalisation? 
 
“Of course it's an ethical problem. We wanted to be honest, but if we didn’t go along, we 
wouldn’t exist.”  
 
  A doctor who participated in Beijing’s SARS cover-up647 
 
Even if Chinese medics were to subscribe to the Hippocratic Oath, the ancient moral 
dictum that guides Western medical workers, medical practitioners in China are 
facing moral dilemmas regarding either turning against orders or protecting 
themselves. Chinese medics serve the all-powerful state: whenever a professional 
code of conduct conflicts with Party fiat or government protocol, the latter often holds 
sway. But this is not always the case. Reports suggest that there were Chinese medics 
who refused to engage in unethical practices when other medics in the same 
environment did. They were the whistle-blowers whose interest lay in serving their 
patients or in the advancement of science. This section examines the implications of 
several whistle-blowing cases for the process of professionalisation in China.  
 
Foucault says: “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to 
power.” 648  In other words, there is no absolute power, as therein always exists 
resisting forces. Such forces are present as resistance everywhere in the power 
network.  
 
Within the Chinese healthcare power structure, resistance to authorities and voices 
asking for change have been witnessed in hospitals. A number of doctors and nurses 
were reported as refusing to continue working under the pressure of profit-orientated 
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unethical practice.649 There were an estimated 40% of registered medical graduates 
who chose other careers rather than become medics. 650 Most of them blamed the 
unfunded national healthcare system and the disappointing social environment which 
did not give medics enough respect either in terms of material rewards or reputation. 
Above all these disappointments, patients for whom they are providing services, are 
turning against them or even physically threatening them. Some individual doctors 
even took off their white uniforms to launch campaigns against unethical practices in 
their working institutions, greedy pharmaceutical companies, and even government 
departments (examples will be given shortly). They operated on the maxim – “never 
harm”. A physician whistle-blower during the SARS epidemic is one of the premier 
examples and it is valuable to explore this here.  
 
Dr. Jiang Yanyong, a retired surgeon, finally broke the silence about SARS.651 After 
his best friend contracted SARS at a military hospital, Dr. Jiang conducted a 
preliminary investigation and discovered 146 SARS cases in three military hospitals 
alone. This was more than 10 times the figure former Minister of Health Zhang 
Wenkang had released at a news conference.652 Dr. Jiang subsequently wrote to two 
main television stations in Beijing and Hong Kong. In his letter, Dr. Jiang called on 
the Minister to resign for covering up the SARS information in Beijing.653 After the 
stations refused to publish the letters, Time Magazine released Dr. Jiang’s findings on 
the internet in Susan Jakes’s article, entitled Beijing’s SARS Attack.654 Many doctors, 
experts, and health officials were also aware of the severe situation in China at the 
time when Dr. Jiang challenged the government’s underreported figures. However, Dr. 
Jiang was the only one who had the courage to speak out.  
 
This is not the only ‘whistle-blower’ case in China. Other examples include, Doctor 
Chen Xiaolan, who had experienced frustration and setbacks during her 9-year-
campaign against the use of fake medical instruments by hospitals in Shanghai. Her 
                                                 
649 Private conversation with a Chinese nurse who admitted that it is happening in her former servicing 
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whistle-blowing actions occurred against great pressure from the hospitals and her 
peers who thought she would cut their source of income. Because of her persistence in 
revealing hospital malpractice, Doctor Chen finally gained support from the central 
government and such malpractice was banned in 2005. In 2007, Doctor Chen was 
awarded the “Annual Award for Inspiring People in China”. At the award ceremony, 
Doctor Chen said: “Because I was a doctor, I had to be responsible for my conscience 
as well as the life of my patients.” 655  These whistle-blowing actions show an 
encouraging revival of professionalism in China’s deprofessionalised healthcare 
environment and resistance to a top-down exercise of power by the state or hospital 
management.  
 
However, Doctor Chen lost her job during her campaign and none of the Shanghai 
hospitals wanted to offer her a job after she disclosed the case. In an interview after 
the award, she told the media that she felt honoured but also sad. She wished she 
could wear her white uniform to receive the award, but she was no longer a doctor and 
had no right to wear it any more. Such a sad ending for whistle-blowers in China is 
not rare.  
 
In Hainan province, more than ten doctors and nurses disclosed that, within their 
hospitals, their colleagues had prescribed unnecessary and potentially harmful 
medication to patients, in return for a commission, for six years.656 Soon after this 
scandal had been published by local journalists, the doctors and nurses who reported 
the incident lost their jobs. The explanation given by the hospital was that the 
hospital’s reputation had been damaged by those whistleblowers. Similar whistle-
blowing cases have been reported in Anhui,657 Hunan658 and Shandong provinces659 
where healthcare workers blew the whistle on their colleagues taking “kickbacks” 
from pharmaceutical companies by prescribing expensive and unnecessary drugs to 
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patients. They all lost their jobs, except Dr Zhang Shu. But even Dr Zhang admitted 
he would have remained silent and practised ethically himself if he had known about 
the complexity and difficulty of whistle-blowing.660 He said that he had brought great 
troubles to himself during the 10-year-campaign and had been isolated by his 
colleagues.661  
 
Referring back to the SARS whistleblower Dr Jiang, despite the fact that his whistle-
blowing behaviour has saved thousands of Chinese people’s lives and he has received 
rewards internationally, 662 he has not been given recognition in China. It is even 
reported that Dr Jiang was detained and held for weeks at an army guest house where 
he was forced to undergo “study sessions” after he wrote a letter to officials asking for 
a re-examination of the responsibility borne by the Chinese government for the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre in 2004.663 Though he was released later, it was reported 
that, in 2007, Dr. Jiang was not permitted by his army affiliated work unit Beijing 
Hospital 301 to travel to New York to receive the Heinz R. Pagels Human Rights of 
Scientists Award.664 
 
It is worth emphasising the fact that the motivation of whistleblowers was a sense of 
professional ethics and responsibility. However, the sad story in China is that the 
whistle-blowing doctors’ good intentions were not only discouraged by the hospital 
management team, but also discouraged by the state authority which adopted a 
“harmonious” society as its political slogan (as discussed before). Whistle-blowers 
often need credible protection against the various sorts of punishment to which they 
may be exposed. The UK introduced the Public Interest Disclosure Act in 1998 to 
protect UK employees who blow the whistle on wrong-doing or malpractice. In China, 
so far, there is no law in place to protect whistle-blowers’ interests which to some 
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extent de-motivates whistle-blowing behaviour and hinders the development of 
professionalisation.  
 
Striking evidence shown in different media reports has illustrated that whistle-
blowing medics in China were treated as betraying their work place - they lost their 
jobs, and some of them even faced threats and were placed under tremendous pressure. 
However, professionals’ whistle-blowing actions have been welcomed by the public. 
In return for the loss of their jobs in the short term, whistle-blowers like these doctors, 
gain back the public trust for their profession in the long term. Dr Chen Xiaolan lost 
her title of doctor as a result of her exposure, yet her whistle-blowing has successfully 
stopped unethical practices at her former hospital. Her behaviour has not only been 
well received by the public, but also motivated a lot of colleagues. She upheld her 
professional beliefs, primary among which is the fundamental ethical principle “First, 
do no harm”. The Shanghai government’s Food and Drug Administration has hired 
her as a Food and Drug Safety Inspector.  
 
There may be other brave whistle-blowing medical practitioners in China. They are 
publicly unknown due to China’s media control. One thing is for sure: there must be 
huge amount of pressure that these whistle-blowers have to bear. One purpose of this 
thesis is to argue for support for China’s slow but awakening professional 
consciousness. As the Washington-based director of Human Rights Watch, 
Jendrzejczyk says, “The world medical community should speak out on this important 
issue. The Chinese psychiatrists who bravely refuse to participate in state repression 
need to feel they have support from abroad.”665 With regard to China’s psychiatry 
abuse cases (discussed in Chapter 7), Baker and Latham say,  
 
“Physicians need more than codes that proscribe putting their skills in the service of non-
medical goals of governments, military establishments and cooperation. They also need 
supports for upholding medical ethics and human rights in medicine, and mechanisms to 
punish those who violate basic medical ethics and human rights in medicine.”666 
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Hints of resistance from Chinese medical practitioners embody hopes of future 
professionalisation. Although barriers and obstacles might cast a shadow over success 
during the process, whistle-blowing, as “socially responsible dissent”667 should be 
encouraged and incentivised. Carr-Saunders and Wilson’s argument reflects my belief. 
The professions, they claim,  
 
  “inherit, preserve and pass on a tradition… they engender modes of life, habits of  thought 
and standards of judgement which render them centres of resistance to crude forces which 
threaten steady and peaceful evolution…the great professions, stand like rocks against 
which the waves raised by these forces beat in vain.”668 
 
China needs more representative “great professionals” like, Dr. Jiang Yanyong, Dr 
Chen Xiaolan, Dr Zhang Shu and many other unknown medical whistle-blowers who 
have steadfast loyalty to the basic principle of medical ethics: protecting patients’ best 
interests above all others. 
 
5.3 Cultural and Political Barriers to Professionalisation 
 
Freidson argues that professionalisation is designed to achieve status in the public 
perception,669 which means that an occupation becomes a profession when enough 
people agree that it is. “Professionalization does not occur in a vacuum”,670 it requires 
active support and involvement from individuals at the state level, institutional level 
(such as, professional development providers), and educational level. While the 
character of Chinese society may not be a direct cause of deprofessionalisation, social 
behaviour is “constructed through a diffuse network of apparatuses that produce and 
regulate customs, habits, and productive practices”, 671  and social and cultural 
elements exert diffuse impacts on professional development. It is likely therefore that 
any progress towards professionalisation will inevitably involve obstacles and 
setbacks. The following offers some general considerations of cultural and political 
barriers to medical professionalisation in China.  
                                                 
667 W. De Maria, ‘Whistleblowing’, 20 (1995) Alternative Law Journal 6, 270-281, 280. 
668 P. A. Wilson and A.M. Carr-Saunders, the Profession (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933), 497. 
669 See note 485, at 7.  
670 H. M. Vollmer and D. L. Mills (ed), Professionalization (New Jersey, Prince-Hall, 1966), 46; also 
cited by B. Willians, et al., ‘From stretcher-bearer to paramedic: the Australian paramedics’ move 
towards professionalisation’, 7 (2009) Journal of Emergency Primary Health Care 4. 
671 M. Hardt and A. Negri, ‘Biopolitical Production’, in Empire (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
2000), 21. 
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(1) Culturally Emphasis on Harmony 
 
“Social conflicts are emerging in great numbers and in more varied forms, which are 
inevitable for China at the present stage. But they must be properly handled in case they 
pose risks to the overall development of the country.”672 
 
                                                                                          Hu Jintao (President of PRC) 
 
Both the documentary and empirical data show there is a phenomenon of non-
resistance to control, even though there are a considerable number of professional 
resistance cases. These resisters are not central; they constitute a marginal movement 
and are not typical of a whole professional community. It is important to press the 
question about the attitudes towards powerful authority amongst Chinese medics, 
alongside the question of why there has not been more outright opposition to 
professional control.   
 
I found that in my fieldwork and library research, most Chinese medical practitioners 
chose not to be whistle-blowers even though they might realise wrong-doing exists in 
their hospitals.673 These medics care about their patients and practice in accordance 
with their morals. They dare not confront conflicts, either with their colleagues or 
their hospital managers, but chose silent ethical practice. If they felt unable to adapt to 
the environment in which they were working, they would choose to change career. 
Reading through documents and findings from my own empirical study, it seems that, 
with the exception of a few whistle-blowers, researchers have not been able to get 
Chinese medics to come forward to discuss their resentment towards the system (if 
such exists). This not only includes medical practitioners, but also other intellectuals, 
such as lawyers.674  
                                                 
672 See note 287; and Hu Jintao, ‘Building a Harmonious Society is critical for China’s Progress’ (in 
Chinese), (June 27th 2005) People’s Daily. 
673 From my interviews and reading Chinese doctors’ blogs from Haodf website (Good Doctor Website 
in Chinese), one female doctor wrote her feeling after hearing Dr Chen Xiaolan’s story on her blog, 
available from: http://xulingmin.haodf.com/wenzhang/39852.htm (Last visited on Oct 1st, 2010). 
674 It is argued that neither Chinese attorney nor the Chinese Government are accustomed to an 
independent legal profession, this is most poignantly shown by a defence attorney’s lack of any real 
ability to assert a client’s innocence. See e.g., C. L. Baraban, ‘Inspiring Global Professionalism: 
Challenges and Opportunities for American Lawyers in China’, 73 (1998) Indiana Law Journal 1247; 
D. C. Clarke and J. V. Feinerman, ‘Antagonistic Contradictions: Criminal Law and Human Rights in 
China’, 141 (1995) China Quarterly 135, 140; T. A. Gelatt, ‘Lawyers in China: the Past Decade and 
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The phenomenon of non-resistance can find its roots in Confucianism which 
emphasises harmony. Confucianism has dominated Chinese culture and demonstrated 
a significant influence on Chinese values for thousands of years. A central concern of 
Confucian principles is ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ which teaches that individuals who are 
excessive in any area disrupt social order and are therefore to be avoided. 675 
According to Confucius, people should avoid competition and conflict, and maintain 
inner harmony.676 This has influenced the Chinese people to preserve overt harmony 
by avoiding confrontation and to adopt a non-assertive approach to conflict- 
resolution.677 
 
In Confucian social doctrine, social relationships amongst those fulfilling these roles 
were bound by customs and rites. As Franke and Trauzettel emphasise, “the great 
achievement of Confucius [was] the transformation of traditional rites, which contain 
no individual elements, but which were practiced in a strictly collective manner as a 
communal cult, into an individualized, personalized ethic.” 678  Unschuld writes, 
“Confucius concluded that the real cause of social unrest was the discrepancy between 
the expectations associated with a social role and the actual conduct of members of 
society...The objective of the harmonious society envisioned by Confucius was 
therefore to bind individuals and groups to previously defined social roles and to 
                                                                                                                                            
Beyond’, 23 (1991) Journal of International Law and Politics 751, 762, 781-82; C. W. Lo and E. 
Snape, Lawyers in the People’s Republic of China: A Study of Commitment and Professionalization’, 
35 (2005) American Journal of Comparative Law 2; And it is argued that a lack of professional ethics 
is a serious detriment to Chinese legal development. See W.  P. Alford, ‘Tasselled Loafers for Barefoot 
Lawyers: Transformation and Tension in the World of Chinese Legal Workers’, 141 (1995) China 
Quarterly 22, 30. 
675 See e.g., A. Chin, The Authentic Confucius: A Life of Thought and Politics (New York, Scribner, 
2007); D. Pierre, translated by C. L. Markmann, Confucius and Chinese Humanism (New York, Funk 
& Wagnalls, 1969); R. Wihelm, Confucius and Confucianism (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 
1931). 
676 Ibid. 
677 A. T. Lee, ‘Cultural Barriers to the Learning Organisation in Chinese Society’, Conference paper 
for the Fourth International Conference for Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management 
(2001); W.  T. De Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol.1 (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1960, revised 1999). 
678 H. Franke and R. Trauzettel, Das Chinesische Kaiserreich (Frankfurt, Fischer, 1968), 51; quote is 
cited by P. U. Unschuld, Medicine in China: A History of Ideas (Berkeley, University of California, 
1985), 62. 
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regulate permanently the relationships between these roles by means of a hierarchical, 
tightly-knit nexus of mutual obligations.” 679  
 
To achieve a harmonious state, one should follow tight social rules and acknowledge 
social positions without breaking boundaries. “The king must act as a king; the 
subordinates must act as subordinates; A father as a father; a son as a son. Any 
confusion and break of the social levels will lead to social destruction”.680 Obedience 
serves as the crucial means for maintaining social hierarchy. In contrast, behaviours, 
such as, argument, defensive reasoning and conflicts with one’s seniors, are 
considered a threat to Chinese social stability. Such behaviour and attitude will not be 
allowed.  
 
Marx says, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.”681 Thus, 
from the cultural point of view, resistance is neither welcomed nor encouraged in 
Chinese society.  
 
(2) Nationalism and Patriotism  
 
The pressure of state propaganda and censorship upon Chinese intellectuals has never 
decreased. In my empirical study, one finding is that almost every medic in different 
ways is subject to political ideological teaching, whether they are Communist party 
members or not. Such political education comes from different sources, such as group 
meetings, on-job ethical and legal training, hospital announcement boards and media, 
etc. The existence of widely-used propaganda has led to a group of medics with more 
accepting attitudes towards authority, which explains why there is little evidence of 
medics who resisted to the implementation of the One-Child Policy. What is more, 
Chinese medics tend to balance a patient’s interest with the state’s interests when they 
are forced to make a difficult ethical decision. As discussed previously, a senior 
doctor in an interview said that procedures such as abortion and sterilisation are 
                                                 
679 P. U. Unschuld, Medicine in China: A History of Ideas (Berkeley, University of California, 1985), 
61-62. 
680 Ibid.  
681 K. Marx, in S. K. Padover (ed) The Karl Marx Library (New York, McGraw Hill, 1972), 245-246. 
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contributing to the state’s family planning. They are therefore helping the patients and 
their families in the long run.  
 
Nationalism or patriotism has played a part in Chinese medics’ decision-making.   
With regard to medical professionalisation, the impact of nationalism is two-fold. As 
discussed before, nationalism inspired Chinese intellectuals to embrace power when 
the state was at risk, such as with the Japanese invasion. It has had a positive 
influence in reminding intellectuals of their social responsibility towards their country. 
However, the negative impact is that nationalism will occasionally conflict with 
professional ethics, especially when the nationalism itself is coloured by politicians.  
 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s political ideology promotes the state’s interest, 
especially after the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 1989, which exhibited the 
internal legitimacy problem faced by the CCP leadership. The CCP started to feel the 
rise of political liberalism among intellectuals and students which was supposedly 
caused by a lack of patriotic education in the 1980s 682, along with trends partly 
resulting from the political instability at the end of the 1980s. 683  The CCP 
strengthened its propaganda strategy by strengthening patriotic education for Chinese 
youth. It also urged the Chinese people to unite under its leadership; otherwise the 
country would descend into chaos.684 Later, the CCP’s Propaganda Department issued 
the “Fundamental Principles on Implementing Patriotic Education”. The aim of this 
new campaign was to “take concerted effort in various quarters to create a strong 
atmosphere in which the entire Chinese people will be influenced by the patriotic 
ideas and spirit”.685  
 
                                                 
682 See e.g., H.Y. Lee, ‘From Revolutionary Cadres to Bureaucratic Technocrats’, in B. Womack (ed), 
Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, University of Cambridge, 1991), 
200-201; T. Tang, ‘The Tiananmen Tragedy: the State-Society Relationship, Choices, and Mechanisms 
in Historical Perspective’, in B. Womack (ed), Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge, University of Cambridge, 1991), 265-327.  
683 Ibid. 
684 Ibid. 
685 Beijing Review (26 September–2 October 1994), 4. For a more detailed study, see S. Zhao, ‘A 
State-led Nationalism: the Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China’, 31 (1998) 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 3, 287–302. 
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Kissinger argues that China’s policy is driven by growing nationalism rather than 
communist ideology. 686  I do not fully agree. Instead, I think nationalism and 
communist ideology are interwoven and have been promoted at the same time, since 
the Chinese communist party claims itself to be a “state-representing-the-nation”.687 
These top-down patriotic campaigns justify state policies and party rules by aligning 
them with nationalist or patriotic principles to encourage responsible citizens to take 
more accepting attitudes. In the healthcare arena, being a patriotic Chinese citizen as 
well as a responsible medic leads the individual medic to confront conflicting values. 
For example, a doctor revealed the fact that the truth had been hidden from both 
patients and the general public when SARS became public. How would a responsible 
doctor have felt about this? Would one stand up to proclaim professional opinions 
which went against the authority of the state? All Chinese medical practitioners 
except one chose not to disclose it to the public. The reason was either the belief that 
the benefits of revealing it were outweighed by the potential harm of doing so or that 
the state was putting pressure on them, or rather that they believed the state’s silence 
must be respected as a mark of national duty or obligation.  
 
(3) Fidelity  
 
Another issue which can produce a barrier to professionalization is faithfulness 
towards Chinese culture. In China, people have been taught for centuries to respect 
the right of the community to dictate to the individual. With respect to medical 
professions, such dedication to the group can outweigh their individual professional 
decisions. 
 
“Philosophically, China lacks not only a Kant but the moral machinery that produced Kant. 
Central to Kant’s view and most (but not all) western ethical theory is the view that humans 
are autonomous moral agents who through a rational faculty are able to make the correct 
moral choices. Respect for the moral capacity of every individual implies the egalitarianism 
of democratic liberalism, wherein the legitimate authority of the state is dependent on the 
consent of the individual members of society. . . Citizens, through autonomous democratic 
                                                 
686 H. A. Kissinger, ‘A world we have not known’, (Jan 27th, 1997) Newsweek 74, 77. 
687 Partha Chatterjee states the CCP claimed power to act as the “state-representing-the-nation”, 
therefore “any movement which questions this presumed identity between the people-nation, and the 
state-representing-the-nation is denied the status of legitimate politics.” See e.g., P. Chatterjee, 
Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse (London, Zed, 1986), 168. 
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choice, determine the goals for the society… This moral psychology is absent in China... 
Doing what was right was more important than the capacity to choose.”688 
 
One certain characteristic of professionalisation is autonomy through self-regulation. 
Baraban says, “Liberalism is fundamentally concerned with individual liberty, self-
determination, and self-control.” 689  While individual rights are “universal” and 
“natural” in the West, fidelity to the community is a widely accepted norm in Chinese 
culture. While the liberal democracies view their constitutions as supreme laws that 
protect individuals from government abuses, self-determination of individuals in 
China has not yet infused itself into the legal soul and social norms.  
 
5.4   Barriers to Professionalisation: Summary and Discussion  
 
As previously discussed, the concepts of professionalism and professional autonomy 
are not supported by Chinese historical practice or ideological traditions. Yet cultures 
are different in light of historical records, and the influence of globalisation is beyond 
the control of a few politicians. Looking to the future, it is not the case that Chinese 
cultures are authoritarian and thus will remain fundamentally different from  
individualistic Western ones, nor the case that individual freedom and professionalism 
are alien  or inapplicable to China. 
 
Despite the culturalist objection, the politico-economic rejections remain. Whenever 
there is a proposed change, struggles and conflicts occur. Professionalisation is part of 
the progress for an authoritarian state to become more liberal. Such values of 
liberalism require first and simultaneously broader political changes in China. I also 
doubt that without general legal reform or broader political change, in an 
undemocratic country like China, it is practical to place a great deal of emphasis on 
empowering Chinese medical practitioners. Will Chinese politicians perceive the idea 
of medical professionalism as a political threat? It is not difficult to imagine that this 
will be so once Chinese medics demand the right to practise their professional power 
without political interference. The Communist Party may regard medics’ demands as 
                                                 
688 R. P. Peerenboom, ‘Rights, Interests, and the Interest in Rights in China’, 31 (1995) Stanford 
Journal of International Law 359, 378-379. 
689 C. L. Baraban, ‘Inspiring Global Professionalism: Challenges and Opportunities for American 
Lawyers in China’, 73 (1998) Indiana Law Journal 1247.  
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an implicit challenge to its own competence and treat it as a political threat. Evidence 
can be found from the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy, in which Chinese university 
students and intellectuals confronted the government asking for democracy.690 This 
student protest sadly resulted in a massacre.  
 
However, medical professionalism is not a totally impossible mission. This is not only 
because Chinese Communist Party ideology has long endorsed the concept that 
government action should reflect the will of the people, manifested in the “mass line” 
principle of “from the people, to the people”; but also because we are seeing changes 
happen. The government might (or at least is trying to) be more open to different 
voices. Chinese President Hu Jintao (also General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of China’s Communist Party) says,  
 
  “A harmonious society should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, 
amity and vitality… By developing socialist democracy, the people's opinions may be 
further let out, their intelligence be fully absorbed, and a democratic policy-making 
mechanism will help balance different social interests and avoid social conflicts.”691 
 
It is noted that Chinese leaders are aware of the importance of building up democracy 
in Chinese society. The question is how they balance freedom of speech/intelligence 
with avoidance of social conflicts. China is undergoing fast socio-economic changes 
and relatively slower political reform, so it is hard to predict what will happen to the 
medical profession in China.  
 
The status and role of medical practitioners will be shaped by the nature of society. 
Professional status is not an inherent right, but is granted by society. If Chinese social 
evolution is in the direction of a democratic society, the emergence of 
professionalisation with the establishment of independent associations, increases in 
income and political power are likely to follow. If the evolution does not change state 
authoritarianism completely, professional independence without a reasonable ethical 
standing will be curbed and their association will remain under the control of the state. 
 
                                                 
690 See e.g., H. Y. Lee, ‘From Revolutionary Cadres to Bureaucratic Technocrats’, in B. Womack (ed), 
Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, University of Cambridge, 1991), 
200-201. 
691 See note 287. 
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Admittedly it would be a long and gradual process to achieve Chinese medical 
professionalisation. But it is not impossible. The key element for success requires 
Chinese medics to win the trust from the public, learning from their ancestors who 
empowered themselves through nationalism (further discussion of which in Chapter 
9). If it brings social benefits, the evolution of medical professionalisation will be 
welcomed by the Chinese people. And it will be hard for the Chinese government, 
which has always claimed that it represents the Chinese people’s best interests, to 
counter this move. This is also why the square model presented in the beginning of 
this chapter is important.  
 
6.   Conclusion: Looking to the Future 
 
After looking closely at China’s medical deprofessionalisation in Chapter 7, this 
chapter has discussed the need for the empowerment of Chinese medical practitioners. 
Starting with an analysis of what constitutes a profession in the Western conception, I 
have analysed these characteristics that distinguish professions from other occupations 
and the means by which a technician or skilled worker is granted the status of a 
professional. I then examined the need for and prophecy of developing 
professionalisation in China. This includes questioning general processes of medical 
professionalisation in the West and briefly reviewing China’s past experience of 
intellectual empowerment. I then attended to the question of whether early-stage 
attempted professionalisation exists in China and considered, what are, or would be 
cultural and political barriers for preventing Chinese medical practitioners from 
becoming more professional.     
 
Recognising that the state - which uses various means such as the law, courts, and the 
administration and financing of services – could be the most powerful constraint or 
incentive to influence professionalisation, the Chinese Communist Party has indeed 
never withdrawn its ideological control in order to ensure that the law in China serves 
Party policies. I argue that, on balance, professionalism is a preferable model of 
organising the work of medical professionals in a highly authoritarian country like 
China. Foucault has traced the influence of professional knowledge on both social 
policy and everyday life. Although he did not use the terminology of professionalism, 
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he was in fact concerned with professionalism, for the professions are the agents who 
create and advance knowledge inherent in their disciplines, and the impact of their 
knowledge has an influence on social and state affairs.  
 
Given the complex and changing context of the Chinese healthcare system, it is the 
right time for Chinese medics to reposition themselves as a profession. The whistle-
blowing cases have shown that a few Chinese medical practitioners have responded 
proactively to demands for a better, more responsible practice. However, 
professionalisation cannot progress beyond piece-meal resistance and individual 
localised responses, unless medical professionalisation in China develops collectively 
from the strengthening of professional ethics and institutional support, such as the 
establishment of independent professional associations and the profession’s own self-
regulated ethical codes. Such professional developments will in turn create a more 
balanced healthcare power dynamic in China and allow Chinese medics a position of 
greater influence to negotiate their relationship with centrally-controlled healthcare 
governance structures.  
 
Looking to the future, no matter how the social evolution develops in China, this 
thesis would like to revisit the purpose of medicine – to benefit humanity. In serving 
patients’ best interests, Chinese medical practitioners should become more 
professionalised. Though professionalism is not an answer once and for all (see 
discussion in Chapter 9), it is a valid first step.  
 
However, one should also be aware that medical professionalism which emphasises 
medical professional empowerment can also ignore patients’ interests. Without the 
possession of altruistic motives and codes, professionalism which only serves 
professionals’ self-interest would lose its meaning. This does not mean we should 
abandon professionalism and self-regulation altogether either. The key question to be 
discussed in the next chapter is how to build up professionalism in China, and more 
importantly, how to balance professional autonomy and social responsibility so that 
professionalism is accountable and in the public interest.   
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CHAPTER 9 ENHANCING MEDICAL 
PROFESSIONISM IN CHINA: 
EMPOWERMENT AND THE BALANCE OF 
POWER  
 
1.   Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, I suggested that professionalisation could be a solution to 
solve the problem of medical deprofessionalisation, even though it is unpredictable as 
to which direction Chinese society will turn, or stay. In Chapter 8, I emphasised the 
needs for China to enhance medical professionalisation and finally achieve 
professionalism in healthcare. However, this is not to suggest that the Western 
industrialised countries’ professional model is unproblematic, nor that the existing 
Western model of medical professionalism is the best way forward.  
 
The notion of professionalism in China entails a call for a balance of power. This 
chapter considers the potential harm caused when medical professionals have 
‘superpower’, as in America. It aims to suggest that calling for professionalism in 
China does not mean less patient input, but less state control. In this chapter, I offer 
my proposal for building accountable medical professionalism. How Chinese medical 
practitioners come to gain professional control and how they exercise and organise the 
power once they seize it within the framework of altruistic values are the main 
questions to be answered here.  
 
This chapter starts by examining the pros and cons of professionalism. It then 
reshapes the square-shaped model of professionalisation to propose a pentagon-
shaped of accountable professionalism model in order to ensure that professional 
empowerment will ultimately promote the public good. The pentagon-shaped model 
further divides into three levels of “power balancing” - the belief level of control, the 
interactive control and boundary control. Finally, it draws a conclusion that medical 
professionalism in China is both necessary and desirable so long as suitable power 
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balance systems are also all in place. Such an empowered identity will develop for its 
own sake, and more importantly, for the way it benefits others.  
 
2.   Professionalism in a Pentagon Model  
 
2.1   Professionalism  
 
Medical professionalism is an influential but controversial concept in the West. While 
pressure for changes and resistance against professionalisation is great in the West, 
experience in China suggests that deprofessionalisation is not the best way forward 
either. I propose to introduce this concept to China despite its setback in Western 
countries. As I will explain shortly, I do so, however, by using this established term 
and giving it a new meaning for the Chinese context. At the same time, important 
lessons presented by the Western countries on how to ensure professions are 




Vollmer and Mills use “professionalism” to refer to an outcome of a process which 
“may induce members of many occupational groups to strive to become 
professional”. 692  They also point out that professionalism as an ideology is a 
necessary constituent of professionalisation, but professionalism by itself is not 
sufficient to ensure the entire professionalisation process.693  
 
Freidson indicates the nature of professionalism is a form of occupational control. A 
profession’s aspirations towards occupational autonomy lie not just in the immediate 
work setting, but in the related ability of self-governing and of acting as an 
autonomous source of influence in the policy process.694 It should be noted that there 
is a broader use of professionalism which refers to a broad, educated stratum, 
including personal service functionaries like barbers, bootblacks, and taxi drivers who 
                                                 
692 H. M. Vollmer and D. L. Mills, Professionalization (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1966), viii editor’s 
introduction. 
693 Ibid.  
694 E. Freidson, The Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors and Others (New York, Robert 
Dingwall & Philip S.C. Lewis, 1983), 19-36. 
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appear to be “easily professionalised.”695; it is the narrow definition, as below, that I 
use in this thesis.  
 
Chapter 8 has discussed the characteristics of a profession. Freidson argues that, in 
major advanced industrial nations, the position of professionals and the nature of their 
practice are changing; however the essential elements of professionalism are not 
disappearing, but are rather taking on a new form.696  Parsons further claims that the 
ideal qualities that are connected with a profession contain five essential behaviours. 
Briefly speaking, they are knowledge, community-based orientation, self-control, 
reward systems and autonomy. 697  Parsons’ generalisation of the essence of 
professionalism can be further summarised into two key elements: professional 
principles and an institutional system.  
 
Comments from Frankford and Konrad shed some light on ‘professional principles’: 
“Professionalism is not some given of the social world but rather is a normative vision 
sustained by a particular institutional framework”.698 Unpacking their comments, the 
‘normative vision’ of professionals is that it should sustain and be possessed of 
competency, character, and the principle of being “moral” and so being devoted to the 
public good. Professionalism is understood to be an ideal to be pursued. 
Understandably, medics are human, and they will not always achieve the ideal, but in 
striving for it they should reach ever higher levels of performance.  
 
An ‘institutional framework’ can be interpreted to refer to the ideals of the medical 
professional that are linked to or dependent upon institutions. The core objective of 
professionalism is seen by d’Oronzio as a set of institutions for embodying the 
expertise of individuals, so guaranteeing quality of service, and controlling the 
performance of workers.699 The institutional concept of a profession allows us to think 
                                                 
695 T. Caplow, the Sociology of Work (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1954), 48, 139. 
696 E. Freidson, Professionalism Reborn: Theory, Prophecy, and Policy (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 8-9. 
697 T. Parsons, ‘Professions’, in D.L. Sills (ed), International Encyclopedia of the Social Science (New 
York, MacMillan, 1968), 536-547. 
698 D. M. Frankford and T. R. Konrad, ‘Responsive Medical Professionalism: Integrating Education, 
Practice, and Community in a Market-Driven Era’, 73 (1998) Academic Medicine 2, 138-145.  
699 J. C. d’Oronzio, ‘Practicing Accountability in Professional Ethics’, 13 (2002) Journal of Clinical 
Ethics 4, 359.    
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of “professionalism” as, in Johnson’s terms, a way of organising an occupation,700 so 
that the process of professionalisation can be strengthened within or under the 
institutional framework.   
 
The definitions and generalisation of the term professionalism address the 
specialisation of an occupation amongst others. I have discussed earlier the role of 
being a profession and the importance of the professionalisation process. In the 
healthcare arena, the model of professionalism captures a distinction important for the 
organisation of work and for public policy – professional autonomy. As 
professionals from a state characterised by politically instrumentalised 
deprofessionalisation, Chinese medics’ professional autonomy is what is missing and 
needs to be enhanced. The rise of counter-power or counter-politics, whether from 
non-intellectuals or professionals, is of importance to balance political power, and 
furthermore, to prohibit any possibility of power-abuse. Medical professionalism 
allows medics to stay true to their morals and values, to exercise their independent 
judgement and offer the right to refuse and stay true to their professional 
commitments, when asked to participate in acts that conflict with personal, ethical, 
moral convictions.701 Professionalism allows room for occupational autonomy and 
thus it is especially important for professionals who are struggling for control.  
 
(2)  Scepticism of Professionalism                                                                                                                          
 
Until the late 19th century, it was common for some of the most notable scholars of 
the day to emphasise the importance of professionalism in modern Western societies, 
and to consider professionalisation to be a major social movement that transformed 
societies and the nature of the work.702 Now, however, medical professionalism has 
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701 J. Blackmer, ‘Current Global Trends in Medical Professionalism’, 1 (2009) World & Health Policy 
1. 
702 H. Spencer, The Principles of Sociology (New York, Appleton, 1914[1896]), vol.3, part 7; S. Webb 
and B. Webb, ‘Special supplement on professional associations’, (1917) New Statesman 211, 9; R. H. 
Tawmey, The Acquistive Society (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1920), 91-122; A. M. Carr-Saunders, 
Professions: Their Organization and Place in Society (Oxford, Clarendon Press,1928); P. A. Wilson 
and A. M. Carr-Saunders, The Profession (Oxford, Clarendon Press,1933), 493-4; T. H. Marshall, ‘The 
recent history of professionalism in relation to social structure and social policy’, (1939) Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science 5, 325-40; H .M. Vollmer and D. L. Mills, 
Professionalization (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1966); T. Parsons, ‘Professions’, 12 (1968) 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 545; W. E. Moore, The Professions: Roles and 
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lost its popularity and the existing model of professionalism has been brought into 
question. Half a century ago, Marx pointed out that the topic of professions raised 
fundamental issues about the relationship between social differentiation and class 
structure.703 His idea of a professional group being a privileged “class” is still relevant 
today. Medical professionalism gradually lost its popularity mainly because medical 
professionals were accused of having too much power, alongside a lack of external 
control.  
 
There have been increasing doubts about professionalism, especially when there is a 
healthcare scandal. Public trust in medical professionalism fades away. Scandals 
involving poor medical practice that have been reported in the UK, from operations 
performed without the patients’ permission to the high profile Alder Hey scandal and 
the Shipman murders.704 Similar criticisms are not difficult to find in the US either. 
Barer describes,  
 
“Everywhere in the United States the professions have reached new heights of social power   
and prestige . . . yet everywhere they are also in trouble, criticized for their selfishness, their 
public irresponsibility, their lack of effective self-control, and for their resistance to requests 
for more lay participation in the vital decisions professionals make affecting laymen.”705  
 
Along with the public, the courts and the legislature in the US and UK have been 
increasingly criticised for placing too much power in the hands of medical 
professionals either to define certain issues (such as abortion) or to determine the legal 
                                                                                                                                            
Rules (New York, Russell Sage, 1970); T.  J. Johnson, Professions and Power (London, Macmillan, 
1972); D. Bell, The coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York, Basic Book,1976), 144; E. Freidson, 
Doctoring Together: A Study of Professional Social Control (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1980); E. Freidson, Professional Power: A Study of the Institutionalisation of Formal Knowledge 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986); E. Freidson, Professionalism Reborn: Theory, Prophecy 
and Policy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994); K. M. MacDonald, The Sociology of The 
Professions (London, Sage Publications, 1995); E. A. Krause, Death of the Guilds: Professions, States, 
and the Advance of Capitalism, 1930 to the Present (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996). 
703 K. Marx, ‘Theories of Surplus Value (Vol. IV of Capital)’, translated by E. Burns, Theories of 
Productive and Unproductive Labour (New York, International Publishers, 1969), 152-304. 
704 These healthcare scandals have included the suspension from the medical register of paediatric 
cardiac surgeons from Bristol following an inquiry into poor standards of care, the revelation that 
children’s organs had been removed and retained without their parents’ consent during post mortem 
examinations at Alder Hey Hospital in Liverpool, and the murder by Dr Harold Shipman of more than 
200 of his patients. See e.g., The Report of Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquire chaired by Michael 
Redfern, ordered by the House of Commons, available at: http://www.rlcinquiry.org.uk/ and British 
Department of Health, Reports of independent public inquire by Dame Janet Smith DBE, The Shipman 
Inquire, available at: http://www.the-shipman-inquiry.org.uk/reports.asp (Last visited on Jan 21st, 
2011). 
705 B. Barber, ‘Control and Responsibility in the Powerful Professions’, 9 (1978) Political Science 
Quarterly 3, 599-615.  
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standards to which those professionals are held to account.706 More importantly, the 
reason for criticism is that the position adopted by Western physicians is not for 
patients’ best interests, but for themselves.  
 
Public supervision and state intervention in professional conduct are being gradually 
adapted to include a requirement for regular rectification. As Lord Woolf states, 
 
“The courts are nowadays, with increasing frequency, being asked to adjudicate on legal 
points bound up with fundamental and emotive questions of medical ethics…The 
importance I attach to these cases is the fact that, although the expert evidence of doctors is 
most important on the ethical issues involved, the courts are final arbiters and not the 
doctors.”707 
 
Therefore, the phrase “Doctor knows best” has been updated to “a doctor knows the 
best if he acts reasonably and logically and gets his facts right.” 708 
Deprofessionalisation, in Light709 and Walzer’s710 understanding, may not necessarily 
be a problem, because “professional knowledge and power can be dissolved by 
arming a lay society with sufficient knowledge: through the deprofessionalization of 
everyone or through the generation of appropriate expertise.” 711  Instead, 
professionalism itself may be problematic, as “it stresses professional distinctiveness 
to the detriment of the many points of contact and connection between professional 
institutions and culture, and the more general lay institutions and culture.”712  
 
One feature of the contemporary movement of “anti-medical professionalism” is 
patient empowerment. The introduction of axioms, such as, patient self-determination, 
patient autonomy and the right to choose, indicate power has shifted from doctors to 
patients. Not every professional welcomes these participatory mechanisms, as they 
seem to indicate that the profession is incompetent and not trustworthy, which could 
damage the future of medicine. Having had a different view several years previously, 
                                                 
706 K. Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law (Hampshire, Ashgate, 2007), 2-3. 
707 The Right Honourable The Lord Woolf, ‘Are the Courts Excessively Differential to the Medical 
Profession?’, Spring (2001) Medical Law Review 9, 13. 
708 Ibid, 1-16. 
709 D. W. Light and A. Schuller, Political Values and Health Care: the German Experience (Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 1986), 10-11. 
710 M. Walzer, ‘Socializing the Welfare State’, in A. Gutmann (ed), Democracy and the Welfare State 
(New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1988). 
711 D. M. Frankford, ‘The Normative Constitution of Professional Power’, 22 (1997) Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law 1, 213. 
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the prominent American sociologist Friedson went on to argue that ideological attacks 
on professionalism had distracted us from the fact that we were profoundly dependent 
on organised bodies of specialised knowledge and technique.713 This assault, he said, 
had created a sense of distrust that further weakened the credibility of the professional 
institutions’ ability to offer an independent and moral viewpoint.  
 
The existing systems in the West have brought professionalism into question. The 
increasing domination of professional power is conceived to be a problem as it is 
likely to ignore the interests of patients. The solution to this problem lies in the use of 
countervailing power, as some scholars have suggested. 714  But I think that 
countervailing power is not the perfect answer either. Because “professionalism is a 
complex mosaic laid on a foundation of both competency and character”,715 to throw 
the baby out with the bath-water can do more harm than good. What we really need is 
to strike a balance between the “necessary freedom for the professional” and a 
“sufficient measure of accountability to ensure responsiveness to social needs and 
agreed social purposes”.716  
 
Several sociological accounts of professions in post-socialist societies emphasise the 
relationship between the state and the professions in terms of control and discipline, 
suggesting that professionals lack the critical autonomy and integrity to shape their 
professional field.717 In the West, no one would wish the professions to be totally 
subservient to the will and whims of the state. Equally, the autonomy to which the 
professions lay claim fits uneasily with self-governance, especially without the 
scrutiny of a third party. There has to be an accommodation between the professions 
and the state, so preserving the professions as independent critics of public policies 
                                                 
713 See note 696. 
714 E. Freidson, Professional Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care (Chicago, Aldine, 
1970), 76, 158, 211, 234; also cited by D. M. Frankford, ‘The Normative Constitution of Professional 
Power’, 22 (1997) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 22.  
715 J. C. d’Oronzio, ‘Practicing Accountability in Professional Ethics’, 13 (2002) The Journal of 
Clinical Ethics 4, 359.   
716 P. Wilding, Professional Power and Social Welfare (London, Radical Social Policy, 1982), 118.  
717 A. Buchner-Jeziorska and J. Evetts, ‘Regulating Professionals: the Polish Example’, 12 (1997) 
International Sociology 1, 61-71; I. Butenko, ‘The Russian Sociological Association: Actors and 
Scenery in a Revolving Stage’, 17 (2002) International Sociology 2, 233-251; A. Smolentseva, 
‘Challenge to Russian Academic Profession’, 45 (2003) Higher Education 391- 424; S. Pasti, ‘Two 
Generations of Russian Journalist’, 20 (2005) European Journal of Communication 1, 89-115; P. 
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while at the same time securing their subordination to agreed public policies and 
purposes. In the following section, I will propose a pentagon-shaped model to solve 
the possible dilemmas caused by professionalism. 
 
2.2   A Pentagonal Model and Three Tiers of “Power Balancing” 
 
 
(1) A Pentagonal Model 
 
 
‘So what I’ve said does not mean that we are always trapped, but that we are always free 
– well, anyway, that there is always the possibility of changing.” 
 
                                                                                                        Michel Foucault718 
 
 
This thesis has examined the triangular and top-down models drawn from the 
literature reviews, and the circular model derived from my empirical study, suggested 
a square model was necessary for the discussion of deprofessionalisation. However, 
none of these models is ideal for the purpose of empowering the medical professionals 
whilst maintaining professional accountability, and ensuring that patients’ interests 
are well protected within a professional empowerment movement. Medical 
professionalism operates in the field of power relations which entails responsibilities, 
reactions, effects, and even, interventions. I have faith in professional power, but I 
also believe the best way for Chinese medics to hold power is to give it away. 
Therefore, towards the end of this thesis, a pentagonal model is suggested as below:  
 
                                   State         Law 
                              
                                  Medical Ethics 
 
                                                 
718 Foucault responded this to the critiques addressed to him ever since he initiated his work on power. 
Quote cited by M. Lazzarato, ‘From Biopower to Biopolitics’, 2 (2002) Tailoring Biotechnologies 2, 
11-20. 
Medical Professionals Patients
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The dynamics of this new pentagonal model are that it connects professionalism with 
patient participation. What is more, horizontally, this model can be divided into three 
tiers (state & law; medical profession & patients; ethics) where the whole model still 
shows a visible, compact network between the different parties in healthcare 
governance. In this model, empowered professionals are guided by law and can affect 
legislation; patients are supported by a state funded healthcare system and can voice 
their reaction to the state agencies; ethics is grounded for all healthcare interactions, 
especially for medics.  
 
Power in this model is not held by a single party. Power, according to Foucault, can 
be dispersed, fragmented, decentralised, omnipresent and therefore invisible.719 In the 
pentagonal model, neither the medical profession, patients nor government 
bureaucracy capture absolute power. I do not mean to suggest elimination of either 
professionals’ or patients’ power, but instead the pentagonal model suggests the 
necessity of their involvement in a healthcare governance network, so that the power 
can flow through and from those activities, in which state, law, professionals and 
patients can work together for a common purpose: humanity and care.  
 
According to Light720 and Walzer721, in the liberal vision, the power over health 
would not be delegated to the state, to experts, including professionals, or to the 
bureaucracies of private associations. Rather, power over health would be mutual 
between professionals and patients. It should also be participatory. 722  Medical 
professionals need to treat patients with dignity and respect, and to see them as 
partners in the process of medical decision-making and care-giving; and patients need 
to reciprocate professional behaviours. I argue that patient autonomy is as important 
as professional autonomy. The pentagonal model also reflects my argument that the 
power dynamic flowing between medics and patients has to seek and develop a 
balance between mutual respect for autonomy and accountability.  
 
                                                 
719 See notes 456, 479 and 560.   
720 D. W. Light and A. Schuller, Political Values and Health Care: the German Experience (Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 1986), 10-11.  
721 M. Walzer, ‘Socializing the Welfare State’, in A. Gutmann (ed), Democracy and the Welfare State 
(New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1988). 
722 D. M. Frankford, ‘The Normative Constitution of Professional Power’, 22 (1997) Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law 1, 186-219. 
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Moreover, accountability is more likely to be achieved in a balanced and interactive 
model. Therefore, finding a balance between professional power and its altruistic 
basis is necessary; so is establishing control mechanisms to ensure medics are 
competent. To suit this purpose, in the following section, I will suggest three tiers of 
“power-balancing” from (1) bio-ethics; (2) professional self-regulation & patient 
participation and (3) state stewardship.   
 
(2) Three Tiers of “Power-Balancing” 
 
My idea of varied levels of control for medical professionalism is borrowed and 
reinvented from an idea proposed by Professor Robert Simons of Harvard Business 
School. He suggests four control levers for business management: a diagnostic control 
system, a belief system, a boundary system, and an interactive control system.723 The 
idea of having four levels of control is to “reconcile the conflict between creativity 
and control” so that the necessary control can be in place when empowering 
employees in business management. 724  Simons’s notion of different levels for 
balancing control and empowerment could also be re-invented and accommodated 
into the context of medical professionalism and accountability control.  
 
To establish a responsive model of medical professionalism for China, I divide the 
pentagonal model into three tiers: the first tier is foundational – professional ethics; 
the second tier is interactive – participation of the medical profession and patients, 
and the third tier includes the boundary between healthcare governance and law. Each 
level of control aims to balance professional power and ensure its altruistic values. 
They are in conjunction with one another to suit the ultimate mission of the medical 
profession: to safeguard the health of the people.   
 
Within the pentagonal model’s three levels of power-balancing mechanisms, the 
ground level is the value system - bio-ethics. Bioethical control is “to inspire and 
                                                 
723 R. Simons, ‘Control in an Age of Empowerment’, March-April (1995) Harvard Business Review, 
81-88; R. Simons, Levers of Control: How Managers Use Innovative Control Systems to drive 
Strategic Renewal (Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1994). 
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promote commitment to an organisation [medicine]’s core value”.725 The interactive 
level is to empower both the Chinese medics and patients, so that deprofessionalised 
medics will have more control over their work and patients will be able to exercise 
autonomy. As to the boundary control, state and law have a role to facilitate and 
oversee this partnership with and between medical practitioners and patients, but state 
and law should not prescribe every single rule. The state needs to ensure a funded 
healthcare system is in place, while law establishes the boundaries of practice and 
identifies actions and pitfalls that practitioners must avoid.  
 
3.  The Foundation Tier: Professional Ethics 
 




3.1   Medical Ethics: Laying the Foundation Stone for Medical Professionalism 
 
“First, do not harm.” – the core of Hippocratic Oath, 727  and the most quoted 
tradition in the history of medicine has provided the moral foundation for the practice 
of Western medicine since ancient Greece. Through modification over the years, the 
Hippocratic Oath’s ethical strength can still be seen in different forms, both 
internationally and locally. The Declaration of Geneva of the World Medical 
Association binds the physician with the words, “The health of my patient will be my 
first consideration… I will maintain by all the means in my power, the honour and the 
noble traditions of the medical profession”,728 and the International Code of Medical 
Ethics declares that, “A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical 
service in full professional and moral independence, with compassion and respect for 
human dignity… [and] act in the patient's best interest when providing medical 
care.”729 The Declaration and International Code provide the moral grounding for the 
                                                 
725 Ibid, 82. 
726 H. L. Mencken, A Mencken Chrestomathy: His Own Selection of His Choicest Writing (New York, 
Knopf, 1949).  
727 L. Edelstein, the Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation and Interpretation (Baltimore, John Hopkins 
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728 World Medical Association, Declaration of Geneva, May 2006, available at: 
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/g1/index.html (Last visited on Oct 6th, 2010). 
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international medical community’s consensus with respect to medical ethics. Locally, 
the Physician’s Oath or Bioethics Code varies from region to region, but in general 
they share the common professional commitment: make the care of patients the 
medical profession’s first concern.730  
 
The code of medical ethics provides a behavioural standard for medical professionals. 
It also establishes the moral authority and independence of medics from the state in 
their service to others and their responsibility towards the sick. Weisz says, 
“‘Bioethics’ is a social and cultural, as well as intellectual happening.”731 In Fox and 
Swazey’s interpretation, bioethics is “not just bioethics,… and [it] is more than 
medical…using biology and medicine as a metaphorical language and symbolic 
medium, bioethics deals… with nothing less than beliefs, values and norms that are 
basic to our society, its cultural tradition, and its collective conscience.”732 
 
The individual medical practitioners’ initial emphasis on professional ethics reflects a 
landmark in medicine’s professional development. Professions, as Collins puts it, “are 
occupations which organize themselves ‘horizontally’, with a certain style of life, 
code of ethics, and self-conscious identity and barriers to outsiders.”733 The code of 
medical ethics portrays the medical profession’s moral identity as well as one of 
individual honour - the honour of being accountable and trustworthy. Indeed, medics’ 
claims to autonomy and authority are dependent upon their professional knowledge 
and their claim to serve the public interest. A good reputation is the basis for 
obtaining trust and greater power. Unethical practice and breaches of trust not only 
conflict with the aspirations of medicine, but also endanger professional status.  
   
I suggest that medical ethics should become the foundation stone for medical 
professionalism in China. This is because a code of medical ethics would give 
                                                 
730 See e.g., GMC, ‘Good Medical Practice: Duties of a doctor’, available at: http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice/duties_of_a_doctor.asp; AMA, ‘Declaration of Professional 
Responsibilities’, available at: http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
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Chinese medical practitioners the confidence to stay true to their dedicated profession; 
it would grant them public trust and support; ultimately and more importantly, it will 
provide them with power to avoid micromanagement and policing, and will empower 
them to resist instrumentalisation.  
 
Western medicine is currently widely practised in China, a country whose past is 
filled with philosophical and at times, violent rejections of the rule of law, so Chinese 
medical practitioners are often lost in the gap between using Western medicine and 
the inheritance of the Chinese values. It has been a century since Western medical 
knowledge was introduced into Chinese medical schools, whilst Western bioethics 
which should have been introduced together with the techniques and knowledge have 
lagged far behind. Yet, one might also argue, Western medicine and Western 
bioethics have never developed at the same pace, neither do they necessarily come “in 
the same package”, so why should I claim there is a loss in China? 
 
Western medicine’s development embodies both values and aspirations. The image of 
Western medicine is as a tool for healing; medical practitioners are users. It is not 
enough for users only to know how to use the tool; more importantly, they need to 
know how to get the best use from it. Users should learn the meanings and ‘spirit’ that 
are embodied in the tool, so that their competence can be applied responsibly. 
Therefore, medical practice should be carried out conscientiously. Laying medical 
ethics as a foundation is also necessary to ensure that medicine is not misused for 
purposes other than medical one. A medical ethics foundation could be a start to 
approaching the problem of political instrumentalisation of medical practitioners in 
China. Western bioethics that was missing originally should be introduced; better late 
than never.  
 
3.2   Restoring Professional Ethics in China  
 
The lack of bioethics has profoundly affected China’s healthcare environment. There 
is a great need to restore it in China. I will first review the development of Chinese 
medical ethics from past to present, and then argue for a reform of medical ethics 
education in China.   
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(1) “Love” in Traditional and Modern Chinese Bioethics  
 
“The achieving of humaneness depends upon oneself. If a man is not humane, what is the use 
of knowing norms?” 
 
                                                                                                                 Confucius734 
 
The professional value of “love” is associated with traditional Chinese medicine, 
developed over a period of 2,500 years. 735  In ancient China, it was commonly 
recognised that one must read a vast range of books, particularly the “Four Books and 
Five Classics”736, in order to become a medical doctor. These books addressed many 
subjects, such as politics, ethics, and history, and the purpose of reading them was to 
cultivate one’s moral attitude. As a result, most medical doctors were also 
intellectuals. Traditionally, the word “intellectual” in Chinese implies loftiness, a 
sense of social responsibility, a loving heart, honesty, and scrupulous conduct.737 That 
is why in Chinese philosophy, medicine was considered a humane art that was based 
on the spirit of loving others. It holds that to be a good doctor one must be a morally 
good person. Consequentially Confucians put more weight on internal feelings than 
on external restraints.  
 
Traditional Chinese medical ethics drew upon China’s major traditions: Confucianism, 
Daoism and Buddhism. The word “yide” (medical morality) in the contemporary 
Chinese language mainly means “professional and personal virtue of the health 
professional”. Ethical principles and philosophical analysis of medical practice 
constitute only a part of medical morality. According to Nie, moral experience itself is 
the basis of medical morality.738  
 
                                                 
734 Confucius, in W. E. Soothill (ed), The Analects of Confucius (Edinburgh, Dover Publishing, 1995), 
76.  
735 R. Peng, ‘How Professional Values are Developed and Applied in Medical Practice in China’, 
Special Supplement, 30 (2000) Hasting Centre Report, 23. 
736 A collection of the most important Chinese classics in literature, namely, The Great Learning, The 
Doctrine of Mean, The Analects of Confucius and Mencius, The Book of Songs, The Book of History, 
The Book of Changes, The Book of Rites, and The era of Spring and Autumn Annals. 
737 D. Zhang, ‘Love and the History of Chinese Bioethics’, 9 (1999) Journal of Asian and International 
Bioethics 9, 47-49. 
738 J. Nie, ‘The Plurality of Chinese and American Medical Moralities: Toward an Interpretive Cross-
Cultural Bioethics’, 10 (2000) Kennedy Institute of Ethical Journal 3, 239-260. 
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Contemporary Chinese medical ethics have developed in a country with an 
underdeveloped economy, a power-centralised political system and a natural law 
tradition. Moral intuition and moral attitudes towards medical decisions are affected 
both by long-standing and socially entrenched traditional values, and by the current 
dominant ideology.739 Contemporary Chinese medical ethics provides an example of a 
Marxist Socialist society’s alternative to the Hippocratic Oath and liberal Western 
medical ethics.740 Renzong Qiu, a leading bioethicist and philosopher of science in 
China, has effectively summarised and expressed the common Chinese view of the 
culture of Chinese medical ethics: 
 
   “A quasi-holistic socio-political philosophy has been developed from Chinese cultural 
traditions. It is based on two thousand years of power-centralized, autocratic monarchy – 
one that has lacked any rights-oriented, individualistic, liberal democratic tradition. In 
recent decades, Marxism has become the dominant ideology. The historicism and social 
holism of this system, interwoven with traditional ideas, puts the greatest emphasis on 
nation, society, and country rather than on individuals.”741 
 
For both Qiu and Nie, there exists a characteristic Chinese way of thinking about and 
acting in public and private life, in interpersonal interactions, and in moral issues in 
medical practice, where Chinese culture and medical ethics give priority to country, 
community and authority.742 Fox and Swazey point out that contemporary Chinese 
medical morality is an unbalanced combination of Maoism-Marxism-Leninism, 
Confucianism, Taoism, and Chinese Buddhism.743 Engelhardt disagrees with Fox and 
Swazey, as he observes that, for many of his Chinese hosts “ethics was a mode of 
moral indoctrination or of exegesis of a single moral viewpoint, in this case Maoist-
Leninist-Marxism.”744 However, Nie states, “contemporary Chinese medical ethics is 
anything but a single moral perspective, no matter how hard the official “state” 
ideology resists cultural and moral pluralism.”745  
 
                                                 
739 R. Qiu, ‘Chinese Medical Ethics and Euthanasia’, 2 (1993) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 69; also cited by E. K. Kim, ‘Neonatal Euthanasia in Modern China’, vol III The Lantern 1, 23.  
740 R. Crawshaw, ‘Medical Deontology in the Soviet Union’ in R.M. Veatch (ed), Cross Cultural 
Perspectives in Medical Ethics: Readings (Boston, Jones and Bartlett, 1989).  
741 R. Qiu, ‘Medical Ethics and Chinese Culture’, in E. Pellegrino, et al. (ed), Transcultural Dimensions 
in Medical Ethics (Frederick, University Publishing Group, 1992), 170-72. 
742 Ibid; also see note 738. 
743 See note 238. 
744 H. T. Engelhardt, ‘Bioethics in the People’s Republic of China’, 10 (1980) The Hasting Center 
Report, 7-10. 
745 See note 738, at 247. 
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In traditional China, apart from the maxims, admonitions or warnings set forth by 
individual physicians, there were no medical organisations or professional codes to 
regulate and control the relationships between medical practitioners and patients as 
well as those between medics themselves.746 “Hence there was no guarantee for all 
that the prestigious physicians said about medical ethics. The only control or restraints 
came from the penetrating influence of Confucian ideology.”747  
 
Using training techniques that intermingle the Confucian virtues of benevolence with 
Western bioethics may give Chinese medics the basis they need to confront wrong-
doing or malpractice within their profession. Another Confucian virtue – that of self-
cultivation – may help create a foundation for a more autonomous profession by 
encouraging Chinese medical practitioners to reflect more individually on ethical 
issues rather than with blind obedience. 748  According to Fei, Chinese society 
considers order, not laws, to predominate; and in this context, order means that each 
person must uphold the moral obligations of his or her network ties.749 So culturally 
speaking in China, the self-regulation of ethical codes is more socially acceptable than 
hard legislation (How to get this “moral obligations” agreed from one social network 
group to another will be addressed shortly). 
 
What is more, I argue that bioethics is relevant to all bio-political participants, 
including the state and patients. Referring back to the pentagon-shaped model, ethics 
should serve as the foundation for all parties. It is not only important for medical 
professionals, but also for regulators and politicians when they need to make 
judgements or decisions in relation to biotechnology. An ethical dimension in bio-
politics means there should be rational or moral grounds for political decisions.  
 
(2) Bioethical Education Reform  
 
                                                 
746 R. Qiu, Cross-cultural Perspectives in Medical Ethics (London, Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2000), 
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Professional doctoring demands that a medical practitioner acts ethically. From my 
data, answers from Chinese medical practitioners to the question about whether 
medical ethics is an essential feature of professionalism remained ambivalent. This 
section lays emphasis on professional ethics because it can be regarded as a means of 
controlling the use of medical knowledge, especially when there are tensions between 
the demands of morality and law have been felt, and where there is a vacuum created 
in professional codes. In my opinion, without ethics, the practice of medicine is not 
truly professional; and ethics should function as the core value of professional 
practice. 
 
Professions are bound by ethical codes. Berlant stresses that, as far as medicine is 
concerned, codes of medical ethics must be seen as organisational tools and resources 
used by the profession in its bid for a range of privileges, and in particular for 
professional autonomy and monopolization.750 In China, a medical practitioner is very 
likely to bear a double-duty of being a skilled healer and a party member. Under these 
circumstances, bioethical education becomes more important: “the discipline 
inspection system has the disciplinary authority to compel party members to conform 
to the political will for fear of punishment. But it does not necessarily have the moral 
authority or persuasive power over party members to engender an ‘inner sense of 
duty’ for them to pursue high moral standards.”751   
 
When evaluated from the perspective of the goals of medical education in a 
democratic society, the Chinese system leaves much to be desired. The Chinese 
system focuses on conveying knowledge of substantive law, legal institutions and 
legal processes. Medical values also come from the state rather than professional 
ethics. The following Medical Student Oath set out by the PRC Ministry of Education 
for the education of every Chinese medical student in their “white-coat” ceremony, is 
an example: 
“Health related, life entrusted. The moment I step into the hallowed medical institution, I 
pledge solemnly – 
I will volunteer myself to medicine with love for my motherland and loyalty to the people. 
I will scrupulously abide by the medical ethics, respect my teachers and discipline myself. 
                                                 
750 L. J. Berlant, Profession and Monopoly: A Study of Medicine in the United States and Great Britain 
(Los Angles, University of California Press, 1975), 64.  
751 T. Gong, ‘the Party Discipline Inspection in China: its Evolving Trajectory and Embedded 
Dilemmas’, 49 (2008) Crime, Law and Social Change 139-152, 151. 
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I will strive diligently for the perfection of technology and for all - round development of 
myself. 
I am determined to strive diligently to eliminate man’s suffering, enhance man’s health 
conditions and uphold the chasteness and honor of medicine. 
I will heal the wounded and rescue the dying, regardless of the hardships. 
I will always be in earnest pursuit of better achievement. I will work all my life for the 
development of the nation’s medical enterprise as well as mankind’s physical and mental 
health.”752 
 
Most Chinese medical students begin their first year with such a ceremony, in which 
they learn the meaning of the responsibility that comes with wearing the white coat. 
The expectation arising from the Oath varies from their Western counterparts; the 
latter expects humanity and professionalism. In the Chinese Oath, nationalism and 
faithfulness to the state are emphasised. Verbally, it even puts the “motherland” or 
state’s interests before “the people”. Nie indicates “Like the official ideology, the 
socialist discourse of medical ethics in the PRC is statist and collectivist, emphasizing 
the almost absolute primacy of the interests of the state, the country, and the collective 
over those of individuals. As a result, medical professionals are morally obliged to be 
loyal not only to the individual patient but also to the state.”753 
 
Historically speaking, however, the statist and collectivist element in contemporary 
socialist medical morality is unprecedented. For centuries, major Chinese bioethical 
traditions were ruled by Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism which have always 
advocated that the primary duty of healers is to individual patients. Moreover, while 
some doctors interviewed in my study apparently accepted and believed in the basic 
principles of socialist medical morality, especially that of the primacy of the collective 
interest, in their hearts, some seemed not to accept them. The faith in socialism is 
fading, some of my interviewees told me. “Isn’t China becoming more capitalist than 
socialist right now?” one of them asked me. Being a CCP member in a healthcare 
institutions does not mean a belief in communism, but means that they would be 
granted more opportunities for promotion and career development, so it is a way for a 
better living in China.  
 
                                                 
752 Q. Liu and L. Xu, ‘The Oath of Medical Students’, 29 (1999) Chinese Journal of Medical History 4, 
214.  
753 J. Nie, Behind the Silence: Chinese Voices on Abortion (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 187. 
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Chinese medical graduates may do a reasonably good job in the development of their 
technical skills and practical competence. Where their ability falls short, is in the 
development of the most essential doctoring qualities, notably, a healthy scepticism 
(towards both knowledge and state influenced ethics), intellectual curiosity and 
creativeness. This is why the values of medical professionalism need to be developed 
from the early beginnings of medical education. The pentagon-shaped model, which 
puts ethics as a foundation tier below the profession and patients, indicates that ethics 
could be seen as a control framework for professionalism, but could also be used to 
uphold professionalism. Good ethical practice will bring medical practitioners a good 
reputation, public trust and confidence; in return, public trust and confidence would 
grant the professionals the power of self-control.  
 
4. Interactive Control: Participation of Professionals and 
Patients  
 
The practice of accountability entails not only an inner sense of professional ethics, 
but public scrutiny is also needed through institutional settings with many observers 
and multiple occasions for accountability. Upholding professional power while 
keeping the power publicly accountable will not only be an ethical project, but also a 
social and political, long-term, systematic reconstruction. How to expose, confront 
and resolve infractions of professional ethics is a question to be answered by scrutiny 
mechanisms, such as, peer review (self-regulation), public oversight, and state and 
legal surveillance. This section discusses interactive control mechanisms including 
medical professionalism and patient participation, while state and legal surveillance 
are discussed in a subsequent section.   
 
4.1   Building Medical Professionalism in China 
 
In the face of China’s medical de-professionalisation, I propose building medical 
professionalism– by requiring Chinese medical practitioners to adopt the basic 
requirement for a professional development regime similar to the West: establishing 
independent professional associations; instituting professionally-led self-regulation; 
and developing a professional culture with patient-orientated ethics at its base.    
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 (1) Establishing Independent Professional Associations 
 
Medical professionals gain their self-governmental competence by starting to group 
together in order to constitute a professional corporation or association. 754  The 
Chinese Medical Association (CMA) is the largest and oldest non-governmental 
medical organization in China. Like a family, the CMA plays a leading and active role 
in the nation’s medical education, training and professional exchanges for more than 
430,000 members and 82 specialty societies.755 However, according to the criteria for 
the professions outlined in the previous chapter, the CMA group of Chinese medics 
have no autonomy to regulate themselves without interference from the state; they 
have no monopoly over a defined sphere of work; the codes of ethics are set up by the 
government; and although there is a system to further train medics, this also comes 
under the control of the state. In short, the CMA is not separate from, but actually 
controlled by government. 
 
Mr Zhang Wenkang, the former Health Minister who was responsible for the SARS 
cover-up, was “elected” as the head of the Chinese Medical Association soon after he 
was sacked by the government. However, the CMA website did not give any 
information as to how he was “elected”. This example indicates that Chinese medical 
practitioners do not have a formal association that is independent of the state and state 
agencies. Moreover, a real sense of professional unity may have even not started yet. 
The same phenomenon happened in the Soviet Union which had a centrally planned 
political economy governed unilaterally by the Communist Party, in conjunction with 
state agencies, which permitted the existence of few if any independent “private” 
associations or enterprises.756 To sum up, the CMA cannot be the equivalent of its 
                                                 
754 The Association of Professional Orders of Québec, ‘From the First Professional’, Professional 
System, available at: http://www.professions-quebec.org/index.php/en/element/visualiser/id/7#2503 
(Last visited on Nov 10th, 2010).  
755 Chinese Medical Association, available at: http://www.chinamed.com.cn/ (Last visited on May 12th, 
2008). 
756 E. Friedson, Professionalism Reborn: Theory, Prophecy and Policy (Cambridge, Policy Press, 1994), 
36-37.  
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counterparts in the West, such as the British Medical Association757 or American 
Medical Association which exercise professional power and are self-regulating.  
 
In the West, doctors form powerful groups, notably the national medical associations, 
which act like trade unions to defend the interests of their members.758 In countries 
with socialised health-care systems, medical autonomy is limited by state intervention, 
as Gill and Horobin have noted in Britain.759 Yet, in the UK at least this does not 
affect the societal esteem of the occupation or their collective self-regulation. The key 
challenge facing each country is how to balance professional autonomy against 
control mechanisms. The following sections examine the pros and cons of 
professionally-led self-regulation, so that the complexities of this can be taken into 
account when suggesting medical professionalism in China.  
 
(2) Setting up Professionally-led Regulation 
 
a.   Professionally-led Self-Regulation 
 
It is assumed that professions understand what it means to be a professional and apply 
this understanding when they make decisions in their private and professional lives. 
As the general public do not fully comprehend the body of medical knowledge, the 
Western world has granted medical professionals the right to self-regulation. 
Autonomy is given to medics on the basis that professionals will put the welfare of 
both the patient and society above their own interests, and that they will be governed 
by a code of ethics.760  
 
Under a self-regulation regime, medical professionals also have a right, and indeed a 
duty, to stipulate the pattern of service they wish to provide in the hospital, if they feel 
this is necessary. It is also their duty to take disciplinary action against any unethical 
                                                 
757 In the UK, as a doctors’ union, the British Medical Association (BMA) represents the profession; 
while General Medical Council (GMC) is a regulatory body to medics. Comparing with BMA, the 
GMC aims to have an independent voice or serve as a pressure group to ensure good medical practice. 
758 P. U. Unschuld, Medicine in China: A History of Ideas (London, University of California Press, 
1985). 
759 D. G. Gill and G. W. Horobin, ‘Doctor, patients and the state: relationships and decision-making’, 
20 (1972) Sociological Review 4, 505.  
760 S. R. Cruess and R. L. Cruess, ‘Professionalism must be Taught’, 315 (1997) British Medical 
Journal 1674-1677. 
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practice. There should be a control mechanism in place so that their every action will 
be guided (but not decided) by the state.  
 
Professionally-led regulation should also be considered as a critical concept when 
defining medical professionalism. “Without the ability to self-regulate, medicine will 
relinquish control of the education, training and licensing of its members to an outside 
party, which in most cases will be the government.”761 Although the tendency to shift 
professionally-led self-regulation to central regulation happens in some Western 
countries, such as the U.K, it is not necessarily a bad thing, as long as central 
government is in a better position to legislate medical law from a moral basis. The 
question raised is whether the Chinese legislative institution is acting in the best 
interests of the public? Or are they only acting for their own benefit? In which case, 
should the Chinese medical profession be given more power to fulfil their 
professional obligations?  
 
Since law is made by the legislature, those who control this can make the law reflect 
their will. As discussed in Chapter 2, the PRC Constitution is regarded as “a general 
summary of [the] present policy” of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).762 For the 
first time an amendment of the PRC Constitution in 2004 includes the clause “the 
state respects and protects human rights”. This can be seen as a signal that Chinese 
legislators have started to take the public interest issues more seriously. In order to 
maintain political stability, the CCP has a certain degree of tolerance, as long as any 
change of law does not affect the ruling status of the Party. Professionally-led self-
regulation in China thus is still possible if the CCP can perceive it as a win-win 
solution to the state’s healthcare system and the demands from the medical 
practitioners.      
 
Hunt and Wickham maintain that Foucault gave, in the Birth of the Clinic, the 
example of the medical profession as an important source of ‘government’ activity; 
                                                 
761 J. Blackmer, ‘Current Global Trends in Medical Professionalism’, 1 (2009) World Medical & 
Health Policy 1, 5-17.  
762 According to Jones, not only is the constitution a summary of policy, but also other laws are “more 
particularized statement of policy”. “[Party] policy in China is law”. See, W. C. Jones, ‘The 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China’, in L. W. Beer (ed), Constitutional Systems in Late 
Twentieth Century Asia (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1992), 59; also cited by K. Zou, 
China’s Legal Reform: Towards the Rule of Law (Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 49. 
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this becomes particularly apparent in periods of significant shift in the organisation of 
medical practice, or in response to plagues and epidemics.763 For me, whether the 
medical profession acts as a bio-political tool or not, to some extent, must depend on 
the pattern of its medical regulation: state-regulation or self-regulation. It does not 
necessarily mean that medics in a country where direct regulation by the state prevails 
do not hold on to professional trust, ethics and honesty. But different forms of medical 
regulation tend to affect medical decision-making, especially when the state interests 
conflict with public interests.   
 
b. Possible Problems in Professionally-led Regulation 
 
Self-regulation has been subject to frequent public criticism. As far as 
professionalisation is concerned, Unschuld argues that,   
 
“The emphasis on professional ethics has decisive advantages over prognosis. In diverting 
the interests of the public from the outcome of medical activities to its process, it allows the 
practitioners access to practically all the material and non-material rewards. Ultimately this 
is the essence of formulated ethics. Such ethics are designed to persuade the public that 
whoever is in control and possession of medical resources uses them in a morally 
trustworthy manner.”764 
 
Freidson also contends that self-regulation is likely to prompt challenges, especially in 
regulatory procedures and rule-enforcement.765 He argues that physicians in a group 
practice may see the faults of their colleagues but usually take no action to correct 
them, and many even avoid or ostracise such colleagues. Under self-regulation, 
Curess criticises that, “standards were considered weak, variable, and inconsistently 
applied, and physicians were further accused of using collegiality as a means of 
shielding poor performing peers.”766  
 
                                                 
763 A. Hunt and G. Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (London, 
Pluto Press, 1994), 26. 
764 P.U. Unschuld, ‘Introduction: Medical System, Resources, Professionalization’, in Medical Ethics in 
Imperial China: A Study in Historical Anthropology (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979), 5.  
765 E. Freidson, Professional Dominance (New York, Atherton Press, 1970); E. Freidson, Profession of 
Medicine (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1970); and E. Freidson, Doctoring Together (New York, Elsevier, 
1975). 
766 S. R. Cruess and R. L. Cruess, ‘The Medical Profession and Self-regulation: A Current Challenge’, 
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In contrast to the critics, Dauphine’s support for self regulation is based on his 
understanding of experience in the United States and Canada, which shows that self 
regulation can be effective and can maintain the public’s trust. He also mentions that, 
the required infrastructure and tradition of excellence in assessment have been part of 
the North American medical culture for decades, and “the separation of assessment 
bodies from other national bodies with advocacy roles is a major advantage for North 
American certifying bodies.” 767 He thinks this experience has given US bodies the 
opportunity to win acceptance and, perhaps most importantly, “to take advantage of 
past reputations for doing their jobs at an arm’s length from the professional 
associations.”768  
 
As discussed earlier, professionalism is a mode of occupational control. Historically, 
professionalism was based on the assumption that lay people were incapable of 
understanding or judging the effectiveness of the services provided, and professionals 
were given wide latitude in setting their own standards and norms. Professionally-led 
self-regulation is “a special way of regulating the market in the service offered by an 
occupation.”769 It means that professional standards elucidated in professional ethical 
codes are generated by medical professional organisations. These professional 
standards are utilised by administrative and legal agencies when identifying and 
sanctioning unethical behaviours. The profession therefore is able to discipline its 
own members and oppose external regulations intruding into areas it considers its 
autonomous domain.770 Within the professionalism debate, self-regulation has been 
criticised as leading to a loss of credibility and accountability.  
 
Critics of self-regulation are more or less asking for the control of professional power, 
which means that they have lost confidence in professionals and their credibility to 
maintain accountability. According to Haskell, driven by the Jacksonian populism of 
the mid-19th century, policymakers in the UK had largely rejected the legitimacy of 
professional expertise and stripped away regulations that had supported professional 
                                                 
767 W. D. Dauphine, ‘Self Regulation must be made to work: GMC and the Future of Revalidation’, 
330 (2005) British Medical Journal 1385-1387. 
768 Ibid. 
769 M. Moran and B. Wood, States, Regulations and the Medical Profession (Buckingham, Open 
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authority.771 More importantly, this loss of authority is reflected in the decline of 
public confidence in the medical profession. 772 Academics such as Pawlson have 
argued that professionalism along with regulation, strongly influenced or controlled 
by professionals, has been at the expense of accountability in medicine.773  
 
It is understandable that medical professionals want self-regulation, including those in 
China; as shown in the fieldwork, a high percentage of surveyed medics reported that 
they would like to be more involved in China’s health legislation. The main reason for 
this is that, they will benefit from these regulations in a number of ways. Regulation 
of medical education and of the acceptability of qualifications can control the supply 
of medics. Market competition, both from outside and within the profession can also 
be limited. Regulatory machinery and processes can ensure that professionals control 
their own practice standards, and determine their own income. From the medical 
professionals’ perspective, self-regulation is thus a powerful tool. This would increase 
their autonomy but not necessarily lead them to become followers of patient-
orientated professional ethics. So actually the question becomes how trust-worthy are 
the medical professionals? Likely problems in professionally-led regulation thus still 
lie in medical ethics, which as I suggested earlier lays the foundation stone for 
medical professionalism. 
 
 (3)  Developing a Culture of Professionalism 
 
Apart from establishing independent professional associations and setting up 
professionally-led self-regulation in China, there is also a need to develop a 
professional culture for ongoing medical professionalism. An interpretation of 
professionalism as “something which defines and articulates the quality and character 
of people’s actions within that group”774 indicates common qualities that are shared 
collectively within the group. There should be beliefs, behaviours, objectives, and 
                                                 
771 T. Haskell, Introduction to the Authority of Experts (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984). 
772 See, e.g., R. J. Blendon, et al., ‘Bridging the Gap between Expert and Public Views on Health Care 
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other characteristics common to members of the medical group. Therefore, to some 
extent, it can be regarded as a professional culture. In my opinion, this professional 
culture is a historically changing and socially constructed accommodation to 
professionalism. A professional culture in healthcare would nurture the development 
of professionalism amongst the different areas of healthcare professionals, e.g. 
medicine, dentistry, nursing, pharmacy and allied health professions.   
 
A professional culture would become a supportive environment for medical 
professionalism. Without a supporting culture, even if professionalism, the notion and 
ideology born in Western liberal societies, could emerge successfully in China, I 
doubt whether it would flourish and be sustained for long. The notion of 
professionalism does not exist in China, neither historically or culturally. The 
enhancement of professionalisation has also not been part of its industrialisation 
process. What is more, the Chinese culture emphasising harmony/no resistance, 
nationalism/patriotism and faithfulness can become barriers to developing 
professional independence. The influence of cultural change might have an impact on 
individual professionals’ attitudes so that the value of professionalism could become 
more socially acceptable. Developing an ongoing supportive culture amongst medics, 
therefore, is essential for their professional consciousness development, together with 
peers. 
 
In my opinion, developing a professional culture involves: (1) enhancing a 
professional culture in medical schools to support early-career pre-professionals; (2) 
enrichment of professionalism from individual to groups of medical practitioners; (3) 
bridging different areas of medical professionalism and building a shared value-base 
amongst the professionalised community.775 Freidson suggests that power is exercised 
by a collective will, but not by the individual will in isolation.776 Developing a culture 
of professionalism would strengthen individual professional development, so that the 
fragmented medical professionalism of individuals from different designations could 
form an integrated coalition and so secure the power of medics and autonomy 
necessary for their commitment to patient care.  
                                                 
775 The idea of developing a medical professionalism culture in China needs further research and better 
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4.2   Patient Engagement 
 
Patient participation lies on the other side of the interactive control process. Patient 
engagement can be seen as the countervailing power in preventing the increasing 
power of medical professionals becoming counterproductive or even doing more harm 
than good. Western societies have witnessed incidents when professionally-led self-
regulation fails to balance the interests of professional and patient. The decline of 
professional accountability raises public outrage and loses public trust. In this 
situation, the pressure on medics comes not only from the state and other health 
professions, but from the general public. Hence my suggestion is empowering 
together both Chinese patients and medics in the pentagon model, so that the power of 
medics is grounded in the public interest.  
 
(1) Regaining Public Trust  
 
To encourage patient engagement in healthcare governance, regaining public trust is a 
priority. As discussed earlier, there are frequent reports of doctors or hospitals being 
attacked by patients. From my own experience, I also found that the Chinese public 
do not trust the professionals. During my empirical study, I met a patient who insisted 
on standing and crying loudly in one of the doctors’ offices where several doctors 
were filling in my questionnaires. One of the doctors told me this is not unusual. Once 
a patient has had a bad treatment result, they tend to blame their doctor for not 
fulfilling their duties well enough.  
 
The issues of public trust in China are not confined to the healthcare arena. Nowadays, 
Chinese people are less likely to trust the quality of food, commodities, government 
policies, etc. I heard one Chinese say to another Chinese outside one of my field 
hospitals, “Nothing is real in China, except the fakes, which are really fake.” 
Regaining trust from the public should not only be the task of the medical profession, 
but also the state, and its administrative and legal departments. Although this thesis 
does not focus on studying a systematic loss of public trust, the existence of this does 
increase the extremes of public rebellion. Patients who frequently assault medical 
practitioners (as discussed previously), have become a serious social problem.  
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The doctor-patient relationship evolves in an ever-changing society. As discussed 
earlier, from the 1990s, the drive towards commercialised healthcare consumption 
with increasing numbers of health legislation empowers patients; but, at the same time 
public trust in Chinese medical professionals has declined greatly ever since. 
Criticisms from the media are frequently and widely available. Several of my 
empirical study informants expressed their concern about a newly invented “job” - 
called “hospital violator hired by patients” to meet the increasing need for patient 
campaigns. In the opinion of the medics, public anger towards the Chinese healthcare 
system is growing.777 A large number of studies found that hospital staff in urban 
hospitals had experienced physical or psychological violence because of 
dissatisfaction with the standard of care provided.778 The trust of the doctor-patient 
relationship in China is in crisis. In order to grasp a general idea of how inflammatory 
this issue was, I typed two key words “hospital” and “attack” to a Chinese Google 
search engine, it provided me with 6,150,000 relevant results.779 
 
During the process of writing up this thesis, doctor-patient relationships in China have 
worsened further. In July 2010, it was reported that, with the support of the local 
health department, 27 hospitals in Ji Lin Province started to hire policemen as deputy 
hospital managers, in order to strengthen hospital security to protect these hospitals 
from being attacked by the public. 780  This decision raised wide controversy in 
society.781 Critics argued that the police force is a public resource; and that hospitals 
have no legitimacy to hire policemen to prevent attacks from the public.782 But the 
local Health Secretary defended the decision at an “employment ceremony”. He said, 
in 2009, for one year only, there had been 152 attacks in Ji Lin provincial level 
hospitals. 783 In early 2010, another hospital’s emergency room and an emergency 
medical technician were attacked. The local government hoped that, by employing 
                                                 
777 See discussion in Chapter 3. 
778 Ibid. 
779 The number of search result was provided by the Google on June 16th, 2011, available at: 
www.google.com.  
780 See e.g., ‘Policemen were Hired as Part-time Hospital Deputy Manager’ (in Chinese), (July 7th, 
2010) Xin Hua News. 
781 G. Zhang, ‘Rights of Policemen: Embarrassing Resolution to Damaged Doctor-patient Relationship’ 
(in Chinese), (Sep 2nd, 2010) Journal of China Hospital CEO. 
782 Ibid.  
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these hospital policemen, the problems of doctor-patient relationships could be 
resolved and future attacks prevented.        
 
Ji Lin province is not the only province in China to use this measure for tackling 
hospital violence. Fu Jian province is another example. 784  The public has used 
extreme methods to express their anger towards the whole system in which the 
professionals are serving. Local government agents, who are only in charge of part of 
the system, were reacting passively. Employing policemen may be of temporary use 
in dealing with hospital violence towards medical staff and their workplaces. But this 
measure cannot repair the weak relationship between the public and healthcare 
providers in the long run; it may further damage it.  
 
To regain trust from the public, the medical profession must be seen to be acting in 
the best interests of the public. 785  Philosopher Onora O’Neill has raised the 
importance of trust in a profession. In her Reith Lectures, she says:  
 
“Intelligent accountability, I suspect, requires more attention to good governance and fewer 
fantasies about total control. Good governance is possible only if institutions are allowed 
some margin for self-governance of a form appropriate to their particular tasks, within a 
framework of financial and other reporting... Real accountability provides substantive and 
knowledgeable independent judgment of an institution’s or professional’s work.”786 
 
Trust is the basis for professional power. The decline of patient trust further decreases 
the power of Chinese medics. As long as the Chinese public remains sceptical toward 
medical practice and the medical profession, progress towards professionalism will be 
slow. Re-gaining trust and support is necessary. In order to achieve medical 
professionalism, the regaining of public trust must be an urgent task for Chinese 
healthcare governors and medical practitioners. 
 
Professional status and its maintenance are granted by a society on the basis of the 
public’s belief that professionals are trustworthy. To remain trustworthy, professionals 
must meet the obligations expected by society. The substance of professionalism, 
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should be taught at all levels of medical education in China, as part of the profession’s 
response to changing societal expectations. Apart from this, there is also a need for 
educating the public about professional commitments and different ways of conflict 
resolution e.g. from the public media. Local government needs to set up more 
complaint systems and build channels to make dialogue possible between medics and 
the public; for example, on-line or face to face forums where both parties participate; 
offering legal officers to manage disputes and bring them to a resolution within a 
framework of law. In seeking to rebuild the trust relationship between the public and 
medics, most important of all is the reform of the ineffective and unfair healthcare 
system (I discuss this shortly). 
 
Building trust is essentially important for professionalism. The discourse of 
professionalism consists of a social contract, and an agreement between the State and 
members of the occupational group. Within this agreement, the professionals commit 
themselves to restrain their self-interest in return for greater status, income and 
freedom.787 In exchange for refraining from exploiting their expertise and superior 
knowledge for their own benefit and using their knowledge and skills for the common 
good, professions are granted a degree of autonomy and certain privileges. Essential 
to this discourse is public trust, which depends on the integrity of both individual 
medics and the whole profession.788 In other words, it will be a collective social 
problem if medics no longer receive the social respectability that they desire and 
society is not satisfied with the service they receive. 
 
(2) Patient and Public Engagement 
 
Ever since Eliot Freidson’s landmark books about professions, the concept of 
professional dominance has stood to mean the ways in which the medical profession 
abuses its clinical expertise and legal monopoly into various forms of institutional, 
economic, occupational, and cultural dominance. 789  Freidson’s term “professional 
                                                 
787 M. Waters, ‘Collegiality, Bureaucratisation and Professionalisation: a Weberian Analysis’, 94 (1989) 
American Journal of Sociology 5, 945-972. 
788 Project of the ABIM Foundation, ACP-ASIM Foundation, and European Federation of Internal 
Medicine, ‘Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter’, 136 (2002) Annals 
of Internal Medicine 3, 243-246; D. Wear and J. M. Aultman (ed), Professionalism in Medicine: 
Critical Perspectives (New York, Springer, 2006), 38. 
789 See notes 484 and 485.  
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dominance” refers to a healthcare system whose organisation, laws and financing 
reflect the priorities of the medical profession to provide the best clinical medicine to 
every sick patient, which enhances the prestige and incomes of the profession, and 
protects the autonomy of professionals.790 This professional dominance model has 
been challenged by patient empowerment.  
 
In Western countries, the “informed decision making” model has replaced the 
paternalistic model in the field of health, 791  which means that the public are 
empowered to become more active and responsible consumers rather than just 
recipients of medical care. This change in the doctor-patient relationship brings 
together doctors and patients to become more of a partnership. This relational shift 
has been seen as a decline of medical professionalism in the West.792 The traditional 
idea that “doctor knows best” has shifted to a “consumerist” stance, accompanied by a 
questioning and bargaining approach to professional dominance.  
 
Haug contends that a marked increase in educational attainment has made the public 
less likely to view medical knowledge as mysterious.793 As a result, people are more 
likely to challenge the medics’ authority today than ever before, while professionals 
can no longer be governed by their own colleagues or associations. In addition, they 
are now also controlled by others. Throughout the history of Western medicine, the 
changes to professional roles reflect a shift in social conventions, and a move from 
passive patients to those who are adequately informed and make fully rational 
decisions in their own interests. This has not resulted in deprofessionalisation, though 
professionals are no longer in the dominant position in taking medical decisions. The 
move to patient empowerment gives patients and the public freedom to choose and 
freedom to decide in healthcare.  
                                                 
790 D. W. Light and A. Schuller, Political Values and Health Care: the German Experience (Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 1986), 14 -17. 
791 C. Charles, A. Gafni and T. Whelan, ‘Shared Decision-Making in the Medical Encounter: What 
does It Mean’, 44 (1997) Social Science and Medicine 5, 681-692. 
792 See e.g., E. Freidson, Professionalism Reborn: Theory, Prophecy, and Policy (Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 131-132, 156-157; E. Willis, ‘The Medical Profession in Australia’, 
in F. W. Hafferty and J. B. McKinlay (ed), The Changing Medical Profession: An International 
Perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), 108-109. 
793 M. R. Haug, ‘The Erosion of Professional Authority: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry in the Case of the 
Physician’, 54 (1976) Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 83-106; M. R. Haug and B. Lavin, 
‘Practitioner or Patient: Who is in Charge?’, 22 (1981) Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 212-
229; M. R. Haug and B. Lavin, Consumerism in Medicine: Challenging Physician Authority (Beverly 
Hill, Sage, 1983). 
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Empowering patients to take a proactive role in their healthcare is necessary, not only 
because patients and the public can act as a counterbalance to professional power by 
lobbying and advocating on their own, but also for the public’s sake. A more active 
role in healthcare, such as, prevention of illness by leading a healthy lifestyle, brings 
change to one’s life (though discussion of this is outside the scope of this thesis). A 
counter-balance to professional power is important, because of “the effective power of 
the client to criticize the professional and hold him responsible for his actions”.794  
 
In the UK, for example, in response to pressures from below and above for patient and 
public involvement, building a partnership between medical professionals and citizens 
has become a means managing medical power.795 In China, there is no limit to the 
examples of challenges to medics. Therefore, a calling for patient participation is no 
longer to counterbalance professional power, but more to build a culture of mutual 
understanding and support. The success of medical professionalism in China will lie 
in the relationship between medical practitioners and their patients. This requires 
wider public education; the emergence of civil societies that support patients’ rights 
and their welfare (for example Patient’s Associations); more patient-friendly public 
policies; and a transparent and effective complaints management system, etc. Instead 
of reacting passively and trying to avoid conflicts, local government needs to give 
patients and the public a stronger voice. Public participation – through public 
hearings and open meetings, publications of draft rules and polices for public 
comment – is one way of getting public acceptance and compliance.  
 
Additionally, I suggest that the public’s attention should be drawn towards preventive 
rather than remedial measures. Instead of resorting to violence, the public needs to 
have affordable independent patient advocates or “patient representatives” 796 – a 
person to whom patients can go with complaints; get solutions to a broad range of 
problems (both in and out of the hospital), and to have their interests in clinically 
                                                 
794 M. Haug, ‘Deprofessionalization: An Alternative Hypothesis for the Future’, 307 (1973) the 
Sociological Review Monograph 20, 95-211.  
795 T. Milewa, et al., ‘Partnership, Power and the ‘New’ Politics of Community Participation in British 
Health Care’, 36 (2002) Social Policy and Administration 7, 796-809. 
796 G. J. Annas, ‘Medical Remedies and Human Rights: Why Civil Rights Lawyers must Become 
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related negotiations represented. Moreover, patients also need to realise that medics in 
China are also “victims” of the failed healthcare system. Most Chinese medics are 
dedicated to their careers, despite having insufficient power, but have not tried hard 
enough to protect patient interests. Chinese patients, the public and medical 
practitioners need to form a partnership, not only to treat each other with dignity and 
respect but to see each other as partners in the process of decision making and care 
giving through informed consent, and also to fight together for their mutual interests 
and empowerment. And this would bring about a strengthened form of medical 
professionalism “that underpins the trust the public has in doctors”.797  
 
5.  Boundary Control from State and Law  
 
At the top level of the pentagonal model is the boundary between state and law. I 
suggest that the role of the state and law, namely bureaucratic, administrative, and 
legal governance should be soft rather than hard nosed management, so that more 
space can be left for the empowerment of medics and patients. Although it is assumed 
that healthcare professions carry moral and ethical responsibilities, boundary controls 
are also necessary to secure accountability and sanction those who break the rules. 
Qualifications for medics and professional organisations that are driven by 
professionalism should be tied to administrative and regulatory oversight.798  
 
This boundary control in the pentagonal model has a dual purpose. First, it claims that 
the medical profession should be given secure financial and regulatory support. 
Secondly, it suggests that proper oversight of professional practice and its self-
regulatory regime are also necessary. In other words, a nationally funded professional-
friendly healthcare system, and a legal environment which facilitates and supervises 
professionally-led regulation, are both needed to complete the ideal model. Issues and 
arguments that are raised from the state and legal boundary controls are explored in 
the next section.  
 
                                                 
797 Royal College of Physicians, ‘Medical Professionalism – a Force to Improve Patient Care’, 
(December 6th, 2005) RCP London Press Release. 
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5.1 State: A State Funded Professional-Friendly Healthcare System  
 
Professionalism is not an answer in itself: it requires substantive, defensible, and valid 
processes. One of the key ways modern professions achieve a dominant position is by 
acquiring power and authority from the state.799 Freidson says, “The foundation of 
medicine’s control over its work is thus clearly political in character, involving the aid 
of the state in establishing and maintaining the profession’s pre-eminence”. 800 To 
finally achieve a status of healthcare professionalism, building a sustainable 
healthcare system is the first step towards change.  
 
As discussed earlier, the Chinese healthcare system has not preformed well since it 
underwent a privatisation process. Government funding was reduced, and insurance 
coverage rates also dropped. Due to a lack of government funding, hospitals had to 
rely too heavily on fee-for-service principle. For years, practitioners in public 
hospitals have mainly operated using profits from medical services and drug 
prescriptions. Without sufficient oversight, this results in rampant over-prescription 
and, often outright corruption. This has caused dilemmas for many Chinese medics 
who want to practice ethically. As discussed in the empirical studies, a reform of the 
healthcare financial system is at the top of the Chinese medics’ wish list.  
 
China’s healthcare system is finally undergoing a new wave of reform. In January 
2009, the PRC State Council approved the Initiative for Health Reform. Under a plan 
passed by the State Council, China is set to spend more than 850 billion RMB (78 
billion British Pounds) by 2011, to build hospitals and clinics as part of an effort to 
provide basic, universal healthcare to the country’s 1.3 billion people by the end of 
2020.801 This new policy proposes major reforms in four areas: (1) the public health 
system, (2) the medical care delivery system, (3) the health security system, and (4) 
the pharmaceutical system.802  
                                                 
799 M. Moran and B. Wood, States, Regulations and the Medical Profession (Buckingham, Open 
University Press, 1993), 26. 
800 E. Freidson, Profession of Medicine: an Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (New York, 
Dodd Mead, 1970), 23. 
801 ‘State Council passes the Proposal of Health Reform’ (in Chinese), (January 21st, 2009) Xinhua 
News; also see PRC Council of State, ‘Healthcare Reform Initiative’ (in Chinese), 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-04/08/content_1280732.htm (Last visited on Oct 10th, 2010). 
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China’s official Xinhua News has said this:  
 
“The health care sector is one of the weak links in China’s social welfare system. Soaring 
medical fees, a lack of access to affordable medical services, poor doctor-patient relations 
and low medical insurance coverage compelled the government to launch the new round of 
reforms.”803 
 
Under the new policy, central government will completely subsidise the delivery of an 
“essential public health package” which includes a minimum of a 90% coverage by 
medical insurance to cover “basic medicines”, an improved network of local-level 
clinics, a better public health system and increased government support in public 
hospitals.804  
 
The 2009 healthcare reform opens a door of opportunity for change. Since the reforms 
were implemented a year ago, a series of regulations and guidelines has been 
introduced.805 The Chinese government has chosen 16 cities to pilot the reforms.806 
The cities, including six in central China, six in the east, and four in the west, were 
asked to introduce the reforms from that year.807 The government plans to evaluate 
the success of these early trials, and possibly conduct further trials with refined 
guidelines, before the healthcare reform is rolled out at a national level. China’s 
healthcare reform is therefore likely to be a lengthy process.  
 
One question raised about the 2009 health reform plan is how it might affect the 
Chinese medical practitioners and their practice. There are two main areas of reform 
which will affect the Chinese medical practitioners directly. First, the state plans to 
                                                 
803 ‘Chinese Pin Hope on Healthcare Reform’, (Sep Jan 22nd, 2009) Xinhua News. 
804 The Ministry of Health of PRC, ‘Implementation Plan for the Health Care Reform’ (in Chinese), 
April 7th 2009, available at: 
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essential drugs was released; in January 2010, a guideline on training and development of village 
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http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohzcfgs/s3576/list.htm (Last visited on Sep 
18th, 2010). 
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reform the public health system by providing free basic care to almost all Chinese 
citizens.808 This means there will be much more financial support from the state to the 
public hospitals. Public hospital medical practitioners will be much less likely 
therefore to rely on over-prescribing drugs in order to make a profit for their hospital. 
The reform initiative, however, does not address payment methods or any financial 
incentive mechanism for Chinese medics, nor does it address the role that patients 
could have in the new healthcare system. But we can expect that, with more state 
funding in place, China’s healthcare will become a better organised, centrally planned 
national health service.809 And the reform will not necessarily lead to an increase of 
Chinese medics’ incomes.810 
 
Second, the state is promoting a primary care delivery system, emphasising a great 
need for medical practitioner training for the rural areas of China. Section 10 of the 
Implementation Plan states,  
 
   “Develop and implement free training to general practitioners as well as recruiting more 
practitioners for rural areas. In three years, the state plans to provide training for 3.6 
hundred thousand medics in township hospitals, 1.6 hundred thousand medics in urban 
community health service institutions and 1.37 million medics in village clinics. The state 
also plans to improve urban - rural hospital partnership so that more support could be 
provided from urban to rural areas. The state will continue implementing the ‘thousands of 
physicians support rural health projects’, providing opportunities for doctors from rural 
areas to visit and have resident training in urban hospitals.”811 
 
The health reform requires a strengthening of human resources in primary care, 
encouraging more training of medical residents in primary care and advanced training 
in rural areas, where most primary care is delivered. Relocation of healthcare 
resources to the rural areas is not new in China. The “barefoot doctors” in Mao’s era 
served this aim. The current health reform plan demands a large increase in human 
resources. In total, the government plans to train 1.89 million more health workers. 
This exceptionally high number may boost China’s healthcare delivery. But it also 
                                                 
808 See note 804, Section 1. 
809 According to Enthoven, based on healthcare resource allocation, healthcare can be distinguished to 
be three categories: guide-free-choice system, centrally planned national health service, and Managed 
competition. See A. C. Enthoven, Theory and Practice of Managed Competition in Health Care 
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810 Interviews with Deputy Health Minister Huang Jiefu, S. Wang, ‘Don’t Expect the Healthcare 
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indicates there will be an increase in competition between Chinese medics for 
entering medical practice.  
 
The benefit of a state-funded health service is that it brings about distributive justice, 
providing a safety net for the poor and vulnerable, and reducing urban-rural 
imbalances. It also meets the need for effective public health and preventive 
programmes. However, there are also limitations of a state-funded health service. 
Under a centrally planned healthcare system, resources and budgets are likely to be 
tight and insufficient. This will result in, according to Polder and Jochemsen, first, a 
deterioration in the quality of care; and second, a private healthcare sector will emerge 
and cause distributive justice problems.812  
 
What is more, medical practitioners are major players in the healthcare system. In the 
state planned national health service, the state is bound to increasingly intervene in 
medical practice in order to control its budget.813 This does not mean a state planned 
national health service will necessarily take away professional power. Examples from 
the UK and Italy, which also have national health services show that, medics can have 
substantial autonomy under this system. But I fear that autonomy and professional 
power will be affected by China’s state planned health service. Healthcare 
practitioners who work for public hospitals are employees of the state, and as such are 
subject to state rules and reviews. Under these circumstances, the role of the state is 
likely to become stronger, while the professionals’ role may diminish. 
 
“The ambitious overhaul of the Chinese healthcare system is a challenge that won’t be 
solved by money alone”, said China’s Minister of Health, Chen Zhu.814 He admits 
that there is still an unsolved challenge that the Chinese government is struggling with. 
Without out-of-pocket payments from patients, how will Chinese hospitals cope with 
the resulting reduction in income? Minister Chen suggests that there are unsolved 
problems existing in the Chinese healthcare system that cannot be solved by money 
alone. He mentioned the role of government, hospitals, and insurance companies 
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within the health reform plan. What he and the Health Reform Initiative have missed, 
I would argue, is the role of the medical profession and patients (To focus on my 
research question, I mainly discuss the role of the profession here).  
 
In my proposed pentagon-shaped model, I suggest that China not only needs a state-
funded healthcare system, but also a professional-friendly state-funded healthcare 
system. Minister Chen is concerned that a reduction in hospital income without 
enough back up from the state will cause problems. He dismisses the possibility that 
income reduction could be offset by cost-saving measures taken by the main players 
in healthcare delivery - medical practitioners and patients.  
 
One main reason for suggesting an involvement of medics at the various levels of the 
healthcare system in the budgetary process is because a state funded-health system 
always has a budget. Although patients are not usually involved in budgetary 
decision-making, their awareness of cost-savings might contribute to their choices 
when facing differing treatment methods. A trusted relationship between patients and 
medical professionals is therefore necessary. As the direct providers and recipients of 
healthcare, it is medics and patients who play key roles in suggesting and deciding 
how much diagnostic and therapeutic intervention is needed. Though patients can take 
part in the medical decision-making process, it is medics who should take the leading 
role of budget checking and balancing the budget. This is why I suggested a 
professionally friendly healthcare system in the pentagonal model. Healthcare can 
only be developed to its fullest, if professionals are given extensive autonomy and 
control over services, even if within a limited budget. 815  
 
It has been argued that professional autonomy means a loose and decentralized 
organisation that ignores prevention and public health, because too much attention is 
paid to ‘professional work’ without carefully monitoring costs. 816 But this is less 
likely happen in a state-funded system, where, in principle, state-administrated 
regulation or oversight ensures public accountability.    
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5.2 Law: Facilitating Professionally-led Self-Regulation    
 
     “To govern better, the state had to govern less.” 
 
                                                                                                       Ciccarelli 817  
 
Regulating medical practitioners is similar in many ways to regulating other 
occupations, but there is also a difference in regulating medicine: that is, generally, 
medical practitioners are regarded as professionals and have a well-developed code of 
ethics that distinguishes this profession from other occupations. In the pentagon-
shaped model, legal control of professionalism is particularly important for ensuring 
that the aim of professionally-led self-regulation is to serve the public interest. 
 
This section outlines the need for legislators to establish rules for professionally-led 
self-regulation in China, so that medical practitioners can be given legitimacy to 
exercise their autonomy whilst patients’ interests are protected. It discusses the nature 
of law, addressing questions about how rules are made and put into effect, and what 
medical practitioners can gain from such a regulatory framework, rather than the 
detailed substance of rules.  
 
Before undertaking a detailed discussion of how to organise this facilitating role of the 
law, the first question that needs to be answered is, why should there be a role for the 
judicial system in the pentagon-shaped model, especially in the light of earlier 
discussion about the ineffectiveness of legal implementation and of pro-Communist 
legislation. One might argue it would be of no use to argue for legislation if the state 
bureaucracy itself does not respect the law and regards it only as a way to express and 
achieve its will. The reason that I still have faith in the law, and so advocate it as part 
of the pentagon model is because legislation which sets up clear boundaries for the 
use of medicine could better protect the public as well as the doctors. Politically 
instrumentalised medicalisation would lose its legitimacy if such clear legislation 
were in place. Overall, Chinese government officers are keen to improve the legal 
system in order to achieve its political modernisation. Although it would appear that 
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there is a long way to go before legislators fully respect the law and justice, such 
legislation could assist progress. Clear laws can serve as a marker to remind 
legislators of the original purpose of legislation, and the direction in which they 
planned to lead the country in the best interests of its people. 
 
China’s post-Cultural Revolution Constitution (adopted in 1982), established the 
principle that all power belongs to the Chinese people, who are to manage state affairs; 
it required state organanisations to “heed their opinions and suggestions, accept their 
supervision and work hard to serve their interests”.818 The pentagon model supports 
this constitutional principle, by promoting greater involvement of Chinese medical 
professionals as well as the public, in the process of formulating the legislation and 
the policies related to healthcare issues. The following analysis goes on to discuss the 
setting-up of clear legal guidelines for professionally-led regulations, together with 
related supervision measures.   
 
(1) Clear Legal Guidelines for Professionally-led Regulations 
 
Clear guidelines and regulation must be in place to ensure transparency in 
professionally-led regulation. Professional standards 819 are developed in the social 
and educational structure of medicine itself and articulated in the professional 
publications and activities of organised medicine. The essence of these standards 
captures a sense of individual commitment towards the profession, which should also 
be internalised by practitioners during education, training and continued professional 
development.  
 
Friedman has argued that best practice should encourage individuals to govern 
themselves, within a legal structure guaranteed by the state.820 “Just as a common 
morality is accepted by all moral persons, so most professions contain, at least, 
implicitly, a professional morality with standards of conduct that are generally 
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acknowledged by those who are serious about their moral responsibilities.”821 The 
notion of professionals as experts in the service of public interests could serve as an 
important source of standards and moral authority in a market-orientated economic 
society like China.822  
 
Recognising that there are a wide variety of professional regulations, and different 
ways of regulating the medical profession in different countries reflects the fact that 
the medical profession and the state negotiate very differently over the contract 
governing heath care delivery. Such international differences are due to varying 
degrees of tolerance towards competition, individualism, and the role of government 
within individual political cultures.  
 
According to Moran and Wood, the role of the law in regulating medical practitioners 
and the degree of independent self-regulation is generally based on three broad 
approaches: independent self-regulation; state sanctioned self-regulation; and state-
administrated regulation. 823  Independent self-regulation has been criticised as 
presenting serious problems of accountability. In contrast to it, state-sanctioned self-
regulation brings self-regulatory institutions under state supervision, whilst the 
institutions retain their function of carrying out the regulation of detailed tasks. The 
third way to regulate medical practitioners is by state-administered regulation, carried 
out by public institutions. This is commonly applied in welfare states where 
healthcare is state funded, and healthcare professionals, as employees of the state, are 
also subject to the rules of public accountability and review.  
 
The degree of independent self-regulation in China is also related to the role of 
Chinese law in regulating medical practitioners. From my analysis, Chinese 
healthcare is under state-administrated regulation for the following reasons: China has 
a long tradition of an authoritarian state governance. Over the past two decades, 
Chinese leaders and legal scholars have come to recognise that achieving rational and 
effective regulation in a rapidly-changing modern society requires the opening up 
China’s law-making and regulatory processes to a far greater degree than ever before 
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in China’s long history. The 2000 PRC Law on Legislation  stipulates that, legislation 
should reflect the will of the people and requires, for the first time, that the Chinese 
people should “participate in legislation through various channels”824 Thus under a 
Chinese state-funded healthcare system, the role of law in the pentagon model is still 
very likely to be a state-administered regulation, assuming, in the first place, that 
Chinese leaders might not be willing to hand over too much of their power too soon to 
the medical practitioners. However, when changes to the healthcare system, and a 
culture of public and professional engagement, and more importantly, an endorsement 
of codes of ethics for medical practice are all in place, there will be the potential for 
pure state-administered regulation to mix with state-sanctioned self-regulation. Such 
possible change, though, not the ideal pentagon-shaped model as proposed, would be 
a positive sign that Chinese medical practitioners are no longer subject to absolute 
control by the state and would be gaining more power. This possible trend would be, 
not only in the interests of professionals and the public, but would also save the 
government administrative costs.  
 
(2) Supervising Professionally-led Regulations 
 
Maintaining the power of medical practitioners, within the growing trend of patient 
empowerment, is also an issue that needs to be taken into consideration. 
Accountability, according to d’Oronzio, is a social practice in which the conduct of an 
individual healthcare professional is reviewed in the light of public policies and 
professional standards of conduct. 825  In Western societies, there has long been a 
history of combining external regulation, under the penalty of the law, and self-
regulation by consensus of the medical profession.  
 
To avoid potential misbehaviour from within the profession and maintain 
accountability, there is a need to provide surveillance over professional activities. 
Western experience of state-licensed legislation normally includes a full range of 
methods: initial licensing requirements, qualifications, continuous tracking and 
record-keeping of activities connected with subsequent licensing, scrutinizing failures 
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to comply with requirements, pursuing complaints through active investigation and 
disciplining transgressors.826 As part of a professional architecture, a state licensing 
board can take action against unprofessional behaviour, in the interests of patient 
safety and continuing trust in the profession. On the one hand, rules of licensing, 
monitoring and disciplining can be regarded as a safety net, which is necessary for 
ensuring effective medical practice. On the other hand, such rules can become 
distracting and jeopardise professional autonomy, or even be decried by medical 
practitioners as “attacking the very nature of their profession.”827 However, a balance 
must be struck and, in my opinion, the benefit of state licensing legislation should be 
recognised and be introduced to China, whilst taking into account any potentially 
negative effects.  
 
The law and morals do not always coincide in the guidance that they offer and there 
still is an unanswered question as to the extent to which the law should enforce moral 
judgements. Formal instruction and attempts to codify professional morality have 
increased in recent years through codes of medical and nursing ethics, and codes of 
research ethics.828 In areas as diverse as informed consent, medical malpractice law 
and confidentiality, as well as other torts and criminal law related to medical practice 
and treatment, there has been a huge growth in the scale of litigation brought against 
the medical profession, and a tendency to limit professional power through court 
decisions.829 Professional regulation, to some extent, can be seen as legislating ethics. 
Western scholars regard state legislative ethics reform as a scandal-driven process.830 
The increase in legislation reflects a decline in confidence in doctors. This decline in 
confidence is yet another way of strengthening control when professionalism faces 
criticism, as discussed earlier.  
                                                 
826 See e.g., AMA, ‘Medical Licensure’, available at: http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/education-
careers/becoming-physician/medical-licensure.shtml; GMC, ‘General Information about registration 
and licensing’, available at: http://www.gmc-
uk.org/doctors/before_you_apply/registration_factsheet.asp (Last visited on Jan 20th, 2011). 
827 M. J. Schlesinger, B. H. Gray and K. M. Perreira, ‘Medical Professionalism under Managed Care: 
The Pros and Cons of Utilization Review’, 16 (1997) Health Affair 1, 106-124, 1. 
828 See e.g., B. A. Rosenson, The Shadowlands of Conduct: Ethics and State Policies (Washington, 
Georgetown University Press, 2005), 13-15; C. Ham and K.G.M. Alberti, ‘The Medical Profession, the 
Public and the Government’, 324 (2002) British Medical Journal 838-842.  
829 Ibid. 
830 A. Rosenthal, Drawing the Line: Legislative Ethics in the States (New York, Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1996); M. Goodman, et al., ‘Ethical Instruction at School of Public Health in the United States’, 
89 (1999) American Journal of Public Health 5; B. A. Rosenson, ‘The Cost and Benefits of Ethics 
Law’, 8 (2005) International Public Management Journal 2, 209-224.  
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However the problem China faces is that, Chinese legislators have drawn strongly on 
Western experience and are following the West in drafting the law, regulations and 
policies in order to maximise the prevention of misconduct by medical practitioners. 
This has taken place in circumstances where the Chinese medics have not yet reached 
a position of professional dominance, and concurrently, there are still a relatively 
large number of illiterate people among the general public in China.831 Many people 
are afraid to make decisions when they cannot fully understand the information given 
by their doctors. The previously discussed case – “a migrant worker in Beijing, 
refused to sign a consent form authorising doctors to perform a C-section on his 
pregnant wife, and then she and their baby died”, is a good example. Clearly, then, 
with regard to China’s healthcare law-making, there is a gap between professional 
development, public awareness and legislation.  
 
As discussed earlier, the enacting of the 2002Regulation on the Handling of Medical 
Accidents putting the burden of proof on medical practitioners raised great concern 
from those whom I encountered in the field. In the research interviews, Chinese 
doctors told me that they thought the law was actually de-motivating doctors from 
saving patients. One of them said, “I knew it was immoral to persuade patients I did 
not think had fully understood what I meant to sign the informed consent forms but, 
according to the law, I had to get that patient’s signature to save his life.” The answer 
to the question “Does professional regulation make physicians too anxious to take 
risks in treatment?” was strongly affirmative. “We need to follow the law carefully to 
avoid litigation, and we know that, eventually, it is the patient who bears the 
consequence.”  
 
Professionally-led and state-administered regulations for medical practice should 
come hand-in-hand with an enhancement of professionalism. Legal development is as 
                                                 
831 According to United Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, based on the 5th 
national population census of 2000, there were 85.07 million adult illiterates, of which 22.27 million 
were male and 63.2 million were female. Statistics of National population are based on national 
population census, sample survey of 1% of national population and sample survey of 1‰ conducted 
every 10 years, 5 years and per year. See, United Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation, ‘Country Paper: Status and Major Challenges of Literacy in China’, June 2010, available 
at: http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/ED/pdf/E9China_literacy.pdf (Last 
visited on Oct 9th, 2010). 
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important as preserving morality. I would also argue that, to some extent, the 
regulation of medical ethics in China has caused a decline of ethics. For some Chinese 
medical practitioners, a priority was given to self-protection from litigation and 
sanctions, rather than humanitarian consideration. Professional regulation, which was 
supposed to be a mechanism for protecting patients and the public, has instead 
become a mechanism for the self-protection of medical practitioners. This would also 
explain why, in my empirical findings, Chinese medical practitioners and their 
associated health institutions have high levels of legal awareness. When the law is in 
conflict with ethics, medics would rather choose to follow law than ethics. Medical 
regulations in China, which are very different from those in the West, have become a 
shield for relatively powerless medical practitioners.  
 
The question of balancing the supervision of ethics and self-regulation echoes back to 
my original question: how to retain professional autonomy within a framework of 
accountability? Clearly, a system of professionalism needs to be built. What is more, 
the system of professionalism needs to be consistent with professional regulation and 
governance. In the pentagon model, I classified professional regulation as a boundary 
control, precisely because “the law alone would be inadequate to maintain the 
cohesion of society: moral prescriptions are essential.”832 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
“We have not lost faith, but we have transferred it from God to the medical 
professions.”   
                   
                                                                                      George Bernard Shaw833 
 
The role of the medical practitioners in China tends to be practical and technocratic. 
Their professional awareness is affected by the Chinese values of freedom and social 
control. The aims of this chapter were to point out that their professional ethics is of 
crucial importance in enabling them to reach a higher stage of professionalisation and 
                                                 
832 Lord Devlin, ‘Morals and the Criminal Law’, Maccabaean Lecture, British Academy, 1958, cited by 
R. A. Hinde, ‘Law and the Sources of Morality’, 359 (2004) Philosophical Transactions: Biological 
Sciences 1685-1695. 
833 Famous quote, source not found, cited by M. S. Schlesinger, ‘A Loss of Faith: The Sources of 
Reduced Political Legitimacy for the American Medical Profession’, 80 (2002) The Milbank Quarterly 
2, 185-235. 
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eventually medical professionalism. Taking into account the role of the public and the 
input of patients, this becomes an important factor when striking the right balance of 
power for the medical profession in China.  
 
Sun Simiao, who wrote the so-called Chinese Hippocratic Oath said, “Greed was 
evidently one of the most serious grounds for the suspicions in which the public held 
the practices of physicians.”834 The gaining of trust is an essential trait of a formulated 
ethic. The essence of professional accountability is to maintain medicine as a public 
activity. As d’Oronzio said, “the more public the behaviour, the more likely it is to be 
exposed to this practice of accountability.”835  
 
The nexus of accountability that surrounds medical practice depends upon 
transparency, as well as intact, sustained lines of communication and engagement. 
Thus, the major challenge facing healthcare professionals is whether or not their 
professionalism, whilst retaining commitment to patients’ well-being and trust, can be 
reinvented to include performance-based competency, scientifically-driven quality of 
improvement, and public disclosure of valid quality information.  
 
Observing interactions between this profession and society in a totalitarian state such 
as China, it is suggested that the medical professionals could generate power if they 
managed to join together as an autonomous professional group, together with 
members of the public; and in order to sustain the power they gain, they have to 
respond to the public expectations and desires of being accountable and trustworthy.  
 
Biopolitical theorists Fehér and Heller suggest that, “communism as one biopolitics 
had no other choice but to be part and parcel of democratic politics”.836 It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to discuss wider political reform. But one cannot forget that 
the professional model is based on the democratic notion that people are capable of 
                                                 
834 P. U. Unschuld, Medical Ethics in Imperial China (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979), 
28. 
835 J. C. d’Oronzio, ‘Practicing Accountability in Professional Ethics’, 13 (2002) The Journal of 
Clinical Ethics 4, 360.   
836 F. Fehér and A. Heller, Biopolitics (Aldershot, Avebury, 1994), 21. 
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controlling themselves by cooperative, collective means, and that those who perform a 
service are in the best position to make sure that it gets done well.837  
 
In order to revive professionalism, this thesis calls on a structural realignment 
between decentralised communities (such as patient groups), professional experts, and 
the state in China. Three levels of control (from ethics, interactive participation and 
boundaries) in an age of medical professionalism would form a more balanced and 
ideal model as shown below:  
                          
                                        State                    Law 
                   
                                             Medical Ethics 
 
In this pentagonal model, there would be a better balance of power in healthcare 
governance. It would also provide space for developing a support system for 
professional codes, and a better support system for “whistleblowers”. As a 
consequence of which, the role of professionals will be better established.  
 
In conclusion, the effort to maintain professionalism is essentially an ethical and 
political project. The project is to help members of the medical community to develop 
within themselves the moral character required to act appropriately.838 Professionals 
could gain public support by seeking to serve the public good, rather than for the 
benefit of their own interests individually or collectively. Such a power-dynamic 
serves to promote confidence and authority, to address key relational problems 
between medical professionals, patients and the state, and to foster solidarity with 
other members.839 Trust would be fostered in both the process and outcome of this 
endeavour. Professionalisation, ultimately the development of medical 
                                                 
837 E. Freidson, ‘Professionalism as Model and Ideology’, Professionalism Reborn: Theory, Prophecy 
and Policy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994), 176.  
838 D. Wear and J. M. Aultman (ed), Professionalism in Medicine: Critical Perspectives (New York, 
Springer, 2006), 37. 
839 Ibid, 32. 
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professionalism, would secure a more professionally responsible and accountable 
environment in China.  
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CHAPTER 10 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
1.   Summary  
 
At the beginning of this study, the following questions were asked:  
(1)  How do Chinese medical practitioners react to state governance and law?  
(2) Whether, how and why do law or political ideology take priority over medical 
ethics and professional knowledge, or vice versa?  
(3) Do Chinese medics feel frustration over their role within the healthcare system and 
think that their current position in the healthcare arena is problematic? 
(4) If so, what are the causes, effects and solutions? 
 
Throughout the study (which consists of three parts: literature review; empirical 
studies findings; and reflection and discussion), I have shown that Chinese medical 
practitioners take the law and state policies very seriously, though confusion and 
moral dilemmas do exist within ethical-legal or ethical-financial conflicts. In this 
respect, cultural acceptance contributes to their silence, and the submission of 
individual professionals to the state conforms most closely to the stereotype of a 
captive practitioner. Although Chinese medical practitioners express high 
expectations for more power and professional control, in this study so far, a wide 
range of resistance is still less likely to happen. There are uncertainties on the Chinese 
medics’ road to professionalism.   
 
This thesis has moved the discussion from a hypothetical tripartite relationship 
between state, law and medics to a top-down model after concluding the literature 
review which provides background and conceptual framework. Based on the 
empirical studies, I modified the top-down model and suggested a circular model in 
light of medics’ understanding of the system. I then identified a problem that had 
received little attention – medical deprofessionalisation in China. After examining the 
underlying issues which lead to medical deprofessionalisation, I called for 
professionalism in China’s healthcare arena, thus a square model was suggested. But 
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it was also noted that there would be limitations for medical professionalism within 
the square model. This led to the final suggestion of a pentagon model which asked 
for the balance of power in medical professionalism. 
 
(1)  A Tripartite Relationship 
                                                    Healthcare Governance (the State) 
Medical Profession/Medical Ethics Medical Law 
 
At the beginning, the initial question was to find out how Chinese medical 
practitioners interacted with law, state governance and bioethics. This thesis was 
especially interested in understanding the position and power of medical practitioners 
in the tripartite relationship, and exploring ways in which their medical practices are 
affected by the guiding principles, such as law or ethics, and whether they face 
dilemmas in choosing guiding principles in practices.  
 
Before exploring this journey into China’s power structure of healthcare professional 
governance, this thesis began with a review of Western model of state, law and 
medical profession. In the area of Western healthcare governance, the state, based at 
the top, decides the nature of the healthcare system and supervise the direction of 
healthcare legislation. The Western medics have their say by exerting influence on 
state policies and even voice their resistance towards healthcare laws. Therefore a 
triangular-shaped model was drafted as an initial hypothesis.  
 
(2)  Literature Review: A Top-down Relationship      
                                  
                                             State  
                                               
                                             Law 
                               
                Medical Practitioners/Medical Ethics 
Chapter 10 Summary and Conclusion 
301 
 
Both the historical and theoretical review indicated that, within China’s healthcare 
power dynamics, Chinese medical practitioners are located at the bottom of a 
hierarchical structure. These practitioners are subject to political oversight, legal 
control and institutional scrutiny. The role that Chinese medical practitioners play in 
healthcare governance is minor. And it is hard to discover in literature their views and 
awareness concerning their professional responsibilities. 
 
The top-down linear model was used to express the notion that the state remains at the 
top of the power structure determining the healthcare law and overseeing the legally-
ruled Chinese medics. This top-down model can also be understood as a simplified 
healthcare regulatory framework, where the Chinese medical practitioners are based at 
the bottom. This top-down linear model was to be tested by the empirical studies. The 
main questions to be asked empirically were: how do Chinese medics prioritise law, 
political ideology, and medical ethics? How do they perceive their position in relation 
to the state, law and ethics? Do they think their role in this healthcare power dynamics 
is in any way problematic?       
 
(3)  Fieldwork and Findings: A Verified Top-down Model and a Circular-shaped 
Perception  
 
                                                        State  
                                                  
                                                        Law 
                                     
                           Medical Practitioners/Medical Ethics 
 
The Chinese healthcare power structure reflects a top-down, authoritarian model with 
centralised command and control. The authorisation of state intervention is the 
strongest proponent within the relationship between state, law and medics (and their 
ethics). The empirical investigations deepened my hypothetical understandings of 
medical practitioners’ position in China’s healthcare power dynamic: that is, they are 
based at the bottom of healthcare power structure; however it does not mean medical 
practitioners have absolutely no sense of resistance.  
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                                            Medical Laws  
  
                                            Practitioners 
 
Findings in the empirical study were that different levels of medical institutes and 
medics take law seriously. They said bioethics (or professional morality) was also 
important. However, in practice, they did not follow professional ethics, but the law. 
Hospital Party branches act as the main resource for training Chinese medics in 
medical law and bioethics. In this training, political propaganda is mixed with law and 
bioethics. In Chinese medics’ perception, there seems to be no clear divide between 
state governance, medical law and bioethics. The voices of dissatisfaction and power 
seeking from Chinese medics exist, but they are not loud enough to be heard. 
Opportunities for collective resistance are not obvious either. The circular diagram 
represents this fluid and confused state of affairs.  
 
(4)   A Calling for Professionalism: A Square-shaped Model  
 
State Governance                     Medical Law 
 
Medical Ethics                       Medical Professionals 
 
The third part of this thesis offers an analysis of the problem and a possible solution. 
Recognising the top-down relationship, and the “circular” understanding expressed by 
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medical professionals (note: not merely practitioners) become involved in healthcare 
governance. By including medical professionals in healthcare governance, this square-
shaped model resembles a suggested change to the original triangular model, i.e. 
medical professionals and professional ethics should work hand in hand more 
effectively in healthcare. 
 
(5)   Empowerment and the Balance of Power: A Pentagon-shaped Model 
 
                                         State         Law 
                                    
                                          Medical Ethics 
 
Professionalism is a controversial notion to Western societies where too much power 
has been vested in the professionals. The pentagon-shaped model was suggested as a 
way to find a balance between a necessary freedom for medical professionals and a 
sufficient measure of accountability to ensure their responsiveness to social needs and 
agreed social purposes. The dynamics of this new pentagonal model are that it 
connects professionalism with patient participation. What is more, horizontally, this 
model can be divided into three tiers (state & law, medical profession & patients, and 
ethics) while the whole model still shows a visible compact network between the 
different parties in healthcare governance. In this model, the empowered professionals 
are guided by law and affected by legislation; patients are supported by a state-funded 
healthcare system and can voice their reactions to the state agencies; ethics underpins 
all healthcare party interactions, especially those of the medics.  
 
Power in the pentagon model is not held by any single party. None of the party – the 
medical professionals, patients, government bureaucracy, should capture absolute 
power. It is not meant to suggest the elimination of either the professionals’ or 
patients’ power; instead it suggests the necessity for their involvement in a healthcare 
Medical Professionals Patients 
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governance network, in which state, law, professionals and patients can work together 
for a common purpose: humanity and care.  
 
2.   Conclusion 
 
“Politics is part of man’s nature; man through the exercise of his reason, can make 
enlightened decisions, indeed, ethical decisions;  put succinctly, politics is the study 
of ethics, emphasizing the “proper” relations among men, relations which are a 
function of man’s place in the larger natural order.”  
 
                                                                                                             I. H. Carman840 
 
My desire to explore the gap between China’s healthcare governance system and the 
operation of medical law has led to the discovery of a missing role for Chinese 
medical practitioners. In an effort to hear the hidden voices of Chinese medics from 
history, from today through empirical studies and case studies, and against a robust 
theoretical analysis of power, my findings and my thinking have brought me to a firm 
conviction about the need for professionalism in China. This journey has been 
intellectually and emotionally challenging, and rewarding in equal measure. 
 
I am aware that there are limitations to this research. The project would have greatly 
benefited from hearing the views of a range of Chinese medics from wider 
geographical areas. My limited number of fieldwork respondents was like “a drop in 
the ocean”, and while my findings are of value, I cannot claim that they represent the 
views of the majority of Chinese medics. If the social and political environment had 
permitted, it would have been useful to have heard views from a randomly chosen 
sample rather than from the controversial snow-ball sample. Due to financial and time 
constraints, the empirical data provides only a “snap-shot” of the field. The project 
would have contained more convincing evidence if a longer, more continuous period 
of field study had been possible.   
 
However, the strengths of this research far outweigh its limitations. This research 
throws light upon the existing weaknesses of the Chinese system and offers up a 
possible strategy for the future of China’s healthcare governance. By considering the 
                                                 
840 I. H. Carmen, ‘Biopolitics: the Newest Synthesis?’, 99 (1999) Genetica 173-184. 
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development of Chinese medical practitioners, not just from a socio-historical 
perspective, but also from an empirical viewpoint, it exposes a need to assign Chinese 
medical professionals a ‘proper’ and ‘rightful’ place in the modern health service. The 
study of Chinese medical deprofessionalisation contributes to our understanding of 
the relationship between the medical profession and the Communist state of China. It 
is also hoped that, by placing such an analysis in its wider socio-cultural context, the 
lessons of medical deprofessionalisation in China provide further clarity and insight to 
discussions of the interface between professions and political forces in other societies. 
Last but not least, I suggest that this thesis can be used as an exemplar to demonstrate 
the usefulness of a multi-methods approach for studying questions concerning the 
relationships, complexities and boundaries between political structures, legislation, 
professionalism and the public interest. 
 
Having established a distinct place for bio-power and bio-politics in this thesis, 
possible future research might focus in much more detail on the political theories that 
relate to power, medicine and medical practice. The notions of professionalisation and 
professionalism that the literature shows have largely been discussed by Western 
scholars might help to stimulate further debates on their potential contributions to 
underdeveloped societies. In light of the proposed pentagon-shaped model, future 
research might also examine the possibilities for developing patients’ input into 
healthcare governance, an exercise that was not possible within the confines of this 
thesis. 
 
A recollection from Beauchamp and Childress brings this thesis to its conclusion: 
“Problems of professional ethics usually arise from conflicts over professional 
standards or conflicts between professional commitments and commitments of 
persons outside the profession.”841 Chinese medical practitioners are equally faced 
with these dilemmas: how best to serve the country and help to make it rich, powerful, 
and modern without compromising intellectual and moral values.  I believe China will 
forge its own path, though it may not necessarily lead to a Western-style, liberal 
democracy. However, this does not mean that medical professionalism can never be 
generalised in China, nor that we cannot have hope for a freer China which respects 
                                                 
841 See note 326, at 7. 
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professional autonomy and self-regulation. By emphasising the values of medical 
ethics, professional consciousness, the need for more effective healthcare policies and 
laws, and by inspiring the Chinese medical profession to take back some of its power, 
we may move one step closer to this vision of China.  
 
Last but not least, this study is a cross-cultural dialogue. It tends to express its 
findings and opinions in the most respectful ways rather than in arrogant terms. All of 
this is done with a hope that the Chinese government could be more accepting and 
responsive to the call to loosen its control over professional power. The most 
profound hope is that Chinese medical practitioners themselves will not view the 
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Questionnaire Form (in English) 
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Study of Chinese Physicians’ Legal Consciousness and 






Dear Medical Professionals, I’m so sorry to bother you all,   
 
 
My name is Wei Ouyang and I am a Ph.D. candidate in Law with a specialization in 
medical law and medical ethics at The University of Edinburgh. I am writing today to 
invite you to participate in my doctoral dissertation research on 'China's Public 
Health Biopolitics: Roles of Law and Medical Ethics'. The main purpose of this study 
is to explore the ways in which the medical practices of health workers are affected 
by guiding principles, such as law or ethics, and dilemmas over choosing guiding 
principles in medical practices in China.  
 
If you choose to participate by completing the survey questionnaire, it will take 
approximately 20 minutes to complete. Your identity is in no way connected to your 
responses and confidentiality is given the highest priority. If you have any questions, 
please feel free to contact me either by email (w.ouyang@sms.ed.ac.uk) or by phone 
(0044 784 035 1851).  
 
This project is subject to the institutional ethical review from the University of 
Edinburgh. This research project aims to design and conduct in a way that meets 
ethical principles of the College of Humanities and Social Science Code of Research 
Ethics and the ethical code of ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) 2005. 
 
Your opinions and experiences are very important to me. Thank you very much for 





Wei Ouyang, Ph.D. Candidate 
School of Law, 













Questionnaire Form (in English) 
- 2 - 
Part 1.   Medical Law and Medical Professionals 
 
1. Are you aware of any law regulating medical practice?   
 
A. Yes, I study laws and regulations relevant to my practice closely. 
B. Yes, I learn few of laws.  
C. Yes, but I don’t know much detail about it. 
D. No, I don’t know any law related to my medical practices. 
            E.   I am not sure. 
            F.   No comments. 
 
2. Do you think you understand laws and regulations that relevant to my practice 
clearly? 
 
A. Yes, I always understand what the law requires me to do in any situation.  
B. Yes, I understand law occasionally. 
C. No, I am often not sure what the law requires. 
D. No, I am never sure. 
E. No comments. 
      
3.  Do you think it is important to apply the law regulating your area of practice to 
your work? 
 
A.  Yes, it is very important. 
B.  Yes, it is relatively important. 
C.  No, it is not. 
D.  I am not sure. 
E.  No comments. 
  
     If you answer “yes”, how often do you apply it to your work? 
 
A. Yes, I do and I apply it to my practice carefully. 
B. Yes, I do but I’d rather follow my professional ethics. 
C. Yes, but I don’t think I understand it clearly. 
D. No, I don’t think it is necessary. 
E. No comments. 
 
   If you answer “yes”, why do you think so? Please choose whatever you think is 
or are relevant.  
   
  A.   It can be a tool for use for protecting myself against possible law suits. 
     B.   It can be my guide to better understand patient’s rights.  
     C.   One of my duty as a decent citizen is to follow the rule.   
     D.   If I didn’t, I would be punished by law.  
     E.   It is the safest way to practise medicine in China, even though the legally 
rightness don’t mean medically rightness.  
     F.   It is encouraged by current dominant political thoughts. 
     G.  And others: ______________________________(please specify) 
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4.   Are there law promotion campaigns in your hospital? 
 
A. Yes, it is. 
B. No, it isn’t. 
C. I don’t know. 
D. No comments. 
 
5.   What sort of law do you pay most attention to? Please choose whatever you 
think is or are relevant.  
 
      A.   Professional codes, ethics consult;  
      B.   Regulating general medical practice;  
      C.   Regulating medical and clinical malpractice;  
      D.   Legal and moral questions concerning the beginning and the end of life;  
      E.    Legal aspects of medical research;   
      F.    Legal aspects of medical product and medical device usage;  
      G.   Legal procedure of medical law making;  
 H.   And others: ______________________________(please specify) 
 
      6.   How do you know about these laws?  
 
A. At school;  
B. Through hospitals on-the-job training;  
C. Through law promoting campaign;  
D. From colleagues;  
E. By self-learning from library, internet, or media;  
F. Others: _________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
7.   What do you think the motivation of these campaigns? 
 
A. In reaction to patients’ increasing demand, legal knowledge can be used 
for defending medical practices and protecting medics; 
B. Reduce prospected suit cost; 
C. For better protecting patients’ best interests; 
D. It is ordered by higher administrative governances; 
E. To reduce conflict between patients and medics in order to maintain a 
harmonious working environment. 
F.   Others: _________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
      8.   Do you think there should be more involvement of medical professionals in 
medical law making in China?  
 
A.  Yes, it is very important. 
B.  Yes, it is relatively important. 
C.  No, it is not. 
D.  I am not sure. 
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      If you answer “yes”, could you please give a reason? 
 
A. Professional review of medical law is for patients’ best interests. 
B. Law should act more to protect medical professionals. 
C. I wish Chinese Medical Association should have been more actively 
engaged in defending our interests.  
D. Even I think so, but I personally not feel interested in involving in law 
drafting debate. 
            F. Other: _________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
    9.   Have you ever heard of “China Health Law Society”? 
 
     A. Yes, I have joined or is planning to join in it. 
     B. Yes, I heard of it, but I don’t plan to be a member of it. 
     C. Yes, but I am not sure what it is. 
     D. No, I have never heard of it. 
     E. No comments. 
 
 
Part 2.   Healthcare Governance and Healthcare Professionals  
 
1.   In terms of China’s current health service, do you think it is in harmony with 
the public? 
 
A. Yes, all the time. 
B. Yes, most of the time. 
C. No, conflicts happen very often. But I believe things will be better. 
D. No, conflicts can’t be solved in a short term. The situation is so complicate. 
 
2. Has your practice been affected by China’s health sector reform? 
 
A. Yes, it affects my practice in a good way. 
B. Yes, it affects my practice in a bad way. 
            C. No, my practice hasn’t been affected at all. 
            D. Not sure. 
            E. No comments. 
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3. Do you think good medical practice is important to secure a “Harmonious 
Society”? 
 
A. Yes, it is very important. 
B. Yes, it is relatively important. 
C. No, it is not. 
D. I am not sure. 
E. No comments. 
 
      If you answer “yes”, could you please give a reason? 
 
      A. Health care services are closely related with public interests. 
      B. Politicians have emphasised its function to harmonious society very often 
      C. Current trust crisis between doctors and patients have proved this.  
D. Others: _________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
4.   Besides of law promotion campaign, is political thought education accessible 
at your serving medical institute?  
 
            A. Yes. 
            B. No. 
            C. I don’t know.  
            D. No comments. 
 
           If “yes”, where do you usually get your political thought updated? Please 
choose whatever you think is or are relevant to you. 
 
A. I get the latest political thought update from regular seminars in my    
hospital. 
B. Yes, I get it mostly from branch party discussion group of my hospital. 
C. Yes, I get it often from TV, newspaper or magazines. 
D. No, I am not interest in political issues.  
E. Others: _________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
5.  Do you think you should connect the latest political thought with your practice? 
 
A. Yes, it is very important. 
B. Yes, it is relatively important. 
C. No, it is not. 
D. I am not sure. 
E. No comments. 
 
      6.  What functions does the hospital’s party branch play in hospital management?  
 
A. Party branch manages core spiritual theme of my hospital. 
B. Party branch cooperates with hospital’s management team. 
C. Party branch coordinates party members and non-members relationship.  
D. It doesn’t affect hospital’s management at all. 
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E. Others: _________________________________________ (please specify) 
            F. No comments. 
 
7.  Have you heard of “China Health Political Thought Promotion Association”? 
 
A. Yes, my hospital has joined or is planning to join in its local branch       
association. 
B. Yes, I heard of it, but my hospital doesn’t plan to be a member of it. 
C. Yes, but I am not sure what it is. 
D. No, I have never heard of it. 
             E. I am not sure. 
             F. No comments. 
 
Part 3.   Medical Ethics: Learning and Practice 
 
1. Were you taught medical ethics in medical school?  
 
A. Yes, I had systematic learning. 
B. Yes, I had limited learning. 
C. Yes, very informally.  
D.  No, almost none. 
            E.  I am not sure. 
            F.  No comments. 
 
2.   In your opinion, do you think medical ethics are important to your practice? 
 
A.  Yes, it is very important. 
B.  Yes, it is relatively important. 
C.  No, it is not. 
D.  I am not sure. 
E.  No comments. 
 
      If you answer “yes”, how important it is to your practice? 
 
A. It is a very important self-regulation to me and I’d rather not be a medic if 
I can’t apply it to my practice.  
B. It is important, but I sometimes I have to compromise it with practical 
reasons.  
            D.   I am not sure. 
C. No comments 
 
3.  What is your understanding of modern medical ethics? Please choose whatever 
is relevant to you, and then to put them into order according to their level of 
importance (start from the most important one).  
 
      A.  Improve the quality of patient care;  
      B.  No disclosure of patients’ medical record;  
            C.  Non-maleficence;  
      D.  Respect patients’ autonomy;  
      E.  Team work between colleagues;  
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      F.  Ethical aspects of biotechnological development;  
               G.  Combining Professionalism and Patriotism;  
      H.  Safeguard public health; 
I.   And others: _____________________________(please specify). 
 
4.   Do you find the modern medical ethics guideline understandable?  
 
     A.  Yes, I am very sure. 
     B.  Yes, most of the time.  
     C.  No, I got confused occasionally. 
     D.  No, I often get confused. 
     E.  No comments. 
 
5.   In the current situation, do you think it is easy for you to apply your 
understanding of medical ethics to your practice? 
 
      A. Yes, it is naturally easy. 
      B. Yes, relatively easy. 
      C. No, I have to make difficult decisions in some situations. 
      D. No comments.  
 
6.  Have you heard of “Chinese Medical Association”? 
 
A. Yes, my hospital has joined or is planning to join in its local branch 
association. 
B. Yes, I heard of it, but my hospital doesn’t plan to be a member of it. 
C. Yes, but I am not sure what it is. 
D. No, I have never heard of it. 
 
7.  Has the “Chinese Medical Association” made any impact on your work so far?   
 
A. Yes, a lot 
B. Yes, but limited 
            C.  No, almost none. 
            D.  I don’t know. 
            E.  No comments. 
 
  8.  Have you ever consulted international bioethics guidelines, particularly those 
relating to your field?  
 
     A. Yes, I have been keeping my eyes on international bioethical development. 
     B. Yes, but I only know a sketch of them. 
     C. No, I haven’t but I would love to learn in the future. 
     D. No, I don’t think it is necessary for me to learn. 
     E.  I have never heard of international bioethics guidelines. 
     F.  No comments. 
 
 
Part 4.  Essential Guiding Principle  
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1.  Could you please classify what is the most important practice guideline to you? 
Please choose whatever is relevant to you, and then to put them into order 
according to their level of importance (start from the most important one). 
 
A.   Practice guidelines of your belonging hospital;  
          B.   Medical law;  
          C.   Medical ethic or your moral consciousness;  
          D.   Party’ political thought;  
E.   And others: _____________________________(please specify) 
 
2.  Which area of you working life needs most improvement? Please choose 
whatever is relevant to you, and then to put them into order according to their 
level of importance (start from the most important one). 
 
A.  Medical law;  
B.  Medical Ethics;  
C.  Income;  
D.  Supervision of public opinion;  
E.  Health care system;  
F.  And others: _____________________________(please specify) 
 
3. What is the guidance that is most needed by you currently? 
 
A. Law 
B. Technical requirements of my hospital 
      C.  Higher awareness of political thought 
      D.  Clearer medical ethic guidance 
            E.  Other: _________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
 
4. Have you ever got a feeling of depression during or after your work? 
 
A. Yes, many times. 
B. Yes, a few times. 
C. No, never. 
D. No, I am quite happy with my work instead. 
E. No comments. 
 
    If you answer “yes”, why did you get depressed? Please choose whatever is or 
are relevant to you.  
 
     A.  Income is too low. 
     B.  Law conflicts with my medical ethics sometimes.  
     C.  Professional independence.  
     D.  Commercial interests conflict with my medical ethics sometimes.   
     E.  Doctors’ social reputation has destroyed. Our hard work hasn’t been 
understood by the public. 
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     F.  Guidelines and requirements are confusing. (      )    
     G. Others:   _________________________________ (      ) 
 
Part 5.   Demographic Information (Not for disclose of your identity, research 
purpose only) 
 
1. Sex:        Male             Female  
 
2. Age: ___ under 25;   ___26-35;   ___36-45;   ___ 46-55;   ___ 56-65;   ___over 65 
 
3. Your educational level:  
 ___High School and Below; ___ Secondary Technical School ;  ___ Junior 
College;  ___ Bachelor;  ___Master;   ___ Doctorial  
 
4. Your health professional title:  
___ Doctor; ___Assistant Doctor;  ___ Senior Nurse & Nurse; ___ Pharmacist;   
___  Laboratory Technician;  ___ Others 
 
5. Your technical title:   
      ___ Primary; ___ Intermediate; ___Associate Senior;  ___ Senior 
 
6. Type of your servicing health institution:  
      ___ General Hospital;  ___ Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital;     
___Specialized Hospital;   ___Health Center;   ___ Sanatorium;  
      ___Outpatient Department & Clinic; ____Country Clinic; ___Others 
 
7. Your servicing hospital by grade in 2008:  
___Third Level 1st Class; ___Third Level 2nd Class; ___Third Level 3rd Class; 
___Second Level 1st Class; ___Second Level 2nd Class;  
___Second Level 3rd Class; ___ First Level 1st Class; ___ First Level 2nd Class;  
___ First Level 3rd Class; ___ Others  
 
8. Your working department: 
___Internal Medicine; ____Surgery; ___ Obstetrics & Gynaecology;  
___ Paediatrics; ___Pain Clinic; ___Traditional Chinese Medicine;  
___ Acupuncture and Moxibustion; ___E.N.T.; ___ Ophthalmology;  
___ Assistant Diagnosis and Examination; ___Others 
 
9. Length of your professional serving time: ___ 
 
10. Province in which your hospital is base: ____ 
 
11. Are you willing to participate in a follow-up interview?  
□ Yes. My email or my phone number:                            □ No.  
 
 
~Thank you so very much for your participation~
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E. 为了避免执业的风险, 即使在法律上站得住脚，不代表在医学上正确无误。 
F. 国家的政治思想强调了依法治国。 
G. 如有其他（请您补充）: ______________________________  
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5.  您最为重视哪类法律? [不定项选择] 
 
       A. 您专业的守则及道德操守的规范。 
B. 规范医疗行为的基本总则。  
    C. 医疗过失与医疗事故的相关法规。  
    D. 关于管理基因/胚胎,或安乐死等关系生死类的法律。  
    E. 关于医学研究的法律规范。    
    F. 医疗产品及器械的使用规范。  
    G. 关于医疗法立法程序的规定。    
H. 如有其他(请您补充): ______________________________ 
 
6.   您最主要是通过何种途径学习法律? [单选] 
 
A. 在学校。  
B. 在医疗机构的实习中。  
C. 医疗机构的普法宣传活动。  
D. 听同事介绍。  
E. 从书本或大众媒体中自学。  
F. 如有其他: _________________________________________ (请您补充) 
 







K. 如有其他: _________________________________________ (请您补充) 
 
8.   您认为在制定卫生法的过程中，是否需要更多医务工作者的参与? [单选] 
 
A. 是的, 非常重要。 
B. 是的, 相对重要。 








C. 中华医学会应更积极捍卫医务工作者的权益。  
D. 虽然我的答案是肯定的，但我个人对于参与卫生法律的修订不感兴趣 
E. 如有其他: _________________________________________ (请您补充) 
 
9.   请问您是否听过“中国卫生法学会”? [单选] 
 
   A. 是的，我是会员或我正准备加入这个学会。 
    B. 是的，我听说过，但我不准备加入。 
    C. 是的，我听说过，但我不确定它是做什么的。 
    D. 不，我从未听说过。 
    E. 无可奉告。 
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二、  医疗体制的管理与医务工作者  
 











       C. 没有，并无受到任何影响。 
       D. 我不确定。 




















   如果您的回答是肯定的，理由为何？[单选] 
 
      A. 医疗服务是公共事业，与公众的利益密切相关。 
    B. 政府已多次强调医疗服务对于稳定社会的重要性。 
    C. 医患关系的和谐在某种程度上会影响社会稳定。 
D. 如有其他: _________________________________________ (请您补充) 
 
4.   请问您在您所在的医疗机构除了业务学习之外，是否有参加思想政治学习？[单选] 
 
        A. 有。 
        B. 没有。 
        C. 我不确定。 
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E. 如有其他: _________________________________________ (请您补充) 
 
5.   请问思想政治学习对您的医学工作影响大吗？[单选] 
 
A. 是的, 它非常重要。 
B. 是的, 它相对重要的。 










E. 如有其他: _________________________________________ (请您补充) 
        F. 无可奉告。 
 
7.   请问您听说过 “中国卫生工作政治思想促进会”吗? [单选] 
 
   A. 是的，我所在的医疗机构是会员或正准备加入这个协会。 
    B. 是的，我听过，但我不确定我所在的医疗机构是否准备加入。 
    C. 是的，我听过，但我不确定它是做什么的。 
    D. 不，我从未听过。 
    E. 我不确定。 
    F. 无可奉告。 
 
 
三、   医学伦理/医德规范的学习与实践 
 






        E. 我不确定。 
             F. 无可奉告。 
 
2.     医学伦理的学习对于您的医学实践影响大吗？[单选] 
 
A. 是的, 非常重要。 
B. 是的, 相对重要的。 
C. 不, 不重要。 
D. 我不确定。 
E. 无可奉告。 
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3.   什么是您理解中的医德规范？请您根据对您而言的重要性，选择相关数字选项，并按最重
要,次重要，依次类推的顺序排序。[不定项选择] 
 
    ① 自身医术的精进。 
    ② 保护病患的隐私。 
    ③ 不伤害的原则。 
    ④ 尊重病患的自主决定。 
    ⑤ 医务人员之间的相互配合协作。  
    ⑥ 生物科技发展衍生的伦理问题。 
    ⑦ 敬业精神与爱国主义相结合。 
    ⑧ 维护群众和社会的健康。 
⑨ 如有其他（请您补充）: _________________________________________  
 
4.   请问您认为您理解的医学伦理是否准确无误呢？[单选] 
 
    A. 是的，我一直非常确信。 
    B. 是的，一般情况下我能确信。 
    C. 不，有时会有些疑惑 
    D. 不，我常常疑惑。 
    E. 无可奉告。 
 
5.   在现今中国的医学实践与社会现况，请问您是否能轻易将理想中的医学伦理与工作 
实际相结合？[单选] 
 
    A. 是的，可以轻易将理论结合实际。 
    B. 是的，比较容易。 
    C. 我不确定，有时我需要做出困难的决定。 
    D. 无可奉告。 
 
6.   请问您听过“中华医学会”吗? [单选] 
 
   A. 是的，我是会员或我正准备加入这个学会。 
    B. 是的，我听过，但我不准备加入。 
    C. 是的，我听过，但我不确定它是做什么的。 
    D. 不，我从未听过。 
    E. 无可奉告。 
 





        C. 不，几乎没有。 
        D. 我不知道。 
        E. 无可奉告。 
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8.   请问您是否有参考过国际生命伦理指南，尤其是与您医学实践相关章程的内容？ [单选] 
 
    A. 是的，我一直关注其进展。 
    B. 是的，但我只有少许了解。 
    C. 没有，但我希望以后能有机会了解。 
    D. 没有，而且我不认为有了解它的必要。 
    E. 我从未听过国际生命伦理指南。 
    F. 无可奉告。 
 
 
四、   关键指南 
 
1.   请您区分对您工作影响最大的指南，请您根据对您而言的重要性，选择相关数字选项，
并按最重要,次重要，依次类推的顺序排序。  [不定项选择及排序] 
 
① 您所在医疗机构的内部规章。 
        ② 卫生法规。 
        ③ 医学生命伦理。 
        ④ 政治思想理念。 
⑤ 如有其他（请您补充）: _________________________________________  
 








⑥ 如有其他（请您补充）: _________________________________________  
 






E. 如有其他: _________________________________________ (请您补充) 
 
4.     您在工作中或工作后是否曾感到沮丧? [单选] 
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        如果您回答“有”，请问您为何沮丧?  [不定项选择] 
 
    ① 收入与社会地位。  
    ② 法律与生命伦理的冲突。 
    ③ 医务人员自主。  
    ④ 商业利益与生命伦理的冲突。 
    ⑤ 公众欠公平的舆论。 
    ⑥ 工作指南多而不明晰。  
⑦ 如有其他（请您补充）: _________________________________________  
 
 
五、  个人的基本信息 （*统计的需要，您的身份不会因此确定及公开*) 
 
1. 性别:   ①男    ②女   
 
2. 年龄:   ①25 岁以下  ②26-35 岁  ③36-45 岁   ④46-55 岁   ⑤56-65 岁   ⑥65 岁以上  
 
3. 您的最高学历:  ① 初中   ②高中   ③中专   ④大专   ⑤大学本科   ⑥研究生及以上 
 
4. 您的卫生技术职务类型：  ① 执业（助理）医师     ②注册护士      ③药剂人员          
④检验人员              ⑤其他卫生技术人员  
 
5. 您的专业技术职称：  ①初级    ②中级    ③副高级    ④正高级 
 
6. 您所在医院类型：  ①西医医院   ②中医医院     ③民营医院   ④社区医院    
 ⑤门诊部     ⑥乡村卫生室   ⑦其他 
 
7. 您所在医院的等级：  ①三级甲     ②三级乙     ③二级甲    








   □ 愿意,我的电子邮箱或电话号码是:____________________________  






~ 非常感谢您的参与 ~ 
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Guide Sheet for Semi-Structured Interview 
 
 
The interviews were carried out attempting to grasp medics’ opinions, feelings, 
attitudes and the meanings that are implicit in their actions from their own viewpoints. 
Technically, the qualitative research interviews were semi-structured and carried 
through following the same themes but not exactly the same questions to be asked to 
different individuals. Following questions were asked of each interviewee during the 
one-to-one interview. The questions were designed to be open-ended. Various follow-
up questions were asked depending on the interviewee’s answers.  
 
Interviews lasted averagely around 40 minutes, within which three interviews lasted 
for an hour or two.  
 
1. Can you give me your opinion on your current practice environment? 
 
2. Do you think law is relevant to your profession? How do you understand or 
apply it in your daily practice? 
 
3. Do you think political thought education is relevant to your profession? How 
do you understand or apply it in your daily practice? 
 
4. Do you think medical ethics is relevant to your profession? How do you 
understand or apply it in your daily practice? 
 
5. How do you prioritise ethics/law/political ideologies in your practice? Why? 
 
6. Have you experienced any dilemma with political ideology or law conflicting 
with your understanding of medical ethics? Could you give me an example? If 
you haven’t, have you heard from a colleague who has? How did you or your 
colleagues resolve those dilemmas? 
 
 
7. Have you heard about the controversial “husband refused to sign then medics 
refused to treat in their capacity” in Beijing last year (2008)? If similar 
situation arose in your practice, what would you do? 
 
8. In current situation, how do you feel about being a medic in China? Why? 
 
9. Have you experienced any difficult time? How did you handle it? 
 
10. Do you expect changes to happen in the future? What are your expectations? 
 
11. How do you think about my fieldwork in general? Could you give me any 
comments? Would you mind if I contact you again in the future to verify some 
answers?  
 
 
 
